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The Kyoto School and Confucianism: 
A Confucian Reading of the Philosophy of History and Political 
Thought of Masaaki Kōsaka 
 
Introduction 
In this dissertation I examine the philosophy of the Japanese 
thinker Masaaki Kōsaka (1900-1969) from the East Asian perspective 
of Confucianism, which I believe is the most appropriate interpretative 
framework for comprehending his political thought. Kōsaka was a 
prominent member of second generation of the Kyoto School in the 
1930s and 40s, a group of thinkers associated with the philosophies of 
Kitarō Nishida and Hajime Tanabe. Although ‘the ultimate arche and 
telos’ of the Kyoto School has been described as ‘the philosophy of 
religion’, Kōsaka was primarily concerned with history and politics, 
and he is now best known for his participation in the Chūō Kōron 
symposia.1 This was a series of three meetings held in 1941 and 1942 
by four members of the second generation of the Kyoto School, 
including Keiji Nishitani, Iwao Kōyama and Shigetaka Suzuki. During 
these talks, the participants discussed in detail the historical 
significance of the international crisis Japan was confronting at the 
time, culminating in the outbreak of the Pacific War shortly after the 
first gathering took place. This included the problems of Western 
colonialism in East Asia, the roles and responsibilities of Japan as the 
leading nation of the region, and the feasibility of the country’s 
proposal for the establishment of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
                                                   
1 Bret W. Davis, ‘The Kyoto School’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Winter 2014 Edition), accessed March 9, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/kyoto-school/. 
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Sphere. David Williams describes the resulting publication as having 
represented the ‘popular manifesto’ of the wartime Kyoto School.2 
 Kōsaka has been largely neglected in the post-war period as a 
consequence of the ‘religious-philosophical paradigm’ that has 
dominated Western scholarship on the Kyoto School.3 At the time of 
the symposia, however, he was perhaps the most famous of the four 
participants due to the success of his 1937 bestseller The Historical 
World. This book was well received by the other members of the Kyoto 
School who participated in the meetings. Kōyama, for example, 
describes the work as a ‘revolutionary publication’i that ‘laid the 
foundation stone’ for future research on the philosophy of history.4/ii It 
is not surprising, therefore, that many of Kōsaka’s ideas on the 
‘historical world’ figured prominently during the Chūō Kōron 
discussions.5 Furthermore, his personal development of the 
‘Metaphysics of War’ in the early 1940s ensured that among the 
participants he had the ‘most sophisticated understanding of war as an 
idea’. Kōsaka was also the oldest member of the Kyoto School in 
attendance, which is significant insofar as differences in age and social 
status require ‘sensitive navigation in Confucian East Asia’. This is 
discernible from the respectful language each of the symposiasts used 
in accordance with their relative social standing to the other 
participants.6 In a typical show of Confucian reverence for one’s seniors, 
Kōsaka was subsequently given responsibility for opening each of the 
                                                   
2 David Williams, The Philosophy of Japanese Wartime Resistance: A reading, with 
commentary, of the complete texts of the Kyoto School discussions of ‘The Standpoint of World 
History and Japan’ (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 19. 
3 David Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War: The Kyoto School philosophers and post-
White power, (London & New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 96; Kenn Nakata Steffensen, ‘The 
political philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi: A close reading of the philosophical foundations of 
cooperative communitarianism’, (PhD Thesis, University College Cork, 2014), 6; 9; 18-25. 
4 Iwao Kōyama, ‘Kōsaka Masaaki: ‘Rekishi-teki sekai’ wo yomu [Reading Masaaki Kōsaka’s 
Historical World]’, Shisō [Thought], February issue (1938), 232 & 241. 
5 Tetsufumi Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki: Kyoto gakuha to rekishi tetsugaku [Kōsaka 
Masaaki: The Kyoto School and the Philosophy of History] (Kyoto: Tōeisha, 2008). 
6 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xliii & 30. 
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meetings, as well as for leading ‘the overall development of the 
symposia’ and ‘posing questions at key moments’ thereafter.7  
Through an in-depth analysis of Kōsaka’s individual writings I 
hope to demonstrate the extent of his contribution to the theoretical 
background of the Chūō Kōron discussions. This is something that 
remains largely unknown to the modern reader of the symposia texts 
due to the relative obscurity of his works in the post-war era. In turn, I 
believe this will help advance a greater understanding of the collective 
arguments that were forwarded by the four symposiasts, including the 
philosophical reasoning behind their support for the war and the 
establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Although it is unwise to 
generalise about a movement as diverse as the Kyoto School from the 
writings of a single philosopher, the three symposia are a good example 
of the East Asian regard for a form of intellectual interaction that has 
often been neglected in the West: ‘group-think’. As Williams explains in 
the extended commentary to his English rendering of the Chūō Kōron 
discussions, these meetings ‘do not represent a clash of egoists 
jockeying for advantage or superiority’. Rather, they were held as 
‘gatherings of like-minded thinkers attempting to flesh out a collective 
position’ on the most pressing political matters of the day.8 
 The principle goal of this dissertation is to present an impartial 
account of Kōsaka’s long neglected philosophy of history. I believe this 
is best achieved through a contextualised reading of his political 
speculations and wartime activities. Consequently, I conduct a textual 
exegesis of his works based on the empirical methods and techniques of 
academic history and Orientalism. This approach prioritises the use of 
primary sources whenever possible – a standard of empirical research 
that has not always been followed by some Western commentators on 
                                                   
7 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me: chichi – Kōsaka Masaaki/ani – 
Kōsaka Masataka [The Eyes that Gazed at the Fate of the Showa Period: My Father – Kōsaka 
Masaaki/My Elder Brother – Kōsaka Masataka] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 2000), 132. 
8 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 30. 
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the Kyoto School. However, the epistemological standpoint of 
empiricism does not simply require the use of original documentation; 
it also demands a commitment to ensure that the conclusions reached 
accurately reflect the known facts about the research target. Since this 
dissertation analyses the political thought of a Japanese philosopher 
from the 1930s and 40s, I take into consideration the historical, 
cultural and political contexts within which he lived, worked and 
philosophised. For the duration of this study I am therefore obliged to 
‘bracket’ any preconceptions I may hold about the period in question, 
whether in regard to the nature of the political world or the immorality 
of Japan’s conduct during the war, so as not to distort my 
interpretation of Kōsaka’s actual ideas.9 This is because the empirical 
researcher must be willing to engage sincerely with the values and 
beliefs of a thinker who lived and breathed in a very different time and 
culture.  
 This approach is diametrically opposed to the methodology 
employed by James Heisig in relation to philosophical translations. 
This is due to the emphasis he places on the contemporary context of a 
translated work over the historical and cultural nuances of the original 
text.10 The problems that can arise from adopting such an approach are, 
I think, exemplified by Herbert A. Giles’s distortion of the Daoist 
philosophy of the Zhuangzi as a consequence of the Western 
philosophical concerns of consciousness, remembrance and doubt that 
he overly reads into certain sections of the text. While Hans-Georg 
Moeller acknowledges the stylistic beauty of Giles’s prose, a dimension 
of translation that Heisig suggests should take precedence over textual 
fidelity, in the end none of these problems can be found in either the 
                                                   
9 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 50-55; 41 & 142. 
10 James Heisig, ‘Desacralizing Philosophical Translation in Japan’, Nanzan Bulletin 27 (2003): 
46-62; James Heisig, ‘East Asian Philosophy and the Case against Perfect Translations’, 
Comparative and Continental Philosophy 2.1 (2010): 81-90. 
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original text or in the traditional Chinese interpretations of the work.11 
Heisig argues that we should welcome the fact that an English version 
of a non-Western philosophical text may reveal things that were ‘only 
dimly there, if they were indeed there at all, in the original’.12 However, 
the notion of inserting ideas that are not found in the original work is 
questionable because the translator subsequently attributes something 
to the author that he or she did not actually say. This is part of the 
reason why Williams and Graham Parkes both strongly criticise the 
continued translation of the Japanese expression minzoku as race, folk 
or Volk by many Western commentators on the Kyoto School, thereby 
implicitly associating the movement with the crimes of the Nazis, 
instead of the more appropriate renderings of ethnic group, people or 
nation.13 This is supported by the careful distinction that Kōsaka 
draws between the terms minzoku (peoples) and jinshu (race) in order 
to distance himself from the racist ideology of National Socialism.14 I 
believe such translation practices have become prevalent within 
                                                   
11 Herbert Giles’s translation: ‘Once upon a time, I, Zhuangzi, dreamt I was a butterfly, 
fluttering hither and thither, to all intents and purposes a butterfly. I was conscious only of 
following my fancies as a butterfly, and was unconscious of my individuality as a man. 
Suddenly, I awaked, and there I lay, myself again. Now I do not know whether I was then a 
man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, dreaming I am a man. 
Between a man and a butterfly there is necessarily a barrier. The transition is called 
Metempsychosis’. Hans-Georg Moeller’s alternative translation: ‘Once Zhuang Zhou dreamt-
and then he was a butterfly, a fluttering butterfly, self-content and in accord with its 
intentions. The butterfly did not know about Zhou. Suddenly it awoke-and then it was fully 
and completely Zhou. One does not know whether there is a Zhou becoming a butterfly in a 
dream or whether there is a butterfly becoming a Zhou in a dream. There is a Zhou and there 
is a butterfly, so there is necessarily a distinction between them. This is called: the changing of 
things’ – Hans-Georg Moeller, Daoism Explained: From the Dream of the Butterfly to the 
Fishnet Allegory (Chicago &La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2004), 44; See also Zhuangzi 2:49 in 
Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries, trans. by 
Brook Ziporyn (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2009).  
12 Heisig, ‘East Asian Philosophy’, 87. 
13 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 99-101; Graham Parkes,“Heidegger and Japanese 
Fascism: An Unsubstantiated Connection,” Japanese and Continental Philosophy: 
Conversations with the Kyoto School, edited by Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder and Jason M. 
Wirth (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011): 347-372; See also 
James Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 123; 314-315. 
14 Masaaki Kōsaka, Minzoku no Tetsugaku [The Philosophy of the Nation] (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1942), 5-13; Kiyoshi Miki and Masaaki Kōsaka, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku: taidan [The 
Philosophy of the Nation: Dialogue]’, Bungei [Literature] Volume 9 Issue 12, December, (1941): 
15. 
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scholarship on the Kyoto School because of the emphasis that is placed 
exclusively upon contemporary liberal interpretations of the Pacific 
War over contextualised readings that fully acknowledge the various 
historical and cultural nuances of the group’s political arguments.  
 My research is indebted to the work of Williams on the Chūō 
Kōron symposia and I adopt a number of his research propositions, 
including his general schema of interpretation for the middle phase of 
the Kyoto School from 1928 to 1945. This maintains that the major 
philosophical influences on the four symposiasts were Hegelianism, 
Tanabe’s Logic of the Species, and the East Asian tradition of 
Confucianism.15 The significance of G.W.F. Hegel’s dialectic of self-
consciousness for the methods and techniques employed by Nishida 
and Tanabe has been examined in detail by Peter Suares.16 Although 
Kōsaka expressed a preference for the philosophy of Kant over Hegel, a 
similar influence is discernible in his thought due to his appropriation 
of numerous ideas and concepts from his mentors. That being said, in 
terms of the practical implications of Kōsaka’s conception of historical 
praxis, a key aspect of his political speculations, it is arguably Hegel’s 
deliberations on world-historical peoples and objective spirit that were 
of greater importance. Kōsaka himself states that few thinkers have 
exhibited the ‘deep historical insight’ of Hegel.iii He also describes the 
concept of objective spirit as the German thinker’s most important 
philosophical innovation.17 
 The influence of Tanabe on the second generation of the Kyoto 
School has been questioned by a number of prominent scholars. Heisig, 
for example, insists that Tanabe was considered ‘something of an 
outsider by the circle close to Nishida’ and that his influence upon the 
                                                   
15 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 19. 
16 Peter Suares, The Kyoto School’s Takeover of Hegel: Nishida, Nishitani and Tanabe Remake 
the Philosophy of Spirit (New York & Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2011). 
17 Masaaki Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai – genshōgaku shiron [The Historical World – A 
Phenomenological Essay] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1937), 30 & 248. 
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Chūō Kōron symposia was ‘virtually nil’.18 However, this portrayal does 
not fully take into account the political activities of the movement 
during the war as documented in The Ōshima Memos. This is a 
collection of transcripts taken from eighteen secret meetings held 
between members of the Kyoto School, including the four participants 
of the Chūō Kōron symposia, and the Yonai Peace Faction of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy. According to Ryōsuke Ōhashi these meetings 
were held in order to oppose the policies of Hideki Tōjō. Significantly, 
the transcripts include a lecture by Tanabe on the logic of co-prosperity 
spheres. Three of the participants in the Chūō Kōron discussions were 
in attendance at this meeting, including Kōsaka, and there are notable 
similarities between the contents of this lecture and comments later 
made by Kōyama during the third symposium.19 This implies that ‘the 
contributors to The Standpoint of World History and Japan and The 
Ōshima Memos worked and thought in tandem’.20 Kōsaka himself 
describes the concept of the ‘species’ as ‘one of the great 
accomplishments of Tanabe’s philosophy’.iv He even suggests that his 
own speculations were in part an attempt to grapple with the problems 
that it presents.21 This is clearly discernible from his careful analysis of 
the ethnic nation and his general deliberations on the historical 
substratum of being within the historical world. 
 Finally, in order to fully comprehend Kōsaka’s political 
philosophy in its proper cultural context one must acknowledge the fact 
that Japan has over a thousand year history of Confucianism. In turn, 
                                                   
18 James Heisig, ‘Reviews: Defending Japan’s Pacific War: The Kyoto School Philosophers and 
Post-White Japan,’ Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 32 (2005): 165; Harry Harootunian, 
‘Returning to Japan: part two’, Japan Forum 18/2 (2006), 278-279. 
19 Ryōsuke Ōhashi, Kyoto-gakuha to Nippon kaigun: shin-shiryō ‘Ōshima memos’ wo megutte 
[The Kyoto School and the Japanese Navy: On the New Materials The ‘Ōshima Memos’] 
(Tokyo: PHP, 2001); Hajime Tanabe, ‘On the Logic of Co-Prosperity Spheres – Towards a 
Philosophy of Regional Blocs’, trans. by David Williams, in Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 188-
199.  
20 Williams, ‘Footnote 230’, in Japanese Wartime Resistance, 363. 
21 Masaaki Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku [Nishida Philosophy and Tanabe 
Philosophy] (Nagoya: Reimei Shobō, 1949), 126; 2. 
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this has greatly affected the nation’s indigenous political traditions.22 
It is therefore imperative for the empirical researcher to ‘elaborate 
convincing East Asian schemas of interpretation to organize his data’ 
because the Kyoto School thinker was not simply a scholar of Western 
philosophy, but a politically active member of a Confucian-based 
society. In order to do this, I take up Williams’s interpretative 
framework of Confucian Revolution. This he developed as a testable 
thesis of modern political science that is capable of explaining the 
processes of regime change observable throughout East Asian history 
from a Confucian perspective.23 However, while I broadly accept 
Williams’s arguments on the general cultural importance of 
Confucianism for understanding East Asian patterns of political 
behaviour, I also examine the possibility of more direct intellectual 
influences upon the Kyoto School as well. This includes an analysis of 
the Confucian-inspired relational ontology that I identify at the heart 
of the Kyoto School’s political philosophy, and the similarities between 
many of Kōsaka’s ideas and those expressed in the Confucian canon.  
 It is important to note that for the duration of this dissertation I 
adopt a standpoint of amorality that is based on the notion of the 
‘moral fool’ forwarded by Moeller.24 The reader of the wartime Kyoto 
School is confronted not only by the moral arguments of contemporary 
liberal portrayals of the Pacific War, but the ‘moral cosmos’ of Japan’s 
Confucian heritage as well.25 The moral fool professes ignorance in all 
ethical matters, however, because he or she is unable to comprehend 
the grounds upon which an ‘absolute distinction between good and evil’ 
can be established. The inherent goodness of morality normally goes 
unquestioned. Nevertheless, it is a ‘circular argument to say that to 
                                                   
22 Christopher Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-
Prosperity (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2005). 
23 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 37. 
24 Hans-Georg Moeller, The Moral Fool: A Case for Amorality (Chichester & New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009). 
25 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxix.  
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distinguish between good and evil is good rather than evil’. There are 
many different moral systems and contrary ways of distinguishing 
between what is right and wrong, all of which are historically, 
culturally and socially contingent. This inevitably raises questions on 
how it is possible to determine which particular system is the morally 
correct one. This would appear to promote a standpoint of ethical 
relativism because ‘anything and everything’ seems acceptable if we 
deny the existence of absolute moral principles. However, the moral 
fool is sceptical of all moral positions, ‘including relativistic ones’. This 
is because he or she is more concerned with the actual consequences of 
drawing moral distinctions in the social world as opposed to validating 
the metaphysical reasoning for making them.26 For the empirical 
scholar confronted by the conflicting values of different periods and 
cultures, a similar attitude of moral ignorance is beneficial because the 
purpose of a historically-framed investigation is not to pass judgment 
on the past, but to understand what actually happened. This includes a 
willingness to comprehend viewpoints that may contradict what is 
deemed morally acceptable in a contemporary context. 
 That being said, the very suggestion of an impartial analysis of 
the Kyoto School’s political philosophy remains a controversial 
proposition. While I agree with Williams that the symposiasts proposed 
a ‘humane version’ of the Co-Prosperity Sphere based on Confucian 
ideals, it is difficult to reconcile their support for the Pacific War with 
what is now known about the brutality of the Japanese military.27 This 
is something, it should be noted, that Kōsaka may not have been fully 
                                                   
26 Moeller, The Moral Fool, 1-15. 
27 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xviii; Collin Rusneac, ‘The Philosophy of Japanese 
Wartime Resistance: A Reading, with Commentary, of the Complete Texts of the Kyoto School 
Discussions of 'The Standpoint of World History and Japan' by David Williams’, last modified 
September 27, 2014, http://sunsburial.blogspot.jp/2014/09/the-philosophy-of-japanese-
wartime.html 
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aware of until after the war according to Ryōen Minamoto.28 Yet many 
liberal historians continue to dismiss the Kyoto School’s political 
thought as something morally flawed that should not be taken 
‘seriously as philosophy’.29 As a result, the three Chūō Kōron symposia 
have become synonymous with the apparent failings of Japanese 
academia during the war, while Kōsaka himself has been personally 
singled out as a fascist ideologue.30 As a self-professed moral fool, 
however, I reject such ethically charged interpretations of the wartime 
Kyoto School because of the sweeping generalisations that result, often 
in the face of the textual evidence. For instance, although the Chūō 
Kōron participants supported the war as an idea, ‘their treatment of 
Tojo’s policies in the Pacific and China is almost always sceptical if not 
hostile’.31 Moral portrayals of history present an ‘abridgement’ of the 
historical record based entirely upon the subjectively held principles of 
the historian.32 As a consequence, moral assumptions are prioritised at 
the expense of empirical facts. The corrupting influence that such 
ideological perspectives have had on research standards within Kyoto 
School scholarship has been demonstrated in a number of papers by 
Parkes.33 I present a detailed examination of the underlying premises 
of historical research and the problems that arise from employing 
moral principles brought a priori to the historical record in the 
Appendix.  
Nevertheless, most Western research on the wartime Kyoto 
School continues to present modern-day liberalism as the only valid 
                                                   
28 Ryōen Minamoto, ‘Kōsaka Masaaki sensei no koto [Remembering Professor Masaaki 
Kōsaka]’, Kokoro [Heart] vol. 23 issue 2 (1979): 81. 
29 Elena Lange, ‘Reviews: GOTO-JONES, Christopher (Hg.): Re-politicising the Kyoto School as 
Philosophy’, Asiatische Studien Études Asiatiques LXIII 3 (2009): 749. 
30 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan; Harootunian, ‘Returning to Japan: part two’, 278. 
31 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 72. 
32 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London & New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 1965). 
33 Graham Parkes, ‘The Putative Fascism of the Kyoto School and the Political Correctness of 
the Modern Academy’, Philosophy East and West 47/3 (1997): 305–336; Parkes, ‘Heidegger and 
Japanese Fascism: An Unsubstantiated Connection’, 347-372. 
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perspective from which to assess the group’s political thought. However, 
the Kyoto School philosophers were not liberal thinkers and they 
questioned many of this ideology’s ontological assumptions. For this 
reason, I believe it is necessary to resituate Kōsaka’s ideas within a 
more suitable political framework if we are to fully appreciate the 
significance of his arguments and the sincerity of his attempt to put 
the Japanese war effort on a more rational and moral footing.34/v For 
this, I draw upon the East Asian tradition of Confucianism. One 
problem, however, is that Elena Lange, Naoki Sakai and Yōko Arisaka 
have all strongly criticised any interpretation that over-emphasises the 
Oriental nature of the Kyoto School based on Edward Said’s famous 
critique of the discipline.35 I therefore reassess the validity of a 
contextualised reading of modern Japanese political philosophy in 
Chapter 1. I begin by reviewing the objections that have been made 
against Orientalism, most notably the accusation that by exaggerating 
cultural differences the Kyoto School philosophers are shielded from 
justified political censure. I then proceed to expose the liberal biases 
that are identifiable in many of these arguments, which is significant 
as liberal ideology is itself culturally determined. Finally, drawing 
upon the research of Roger Ames, I argue that it is necessary to make 
responsible cultural generalisations if we are to prevent our own 
culturally defined assumptions from overwhelming the empirical 
record of Japan as an East Asian society.36 
 In Chapter 2 I carry out a review of the evidence supporting the 
claim that Kōsaka’s political philosophy was influenced by 
Confucianism. Perhaps the biggest obstacle facing this task is the fact 
that Kōsaka and his associates rarely cite East Asian sources. This 
                                                   
34 Masaaki Kōsaka, ‘Aru tetsugakusha no hansei [The Reflections of a Philosopher]’, Kuru-beki 
jidai no tameni [For the Sake of the Coming Age] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1952), 18-19; Minamoto, 
‘Kōsaka Masaaki sensei no koto’, 81. 
35 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London & New York: Penguin Books, 2003). 
36 Roger Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, (Hong Kong & Honolulu: Chinese 
University Press, 2011). 
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would appear to substantiate Heisig’s suggestion that although the 
Kyoto School philosophers were ‘eastern’ in their personal outlook, 
their speculations were in no way representative of ‘eastern 
philosophy’.37 Nonetheless, it cannot be ignored that the group 
philosophised within the cultural milieu of a society greatly influenced 
by the Confucian tradition. Moreover, focusing exclusively on the Kyoto 
School’s engagement with Western thought neglects the familiarity of 
its members with the classics of the Chinese and Japanese intellectual 
traditions. Kōsaka too was educated in the Confucian classics, and on 
numerous occasions he demonstrates his familiarity with the central 
teachings of the tradition. This is perhaps best exemplified in his short 
essay ‘The Hermeneutic Structure of Roads’. 
 In Chapters 3 and 4 I examine the broad intellectual and 
cultural influences of Confucianism upon the Kyoto School as an East 
Asian philosophical movement. As I believe this constitutes the 
overarching context within which Kōsaka developed his ideas, I 
present these chapters before my examination of his philosophy of 
history. In Chapter 3 I begin by analysing the importance of 
Confucianism upon the core ontological assumptions of the Kyoto 
School’s philosophy in a political context, including the emphasis on 
relations over substances and change over permanence. In particular, I 
examine the strong resemblances between Nishida’s concept of pure 
experience and the central teachings of the Great Learning, as 
highlighted by Michel Dalissier.38 I also refer to a short paper on 
Confucian metaphysics written by Tanabe, what I believe to be one of 
the first references to this work in English.39 It is worth pointing out 
that Makoto Ozaki believes that Tanabe’s conception of praxis was 
                                                   
37 Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness, 8-9. 
38 Michel Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’, Frontier of Japanese Philosophy 
4: Facing the 21st Century, eds. Wing-keung Wam and Ching-yuen Cheung (Nagoya: Nanzan, 
2009): 211-250. 
39 Hajime Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nitsuite [On Confucian Ontology]’, Tanabe Hajime 
Zenshū, Vol. 4. (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1963), 287-301. 
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probably influenced by the Confucian imperative for truth to ‘be 
empirically proved and revealed in action’, especially taking into 
account the extent of his father’s familiarity with the Chinese 
classics.40    
 In Chapter 4 I examine the thesis of Confucian Revolution based 
on the supporting evidence of the Confucian canon. Aspects of 
Williams’s argument are contestable, such as the importance he 
assigns to the use of force in determining the victors of Confucian 
power struggles despite the traditional Confucian condemnation of war 
and violence. This is a consequence of his focus on political realism over 
political idealism. Another issue is his tendency to discuss Confucian 
ideas in relation to a Western conception of truth, which he conceives 
in a manner comparable with Ozaki, despite the fact that this term 
was not actually used by Confucian thinkers.41 This relates to the fact 
that he developed the interpretative schema of Confucian Revolution in 
contradistinction with the ‘Kantian liberal–cosmopolitan orthodoxy’ of 
American global hegemony based on his engagement with the works of 
Carl Schmitt and Benno Teschke.42 Williams therefore compares the 
purported universalism of liberal democratic values with the 
historically and culturally contingent conception of political truth that 
results from adopting Confucian ideals in a contemporary political 
context, as was arguably the case in the philosophy of the Kyoto 
School.43 However, a comparison of Williams’s thesis with the Analects, 
the Mencius and the Xunzi brings to the fore the probable Confucian 
                                                   
40 Makoto Ozaki, Introduction to the Philosophy of Tanabe: According to the English 
Translation of the Seventh Chapter of the Demonstratio of Christianity, (Amsterdam: 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990), 1. 
41 Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., ‘Introduction’, The Analects of Confucius: A 
Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books,1998), 5 & 33. 
42 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxvi & 24; Carl Schmitt, ‘The Turn to the 
Discriminating Concept of War’, in Writings on War, trans. by Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2011): 3-74; Benno Gerhard Teschke, ‘Decisions and Indecisions: Political and 
Intellectual Receptions of Carl Schmitt’, New Left Review 67 (Jan-Feb 2011): 61-95; Benno 
Gerhard Teschke, ‘Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt’ s international political and 
legal theory’, International Theory 3:2 (2011): 179–227. 
43 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxvi & 28. 
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underpinnings of regime change in East Asia and its associated 
patterns of political behaviour. I then adopt this thesis for reassessing 
the wartime activities of Kōsaka from an East Asian perspective. I 
believe this is better able to reconcile his support for the war and his 
condemnation of the imperialistic practices of the Japanese military 
than the alternative portrayal of Japanese intellectuals that is 
presented by Christopher Goto-Jones.44  
In Chapters 5 to 8 I undertake an in-depth analysis of Kōsaka’s 
philosophy of history, the first extended examination of his ideas in 
English. There are a number of reasons why I have chosen to focus on 
Kōsaka in particular. Firstly, I believe he was far more influential than 
the neglect of his works in the post-war era would suggest. For 
instance, although Kōsaka was no doubt influenced by Nishida’s logic 
of place, he may have been the first member of the Kyoto School to 
discuss the notion of a ‘world of worlds’ (sekai no sekai). At the very 
least he had considered a similar concept as early as 1937, several 
years before Nishida’s more famous expositions (1941 & 1943/sekai-
teki-sekai).45 In a personal correspondence to Kōsaka at the time, 
Nishida himself wrote that there was much to learn from his student’s 
discussion on the state, war and national sovereignty, continuing that 
these were all problems he too would like to consider at a later date.46 
Secondly, an examination of Kōsaka’s actual activities raises a number 
of questions about the liberal presentation of the wartime Kyoto School. 
For example, although the Chūō Kōron participants are often 
dismissed as fascist or ultranationalist ideologues, Kōsaka was on good 
terms with the Marxist philosopher Jun Tosaka and he intentionally 
mentioned his friend’s name in one of his works at a time when it was 
                                                   
44 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan. 
45 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 6; 56; 329 (Footnote 149) 
46 Kitarō Nishida, ‘Shokan-shu [Correspondences]’, Nishida Kitarō zenshū dai jūhachi kan [The 
Complete Works of Kitarō Nishida Volume 18] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 608-609. 
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becoming less politically acceptable.47 Thirdly, the philosophy of 
history clearly demonstrates the influence of Tanabe upon a member of 
the second generation of the Kyoto School. Kōsaka’s appropriation of 
the concept of the species and the dialectic of absolute mediation 
permits no other conclusion. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
Kōsaka’s deliberations represent a highly original attempt to reconcile 
the systematic nature of philosophy with the relativistic teachings of 
professional historians. Considering a recent publication by the 
philosophers Ken Nishi, Seiji Takeda and the historian Kazuto Hongō 
on the possibility of a dialogue between the two disciplines, there is 
arguably still much to learn from Kōsaka’s earlier reflections on the 
issues this presents.48 
My analysis concentrates primarily upon Kōsaka’s ideas 
regarding the overall structure and characteristics of his conception of 
the ‘historical world’, something that I think contributed significantly 
to the theoretical background of the Chūō Kōron discussions. As a 
result, I have been forced to make a number of omissions from this 
study, most importantly in relation to the ‘Metaphysics of War’. 
Nevertheless, in too many cases ‘piecemeal translations and … out-of-
context quotations’ have conspired against an accurate presentation of 
the political philosophy of the wartime Kyoto School.49 For instance, 
Kevin Doak argues that Kōsaka’s description of historical peoples as 
representing the ‘unfolding of God’s thought’ in historical reality 
apotheosized the ethnic nation within his philosophy.50 While Kōsaka’s 
proposition is no doubt problematic, it is difficult to fully comprehend 
                                                   
47 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 63-68; Masaaki Kōsaka, Kanto 
kaishaku no mondai [The Problems of Interpreting Kant] (Tokyo: Kōbundō Shobō, 1939), 3. 
48 Ken Nishi, et al., Rekishi to tetsugaku no taiwa [A Dialogue between History and 
Philosophy] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2013).  
49 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxiv. 
50 Kevin Doak, ‘Romanticism, conservatism and the Kyoto School of philosophy’, in Re-
Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy, ed. Christopher Goto-Jones (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 152; Masaaki Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku [The Philosophy of the Nation] 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1942), 204. 
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his intentions without some prior knowledge of his discussions on 
historical praxis as the mediation of the substantial (being) and the 
subjective (nothingness), his dependence on Nishida’s concept of the 
‘eternal now’, and his ideas on metaphysical symbolism. What is more, 
although comparisons may also be made with the ideas of Kant, Hegel 
and Leopold von Ranke, I suspect that Kōsaka was intentionally 
rephrasing Augustine’s description of history as the revelation of God’s 
will. This is because he identified Augustine as the ‘father of the 
philosophy of history’.vi In this sense, Kōsaka conceived his work as a 
modern response to Augustine’s ideas as the founder of the discipline.51 
In order to properly comprehend Kōsaka’s wartime speculations, 
therefore, I believe it is essential to have a sound understanding of the 
worldview upon which he based his arguments. It is for this reason 
that I focus predominantly upon his general conception of social reality 
as opposed to his specific references to the Pacific War or the Co-
Prosperity Sphere.  
In Chapter 5 I present the underlying assumptions of Kōsaka’s 
speculations on history. In particular, I look at the influence of Kant 
and Nishida upon his conception of historical subjectivity, that is the 
collective ability of a people or nation for creative action in the world, 
and the importance of Tanabe and Hegel for understanding the 
mediation that results between the material (substance/being) and 
spiritual (subject/nothingness) dimensions of historical reality. I then 
go on to examine Kōsaka’s epistemology in Chapter 6, including his 
conception of historical essence, the relationship between the ideal and 
the real and the significance of proper nouns for historical knowledge. I 
also address his theory of cultural types and models, a key aspect of his 
                                                   
51 Masaaki Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu [Introduction to the Philosophy of History] 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1943), 41-46; Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 106; Hegel, for example, 
said: ‘The march of God in the world, that is what the state is’ – G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, trans. by T.M. Knox (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 
279 & 283. 
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conception historical universalism and praxis. In Chapter 7 I examine 
in greater detail Kōsaka’s conception of the historical world as a 
‘nothingness-like universal’vii based on the idea of ‘absolute 
nothingness’ and the implications this has for the various peoples, 
nations and states that inhabit it.viii I then go on to analyse his 
conception of the historical substratum of being or historical nature. 
This serves as both the material for and location of historical praxis 
within the world, reinforcing the importance that is attributed to the 
species as represented by the ethnic nation within his philosophy. In 
Chapter 8 I concentrate on the emergence of historical subjectivity 
within the world in the form of the political state. For this, I consider 
the importance of Tanabe’s logic of the species domestically and 
Nishida’s logic of discontinuous-continuity internationally, including 
the historical importance of the phenomenon of war for early state 
formation. My analysis is indebted to the prior research of Tetsufumi 
Hanazawa who published the first book dedicated to Kōsaka’s 
philosophy in 2008.52 
The principle aim of this study is to present Kōsaka’s thought as 
accurately as possible based on what he actually said, something I 
address by including the original Japanese for all translations in the 
corresponding endnotes. I also situate my analysis specifically within 
the context of Kōsaka’s engagement with Western philosophy, no doubt 
the central focus of the Kyoto School as has so often been argued. The 
fact that Kōsaka rarely cites East Asian sources cannot be ignored, 
especially considering my commitment to the epistemological 
standpoint of empiricism. Nonetheless, I do not believe that cultural 
differences can simply be neglected. After all, the ontological 
foundations of the Kyoto School’s philosophy would seem to have been 
grounded firmly within the intellectual traditions of East Asia, while 
                                                   
52 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki. 
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Confucianism as a mode of political action presents a convincing 
account of Kōsaka’s wartime activities. For this reason, I also conduct a 
comparison of Kōsaka’s ideas with those expressed in the Confucian 
canon in the final chapter. This exercise is speculative in nature, since 
I am presuming an intellectual link that Kōsaka at best only ever hints 
at. This is why I have chosen to present this chapter separately from 
my earlier examination of his philosophy. Even so, if one accepts the 
possibility of a Confucian influence upon the Kyoto School, then the 
similarities discernible are compelling.  
I start Chapter 9 by arguing that Kōsaka’s thought may be 
interpreted as a modern reconceptualization of the East Asian political 
tradition as presented in the thesis of Confucian Revolution. A possible 
objection may be that such resemblances arise simply because 
Williams developed his thesis as a result of his ‘close reading’ of the 
Chūō Kōron symposia.53 Nonetheless, I believe that the Confucian 
underpinnings of the worldview presented by Williams are sufficiently 
demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, which is significant because of 
Japan’s long history of Confucianism and the Kyoto School thinkers’ 
known engagement with the tradition. Having highlighted the 
possibility of a Confucian reading of Kōsaka’s conception of historical 
progression, I then go on to examine other potential Confucian 
influences. I begin with the similarities between the structure of the 
historical world, which Kōsaka conceived as a dialectical-triad of the 
historical substratum, historical subjectivity and the nothingness-like 
universal, and the Confucian cosmology of Yin, Yang and the Great 
Ultimate. Once more, I draw upon Tanabe’s exposition of Confucian 
metaphysics. I then look at the probable Confucian influences on 
                                                   
53 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance; David Williams, Confucian Revolution 
(Unpublished Manuscript, 25th January, 2015), 100 (This is an early draft for a forthcoming 
book by Williams that greatly expands the thesis of Confucian Revolution and examines its 
implications for political behaviour in contemporary East Asia with examples taken from 
China, Korea and Vietnam, as well as post-war Japan.) 
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Kōsaka’s conception of historical praxis and the related unity of subject 
and object that it facilitates. In turn, this feeds into my examination of 
the compatibility of certain aspects of German Idealism with Confucian 
values, most notably Hegel’s notion of objective spirit, and how this 
affects Kōsaka’s arguments on the fluidity of the ethical substance of a 
people within the historical world. I finish my analysis with a short 
discussion on the affinity of Confucianism with certain ideas presented 
in Kant’s philosophy, including the practical implications of the 
antinomies of pure reason and the inherently empty nature of both the 
Confucian Way and the moral law as forms of action rather than 
specific ethical doctrines. 
One might well ask why the Kyoto School thinkers focused 
almost exclusively on Western philosophy within their philosophical 
speculations despite the supposed importance of Confucianism upon 
their ideas. As Moeller points out, one will inevitably get caught up in 
a circular argument if he or she tries to substantiate the validity of a 
particular standpoint from the premises of this perspective alone. If the 
thesis of Confucian Revolution is accepted as a feasible presentation of 
East Asian patterns of political behaviour, however, the answer may be 
found in the enduring Confucian legacy of the Meiji Restoration upon 
Shōwa Japan. Although I explore the specific details of Confucian 
Revolution in Chapter 4, to put the matter as simply as possible it is a 
narrative on the periodic and often sudden paradigm shifts in moral 
and political values that are observable throughout the history of 
Confucian East Asia. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was too part of a 
region-wide paradigm shift that took place during the 19th century due 
to the ascendency of Western colonialism. As I will explain, such 
demonstrations of political power and ability are hugely significant 
within the Confucian world. Consequently, the social systems of the 
incumbent governments of the region were one-by-one exposed in the 
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eyes of the people as outdated because ineffectual in the face of the 
force of Western modernity. The previous political paradigm based on 
the intellectual traditions of East Asia was therefore replaced by a new 
paradigm grounded in the intellectual traditions of the West. In 
Confucianism this process is referred to as the ‘rectification of names’ 
or the practice of correct naming. I examine this tradition in Chapter 9. 
At first, this would seem to suggest that Confucianism was 
thereby supplanted by the imperatives of Western cultural teachings. 
However, the reasoning behind this shift was, I think, wholly 
Confucian.54 Nonetheless, even if East Asian concepts were still 
considered relevant, as I hope this dissertation demonstrates in the 
case of the Kyoto School, they still had to be proven against the 
formidable standards that had been set by the Western intellectual 
tradition as the dominant paradigm of East Asian social reality in the 
modern era. It is this mind-set that informs Kōyama’s assertion that 
for Japan in the modern era it was Europe that was spiritually closer 
than China or Kōsaka’s depiction of British global hegemony as 
symbolic of the centrality of the Western world in contemporary East 
Asia.55 This was the Confucian legacy of the Meiji era, and this is why 
Kōsaka describes the ‘philosophical excavation of the deep-truthfulness 
of Oriental nothingness and the establishment of its philosophical 
foundations’ as one of the ‘most important’ aspects of Nishida’s 
thought.56/ix Although Nishida himself conceded that no ‘distinctive 
science of metaphysics’ had developed in the East, he insisted that this 
‘does not … mean there was no metaphysical orientation’. This is 
                                                   
54 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 96. 
55 Masaaki Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium: The Standpoint of World History and Japan’, 
trans. by David Williams, in Japanese Wartime Resistance, 118; Kōsaka, Minzoku no 
tetsugaku, 107-119. 
56 Masaaki Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō [The Life and Thought of Kitarō 
Nishida] (Tokyo: Kokusai Nihon Kenkyūjo, 1971), 129. 
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because every ‘culture has a view of life’.57 It is the major premise of 
this dissertation that this Eastern view of life played a substantial role 
in the political philosophy of the wartime Kyoto School and Kōsaka as 
one of its main exponents. 
  
                                                   
57 Kitarō Nishida, ‘The Forms of Culture of the Classical Periods of East and West seen from a 
metaphysical perspective by Nishida Kitarō’, trans. by David D. Dilworth et al., Sourcebook for 
Modern Japanese Philosophy: Selected Documents, eds. David A. Dilworth et al. (Westport 
Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 1998), 21. 
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Introduction Japanese Citations 
 
i 画期的な名著 
 
ii 決定的な礎石を置いた 
 
iii 歴史の深き洞察を有する 
 
iv 田辺哲学の偉大な功績 
 
v 偏狭な軍部やショーヴィニズムには反対であり、それらの有つ非合理主義を排し、戦争を道徳化
しようとはしたが、戦争そのものを否定はしなかった 
 
vi 歴史哲学の父 
 
vii 無的普遍  
 
viii 絶対無  
 
ix 最も重要な点は…東洋的無の深い真理性を哲学的に堀り起し、基礎づけた点にある 
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Part One – On the Possibility of a Confucian Kyoto School 
I begin this dissertation by examining the validity of a Confucian 
reading of the Kyoto School as represented by the philosophy of Kōsaka. 
Firstly, I respond to the liberal criticisms of Orientalism by 
demonstrating the feasibility of making informed cultural 
generalisations about modern Japanese political philosophy. I then go 
on to examine the evidence supporting the proposition that 
Confucianism was an important influence upon Kōsaka and his Kyoto 
School colleagues both culturally and intellectually. I provide further 
details on the epistemological standpoint of empiricism in the 
Appendix, albeit from the perspective of academic history. Whereas the 
Orientalist focuses on the contrasting lifestyles of peoples from distinct 
cultural traditions, the historian stresses the contrasting lifestyles of 
peoples from past eras. Nevertheless, both of these disciplines aim to 
present an accurate portrayal of the research topic based on a 
contextualised reading of the known facts. The Appendix therefore 
reinforces and expands many of the ideas discussed in this section.  
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Chapter 1: The Challenge of Orientalism 
1a: The Influence of Edward Said’s Critique 
While the assumption of a Confucian influence on the wartime 
Kyoto School will serve as the main premise of this study, it is likely 
that scholars influenced by the indictment of European Orientalism 
that is presented by Edward Said will be critical of over-emphasising 
the importance of East Asian thought on the philosophy of the Kyoto 
School.1 An important example of this is Elena Lange’s rejection of the 
approach to research that is adopted by Graham Parkes. In response to 
the general distinction that he draws between the ‘relational’ ontology 
of East Asian philosophies and the ‘substance’ ontology that has 
defined much of the Western metaphysical tradition, Lange accuses 
Parkes of imposing a ‘reductionist dichotomy of East vs West’ in his 
interpretation of the Kyoto School which portrays their thought in a 
reified manner.2 Lange argues that this places the movement’s political 
philosophy above valid criticisms, especially in relation to the 
contribution she believes its members made to the ultranationalist 
ideology of wartime Japan.3 In this regard, David Williams may be said 
to have gone even further than Parkes in light of his controversial 
assertion that ‘Tōjō’s exercise of power as prime minister … was 
legitimate’ when viewed from the perspective of Confucian Revolution.4 
This would seem to confirm Lange’s assessment of Williams’s earlier 
defence of the political philosophy of the Kyoto School as little more 
than a celebration of ‘the agenda of Japanese ultranationalism’.5 
Lange’s dismissal of Parkes’s methodology is consistent with the 
                                                   
1 Said, Orientalism. 
2 Graham Parkes, ‘The Definite Internationalism of the Kyoto School’, in Re-politicising the 
Kyoto School, 162. 
3 Lange, ‘Reviews: GOTO-JONES’, 753-754. 
4 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 84. 
5 Lange, ‘Reviews: GOTO-JONES’, 753; Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War. 
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earlier works of Naoki Sakai and Yōko Arisaka.6 Both these scholars 
adopt Said’s critique of Orientalism in order to deconstruct the 
East/West distinctions they believe are embedded in scholarship on 
Japanese philosophy, as well as the ‘reverse’ Orientalism they accuse 
the Kyoto School philosophers of employing in their own presentation 
of Japan’s ‘world historical mission’ in East Asia.7 
Despite the narrative power of the thesis of Confucian 
Revolution, Williams also appears to employ a ‘reductionist dichotomy’ 
in his attempt to explain the key political events of wartime Japan via 
an interpretative framework based on seemingly abstract Confucian 
concepts such as the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. Williams’s admiration for 
the methodological approach of classical Orientalists such as Louis 
Massignon and Paul Mus would seem to confirm the suspicion that his 
portrayal of the Chūō Kōron discussions over-essentialises the alterity 
of East and West.8 The result is the presentation of wartime Japan as a 
distinct Oriental ‘Other’ that is in some way irreconcilable with the 
‘modern’ Occident due to its ‘incommensurate moral cosmos’.9 For 
Williams, however, it is in fact the critics of Orientalism who are guilty 
of cultural reductionism in the portrayals that they present of the 
Kyoto School because of their uncritical adoption of a liberal moral 
framework for analysing the Pacific War. This is discernible in Lange’s 
sweeping employment of a liberally-defined designation of ultra-
nationalism to describe the vast majority of the political thought of 
wartime Japan, as well as Sakai’s insistence that the Kyoto School’s 
                                                   
6 Naoki Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism’, in 
Postmodernism and Japan, eds. Masao Miyoshi & Harry Harootunian, (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 1989), 93-122; Naoki Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion: The Kyoto 
School Philosophy under the Pax Americana’, in Re-politicising the Kyoto School, 183-198; 
Yōko Arisaka, ‘Beyond “East and West”: Nishida’s Universalism and Postcolonial Critique’, 
The Review of Politics 59:3, (Summer 1997): 541-560. 
7 Masaaki Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Second Symposium: The Ethical and Historical Character of the 
East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’, trans. by David Williams, in Japanese Wartime Resistance, 
196.   
8 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxiii; Said, Orientalism, 97. 
9 Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique’, 96; Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxix. 
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philosophy can only be assessed in terms of a liberally construed 
understanding of its ‘colonizing positionality in relation to peoples in 
Asia’.10  
Although such appraisals may be justified from a liberal moral 
perspective, they fail to adequately explain why the members of the 
Kyoto School were so damning in their evaluation of the policies of the 
Tōjō government despite their purported ultranationalist sympathies. 
Whatever the assumed moral superiority of political liberalism, the 
Kyoto School was not a liberal movement.11 Consequently, a liberal 
portrayal of the Pacific War inevitably judges the Kyoto School by a set 
of moral criteria that its members are destined to fail. It is therefore 
necessary to recognise the East Asian tradition of Confucianism as a 
legitimate form of morality if one is to fully appreciate the Kyoto 
School’s political thought and behaviour in their proper historical and 
cultural contexts. In other words, the fact that Japan is a Confucian 
society cannot be ignored if we are to understand its rich tradition of 
political thought, including the writings of the wartime Kyoto School. 
Williams believes that this will only be possible if the field of 
Orientalism is acknowledged as a ‘rigorous science’ within the modern 
academy.12 This will entail the ‘eclipse of postcolonial theory and … 
Said’s critique’ of the discipline.13 For many, such a proposition is 
morally dubious because the Orientalist’s approach to research is 
always thought to reduce the rich diversity of the various peoples and 
cultures of East Asia to little more than an object of Western inquiry 
and therefore Western power. What is more, this implies that moral 
relativism is a valid standpoint for the analysis of political philosophy, 
thereby shielding the ‘Oriental despotism’ of Tōjō’s military junta from 
                                                   
10 Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion’, 186-189; 194.  
11 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan, 7. 
12 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 37 & 35. 
13 David Williams, ‘In Response to Thomas Rhydwen’, Comparative & Continental Philosophy 
Vol. 7 No. 1 (2015): 80. 
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justified ethical critique.14 Nevertheless, if the political behaviour of 
East Asia is to be interpreted objectively, a post-Saidian approach to 
Oriental studies will be essential because Said’s indictment of the 
discipline is guilty ‘of liberal moralizing which is anti-scientific, and 
therefore untrue’.15 
 
1b: The Case For and Against Cultural Generalisations  
 Said describes Orientalism as a ‘corporate institution’ for 
‘dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient’.16 
Arisaka explains that for Said ‘the very category of the “Orient” was a 
European invention produced in order to “contain difference” in the era 
of colonial expansion’. It was therefore an intellectual ‘tool’ utilised by 
Europeans in order to ‘bring under control the hitherto unknown “other” 
of Europe’. The Orientalist designations of East and West are 
consequently inseparable from the history of ‘European imperialism’.17 
Building on Said’s thesis, Sakai goes on to assert that distinguishing 
between the Occident and Orient only serves to reinforce the associated 
distinctions of the modern & pre-modern and the rational & mythical 
that are necessarily implied within this dichotomy.18 This is because 
the West always ‘represents on behalf of the East’ in its categorisations 
of the Orient, ‘thereby establishing’ a hierarchical relationship between 
East and West.19 This hierarchy is defined in terms of a Western form 
of universalism, which is grounded in the rationalism of modernity and 
its opposition to the perceived irrationalism of the various 
particularistic cultures of the Orient. 
                                                   
14 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 23. 
15 Williams, ‘In Response to Thomas Rhydwen’ 80; See Appendix for a detailed account of the 
empirical standard of objectivity and the meaning of scientific research from the perspective of 
academic history. 
16 Said, Orientalism, 3. 
17 Arisaka, ‘Beyond “East and West”’, 554-555. 
18 Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique’, 96. 
19 Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion’, 186. 
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For Sakai, the use of Orientalist designations therefore 
reinforces a self-perpetuating discourse of ‘us and them’ that is always 
framed in the Hegelian terms of master and slave.20 However, unlike 
the progress that is displayed by the self-consciousness of the slave in 
the Phenomenology of Spirt, further cultural development in the 
Orient is not possible for Sakai since to modernise is by definition to 
Westernise.21 Imperial Japan was no exception, and through the 
process of modernisation it too became ‘implicated in the ubiquitous 
West, so that neither historically nor geopolitically could Japan be seen 
as outside of the West’.22 The discipline of philosophy as practised by 
the Kyoto School was also a product of Western modernity, having been 
developed in the universities of nineteenth century Europe. The 
group’s speculations were not, therefore, an example of some unique 
esoteric Japanese, Asian or Buddhist system of thought as the 
Orientalist asserts, but a Western form of intellectual inquiry on the 
nature of the universal. This is reinforced by the fact that philosophy 
students in Japan ‘were not expected to be knowledgeable about 
Buddhist theories, Confucian doctrines, or Shintoist rituals’.23  
Arisaka maintains that the Kyoto School’s appropriation of the 
modern Western categorisations of the Orient in their own political 
speculations led to the group embracing a form of reverse-Orientalism 
that universalised the Japanese standpoint in relation to the other 
peoples of East Asia. This universalism was thought to derive from the 
perceived ability of the Japanese nation to modernise and therefore 
compete with the West on equal terms. This ensured that the 
movement’s political philosophy fed into the cultural essentialism of 
the ultranationalist ideology of Imperial Japan in a manner entirely 
                                                   
20 Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique’, 105. 
21 G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 117-119. 
22 Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique’, 113. 
23 Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion’, 187-188. 
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consistent with the political ideologies of the earlier colonial powers of 
Europe.24 Sakai argues that the continued use of Orientalist 
distinctions in scholarship on Japanese philosophy has led to the 
concoction of numerous ‘exotic’ fantasises about ‘the Oriental mind’ 
that differ little from the dubious post-war discourses of ‘Nihonjin-ron’ 
on Japanese uniqueness.25 Such Oriental fantasies hinder meaningful 
comparative studies on the role played by the universal discourses of 
both modern Western and Japanese philosophies in the ‘colonial 
violence’ of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.26 
Because the use of Orientalist designations is always made ‘from 
the viewpoint of the West’, Lange accuses Parkes of naïvely repeating 
the ‘very Eurocentristic approach’ that his distinction between 
relational and substance ontologies was supposed to prevent.27 
Acknowledging the implications of Said’s critique, Bret Davis also 
concedes that cultural generalisations ‘always risk distortion by way of 
reducing a manifold of phenomena to a single sense’. Nevertheless, he 
remains sceptical as to whether it is possible to completely dismiss the 
practice of making generalisations in the manner suggested by Lange 
or Sakai, since in order to be able to ‘speak and think we must’.28 As 
Kōsaka explains:  
 
For cognition to be cognition it must be related to something 
universal [i.e. concepts]. If not, what is known would entail 
nothing more than our impressions for each passing moment. 
                                                   
24 Arisaka, ‘Beyond “East and West”’, 555. 
25 Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion’, 191; Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique’, 101; 105. 
26 Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion’, 196. 
27 Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion’, 186; Lange, ‘Reviews: GOTO-JONES’, 754. 
28 Bret W. Davis, ‘Toward a World of Worlds: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and the Place of Cross-
Cultural Dialogue’, Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for 
Religion and Culture, 2006): 213. 
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These are unable to become judgments or cognition proper, let 
alone the [objects of] an academic discipline.29/i  
 
For Davis, the more urgent question is whether generalisations about 
East and West ‘are always over-generalizations’. While he concedes 
that in many situations this may indeed be the case, he is not 
convinced that this is always the case.30  
One possible solution is perhaps the ‘responsible cultural 
generalizations’ that Roger Ames insists are essential if we are to 
properly respect the ‘unannounced assumptions sedimented over 
generations into the language, the customs, and the life forms of a 
living tradition’ such as Confucianism.31 A similar argument is 
forwarded by Williams who expresses the need to differentiate between 
generalisations that are based on principles and concepts brought a 
priori to the empirical record, as exemplified by the liberal moral 
appraisals of wartime Japan endorsed by the ‘Pacific War Orthodoxy’, 
and generalisations that ‘mirror as closely as possible the facts’ of 
Japan as a Confucian society.32 Such generalisations are possible 
through the adoption of schemas of interpretation that are grounded in 
the principles and concepts of the East Asian intellectual tradition.33 
His thesis of Confucian Revolution is presented as just such an 
interpretative framework. 
The approach that is adopted by the critics of Orientalism in 
scholarship on Japanese philosophy is comparable to the method 
employed by Paul Goldin in his research on China as discussed by 
                                                   
29 Masaaki Kōsaka. ‘Rekishi tetsugaku to seiji tetsugaku [The Philosophy of History and 
Political Philosophy]’, in Rekishi no imi to sono yukue [The Meaning of History and its 
Location], ed. Shirō Kōsaka (Tokyo: Kobushi Shobō, 2002), 41. 
30 Davis, ‘Toward a World of Worlds’, 213. 
31 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, 20-21. 
32 See Appendix for an explanation of Williams’s position, his definition of the ‘Pacific War 
Orthodoxy’, and the inherent biases built into the liberal presentation of the Kyoto School. 
33 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 14-26; Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 
36-37. 
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Ames. Goldin rebukes many distinguished Sinologists of the past 
century for presenting an updated version of the bad Orientalism 
portrayed by Said, based on his conviction that the only valid 
generalisation that can be made about China is that ‘China defies 
generalization’.34 Sakai too dismisses generalisations on the Oriental 
nature of Japanese thought or its ‘native epistemology’ as a fabrication 
of the historical continuity of the Japanese language, culture and 
nation.35 For Ames, however, such a dismissal represents a naïve form 
of realism that mistakes its methodological approach for ‘an ostensive 
interpretive objectivity’ that ‘pretends to a view from Nowhere’.36 Such 
a standpoint would seem to be consistent with Sakai’s own plea for 
research on Japanese philosophy to go beyond a discourse based on ‘us 
and them’.37  
The inevitable consequence of adopting a ‘view from Nowhere’ is 
either the rejection of all generalisations about a particular culture due 
to the sheer diversity of factors observable, as is apparent in Sakai’s 
own ‘resistance to conclusion’, or the alternative claim that there are 
no meaningful distinctions to be drawn between differing cultural 
traditions. This is again discernible in Sakai’s insistence that the 
speculations of the Kyoto School constitute nothing more than a 
regurgitation of Western philosophical ideas in the Japanese 
language.38 In either case, generalisations on the cultural and 
intellectual traditions of Japan are deemed meaningless for 
interpreting modern Japanese political thought. While it is obvious 
that the people of modern Japan have little directly in common with 
the peoples of the Heian, Muromachi or Edo periods, it cannot be 
ignored that the Japanese nation, throughout its many guises, has over 
                                                   
34 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 21. 
35 Sakai, ‘Resistance to Conclusion’, 190; Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique’, 100-101. 
36 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 21. 
37 Sakai, ‘Modernity and its Critique’, 114. 
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a thousand year history of Confucian influences. This is significant 
because, as Christopher Goto-Jones observes, historical precedents 
such as Prince Shōtoku’s Confucian-inspired Seventeen-Article 
Constitution have served as ‘historical conversation partners’ for the 
indigenous political tradition of Japan. This is comparable to the status 
of ancient Greek philosophy in the Western tradition of political 
thought.39 
For Ames, the weakness of naïve realism lies in the fact that its 
attempt to go beyond the discourse of ‘us and them’ not only ignores 
the assumptions that are embedded in the cultural traditions of the 
people being studied, but it fails to account for the culturally informed 
assumptions that are necessarily held by the researcher as well. In 
reality, it is simply impossible to maintain a perspective that is not 
informed in some way by our interests, beliefs and values; in other 
words the perspective of ‘us’. Ames draws on the work of Hillary 
Putnam, who states that the ‘elements of what we call “language” or 
“mind” penetrate so deeply into what we call reality’ it is impossible to 
map out something that is language/mind independent. Consequently, 
Ames believes the refusal to ‘acknowledge the fundamental character 
of cultural difference’ in order to safeguard against the reification of 
East Asian culture or the Orientalising of Japanese philosophy 
unwittingly ‘leads to [the] uncritical essentializing of one’s own cultural 
assumptions’ as a result.40 To put this matter another way, the attempt 
to overcome the discourse of ‘us and them’ inadvertently imposes the 
perspective of ‘us’ as the objective standard by which to analyse ‘them’, 
reducing all differences to the culturally informed assumptions that 
are inherent in the standpoint adopted by the researcher.  
Ironically, Williams believes that Said’s rebuttal of Orientalism 
best categorises the ‘moral disdain’ that continues to be held by the 
                                                   
39 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan, 28-30. 
40 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 22. 
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modern East-Asian specialist in relation to Japan’s behaviour during 
the Pacific War. Consequently, research on Japanese political thought 
has come to mean ‘neither research on political institutions nor the 
study of political philosophy’, but rather an exercise in liberal ‘ethical 
criticism’.41 If it is acknowledged that all interpretations are 
necessarily made from a viewpoint originating from somewhere, it is in 
fact Lange who is guilty of employing a ‘Eurocentristic approach’ in her 
rejection of Parkes’s study of Japanese philosophy. This is because her 
appraisal of the Pacific War uncritically adopts the Western standpoint 
of political liberalism without any consideration for the East Asian 
values that were of actual importance to the peoples concerned, be it 
the Japanese, the Chinese or the Koreans.  
Ames argues that the ‘only thing more dangerous than striving 
to make responsible cultural generalizations is failing to make them’. 
It is no doubt true that Orientalist categories are made from a Western 
perspective. However, this is simply unavoidable because it is 
necessary to ‘sensitize’ the Western student of the Orient to the 
‘uncommon assumptions that have made’ East Asian philosophies ‘so 
different from our own’, as in the case of the relational ontology that 
Parkes believes is shared in common by the Buddhist, Confucian and 
Daoist traditions.42 It cannot be forgotten that Western civilisation has 
also been an object of study in East Asia as well, as exemplified by the 
careful analysis of Western philosophy that was undertaken by 
Kōsaka.43 The greater problem for objective research lies in the fact 
that the portrayals of the Pacific War that are presented by the critics 
of Orientalism have also been made from a wholly Western perspective, 
despite their claim to have transcended the discourse of ‘us and them’. 
                                                   
41 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 33 & 154. 
42 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 23; Parkes, ‘The Definite Internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 
162. 
43 Kōsaka, ‘Rekishi tetsugaku to seiji tetsugaku’, 12-39; Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 4-
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No other conclusion is possible if the verdicts reached are based on the 
assumptions of the ‘Kantian liberal–cosmopolitan orthodoxy’ that has 
come to define modern political discourse in the wake of American 
hegemony.44 For this reason, Williams insists that the liberally-
informed studies on East Asia that are prevalent in the contemporary 
academy have served to reinforce the moral orthodoxy of ‘liberal 
empire’.45  
Naïve realists betray their Western readership ‘not once, but 
twice’ in their rejection of cultural generalisations. This is because they 
not only remove Oriental texts and ideas from their proper cultural 
context, thereby failing to provide a rigorous explanation of their 
content, but base their conclusions on something that is believed to be 
‘an “objective” lexicon’ that is in fact itself ‘heavily colored with cultural 
biases’. Provisional generalisations, modifiable in accordance with the 
‘new information that additional detail yields’, are indispensable if we 
are to ‘locate and inform specific cultural traditions and provide 
otherwise sketchy historical developments with the thickness of their 
content’.46 In order to ensure that these informed generalisations do 
not ‘fall foul of the kind of metaphysical and methodological errors’ 
which result from the ‘inert piling up … of sources, origins, proofs, 
demonstrations, and the like’ that have dogged the liberal presentation 
of the Orient, Williams argues that it is essential that Asia is allowed 
to become ‘our method’ of inquiry.47 In other words, East Asian 
principles must be allowed to guide our investigations if we are to 
present an objective portrayal of the political behaviour of Confucian 
societies. Consequently, ‘no Western method of philosophy or science 
may be rigorous enough to address the formidable difficulties’ that 
arise in confronting a distinct cultural tradition such as Japan. This is 
                                                   
44 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxvi. 
45 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 33. 
46 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 22-23. 
47 Said, Orientalism, 267; Williams, ‘In Response to Thomas Rhydwen’, 80. 
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because in order to ‘make Asia our method’ we must ‘submit’ ourselves 
intellectually to its political traditions. Only then will it be possible to 
appreciate ‘what was Confucian about Confucian Japan’.48 
 
1c: Orientalism as an Approach to the Confucianism of the Kyoto 
School 
For Williams, the primary objective of the academic discipline of 
Orientalism is to ‘describe the Orient and the Oriental as they are’. 
The field is therefore a ‘cultural and scientific exercise [that] is 
grounded in an act of human sympathy’.49 This is necessary in order to 
‘empathise with the East’ so that the values of Oriental peoples, as 
opposed to the ideals that Westerners hold to be ‘crucial to civilized 
existence’, can be appreciated in terms that ‘they would recognise and 
accept’.50 In principle, the Orientalist therefore adopts an ‘a-liberal’ 
approach to research since ‘no liberal Eurocentric impulse’ should be 
allowed to distort a ‘scientific comprehension’ of East Asia as it 
actually is.51 In contrast to the ethical ‘ban on thinking’ that has been 
imposed on an ‘objective understanding of the non-liberal world’ by 
Kantian and Wilsonian moral universalism, the field of Orientalism is 
based on the philosophical acceptance of a ‘common humanity’ that 
recognises the accomplishments of the numerous civilisations of the 
Occident and the Orient as a ‘manifestation of something universal and 
therefore shared’.52 This may be compared with Kōsaka’s conception of 
a ‘world of worlds’,ii through which he acknowledged the multiple 
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cultural realms and histories that together constitute historical reality 
as all constituting unique, individual symbols of ‘absolute 
nothingness’.53/iii This is the all-enveloping topos or universal of 
Nishida’s logic of place that served as the ‘major premise’ for Kōsaka’s 
philosophical speculations on history.54/iv  
This perspective allows the Orientalist to accommodate both ‘our 
liberalism and their illiberalism’ in his or her investigations. This is 
vital because it is the vast geographical expanse traditionally 
designated the Orient which is the birthplace ‘of our most ancient 
civilisations, religions and sciences’. Consequently, the liberal 
moralist’s rejection of political ‘despotism’, the form of governance that 
has prevailed throughout much of the respective histories of Oriental 
peoples, comes close to being a Western rejection of what it has 
actually meant to be human, politically speaking, for the larger part of 
humanity both past and present ‘in virtue of this region’s scale, legacy 
and achievements’.55 Kōsaka writes that as a historical existence, 
humankind necessarily ‘holds its essence within its own history’.56/v For 
this reason, he believed that ‘it is not possible to grasp the true spirit of 
Japan if the past achievements of the Japanese people are not taken 
into account’.57/vi In a similar way, the Orientalist argues that it is 
impossible to comprehend the collective behaviour of East Asian 
peoples if their historical, cultural and political achievements are 
dismissed out of hand as morally inferior or irrelevant to a modern 
understanding of Asian societies.  
 The Confucian tradition has been one of the most influential 
factors in determining the social behaviour and political outlook of 
China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. 
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observe that all Sinitic cultures have ‘evolved around ways of living 
and thinking derived in a significant measure from [the] ideas [of 
Confucius] as set down by his disciples and others after his death’. 
Ideas that they believe are ‘by no means irrelevant to contemporary 
social, political, moral, and religious concerns’.58 Sakai dismisses out of 
hand the importance of East Asian influences upon the Kyoto School’s 
speculations. He believes that even if East Asian concepts were 
employed by the movement, they would have been altered beyond 
recognition once adapted to the universal premises and methods of the 
Western discipline of philosophy.59 Certainly, the Kyoto School’s 
thought was not a simple regurgitation of Oriental ideas.60 That being 
said, Sakai all but ignores the Kyoto School thinkers’ engagement with 
the classical texts of the East Asian intellectual tradition, the notable 
similarities between many of the group’s core ideas and those 
expressed in Confucianism, and their conscious decision to focus on 
those Western thinkers who they identified as more conducive to the 
cultural inheritance of Japan.61 As Williams explains, there ‘could be 
no simple surrender to Europe’s manifest superiority’, even if this did 
not mean ‘the power of European civilization [could] be ignored’.62  
Sakai’s insistence on identifying philosophical universalism 
exclusively with Western modernity also fails to take into account the 
universal significance that Confucianism has had both intellectually 
and culturally for the Sinitic peoples of East Asia.63 As Ames and 
Rosemont point out, Confucius is arguably the most influential 
philosopher in history if the measure of such influence is understood in 
terms of the ‘sheer number of people who have lived their lives, and 
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died, in accordance with the thinker’s vision of how people should live 
and die’.64 If it is accepted that Confucianism was indeed an important 
influence on the political values that were held by the members of the 
Kyoto School, be it through a direct intellectual engagement with the 
Confucian tradition or from the indirect influence of the cultural norms 
of Japan as a Confucian society, it will be necessary to examine the 
underlying premises that inform a Confucian understanding of the 
political.  
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Chapter 1 Japanese Citations 
 
i どのような認識も認識である限り、何か普遍的なものに関係づけられなければならない。そうで
なければそれは瞬間瞬間の印象に止って、判断とはならず、認識とはならず、云わんや学問とはな
らない 
 
ii 世界の世界 
 
iii 絶対無 
 
iv 大前提 
 
v 歴史的動物として自己の本質を自己の歴史の内に於て有つ人間存在 
 
vi 真の日本精神は、我が民族が過去に於て何を成就したかを具体的に知らずしては、捕え得ないで
あろう 
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Chapter 2: The Intellectual and Cultural Significance of Confucianism 
for Kōsaka 
 Post-War scholarship on the philosophy of the Kyoto School has 
predominantly focused on the group’s religious speculations. In 
particular, the movement is strongly associated with the ideas of 
Japanese Zen and Pure Land Buddhism.1 For instance, Robert Wargo 
suggests that it is hardly surprising that the concept of nothingness 
was so important for Nishida considering the fact that ‘it was 
essentially his Zen experience that laid the foundations for his 
philosophy’.2 Such observations help us to appreciate the extent of the 
Kyoto School’s debt to indigenous East Asian sources for the 
formulation of many of the group’s key philosophical concepts. In the 
case of the wartime Kyoto School, however, Williams argues that it is 
the ‘hereto neglected’ importance of Confucianism that reveals the 
‘authentic structure’ of the movement’s political thought.3 Although 
Williams primarily focuses on the cultural influence of Confucianism in 
relation to the ‘logic and conventions’ of regime change across the 
Sinitic cultures of East Asia, this study will assume that the Confucian 
canon was itself an important intellectual resource for Kōsaka’s 
development of the philosophy of history.4 While the Kyoto School is 
typically portrayed as a group of religious thinkers, Kōsaka was 
primarily concerned with the problems of history and politics. Although 
Buddhism was no doubt an important influence on many of the 
concepts that he appropriated from his mentors Nishida and Tanabe, it 
is perhaps the politically orientated ideas of Confucianism that were 
more influential for his philosophy.  
                                                   
1 Davis, ‘The Kyoto School’. 
2 Robert J.J. Wargo, The Logic of Nothingness: A Study of Nishida Kitarō (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 69. 
3 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxii. 
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Many Western scholars typically assess the political writings of 
the wartime Kyoto School from a liberal moral standpoint. Whatever 
the moral justifications for such an approach, the Kyoto School was not 
a liberal movement. As a result, these appraisals have hindered 
objective research on the group’s political thought, since the liberal 
principles adopted are brought a priori to the empirical record of 
wartime Japan as a Confucian culture. Consequently, these studies 
inevitably teach us more about the political ideals of Western 
researchers than the political values that actually mattered to the 
Kyoto School.5 It is for this reason that Williams insists that East 
Asian schemas of interpretation are necessary if we are to comprehend 
the political philosophy of the Kyoto School on its own terms.6 The 
Confucian intellectual tradition would seem a suitable candidate for 
reassessing the wartime Kyoto School from an East Asian perspective 
as it represents an impressive political alternative to Western 
liberalism. As Goto-Jones points out, it is Confucianism that provided 
the ‘conceptual context’ for the main political documents of the modern 
era in Japan, including the ‘Meiji Constitution’ and the ‘Imperial 
Rescript on Education’. In turn, these texts established the ‘dominant 
linguistic and ideological conventions’ of the political state within 
which the Kyoto School philosophers theorised. He concludes that 
there is therefore ‘a strong case for taking Confucianism seriously as 
part of the context of the political philosophy of … the Kyoto School’.7 
It is, however, difficult to discern a direct Confucian influence on 
the Kyoto School’s speculations due to the lack of supporting textual 
evidence in the majority of the movement’s works. Kōsaka is no 
exception in this regard as he rarely cites directly from Confucian 
sources. This problem is further complicated by the fact that the 
                                                   
5 See Appendix for an explanation of the moral biases often inherent within liberal scholarship 
on the Kyoto School.    
6 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 37. 
7 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan, 25-46. 
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majority of the references to the Confucian tradition during the Chūō 
Kōron symposia, including remarks made by Kōsaka, were of a critical 
nature.8 Despite the issues that arise from the lack of explicit textual 
evidence for such an influence, I believe that discerning the importance 
of Confucianism for the political philosophy of the Kyoto School is not 
wholly dependent on the evidence of direct citations or quotations. It is 
of course necessary to ‘be philologically aware’ when attempting to 
demonstrate the significance of the East Asian intellectual traditions 
for the Kyoto School’s thought.9 Consequently, this study will later 
present a comparison of Kōsaka’s philosophical writings with the major 
texts of the Confucian tradition based on the assumption that he was 
sufficiently familiar with the key ideas of the tradition as part of a 
generation educated in the ‘Four Books and Five Classics’ of 
Confucianism.10/i This fact notwithstanding, if it is accepted that 
Confucianism has, in the words of Robert Bellah, ‘for many centuries 
seeped into the consciousness and customs of the Japanese people’, 
then a lack of direct textual evidence may not in itself discount the 
significance of the Confucian tradition for interpreting the political 
thought of the wartime Kyoto School.11 
Although sceptical of a Confucian influence, Matteo Cestari does 
believe that Buddhism was an important factor in Nishida’s 
speculations considering his practice of Zen meditation in the years 
leading up to his publication of An Inquiry into the Good. However, 
because there is a ‘striking imbalance’ between the small number of 
citations from Buddhist sources in comparison to those from the 
Western canon, Cestari calls for a shift ‘from philology to hermeneutics’ 
                                                   
8 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 125-127; 158; Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Third Symposium: 
The Philosophy of World Historical Wars’, trans. by David Williams, in Japanese Wartime 
Resistance, 303. 
9 Matteo Cestari, ‘Between Emptiness and Absolute Nothingness – Reflections on Negation in 
Nishida and Buddhism’, Essays in Japanese Philosophy Vol. 7 (2010): 329. 
10 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 309. 
11 Robert Bellah, quoted in Williams, ‘In response to Thomas Rhydwen’, 81. 
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when engaging with Nishida’s texts. This is because the context within 
which a work was composed has to be taken into account for 
undertaking its textual exegesis, especially when the work concerned 
was written within a culture that is as different from our own as that 
of Japan. Consequently, Cestari argues that a Japanese philosophical 
text cannot simply be read, but must ‘be interpreted’ since an insight 
into the ‘cultural environment and the personal life’ of its author may 
be essential for the proper comprehension of its content.12 If 
Confucianism is as deeply embedded into the ‘consciousness and 
customs’ of the Japanese nation as Bellah suggests, then it is 
reasonable to surmise that the Confucian tradition was also a 
significant part of the ‘cultural environment’ within which the Kyoto 
School philosophers formulated their ideas. It is for this reason that 
Williams insists that ‘the participants in the Chūō Kōron discussions 
never broke free’ of the overarching ‘Confucian moral framework’ of 
Japanese society, whatever their personal criticisms of certain aspects 
of the tradition.13 Cestari concedes that ‘hermeneutic form may not be 
as persuasive as direct textual evidence’.14 Nevertheless, it is likely 
that Kōsaka would be sympathetic to such an approach considering his 
own employment of the hermeneutic methodologies of Wilhelm Dilthey 
and Martin Heidegger.15 
While Kōsaka rarely made references to Confucianism in his 
individual works, his son notes that for the intellectuals of his father’s 
day ‘the Four Books and Five Classics [of Confucianism] were regarded 
as the foundation of a person’s education’.16/ii Parkes too highlights the 
fact that ‘the Kyoto School philosophers were one of the last 
generations to be raised on the classics of Confucian, Daoist and 
                                                   
12 Cestari, ‘Between Emptiness and Absolute Nothingness’, 330. 
13 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 39. 
14 Cestari, ‘Between Emptiness and Absolute Nothingness’, 330. 
15 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 33; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 381. 
16 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 309. 
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Buddhist philosophy – after which they went on to study Western 
thought’.17 It is therefore reasonable to assume that Kōsaka was 
familiar with the main texts of the Confucian tradition, including the 
Analects, the Mencius, the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the 
Mean. As a result, Setsuzō Kōsaka believes that it was perhaps only 
natural that his father would be personally fond of Confucius.iii For 
example, he recalls a time when his father taught him the following 
saying from the Analects:iv  
 
The Master said, “If at dawn you learn of and tread the Way, you 
can face death at dusk” (4.8).18  
 
This was also the subject of a calligraphy that Nishida presented to 
Kōsaka as a gift. Setsuzō Kōsaka goes on to state that in the context of 
this saying he is better able to appreciate the significance of a letter 
Nishida sent to his father at around the time of his publication of the 
Introduction to the Philosophy of History in 1943.19  
This was a period when the Kyoto School were coming under 
increasing pressure from the authorities for what was deemed to be the 
anti-Japanese nature of the standpoint of world history, the principal 
theme of the Chūō Kōron symposia.20 For example, the ‘special higher 
police’ were frequently seen in the vicinity of Kōsaka’s house in Kyotov 
and he was personally warned by a government official that he and his 
                                                   
17 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 161. 
18 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me; The Analects of Confucius: A 
Philosophical Translation, trans. by Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1998). 
19 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 310; Masaaki Kōsaka, Nishida 
Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō [Nishida Kitarō and Watsuji Tetsurō] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1964), 
182. 
20 Tsutomu Horio, ‘The Chūōkōron Discussions, Their Background and Meaning’, trans. by 
Thomas Kirchner, in Rude Awakenings, Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism, 
eds. James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 291. 
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associates were ‘standing on the brink’.21/vi Considering the tragic 
deaths of the Kyoto School philosophers Kiyoshi Miki and Jun Tosaka 
in prison, the threat of incarceration could not be taken lightly. Despite 
this, Kōsaka was determined to continue publishing his ideas on 
history and the responsibilities of the Japanese people as the leading 
nation of East Asia. He was therefore greatly moved by the strong 
words of encouragement he received from Nishida in the spirit of the 
scholarly tradition of Confucianism:  
 
You should continue to publish academic books. There is nothing 
to fear in doing this in an open and dignified manner as this is 
the true way that one serves their country as an academic, even 
if you meet the fate of Galileo or [Giordano] Bruno.22/vii 
 
Setsuzō Kōsaka concludes that his father and Confucius were 
connected through Nishida. He continues that ‘I feel that this 
[tradition] is now being narrated to me as well. It is perhaps in this 
way that our cultural inheritance is passed on’.23/viii 
 Kōsaka himself also discusses the importance of Confucianism 
for his mentor. For example, many of Nishida’s calligraphies were of 
phrases from the Confucian canon rather than the Daoist sayings of 
the Laozi and the Zhuangzi as would perhaps be expected:  
 
The Master said, “Zeng my friend! My way is bound together 
with one continuous strand” (Analects 4.14).ix  
 
Furthermore, when his philosophy came under attack for its ‘anti-
Japanese’x and ‘anti-war’ orientation,xi Nishida expressed his dismay 
                                                   
21 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 162; Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to 
Watsuji Tetsurō ,182. 
22 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 235; See also Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 172. 
23 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 310. 
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at the situation through references to the sayings of Confucius in his 
personal writings and letters:  
 
If Heaven is not going to destroy this culture, what can the 
people of Kuang do to me! (Analects 9.5)xii 
 
The Combined Armies can be deprived of their commander, but 
common peasants cannot be deprived of their purposes (Analects 
9.26).xiii  
 
Kōsaka concludes that the philosophy of ‘the Analects may have been 
more deeply rooted in Nishida’s [thought] than is normally 
appreciated’.24/xiv 
 Nishida was born in 1870 in the village of Unoke in Ishikawa 
prefecture, an area where the influence of Edo culture remained 
especially strong. He later moved to Kanazawa, a town that had 
multiple private institutions specialising in literary Chinese.25 His 
grandfather, who was knowledgeable of the Chinese literary tradition, 
was also an influential figure on Nishida during his formative years. 
For example, it was from his grandfather that he inherited many of the 
classical Chinese texts in his private collection, some 886 volumes. A 
total that is more numerous than his entire collection of Japanese 
works (561 volumes).26 Nishida went on to receive formal tuition in 
literary Chinese from Takeatsu Iguchi, a talented student of the 
Confucian scholar Sokken Yasui, and Iguchi’s own pupil Shinken 
Miyake while at high school in Kanazawa. Miyake would continue to 
look out for Nishida as he got older, helping him to secure a teaching 
position at a school in Hiroshima. Kōsaka concludes that Nishida was 
                                                   
24 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 16-17. 
25 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 78-79. 
26 Dalissier, ‘Footnote 4’, in ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’, 213. 
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born during a period in Japan when ‘an atmosphere of Chinese 
learning still persisted, which he was continuously breathing in as he 
was growing up’.xv As a consequence, he was able to ‘absorb and master 
the world of the Chinese classics almost unconsciously’ during his 
youth.27/xvi This is supported by the assessment of the Sinologist and 
historian Naoki Karino, who believed that the main difference between 
Nishida and other Japanese philosophers was the strength of his 
knowledge of the Chinese classics.28/xvii  
Such factors have to be taken into consideration in order to fully 
appreciate the significance of Michel Dalissier’s investigations on the 
importance of the Chinese intellectual tradition, including 
Confucianism, for the development of Nishida’s philosophy. For 
example, Dalissier highlights the epistemic similarities that are to be 
found in Nishida’s conception of ‘pure experience’ and the 
interrelatedness of all things as discussed in the Great Learning and 
the Doctrine of the Mean. This is significant because Kōsaka identifies 
the foundations for Nishida’s later conception of action-intuition, a key 
aspect of how he himself conceived historical creation, within the 
philosophy of pure experience. This suggests the real possibility of an 
indirect Confucian influence on Kōsaka’s thought through his 
appropriation of the philosophy of Nishida, who was also familiar with 
the works of Mencius, Xunzi and Wang Yang-Ming.29 While 
acknowledging the ‘precise connections’ that Dalissier draws ‘between 
Nishida’s philosophy and classical Chinese thought’, Cestari is 
sceptical about directly correlating Nishida’s ideas ‘to counterparts in 
Chinese philosophies’. He argues that ‘all we can show is that [Nishida] 
was a man of his times, with a refined education that included … 
                                                   
27 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 76-80. 
28 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 16-17. 
29 Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’; Michel Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and 
Chinese Philosophy: Debt and Distance’, Japan Review No.22 (2010): 137-170; Goto-Jones, 
Political Philosophy in Japan, 39. 
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knowledge of Chinese classics’.30 Nonetheless, it is clear from his 
diaries that Nishida set aside much of his personal time for the study 
of the Chinese classics in the years leading up to his first publication, 
including the Four Books of Confucianism.31 This is supported by the 
fact that there are detailed annotations in a writing style that may be 
attributed to Nishida in a number of the Confucian works in his 
private library, including the Analects and the Doctrine of the Mean.32 
 Considering the ‘importance of indirect citation in the Japanese 
literary tradition’, this study assumes that there are also tangible 
intellectual links between Kōsaka’s philosophy of history and 
Confucianism.33 Significantly, Kōsaka demonstrates on a number of 
occasions his familiarity with and respect for the ideals of 
Confucianism, even if his comments during the Chūō Kōron symposia 
were of a somewhat critical nature. For example, he emphasises the 
significance of Tetsurō Watsuji’s references to Confucianism during a 
lecture to the Naval War College in 1943.34 The topic of this lecture 
was the concept of shindō (臣道) or the way of the samurai retainer. 
Watsuji begins his presentation by stating that although the 
willingness of the modern (naval) soldier to offer his life in service to 
the emperor is admirable, this standpoint is overly concerned with the 
self or the inflated importance that is attributed to ‘my’ self-sacrifice. 
However, the issue of whether one lives or dies is not as important as 
the public duty that one should perform in service to the emperor as 
the symbol of national unity. In this sense, the self-sacrifice of the 
modern soldier has yet to truly overcome the standpoint of ‘I’. Watsuji 
distinguishes this from the ‘standpoint transcending life and death’ 
that was honoured in the past. Although he refers to the importance of 
                                                   
30 Cestari, ‘Between Emptiness and Absolute Nothingness’, 329-330. 
31 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 29; 42. 
32 Dalissier, ‘Footnote 4’, in ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’, 212-213. 
33 Cestari, ‘Between Emptiness and Absolute Nothingness’, 331 
34 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 238. 
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Zen Buddhism and, more importantly, the ancient ideal of sonnō no 
michi (尊皇の道/The way of revering the emperor), Confucianism 
embodied the ethical moment of this standpoint in terms of nurturing 
the sincerity of intentions that was necessary to fulfil one’s social 
duties in a manner that overcome egocentrism.35 
In order to appreciate the significance of Watsuji’s criticisms of 
the manner in which bushidō (武士道/The way of the warrior) or shindō 
had been manipulated in the modern era in order to serve the agenda 
of the Army, Kōsaka focuses on two aspects of Watsuji’s lecture. Firstly, 
he believes it is important to recognise the fact that Watsuji presented 
his arguments to the Navy as a historical study. He therefore made an 
important distinction between the historical ideal of shindō, grounded 
in a standpoint that transcended life and death, and its interpretation 
in the present, which had failed to overcome the standpoint of the self. 
Secondly, Kōsaka emphasises Watsuji’s discussions of the Confucian 
dimension of bushidō in the Edo period. The way of the warrior was not 
simply the glorification of a samurai’s self-sacrifice in the name of his 
lord, although a samurai’s willingness to sacrifice his life was no doubt 
highly esteemed. Rather, the true meaning of bushidō lay in the 
selfless fulfilment of one’s duties. In the context of Confucianism, these 
duties were understood in terms of Sokō Yamaga’s portrayal of bushidō 
as shidō (士道), the way of the Confucian gentleman or the exemplary 
person (君子). For Kōsaka, this is significant because ‘the way of the 
scholar-official or gentleman was to be found in the realisation of the 
Way’.xviii In this sense, the ideal of bushidō was not simply perceived in 
terms of carrying out the class-based duties of a retainer to his lord, as 
suggested by Goto-Jones, but in terms of the moral responsibilities that 
were held by a retainer as a leading member of the wider ethical 
                                                   
35 Tetsurō Watsuji, ‘Nihon no shindō [Japan’s Way of the Retainer]’, Watsuji Tetsurō zenshū 
dai jūyon kan [The Complete Works of Tetsurō Watsuji: Volume 14] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1962), 
297-312. 
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community.36 It is therefore not inconsequential that Watsuji himself 
identified the Confucian Way primarily with the ideal of ren (仁), 
variously translated as benevolence, humaneness, reciprocity or 
authoritative conduct, in his own work on Confucius.37 An important 
aspect of the realisation of ren within a community is the fulfilment of 
one’s responsibilities in accordance with the cultural conventions, 
standards and expectations that define a person’s position within 
society. To do this in a sincere manner for the benefit of society rather 
than for personal gain is something that Watsuji describes as far more 
difficult than an egotistically driven willingness to die.xix In regard to 
acts that are overly courageous or bold, the Master says that the petty 
man would become ‘a thief’ (Analects 17.23). Watsuji goes on to 
condemn attitudes that only allow the public expression of ideas 
supporting the ruling elite’s ideology, preventing people from speaking 
frankly and forcing one’s way of thinking onto others in the name of 
‘selfless devotion’.38/xx These were all egotistical acts, and as 
emphasised by Kōsaka, these were all acts committed by the Army 
centred on the government of Hideki Tōjō.39 
Kōsaka himself employed similar Confucian arguments on 
leadership during the first meeting of the Book Recommendation 
Committee of the Publishing Cultural Association in February 1941. 
This committee was held for determining the allotment of printing 
paper, the withholding of which would increasingly be used as a form 
of censorship.40 Indeed, this method was later employed to halt 
                                                   
36 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 239; Christopher Goto-Jones, ‘The Way of 
Revering the Emperor: Imperial Philosophy and Bushidō in Modern Japan’, The Emperors of 
Modern Japan (Handbook of Oriental Studies), ed. by Ben-Ami Shillony (Leiden: Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2008): 23-52. 
37 Tetsurō Watsuji, ‘Kōshi [Confucius]’, Watsuji Tetsurō zenshū dai roku kan [The Complete 
Works of Tetsurō Watsuji: Volume 6] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1962), 312-313. 
38 Watsuji, ‘Nihon no shindō’, 311. 
39 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 239-240. 
40 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 103-105. 
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publication of the book version of the Chūō Kōron symposia.41 During 
the review of a work by the future education minister and Kyoto School 
philosopher Teiyū Amano, which had been recommended to the 
committee by Kōsaka, Major Abe of the Army News Service strongly 
criticised Amano’s Kantianism by insisting that the only ‘categorical 
imperative’ that should matter to the Japanese people is the imperial 
decree of the emperor.xxi Kōsaka, however, referred to the universalism 
attributed to the Confucian Way of filial piety, sincere relations and 
social harmony in the Imperial Rescript of Education. This suggested 
that even the Meiji emperor himself recognised that his political 
authority was subordinate to the moral teachings of Japan’s Confucian 
heritage. What is more, in a manner consistent with a Confucian 
understanding of good leadership, the emperor goes on to state that he 
will offer the example of his own attempts to put these Confucian 
values into practice.42/xxii Perhaps of most significance in the context of 
this study, however, are the explicit references Kōsaka makes to the 
East Asian intellectual tradition in the short essay he appended to his 
magnum opus The Historical World (1937), ‘The Hermeneutic 
Structure of Roads’. Specifically, he directly associates his analysis of 
the meaning of roads within the historical world with the East Asian 
philosophies of the Way. Considering that this essay was written with 
the express intention that it could be included in either his chapter on 
‘The Historical Substratum’ or ‘The Historical World’, this raises the 
real possibility of a Confucian influence upon his conception of the 
‘logos of nature’ and the self-expressiveness of the historical world.43 
                                                   
41 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, l-li. 
42 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 103-104; Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 182-183; 
‘Kyōiku chokugo: iyaku (kōgotai) [Imperial Rescript on Education – Interpretative Rendering 
(Modern speech)’, Kyōiku chokugo [Imperial Rescript on Education] (Tokyo: Meiji Jingū 
Shamushō, 2014). 
43 Masaaki Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō [The Hermeneutical Structure of Roads]’, 
in Rekishi-teki sekai, 367-380. 
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For Williams, however, Confucianism is more than just a ‘moral 
doctrine’ or ‘canon of texts’. Rather, it is a ‘mode of action’ that has 
defined ‘patterns of political behaviour’ across the Sinitic cultures of 
China, Korea, Vietnam and Japan for over a millennium.44 In 
particular, he proposes the unique thesis of ‘Confucian Revolution’ for 
interpreting the political philosophy of the wartime Kyoto School as 
presented in the Chūō Kōron discussions. This is based on the 
Confucian notions of tenkō (転向), a ‘change of direction or orientation’, 
toku (徳), a concept of ‘morality … and political effectiveness’ which I 
translate as ‘virtue’ both due to its moral implications and its 
alternative meaning as an effective force, potency or power, and tenmei 
(天命), or the ideal of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’.45 Williams believes that 
together these three concepts provide a compelling interpretative 
framework for assessing the manner in which Confucian societies have 
historically undertaken regime change while securing the moral 
consensus of the population. In turn, he believes that it is against the 
backdrop of what he designates the ‘Post-Meiji Confucian Revolution’ 
that the factional struggles of Shōwa Japan need to be comprehended. 
This includes the political activities that resulted from the Kyoto 
School’s clandestine alliance with the Yonai Peace Faction of the 
Japanese Navy.46 For instance, the first of the three Chūo Koron 
symposia was organised through the intervention of the Navy in an 
attempt to counter Army propaganda and delay the outbreak of war.47 
                                                   
44 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 73-74; 60.  
45 My translation of toku or de (徳) as virtue was recommended by Graham Parkes; See also 
Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, ‘’Glossary of Key Terms’, in Daodejing: “Making This Life 
Significant” – A Philosophical Translation, trans. by Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 2003), 60-61. 
46 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 19; 23-25; xxii. 
47 Yasumasa Ōshima, ‘Daitōa sensō to Kyoto gakuha – chishikijin no seiji sanka nitsuite’ [The 
Greater East Asian War and the Kyoto School – The Political Involvement of Intellectuals], 
Chūō Kōron 80 (1965): 125-143; Yasumasa Ōshima, et al., ‘Zadankai: Daitōa sensō to Nihon no 
chishikijintachi nitsuite – Kyoto gakuha・Watsuji Tetsurō’ [Symposium: The Greater East 
Asian War and Japanese Intellectuals – The Kyoto School and Tetsurō Watsuji], Kokoro  Vol. 
18 No. 10 (1965): 17-37. 
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Chapter 2 Japanese Citations 
 
i 四書五経 
 
ii 当時の知識人は総じて四書五経が人間教育の基礎であった 
 
iii 父は孔子が好きだった 
 
iv 子曰く、朝に道を開けば、夕べに死すとも可なり 
 
v 京都下鴨泉川町の家の周りを特高警察が徘徊し 
 
vi 今、あなた方はぎりぎりの線に立っているのです 
 
vii 学術書はどんどん出すがよい。正々堂々何の恐れる所はない。これが学者として真に国家に尽す
所以である。たとえガリレーやブルノーの運命に陥るとも 
 
viii 孔子と父は西田先生を通じて繋がっていたのではなかろうか。そしていまそれらが同時に私に
語りかけてくるような気もする。文化の継承はこんなかたちでもなされるのかもしれない 
 
ix 一以貫之 
 
x 非日本的 
 
xi 反戦的 
 
xii 天之未喪斯文也匡人其如予何 
 
xiii 匹夫不可奪志也 
 
xiv 論語は案外深く先生の中に根を下ろしている 
 
xv 西田先生はまだ漢学の空気が生き残っている時代に、その空気を吸いながらおおきくなったので
ある 
 
xvi 西田先生の場合には、支那の古典の世界が不知不識の間に、いわば呼吸され、身についてきて
いる 
 
xvii 西田先生が我国普通の哲学者と違っているところは漢籍の力が非常にあったことかと思う 
 
xviii そして「士」、すなわち士大夫、君子の道は、道を実現することにありとした 
 
xix 清明心に徹底いたしますることは死の覚悟よりむずかしいのであります 
 
xx 滅私奉公 
 
xxi 至上命法 
 
xxii そこで、私自身も、国民の皆さんと一緒に、これらの教えを一生大事に守って高い徳性を保ち
続けるため、ここで皆さんに「まず、自分でやってみます」と明言することにより、その実践に努
めて手本を示したいと思います 
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Part Two – The Confucian Beginnings of the Philosophy of History 
I present a direct comparison of Kōsaka’s philosophy of history 
with the major texts of the Confucian canon in Chapter 9. However, 
because of the lack of relevant citations it is not possible to verify all of 
the comparisons made. Nevertheless, even if a direct intellectual link 
between Kōsaka’s political philosophy and Confucianism cannot be 
substantiated by the textual evidence alone, it should not come as a 
surprise that there are a large number of commonalities considering 
the shared ontological foundations of these two schools of thought. This 
is only to be expected since the Kyoto School developed their ideas 
within the cultural milieu of a Confucian society. As Williams argues, 
Confucianism is the ‘very air the East Asian breathes, and the Kyoto 
[thinkers are] unmistakably … East Asian’ in their approach to 
political thought.1 In this section I examine the relational ontology that 
characterises the East Asian intellectual tradition and the related 
premise of change. I then go on to analyse the consequences of 
Confucian Revolution for social behaviour in Japan as a Confucian 
culture, an important example of the political implications of the 
relational worldview that characterises the tradition.  
 
                                                   
1 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 32 & 37. 
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Chapter 3 – The Confucian Worldview of Kōsaka’s Philosophy 
3a: Relational Ontology 
 In his study on the ‘definite internationalism’ of the Kyoto 
School, Parkes highlights the need to distinguish between the 
substance ontology that has been prevalent throughout much of the 
history of Western thought and the ‘thoroughgoing relational ontology’ 
that is shared in common by the Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian 
traditions.1 Wesley J. Wildman defines relational ontology as the ‘basic 
contention … that the relations between entities are ontologically more 
fundamental than the entities themselves’. In contrast, a substance 
ontology regards entities as ‘ontologically primary and relations 
ontologically derivative’.2 Parkes explains that in the West the world 
has generally been viewed as an ‘aggregate of substantial things’. This 
has led to the human ‘self’ being conceived in terms of a ‘mental 
substance’ that is ‘independently subsistent’, as is typified by the 
‘thinking thing’ postulated by Descartes.3 This is reinforced by the 
strong sense of causal agency that is implied in the verb-noun 
distinction that is so central to Indo-European languages, as well as 
the notion of substantial things that is conveyed through the frequent 
use of countable nouns.4  
In East Asian philosophies, however, the world is typically 
perceived as a ‘field of processes in dynamic interaction’. This 
perspective stresses the ‘inter of the relations rather than the end-
points of the relata’. As a result, the self is thought to be ‘empty of any 
inherent ‘nature’’ and is therefore defined in terms of its relational 
                                                   
1 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 162. 
2 Wesley J. Wildman, ‘An Introduction to Relational Ontology’, in The Trinity and an 
Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. by John Polkinghorne 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 55-73. 
Available at: http://www.wesleywildman.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/docs/2010-
Wildman-Introduction-to-Relational-Ontology-final-author-version-Polkinghorne-ed.pdf 
3 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 162. 
4 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 21-22; Bo Mou, ‘The Structure of Chinese Language and 
Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun Hypothesis’, Philosophy East and West, 49/1 (1999): 45. 
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character.5 In the Japanese language, this is reinforced by the use of 
intransitive verbs and the frequent omission of the subject noun from 
sentences.6 Consequently, within East Asian philosophies, there is no 
postulation of self-subsistent entities or agencies capable of existing 
separately from the dynamic matrix of relations that makes up the 
world, be it God, the immortal soul or the moral self.7 For example, the 
notion of Heaven in the Confucian tradition does not refer to a divine 
entity, but rather a power that transcends humankind because it is the 
location or ‘place’ within which human society itself resides.8 This is 
exemplified by the qi (気/ki) cosmology of the Chinese tradition, which 
perceived the world in terms of a field of interacting energies. The 
accumulation and dispersion of these energies were in turn thought to 
account for the diversity of phenomena found throughout the great 
expanse of Heaven and Earth.9 Both Mencius and Xunzi take up 
aspects of this cosmology into their philosophies.10 
 The notion of the interrelatedness of all things has led to the 
development of a unique conception of the political within 
Confucianism. Parkes explains that whereas in the West most political 
theories have been based on the idea that ‘social groups are formed by 
autonomous individuals bringing themselves into association under 
some kind of social contract’, in the East-Asian tradition it is the social 
relations themselves that are considered primary. As a result, the basic 
ontological unit is not the individual but the family, a ‘paradigm of 
                                                   
5 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 162. 
6 Tomoyuki Oka, ‘Nihongo no ronri saikō: basho no ronri to keishiki rori [A Reconsideration of 
the Logic of the Japanese Langauge: The Logic of Place and Formal Logic]’, Tokyo Gakugei 
Daigaku kiyou, sōgōkyōiku kagakukei, 62/2 (2011): 365-373; See also Bernard Stevens, ‘The 
Transcendental Path’, in Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 6: Confluences and Cross Currents, 
56. 
7 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 27. 
8 Watsuji, ‘Kōshi’, 341-342. 
9 Graham Parkes, ‘Winds, Waters and Earth Energies: Fengshui and Sense of Place’, in Nature 
Across Cultures: Views of Nature and the Environment in Non-Western Countries, ed. H. Selin 
(Kulwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 191. 
10 See also Zhu Xi’s commentary to the Doctrine of the Mean in Daxue & Zhongyong – 
Bilingual Edition, trans. by Ian Johnston and Wang Ping (Hong Kong: The Chinese University 
Press, 2012), 409-411. 
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human beings in relation with each other’.11 For instance, the root of 
the key Confucian concept of ren (仁) or benevolent conduct was 
identified in the filial and fraternal relationships of the family, which 
are among the earliest and most important connections a person 
establishes in his or her life.12 Ames and Rosemont believe that 
through the repeated postulation of an ‘independent and superordinate 
principle [that] determines order and value in the world while 
remaining aloof from it’, be it the personality of God or the personality 
of the moral self, the concepts of ‘freedom, autonomy … and 
individuality’ became key concerns in Western political thought.13 By 
contrast, the Confucian focus on relations over individuals has led to a 
conception of politics that ‘is meant to speak for co-existence rather 
than a single existence’. The Confucian tradition has therefore focused 
on the ideals of benevolence, harmony, obligation and co-operation. The 
‘minimal and irreducible location’ of these values is in turn to be found 
in the ontological unit of the family.14 
Kōsaka’s analysis of the main characteristics of ‘pure experience’, 
the principle concept of Nishida’s first publication, demonstrates the 
fact that a comparable relational ontology was incorporated into the 
philosophy of the Kyoto School from its very inception. The notion of 
pure experience has been accused of solipsism and of ignoring the 
problems of subjectivity. For example, Sho Hayashi and Lange dismiss 
the concept as a ‘naïve account of subjective Idealism through the 
monism of consciousness’.15 However, this critique ignores the East 
Asian orientation of Nishida’s assertion that it is not ‘that experience 
                                                   
11 Parkes, ‘The Definite Internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 162. 
12 See Analects 1.2 
13 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 29-31. 
14 Tingyang Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia, 天
下)’, Social Identities, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 2006): 32-33. 
15 Sho Hayashi and Elena Lange, ‘The Ideology of Identity in the Thought of Nishida Kitarō’, 
Memoirs of the Faculty of Education and Regional Studies, Fukui University, Series I 
Humanities (Philosophy) No. 47 (2007): 23; 26-27; Suares, The Kyoto School’s Takeover of 
Hegel, 13. 
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exists because there is an individual, but that an individual exists 
because there is experience’.16 Kōsaka explains that Nishida rejected 
the idea of ‘first positing a self that then experiences’ the world, as is 
typical in the Western tradition. Rather, the truth of experience was to 
be found in the fact that the experiencing self is also experienced.i The 
unity of pure experience therefore comes before any conception of the 
self or consciousness, which only emerge upon reflection.17 In this 
sense, the self is empty since its identity is dependent upon the 
experiences it has of the world within which it resides: ‘it is the self as 
it exists in the world, expresses the world and works within the world 
that is problematized’. It is in this sense that Kōsaka believes Nishida 
‘may be said to have transcended simple subjectivism and idealism 
from the very beginning’.18/ii Furthermore, Nishida did not conceive the 
concept of pure experience in terms of passive sensibility, but rather 
active perception. This is because experience is only possible through 
the mediation of a living body that is able to interact and affect the 
world of which it too is a part, such as through the movement of the 
eyes and hands.19 In a manner comparable with the holistic tradition of 
Chinese philosophy, epistemology is therefore ‘inseparable’ from 
ontology in the world of pure experience because experience itself is 
dependent on the ‘co-dependency’ of the subject and object that is 
facilitated by the human body.20 This resonates with the Confucian 
perspective of ‘embodying our experience’, which is reinforced by the 
tradition’s focus on somatic practice over theoretical speculation.21 
                                                   
16 Kitarō Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, trans. by Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), xxx. 
17 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 58. 
18 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 2. 
19 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 59. 
20 Jana Rošker, ‘Epistemology in Chinese Philosophy’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2015 Edition), accessed on March 9, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/chinese-epistemology/. 
21 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 21; Graham Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility in the Face of Things: 
Somatic Practice in East-Asian Philosophies’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4/3 
(Autumn 2012): 71-75. 
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Ames explains that from this perspective ‘our entire psychophysical 
persons are involved in the process of assimilating and transforming 
the world as it is experienced’.22  
The totality and unity of pure experience are no less dynamic in 
character, as shown in Kōsaka’s example of experiencing a bird moving 
from branch to branch. In the Western tradition, the totality of 
experience has generally been conceived as an ‘aggregate’ of elements.iii 
The experience of the moving bird is therefore perceived in terms of the 
separate branches and the bird. The unity of the movement of the bird 
from one location to another is in turn facilitated through 
consciousness, for example via the unity that results from apperception. 
In pure experience, however, what is actually perceived is the entirety 
of the ‘movement’ of the bird from one branch to another.iv It is the 
whole experience of a moving bird and the context within which this 
movement takes place. This includes the self that perceives the 
movement. The individual elements of the bird and branches, even the 
perceiving self, are only attained after the experience is analysed post-
event. They are therefore secondary in nature. Because the traditional 
Western conception of experience focuses primarily on these 
‘substances’,v it has neglected the movement that is in fact perceived in 
experience and expressed in terms of the ‘relationship of from … to’.vi 
Kōsaka explains that Kant interpreted such relationships in terms of 
the categories, which were transcendental and therefore preceded 
experience. In this sense, Kant’s conception of consciousness was 
substantial because the subjective form of experience, that which 
facilitates the unity of experience by establishing the causal 
relationships that exist between individual entities, is believed to be 
completely separate from the objective contents of the experience itself. 
This resulted in the re-postulation of the strict dualism between the 
                                                   
22 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 21. 
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subject and object that has been so central to Western philosophy. For 
Nishida, however, it is in fact the ‘relationships’vii expressed through 
‘verbs’ and ‘prepositions’ that are of greater importance than the 
‘substances’ represented by ‘nouns’.viii This is because it is these 
relationships that capture the dynamism of a lived experience and 
therefore life itself.23 
In terms of the political philosophy of Kōsaka, the unity of 
subject and object translates into the unity and mutual co-dependency 
of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ within the social world. The ontological significance of 
this relationship is perhaps best captured by Kōsaka’s fellow Chūō 
Kōron participant Iwao Kōyama: 
 
I and Thou constitute an ontological unity that should not be 
separated. I without Thou is not I … Because separating one 
from the other makes both concepts meaningless, I and Thou, 
though including moments of antagonism, is an ontological unit 
that should not be examined any further. As the direct state of 
social existence, [the unity of] I and Thou represents the 
smallest ontological unit, permitting no further analysis (even if 
such an analysis were undertaken it would no longer relate to 
social existence).24/ix   
 
Although Kōyama does not specifically use the example of the family, 
in a manner comparable with Confucianism he identifies the smallest 
ontological unit as a social group of interdependent persons. Kōsaka 
also recognises the fundamental sociality of human beings in this way: 
‘The I is unable to support itself without Thou. In this sense we are 
                                                   
23 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 58-62. 
24 Iwao Kōyama, Bunka-ruikei-gaku no gainen [The Concepts of Cultural Typology] (Nagano: 
Shinanokyōikukai, 1933), 3-4. 
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essentially social existences’.25/x This results in an interpretation of the 
political world that is remarkably similar to Confucianism. For 
example, the Chinese character for benevolent conduct (仁/ren) literally 
means the ‘best relationship ‘of-two-persons’’.26 Ames and Rosemont 
explain that the concept of ren ‘underscores the Confucian assumption 
that one cannot become a person by oneself – we are … irreducibly 
social’.27 An important aspect of ren is the fulfilment of the 
responsibilities that accompany the relationships that define us as 
people in the wider ethical community. A similar conception of moral 
responsibility is identifiable in Kōsaka’s political philosophy as well, 
thanks to the ontological importance he assigns to the interdependence 
of ‘I and Thou’. It should be noted that during the Chūō Kōron 
discussions both Kōyama and Kōsaka openly discuss the relationships 
that transpire within a family between a parent and child and between 
a husband and wife. Kōyama in particular describes the family as the 
‘most fundamental model in all human ethics’ and believes it can form 
the basis for developing the new moral principles that would be 
required for the success of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.28 
 However, relational ontology is not only concerned with the 
horizontal relationships that exist between individuals, but also with 
the vertical relationships that exist between a particular person and 
the various social groups to which he or she belongs, such as the family, 
the local community and the state, as well as the world as a whole.29 
This relationship is also strongly implied in Nishida’s discussions on 
                                                   
25 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki Sekai, 46.  
26 Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept’, 35. 
27 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 48. 
28 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Second Symposium’, 237-252; Although his conception of the family is 
very different to that of Confucianism, it is worth noting the ethical importance that Hegel also 
attributes to the family as the immediate phase of objective spirit – Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 
110-122.  
29 Based on Nishida’s logic of place, I interpret the family, the local community and the state in 
terms of an ever widening topos of social existence that envelops all lower ‘places’ within it. 
Because each place represents nothingness for the subject therein, I believe it is beneficial to 
distinguish between the ‘horizontal’ relationships within a particular topos and the ‘vertical’ 
relationships that exist between different places. See pages 67-68 below. 
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the unity of subject and object in the context of pure experience, a 
theme that remained an important philosophical concern throughout 
his career. Dalissier indicates that a similar conception of the unity of 
consciousness and reality is discernible in the Confucian tradition as 
well, as exemplified in the opening passages of the Great Learning.30 
Specifically, this text describes the deep interconnectedness of all 
things from the heart-mind of the individual to the great expanse of 
All-Under-Heaven. This is said to have allowed the sage kings of the 
past to bring tranquillity to the world through the careful 
‘investigation of things’ (格物/gewu) within their innermost self, 
ensuring the sincerity of their intentions and the rectification of their 
hearts.31  
The ‘investigation of things’ refers to a fundamental 
comprehension of the ‘Pattern’ that underlies reality.32 Andrew Plaks 
describes this as ‘understanding the place and meaning of all things in 
the world’ or the ‘inalienable ‘interrelatedness’ of self and other in the 
… centre of inner selfhood’.33 This generally follows the interpretation 
of the Great Learning that is presented by the Neo-Confucian thinker 
Wang Yang-Ming, who is described by Goto-Jones as one of Nishida’s 
preferred Confucian scholars.34 Specifically, Wang Yang-Ming argued 
that all people have an innate knowledge of the ‘Principle of Nature’, 
which they share in unity with all other things.35 In this sense, there is 
no strict distinction between the internal (subject) and external (object) 
                                                   
30 Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’, 214. 
31 Daxue & Zhongyong, 135; See also Ian Johnston and Wang Ping, ‘Introduction: The Daxue’, 
in Daxue and Zhongyong, 22-24. 
32 Bryan Van Norden, ‘Wang Yangming’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by 
Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2014 Edition), accessed March 9, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/wang-yangming/. 
33 Andrew Plaks, ‘Appendix I: Further Discussion of Basic Concepts’, in Ta Hsüeh and Chung 
Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean), trans. Andrew 
Plaks (London & New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 111. 
34 Goto-Jones, Political philosophy in Japan, 39. 
35 Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 
trans. by Wing-tsit Chan (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1963). The 
Instructions for Practical Living will be abbreviated as IPL in all references hereafter. 
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or the individual person and the world as a whole as everything is a 
part of Nature and is therefore governed by the same Principle or 
Pattern: 
 
The mind is the Way, and the Way is Heaven. If one knows the 
mind, he knows both the Way and Heaven (IPL 1:68).  
 
As a consequence, the true meaning of the ‘investigation of things’ was 
to be found in inner reflection or ‘rectifying’ (格/ge) the heart-mind so 
as to recover one’s original nature in alignment with Heaven and 
Earth: 
 
The great man regards Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as 
one body. He regards the world as one family and the country as 
one person. As to those who make a cleavage between objects 
and distinguish between the self and other, they are small 
men.36 
 
The concept of pure experience is also based on a similar notion of 
interrelatedness. Firstly, experience is itself dependent on the unity of 
subject and object facilitated through the mediation of a living body, 
which is both a part of the world that is experienced and the means 
through which perception of this world is possible. Secondly, it is from 
the unity of subject and object within pure experience that the notions 
of self and other emerge. They are therefore both dependent upon this 
unity for their respective identities. Becoming self-aware of this 
                                                   
36 Inquiry on the Great Learning in Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo Confucian 
Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 269-280; See also Zhu Xi’s commentary to the Doctrine of the 
Mean: ‘The Way … is the virtue of all natures, and in all cases is the mind-heart. There is 
nothing that does not have it. There is no time that it is not so … Now because Heaven and 
Earth, the ten thousand things, and myself are all one substance, if my heart-mind is rectified, 
then the mind-hearts of Heaven and Earth are also rectified; if my qi (spirit, vital force) is 
propitious, then the qi of Heaven and Earth is also propitious’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 411. 
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interrelatedness in turn facilitates the sincerity of intentions, since the 
sage-king thereby recognises his dependency on the other for his own 
existence, helping him to overcome ‘egocentrism’ and rectify his heart-
mind.37 Thanks to the Confucian ‘predilection for correlative thinking’, 
which emphasises the correspondences that are discernible between a 
‘microcosm and macrocosm’, the sage-king was in turn able to extend 
his personal self-cultivation out to the family, the state and eventually 
to All-Under-Heaven.38 
 Dalissier goes on to highlight the epistemic similarities between 
the ‘unity of man and cosmos’ that is taught in the Confucian tradition 
and Nishida’s ethical discussions on ‘sincerity’ in the context of the 
unification of consciousness that is attained through the ‘mutual 
forgetting of self and other, and to a merging of subject and object’.39 In 
the Great Learning, the notion of ‘making your intentions cheng 誠 
(genuine, true, sincere) is to forbid deception in yourself’, implying the 
need to properly recognise and embody one’s place in the field of inter-
relations.40 In the Doctrine of the Mean, sincerity is further associated 
with the ‘Way of Heaven’; that is the processes and patterns of Nature 
or the world at large.41 In Confucianism, these patterns were often 
interpreted in terms of the interactions of the complementary pairings 
of Yin and Yang.42 The person who embodies sincerity is in alignment 
                                                   
37 Daxue & Zhongyong, 135; Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility’, 72. 
38 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 162; Daxue and Zhongyong. 
39 Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’, 215 & 220. 
40 Daxue & Zhongyong, 153; Dalissier uses the James Legge translation which states that 
‘What is meant by “making the thoughts sincere” is allowing no self-deception’ – The Great 
Learning by Confucius, trans. James Legge (University of Adelaide: ebooks@Adelaide, 2010). 
Available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748g/. A highly suggestive though 
somewhat problematic rendering is provided by Andrew Plaks: ‘What is meant by the words: 
‘achieving a state of integral wholeness within one’s innermost consciousness’ is that one must 
avoid all manner of self-deception’ – Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung (The Highest Order of 
Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean), 11. 
41 Daxue & Zhongyong, 457. 
42 Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nitsuite’, 287-301; See also Zhu Xi’s commentary to the 
Doctrine of the Mean: ‘Heaven, through Yin and Yang and the Five Phases, transforms and 
gives rise to the ten thousand things’; ‘[T]he ends and beginnings of things are nothing other 
than what are created by the merging and the dispersing of Yin and Yang’ – Daxue and 
Zhongyong, 409; 437. 
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with the Way of Heaven because they are able ‘to be in the centre … 
without effort’ and ‘to attain without thinking’.43 This is comparable to 
Nishida’s later conception of action-intuition, the seeds of which are 
also to be found in the philosophy of pure experience.44 In An Inquiry 
into the Good, the notion of goodness is conceived specifically in terms 
of the ‘satisfaction of a sincere demand’ for the unification of 
consciousness or the merging of subject and object. Dalissier concludes 
that Nishida’s account of personality may therefore ‘indicate the fact of 
choosing the good and thus “realize the celestial part in each human 
being,” as we find expressed in the [Doctrine of the] Mean’.45  
Nishida interprets sincerity ‘in the sense of the truly deepest 
demands of spirit as a whole’, continuing that these ‘true demands’ are 
not artificially created by us but are rather ‘facts of nature’.46 This may 
be understood in terms of our inherent natural dispositions, the 
patterns and processes of Nature itself, and our fundamental sociality 
as part of the wider community. Kōsaka presents an appraisal of pure 
experience that is remarkably similar to that of Dalissier: 
 
True goodness is the consummation of the individual or self-
realisation. What is more, the realisation of the self is also the 
                                                   
43 Daxue & Zhongyong, 457; Dalissier uses the Legge translation which states that ‘He who 
possesses sincerity is he who, without an effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, without 
the exercise of thought’ – The Doctrine of the Mean – Confucius, trans. James Legge 
(University of Adelaide: ebooks@Adelaide, 2014). Available at 
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748d/. Plaks writes: “Integral wholeness’ means a 
state of centred balance requiring no striving, complete attainment requiring no mental effort’ 
– Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung (The Highest Order of Cultivation and On the Practice of the 
Mean), 42; See also Analects 6.29. 
44 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 64. 
45 Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’, 220-221; Compare Kitarō Nishida, 
‘Appendix: A Translation of Nishida’s “General Summary” from The System of Self-
Consciousness of the Universal’, trans. by Robert Wargo, in The Logic of Nothingness: A Study 
of Nishida Kitarō, 205-206: ‘[A]s one continues to go deeper in the noetic direction of the self 
that truly sees (sees while being nothing), as one reaches the historical self, both the noetic self 
and ideal determination can no longer be seen … a “historical idea” cannot be observed. All 
that can be seen are the forms, such as a historical period, on the analogy of expressions … 
History is the acting-self trying to see “ideas” as noetic determinations of the profound life. The 
real matter of history is not sensation … but the deep flow of our life’.   
46 Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 144. 
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realisation of the life of Nature. It is the actualisation of the 
Mandate of Heaven (天命/tenmei). Nishida’s theory of ethics is a 
theory of energetism, a theory of self-realisation. To seek for or 
to move toward the good is to know one’s true self; to coincide 
with the true existence of the self is considered the highest 
good.xi 
 
To know one’s true self is to overcome egocentrism and realise one’s 
place within the field of relations. It is also to understand the ways of 
Nature. This is possible because as living beings we are able to know 
other living beings, including the life of the cosmos or the great 
expanse of Nature. As Kōsaka explains, ‘the life or unifying power of 
the cosmos is no different from our own life or the unifying power of the 
self’.47/xii Moreover, through comprehending the interactions of Yin and 
Yang within Nature it is possible to regulate human praxis in 
alignment with the ‘Pattern of Heaven’, allowing for effortless action in 
one’s relationship with others and the world.48/xiii As a result, the 
Confucian gentleman is endowed with the power or virtue (徳/toku /de) 
to attract and influence others through the ‘sympathetic resonance’ 
that is facilitated by our shared qi (気) energies.49 This is why the self-
cultivation of the sage-kings could be extended out to All-Under-
Heaven.  
Taking the influence of Confucianism on Nishida’s philosophy 
seriously sheds light on the reason why the unity of subject and object 
had such important ethical implications. He therefore interprets 
freedom not as something that opposes nature, but as something that 
                                                   
47 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 67-68; 64. 
48 Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nitsuite’, 289; To be in alignment with the Principle or 
Pattern of Heaven is associated with the idea of attaining the centre: ‘The Way is the proper 
expression of heavenly principle; it is being central and nothing more’ (Zhu Xi) – Daxue and 
Zhongyong, 417; See also Analects 6.29. 
49 Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility’, 73-74.  
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is realised through following our true nature.50 In other words, 
goodness is the result of making the most of ‘our personal qualities and 
careers as contextualised members of a specific community’.51 Dalissier 
goes on to cite Confucius’s own references to the sincerity of intentions 
during the performance of the rites, the means through which a person 
coordinates his or her behaviour in line with accepted social customs, 
as well as the significance of forgetting or subduing the self (克己/keji) 
in regard to their proper execution.52 This reaffirms the practical 
implications of sincerity and the inherent emptiness of the self in the 
Confucian tradition. It also invokes further comparisons with Nishida’s 
later conception of action-intuition and the related idea of ‘from the 
created to the creating’, which is also interpreted in terms of the 
relationship of ‘from … to’. 
 Within the social world, the vertical dimension of relational 
ontology comes to be interpreted in terms of the logic of place. The 
foundations of this logic may be traced back to Nishida’s early concern 
for the dynamic relations of experience expressed through verbs and 
prepositions over the substantiality of the noun. This is because the 
basis of the logic of place is the form of a simple judgment which is 
understood in terms of a universal predicate that subsumes or 
envelopes the substantiality of a particular subject. For example, in the 
judgment ‘red is a colour’, red is the particular and colour the universal. 
Rephrased in spatial terms, colour is the place within which the 
particular of red is located. It is therefore the context within which red 
is distinguished from other colours such as blue, thereby determining 
its identity. In relation to the social world, the interactions that occur 
between particular things on the same plane of existence, for example 
between different individuals or between comparable social groups, are 
                                                   
50 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 67. 
51 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 57. 
52 Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’, 220 & 218; See Analects 3.4 & 12.1. 
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also located within a place that constitutes the specific context of these 
interactions.53 For instance, the interaction between a parent and a 
child occurs within the place or context of the family, thereby ensuring 
the interactions are of a familial nature. Different families in turn 
interact within the place of the community, different communities 
within the state and so on. This allows for analogies to be drawn 
between the respective interactions that take place within higher 
(macrocosm) and lower (microcosm) planes of social existence, though 
the specific context of each level determines the nature of these 
interactions. This is comparable to the teachings of the Great Learning 
and the related methodology of correlative thinking.  
 Although the principle ontological unit of Kōsaka’s philosophy is 
the unity of I and Thou, his focus on history and politics ensures that 
he is primarily concerned with the interactions that take place between 
the various peoples, nations and states that populate the historical 
world and which he conceived as the true subjects of history. 
Nevertheless, he understood these interactions in terms of the 
interdependence of ‘I and Thou’: – ‘Just as there is no I without Thou, 
there is no state without other states’.54/xiv In this sense, he would also 
seem to adopt a form of correlative thinking in his philosophy, allowing 
him to draw analogies between the interrelations of individuals and 
the interrelations of social groups. His focus on the relationships 
between different groups and the responsibilities that result are in 
turn consistent with the ideal of benevolence (仁/ren) as employed at 
higher levels of social existence. For example, he argues that other 
peoples and nations (民族/minzoku) must not be treated only as the 
means to achieving national goals, but in terms of mediation and 
therefore mutual co-dependency. Moreover, this requires recognition of 
                                                   
53 Iwao Kōyama, Nishida tetsugaku [Nishida Philosophy] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1951), 33-
53; Stevens, ‘The Transcendental Path’, 60. 
54 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 251.  
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the self-determination and independence of these other peoples, 
through which the self-determination and independence of the nation 
to which one belongs is also assured.55 This is consistent with the 
interactions that take place between the states participating in the 
Confucian ideal of All-Under-Heaven and Mencius’s discussions on 
benevolent government. Ames and Rosemont explain that the concept 
of harmony in the Confucian tradition was understood in terms of 
cooperative relations that enhance the parties concerned while 
respecting their ‘separate and particular identities’.56 This remains the 
case across the various levels of social existence. The result is a very 
different conception of international relations. 
 Parkes explains that in the Western tradition the tendency to 
think in terms of ‘autonomous selves’ allows for a transition from the 
idea of a group of self-interested individuals forming associations based 
on a social contract, to the idea of a group of self-interested nation-
states forming similar associations at the international level, as in the 
case of the League of Nations.57 Tingyang Zhao interprets this in terms 
of a Western political system premised on the singular entities of 
‘individuals, nations and internationals’.58 By contrast, in 
Confucianism the expectation is for a ‘plurality of nations to behave 
more as different members of a family’.59 This is reflected by the 
reverential designations of ‘cousins, brothers, uncles and nephews’ that 
were used to refer to the leaders of the tributary nations of the Chinese 
Empire.60 Zhao interprets this as a political system based on the group-
like entities of ‘families, states and All-Under-Heaven’.61 While an 
emphasis on groups does not rule out ‘competition and disputes 
                                                   
55 Kōsaka, Minzoku no Tetsugaku, 129-131. 
56 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 56. 
57 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 163.  
58 Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept’, 33. 
59 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 163. 
60 Cho-Yun Hsu, ‘Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations’, Ethics & International 
Affairs, Vol. 5 (1991): 151. 
61 Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept’, 33. 
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between members’, it does result in a different understanding of the 
type of relationships that are thought to obtain between the various 
states participating in ‘All-Under-Heaven’. This is because the focus is 
on maintaining the harmony of this enlarged family over securing the 
autonomy of the ‘discrete’ individual units that have negotiated 
‘themselves into some sort of trans-social contract’.62 The Confucian 
idea of All-Under-Heaven offers an important East Asian precedent for 
the Kyoto School’s speculations on the Co-Prosperity Sphere.63 For 
example, Sadami Suzuki believes that the Chūo Kōron discussions 
depicted a ‘vision of family’ in which Japan acted as the ‘father’ 
nation.64 Though hierarchical in conception, in the Confucian tradition 
the relationship between a father and his children is the root of 
benevolent conduct and therefore harmonious interactions in the 
world.65 It is for this reason that Kōsaka believed that Japanese 
regional leadership had the potential to overcome the failings of 
Western imperialism. On the other hand, the Chūō Kōron participants 
also discussed the importance of the ‘existential’ relationship that 
exists in the family between husband and wife, which is based on an 
emotional bond that is freely chosen. In this sense it is no good simply 
forcing a hierarchical structure on the members of the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere as a similar emotional commitment was also needed among its 
members (Kōyama).66 
 
                                                   
62 Parkes, ‘The definite internationalism of the Kyoto School’, 163. 
63 Kōsaka et al., ‘The Third Symposium’, 302. 
64 Masako Hayashi, ‘Kindai Nihon no (Minzoku Seishin) niyoru (Kokumin Bunka) no Keifu: 
Doitsu to no Hikaku wo Shiza toshite [A Genealogy of ‘National Culture’ based on the 
‘Nationalist Spirit’ of Modern Japan: A Viewpoint from a Comparison with Germany]’, Gifu 
Daigaku Chiiki Gakubu Kenkyū Hōkoku no. 25 (2009): 20. 
65 Compare G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. by Williams Wallace and  A.V. 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 218: ‘The rights of the father of the family over 
its members are equally duties towards them, just as the children’s duty of obedience is their 
right to be brought up to be free human beings’. 
66 Kōsaka et al, ‘The Second Symposium’, 248. 
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3b: The Hermeneutics of Roads  
Although Kōsaka does not specifically refer to the idea of a 
relational ontology in his philosophy, his short essay ‘The Hermeneutic 
Structure of Roads’ demonstrates his recognition of the relational 
outlook of the East Asian tradition and its importance for his 
speculations. In this short paper, which he presented at a philosophy 
conference held to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Dōshisha 
University in 1935, he discusses the significance of roads within the 
historical world. He goes on to associate this analysis with the East 
Asian philosophies of the Way, a concept that is itself expressed using 
the Chinese character for road (道/michi). As with all things in the 
historical world, roads are interpreted in terms of a dialectical logic 
that reflects the contradictory nature of historical phenomena. 
Specifically, he identifies the dynamism of roads in their ‘publicness’xv 
and ‘infinitude’,xvi the static nature of roads in their ‘fixedness’xvii and 
‘restrictiveness’,xviii and the moment of mediation in terms of their 
‘reversibility’.xix For example, all roads are public in the sense that they 
permit the passage of other people. What is more, roads lead us to a 
world that unfolds infinitely into the distance. However, through their 
repeated use roads become fixed or established in place, thereby 
restricting the direction and location of human activity. Finally, roads 
are multidirectional. Not only do they invite us to enter into the world, 
but they bring the ‘unknown world’ closer to us.xx Kōsaka continues 
that the historical meaning of roads is to be found within two specific 
phenomena that they facilitate: ‘encounters’xxi and ‘wanderings’.xxii By 
stepping out into the world along roads we are able to encounter the 
other or the ‘Thou’ upon which the identity of ‘I’ depends. It is through 
such meetings that we also encounter and take part in the historical 
world itself. Moreover, it is via the experiences of our wanderings or 
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travels that we grow as people. Roads therefore facilitate the nurturing 
of the historicity and subjectivity of the ‘I’.67  
Significantly, roads are primarily interpreted in terms of the 
‘temporal space’xxiii that serves as ‘the base of history’.xxiv This is a 
reference to the external environment of nature within the historical 
world. In the narrow sense of the term, this indicates the geographical 
regions or territories that constitute the specific ‘climates’ for the 
peoples that live, cultivate and work upon the land.xxv However, the 
‘place’ or ‘topos’xxvi of the historical world is a ‘subjective nature that is 
contextual, systematic and dynamic’.xxvii This conception of nature is no 
longer simply concerned with the phenomena of the natural world. 
Rather, it is conceived as the historical nature that results from the 
mediation of the material and spiritual within the creative processes of 
historical praxis, through which it becomes the place, location or 
context of human interactions.68 On the one hand, the activities of a 
nation inevitably transform the land as it is incorporated into the 
infrastructures of human society. On the other, through the mediation 
of the subjectivity or agency of a people, nature becomes able to express 
itself within the historical world. The lay of the land, the quality of the 
soil and the distribution of resources all determine the activities of a 
society. Over time, such influences are in turn translated into the 
specific customs, conventions, and mores of a national culture. In this 
sense, the ‘logos of nature’ is absorbed into the traditions of a people, as 
exemplified by numerous legends and myths of antiquity.69/xxviii It is 
the phenomenon of roads, however, that Kōsaka identifies as the 
principle expression of the logos of nature in the historical world. This 
is because it is through roads that external nature or ‘climate’ attains a 
                                                   
67 Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō’, 367-380. 
68 Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō’, 367. 
69 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 232. 
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historical context and dynamism, as well as the subjectivity necessary 
to narrate itself in history.70 
Kōsaka states that the purpose of roads is not simply the 
facilitation of transportation and communication, but rather the broad 
mediation of people via which the historical world itself manifests. 
Within a network of roads, the relationships and livelihoods of 
different people acquire a ‘fixed organisation for the first time’.xxix This 
is because it is through the use of roads that people first ‘stand in the 
world … and become persons’ via their encounters and interactions 
with others.xxx For this reason, ‘it can be said that roads are themselves 
an objective of humanity’.xxxi Kōsaka continues that roads are the 
physical ‘realisation of the relationships between people’ since they are 
the principle means and location for their mediation with each 
other.xxxii Furthermore, ‘this mediation itself acquires its own 
subjectivity’ as a consequence.xxxiii In this way, roads are comparable to 
language as independent expressions within the historical world. In 
other words, roads are a spatial expression of the mediation that has 
taken place between different peoples and between the land and a 
nation. However, whereas language is a human expression, roads are 
interpreted as an expression of the ‘Earth’ itself. Kōsaka 
continues:71/xxxiv 
 
If I am permitted to make a bold generalisation and state that 
Western thought is a philosophy that derives from the logos and 
Eastern thought a philosophy rooted in the Way (道/roads), then 
whereas the logos is language and therefore a human expression, 
roads may be interpreted in terms of the Way of Heaven, which 
is based on the expressiveness of nature.72/xxxv 
                                                   
70 Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō’, 375. 
71 Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō’, 377-379.  
72 Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō’, 379. 
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He goes on to state that while language is open and explicit, the 
expressiveness of roads or the Way is silent and hidden. Although the 
notion of a ‘hidden expression’ is contradictory, ‘it is this contradiction 
itself … that teaches the expressions of Heaven’.73/xxxvi He concludes 
that ‘deep within the phenomenon of roads resides the metaphysics of 
Heaven’, which may be interpreted in terms of the Confucian 
tradition.74/xxxvii 
For Kōsaka, roads are the physical manifestation of the inherent 
interrelatedness of humanity as a social existence. A road is not only a 
means through which different people are able to participate in the 
historical world. It is an objective in itself as it facilitates the very 
relationships that define people as members of a specific community, 
nation or culture. As Kōsaka argues, through the mediation of roads 
‘movement’ itself acquires an independent significance in the historical 
world. It is the dynamism of human interaction that creates history. 
What is more, roads embody the fact that we all reside in the same 
world, via which we are interconnected and mediated.75 The 
relationship between humanity and nature is, however, co-dependent. 
Human activity is bound by the potentiality of nature. In other words, 
the process of historical creation must follow natural laws. 
Nevertheless, the products of this process are no longer a mere 
extension of the natural world, but rather a consequence of the 
mediation of both the material and the spiritual. Roads are only found 
in the historical world, not the natural world. Yet in this way nature 
too becomes endowed with subjectivity and thereby participates in 
history. It therefore confronts us as a ‘Thou’ that speaks and narrates 
                                                   
73 See Analects 17.19; See also Ames and Hall, ‘Glossary of Key Terms’, 64-65.  
74 Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō’, 380. 
75 Kōsaka, ‘Michi no kaishakugaku-teki-kōzō’, 374-375. 
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its logos to us.76/xxxviii In this sense, the Way of Heaven is a result of the 
unity and co-dependence of subject and object or ‘I’ and ‘Thou’. 
The relational outlook of East Asian philosophies has ensured 
that one of the most important concepts of this intellectual tradition is 
also interpreted in terms of roads. Ames and Rosemont explain the 
concept of the Way conveys a variety of meanings: ‘to lead through … 
road, path, way, method, art, teachings; to explain, to tell, doctrines’. 
They continue that at its most fundamental level the concept seems to 
‘denote the active project of “road building,” … to connote a road that 
has been made, and hence can be travelled’. The idea of road building 
suggests that the Way is both inherited from our cultural ancestors, 
and something that is added to in the present. Most significantly, 
Ames and Rosemont argue that it is necessary to ‘distinguish between 
simply travelling on a road, and making the journey one’s own’. It is 
therefore necessary for a person to fully embody their experiences of 
travelling along the Way in order to grow as a person, a process that 
reinforces the Way in turn. The Zhuangzi (2:20) asserts that the ‘Way 
is made in the walking of it’.77 A similar emphasis is found in the 
Confucian tradition as well: ‘The Master said, “It is the person who is 
able to broaden the way, not the way that broadens the person”’ 
(Analects 15.29).78 Significantly, Nishida also talked about roads or the 
Way (道) as the ‘technique of Heaven and Earth’ in his own 
deliberations on East Asian morality.79/xxxix Tetusfumi Hanazawa 
believes that this is consistent with Kōsaka’s discussions on the East 
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Asian philosophies of the Way that developed as a result of the 
relationship between humankind and nature.80    
 
3c: The Philosophy of Change 
An important aspect of the relational ontology of the East Asian 
tradition is its focus on the dynamism, movement and processes of 
change observable in the field of relations that constitute the world. 
Ames and Rosemont highlight the manner in which this differs from 
the substance-based ontology of Western philosophy via the example of 
how a tree is perceived differently in the two traditions. A 
substantially informed understanding of the tree leads to an emphasis 
on its continuity over time. In principle, the tree is regarded as being 
the same tree in essence irrespective of the various changes it 
experiences with the passing of the seasons. Alternatively, ‘in the 
world of lived experience’, over the course of the year the tree is seen to 
flower and bud, grow green leaves that turn brown, and eventually 
become bare as the dead leaves are shed. From the perspective of these 
observable changes, the tree in summer is not perceived to be the same 
tree in winter. Whereas in the West the notion of self-subsistent 
entities has led to a focus on the continuity that is presupposed behind 
the ‘appearances’ of experience, leading to the postulation of 
superordinate principles that are thought to govern reality, in the East 
Asian tradition it is the very changes of experience that are thought to 
represent the truth of existence. For Chinese thinkers, the ‘only 
constant is change itself’. They have therefore shown little interest in 
the ‘essence of things’ or the associated notion of self-identity.81 
Consequently, the principle philosophical questions of the East Asian 
tradition have not been concerned with discerning the truth of reality 
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81 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 23; 29-30; 25. 
77 
 
per se, but rather with the practical matter of establishing the best 
Way in light of a world of constant change.82  
 According to Nathan Sivin, early scientific thought in the West 
interpreted the ‘coherent order’ that is discernible in nature through 
associating the seemingly ‘unchanging reality’ behind the world of 
appearances ‘with some basic stuff out of which all things around us, 
despite their apparent diversity, are formed’.83 Ames and Rosemont 
assert that Sivin’s observations not only apply to the realm of science, 
but may be extended to the realm of ‘ethical discourse’ as well. This is 
because ‘the “basic stuff” of the scientific West resembles the enduring 
self, or soul (“strict self-identity”) of the moral and religious West’.84 In 
the East Asian tradition, however, Sivin explains that the most 
influential scientific explanations ‘made sense of the momentary event 
by fitting it into the cyclical rhythms of natural process’.85 Once more, 
Ames and Rosemont argue that this scientific understanding is 
extendable to the ethical realm in terms of the emphasis that is placed 
on social processes in the Chinese tradition.86 An important example of 
which is the identification of the ‘rhythms of natural process’ with the 
interaction of Yin and Yang as explained in the ‘Great Commentary’ to 
the Yijing or Book of Changes, one of the Five Classics of the Confucian 
tradition. 
 In his analysis of Confucian metaphysics, Tanabe describes the 
Yijing as an attempt to discern the patterns that govern the changes 
and transitions that are experienced by all things through 
comprehending the interactions of the contrary principles of Yin and 
Yang. These principles were derived from observing the various 
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changes that are experienced by the phenomena of Heaven and Earth, 
such as the movement of the sun and moon, the coming of summer and 
winter and the transition from night to day. The concept of Yin 
represents that which is dark, passive, soft, and yielding. This is 
thought to constitute the ground, material or the receptacle for change. 
The concept of Yang, in contrast, is that which is bright, active, hard, 
and firm. It therefore represents the power of birth and generation and 
is regarded as the driver of change. However, the principles of Yin and 
Yang are not conceived as opposites in perpetual conflict, but rather 
the reciprocal poles of the single order that has emerged from out of the 
‘Great Ultimate’.xl This Tanabe defines as the unifying principle of all 
things. Why this had happened was deemed inconsequential since the 
interactions of Yin and Yang were seemingly capable of explaining the 
changes that actually take place in the world. Of greater importance 
was the need to comprehend the nature of this interaction so as to 
guide human behaviour in accordance with these processes. This was 
primarily understood in terms of the interactions that are observable 
between the various complementary pairings that are identifiable in 
the world, such as man and woman, husband and wife, lord and vassal, 
even Heaven and Earth itself. Sufficient knowledge of these 
interactions in turn permitted the regulation of human praxis in 
alignment with the so-called ‘Pattern of Heaven’.xli Following this 
pattern thereby contributed to the establishment and maintenance of a 
harmonious society.87 
 Although the world is in a state of continuous flux it is possible 
to discern patterns and cycles within change, as in the case of the 
yearly transition of the four seasons.88 This apparent order within 
nature was attributed to the interactions of Yin and Yang, and it was 
thought that a similar state of order could be realised in society by 
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ensuring that human praxis followed a comparable set of patterns. For 
instance, ‘just as there is Heaven and Earth’ in the natural world, 
there is a need to distinguish ‘between above and below’ in the social 
world (Xunzi 9.70).89 However, these relationships were not simply 
conceived in terms of a restrictive hierarchy of subservience. Without 
the ruler (Yang) the people would lack direction and be without order, 
but without the rich diversity of the common people (Yin) in terms of 
the breadth of occupations necessary to allow a community to function, 
society itself would fall into ruin. Yin and Yang are not understood in 
terms of a confrontational opposition, but in terms of mutual co-
dependence. The principle of Yin is that which allows the movement of 
Yang. Yin is the mediation that is necessary for the Great Ultimate to 
invoke motion as Yang.90 What is more, there is nothing in the world 
that is deemed inherently Yin and Yang ‘in and of itself’. It is only in 
‘relation to one or more other “things”’ that something exhibits the 
characteristics of one or the other. Consequently, a change of context 
results in a corresponding change in the respective dominance of Yin or 
Yang.91 This means that different situations require different 
responses. Just as a farmer must sow in the spring, nurture in the 
summer, harvest in the autumn, and take stock in the winter, the ruler 
must too behave in a proper manner at the appropriate time. For 
instance, the king must not ‘interfere with the busy seasons in the 
fields’ (Mencius 1A:3).92 
 The Confucian conception of the person is also influenced by the 
specific ‘correlationality’ of an individual with others and the world ‘at 
any given time, with differing relations holding at different times’. In 
the Confucian worldview ‘relatedness’ is considered ‘intrinsic and 
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constitutive’. Consequently, ‘the dissolution of relationships’ is said to 
be ‘surgical, diminishing both parties in the degree that a particular 
relationship is important to them’. In other words, a change in the 
nature of a relationship results in a comparable change in the very 
nature of the persons involved in this relationship. We also change as 
persons when different relationships take precedence over others at 
different times and in different contexts. For example, a particular 
individual may be both a father within the family and a merchant 
within the community. However, how this individual behaves in the 
context of these distinct roles in relation to his children and customers 
is very different, on occasion even contradictory. The respective 
natures of these distinct social roles are also susceptible to changes 
over time. Although filial piety is a key value within the Confucian 
tradition, what defines a filial act between a parent and child is 
dependent on their respective circumstances. For instance, while still 
young a child stands in a ‘relationship of beneficiary to their parents’. 
However, as the child becomes an adult and the parents grow older, 
their respective roles switch so that the child is the benefactor and the 
parents the beneficiaries. In other words, ‘no one … is either benefactor 
or beneficiary in and of herself, but only in relation to specific others at 
specific times’.93 
 Confucian values are sometimes presented as static moral 
principles comparable to the ethical doctrines of the Western 
tradition.94 For example, Kant viewed morality as a rational science. 
He therefore believed it was possible to ascertain one correct course of 
action for all circumstances based on the dicta of the categorical 
imperative. For instance, lying is always considered to be morally 
                                                   
93 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 23-24. 
94 See Julia Ching, ‘Chinese Ethics and Kant’, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1978): 
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wrong.95 However, such portrayals of Confucian principles ignore the 
importance of the ever-changing circumstances of the social world. 
Although the notion of yi (義) is often translated as ‘righteousness, 
morality or duty’, encouraging comparisons with Western moral 
theories, Ames and Rosemont believe that it is perhaps better to 
understand this concept as ‘one’s sense of appropriateness that enables 
one to act in a proper and fitting manner, given the specific 
circumstances’.96 In relation to the behaviour of the Confucian 
gentleman Xunzi (3.60) states that ‘Through yi (義), he changes and 
adapts to circumstances, because he knows when it is appropriate to 
bend and straighten’. For example, the sage king Shun lied to his 
parents about his marriage in order to fulfil his filial duty to the extent 
that this was possible given the circumstances: If he had told them 
then he ‘would have to put aside the most important of human 
relationships [between a man and a woman] and this would sour his 
relationship with his parents’ (Mencius 5A:2). It is for similar reasons 
that Confucius often gave different answers to the same question 
depending on who he was talking to.97 This is because everyone is 
different in terms of their character, natural ability and personal 
circumstances – ‘The gentleman is neither presumptuous nor secretive 
or blind; he carefully acts according to the other person’s character’ 
(Xunzi 1.200). All of these things are again susceptible to the changes 
that inevitably accompany the flow of time. Watsuji points out that the 
passages of the Analects are each short propositions that are like 
aphorisms. Many are a ‘living dialogue’ from which it is possible to 
discern the character and personalities of the Master’s pupils, as well 
as the probable circumstances within which the exchange took place.xlii 
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Their continued relevance lies in the fact that they accurately capture 
the inherent sociality of human existence.98  
The emphasis on change in the Eastern tradition has translated 
into political theory as well. Just like the natural world is determined 
by the cycle of life and death, the social world is defined by the cycle of 
rise and fall. As a consequence, the establishment of peace and 
harmony within a community is ultimately a transient state of affairs 
because political reality never remains the same. A ruler must 
continuously strive to maintain his virtue (徳/de /toku). This is not only 
to ensure that his personal desires do not interfere with the 
responsibilities of government, but because the validity of any regime 
in the Confucian world is premised on its ability to act appropriately in 
different situations.99 This requires a deep insight into the particular 
patterns or processes that are dominant in the present moment, one of 
the main reasons why the Book of Changes was such an important text 
in the East Asian tradition.100 Any failure in this regard would put a 
regime in jeopardy because it suggested that the moral vitality of the 
ruler was in decline as his actions had begun to deviate from the ‘Way 
of Heaven and Earth’.101/xliii Whatever the personal failings of the ruler, 
such difficulties necessarily arise because Heaven and Earth are in a 
continuous state of flux, thereby ensuring that different guiding 
principles are required at different times. Mencius (2B:13) suggests 
that every ‘five hundred years a true King should arise … from whom 
an age takes its name’. In the Confucian world, it is a political fact that 
no dynasty is capable of lasting forever. According to Williams this has 
led to the development of a unique pattern of regime change across the 
Sinitic cultures of East Asia, which he refers to as Confucian 
Revolution. 
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The relational ontology at the heart of Kōsaka’s speculations 
ensured that he also perceived the historical world in terms of a 
continual process of change. This is discernible in his appropriation of 
the idea of absolute mediation from Tanabe’s dialectical logic of the 
species – ‘within the historical world, there is nothing that is not 
mediated’.102/xliv All things are therefore embedded in a dynamic field of 
relations with everything else – ‘Press hard on any … aspect of reality 
and another aspect will come into play that matches it’.103 This 
included individual entities such as the self,xlv the nation and the 
state,xlvi which are all recreated anew in each passing moment within 
the process of ‘from the created to the creating’ due to the co-
dependency of subject and object.104 In a manner comparable to the 
Confucian tradition, Kōsaka also identified historical nature as the 
‘source of historical life and death’.105/xlvii The relative power of a 
particular nation on the historical stage is grounded in its ability to 
draw upon the cultural resources at its disposal to respond to the 
problems of an age. The moment that it fails in this its power begins to 
wane. It is in this sense that the Kyoto School philosophers are said to 
have ‘fully anticipated the … arrival of the day when Japan would 
have to yield its leadership role to its hegemonic successor’.106 This is 
why it was so important for Kōsaka that Japan fulfilled its 
responsibilities as the leading member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
help nurture the national subjectivity of the other nations of East Asia. 
If not, the unity achieved under Japanese hegemony in the region 
would disintegrate once its moral energy (道徳的精力/dōtoku-teki-
seiryoku) had been spent. 
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 It is also important to note that the philosophy of Yin and Yang 
represents an influential East Asian forerunner to the dialectical logic 
that the Kyoto School philosophers appropriated from Hegel. Tanabe 
explains that the primary motivation behind the Yijing was to simplify 
the diversity of changes observable in reality through returning them 
to the unity of a constant and unchanging principle. The notion of the 
‘Great Ultimate’ therefore satisfied a ‘demand for the universalisation 
of thought’.xlviii However, this alone was unable to account for the 
dynamism perceived in reality, leading to the further postulation of the 
complementary principles of Yin and Yang. These are thought to have 
emerged from out of the Great Ultimate, the common universal 
through which Yin and Yang are in turn mediated. Unlike the strict 
dualism of ancient Greek and Christian philosophies, the ‘unified 
dualism’ of the Yijing therefore embodies a dialectical unity.107/xlix 
Although it may be argued that Tanabe is guilty of over-reading his 
own appropriation of dialectical logic back into the philosophy of Yin 
and Yang, it is important to acknowledge the conscious decision that 
was made by the Kyoto School philosophers to focus on Western 
thinkers that they identified as more conducive to the cultural 
inheritance of Japan.108 A tentative comparison may therefore be made 
between the triad of Yin, Yang and the Great Ultimate and Kōsaka’s 
own dialectical unity of the historical substratum (material/Yin), 
historical subjectivity (ideal/Yang) and the nothingness-like universal 
(absolute nothingness/Great Ultimate). This comparison is 
strengthened by his description of historical nature as the ‘dark 
foothold’ of history, which he goes on to discuss as both the material 
and receptacle of change within the historical world.109/l   
                                                   
107 Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nitsuite’, 291-297.  
108 Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy’; Saures, The Kyoto School’s Takeover of 
Hegel, xi. 
109 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 174; See Chapter 9 for a detailed analysis of the similarities 
beween Kōsaka’s conception of the historical world and Yin/Yang cosmology. 
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Chapter 3 Japanese Citations 
 
i 我がまずあって、その我が経験する 
 
ii 我とは何かと問われる場合に於いても、世界を意識する我ではなく、世界に於てあり、世界を表
現し、世界に於て働くところの存在する我が問題なのである。かかる意味に於ては、西田哲学は、
初めから単なる主観主義、観念論を越えていると云うべきであろう 
 
iii 雑多的な色彩の集合…普通の経験論は要素から出発して、その結合として全体を考えようとする 
 
iv 運動 
 
v 実体的にのみものを見て 
 
vi from…toの関係 
 
vii 関係の面 
 
viii 名詞的なものよりも、動詞的、前置詞的なものがより一層重要である 
 
ix 私と汝は離すべからざる実在的統一をなす。汝なく汝に対せぬ私は私ではない…そして私と汝を
分離してしまえば私と云い汝と云うは無意味なるが故に、私と汝は対立の契機を含み乍ら之以上分
析すべからざる実在の単位と云わなければならぬ。私と汝は生活の直接事態として之以上の分析を
許さぬ（分析すれば最早や生活ではなくなる）実在の最小単位である 
 
x 汝なくして我は我を支え得ない。我々はかかる意味に於ても本来社会的なる存在である 
 
xi 真の善は個性の完成であり、自己実現である。しかも自己の実現は大自然の生命の実現であり、
天命が行われることである。先生の倫理説は、活動説 energetismであり、自己実現説 self-
realizationである。善を求め、善に遷るのは、真の自己を知ることであり、自己の真実在と一致
するのが最上の善なのである 
 
xii 生きたものは生きたものを知るのである…宇宙の生命、宇宙の統一力は我々の生命、我の統一力
と別物ではなく、一つである 
 
xiii 天理 
 
xiv 汝に対せざる我がなき如く、他の国家に対せざる国家はない 
 
xv 公共性 
 
xvi 無限性 
 
xvii 定着性 
 
xviii 拘束性 
 
xix 可逆性 
 
xx 未知の世界 
 
xxi 出会う 
 
xxii 経巡る 
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xxiii 時間的空間 
 
xxiv 歴史の底面 
 
xxv 風土 
 
xxvi 歴史の場所 
 
xxvii 歴史の場所をなすものは、脈絡を有し、体系を有し、自らに運動を有する主体的なる自然であ
らねばならない 
 
xxviii 自然のロゴス 
 
xxix 道に於て人と人との生活は始めて一定の組織を有つのである 
 
xxx 道に於て人は始めて世の中に立つ…人は始めて人となる 
 
xxxi かくて道そのものが人間にとって目的であると云うことも出来るであろう 
 
xxxii それは人と人の間柄の有つ実在性である 
 
xxxiii しかもその媒介は自らの主体性を有したのである 
 
xxxiv 大地の表現 
 
xxxv もし大胆な概括が許されて、西洋の哲学はロゴスに由来する哲学であり、東洋の哲学は道に根
ざす哲学であると語り得るならば、それもロゴスは言葉であり、言葉は人の表現であるに対して、
道は天の道であり、自然の表現であるに基づく 
 
xxxvi 隠れたる表現とは矛盾であろう。しかしその矛盾こそ…天の表現たることを教えるのではなか
ろうか 
 
xxxvii 道の奥には、天の形而上学…存するのである 
 
xxxviii 一つの汝である 
 
xxxix 道とは天地の技術である 
 
xl 大極 
 
xli 天理 
 
xlii 生きた対話関係 
 
xliii 天地の道 
 
xliv 歴史的世界に於てはいかなるものも無媒介ではない 
 
xlv しかも自己を否定した立場から新たなる創造は起こり、新たなる自己は生起する 
 
xlvi 民族は固定し終わったものではない。むしろ絶えず現在出来上がりつつある 
 
xlvii 歴史的生死の源泉は原始自然ではなかろうか 
 
xlviii 思想の普遍化の要求上 
 
xlix 弁証法的正反合の二元合一的綜合 
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Chapter 4: The Thesis of Confucian Revolution 
4a: Confucian Revolution 
 The establishment of social harmony within a community is 
‘celebrated as the highest cultural achievement’ within the Confucian 
tradition.1 In an ideal society this would be based on the humaneness 
or benevolence (仁/ren) that is nurtured within familial relations and 
realised in the wider community through observance of the rites and 
proper social distinctions. The social hierarchy that emerges is in turn 
founded upon a system of social mobility based on meritocracy: 
‘Promote the worthy and capable without waiting for them to rise 
through the ranks’ (Xunzi 9.1). In reality, however, the respective 
histories of the Sinitic cultures of East Asia have been dominated by 
various forms of ‘Oriental despotism’ or authoritarian rule, be it the 
absolute monarchs of China, the various forms of military government 
in Japan or the Communist dictatorship of modern North Korea.2 This 
is despite the intellectual dominance that the Confucian tradition has 
enjoyed politically across the region for over a millennium. Williams 
interprets the apparent discrepancies between the ideal of benevolent 
government preached by Mencius and the harsh political realities of 
the Confucian world in terms of the concept of ‘Confucianism informed 
by Legalism’ (儒表法里).3 
Although social harmony through benevolent government is the 
principle goal of Confucianism, this is premised on the existence of 
some form of shared community and political organisation: 
 
In order for people to live, they cannot be without community. If 
they form communities but lack social distinctions then they will 
struggle with each other. If they struggle with each other then 
                                                   
1 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 57. 
2 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 6; 20; 23; Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 98. 
3 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 73; Williams, ‘In Response to Thomas Rhydwen’, 81. 
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there will be chaos … to lack social divisions is the greatest 
harm to people, and to have social divisions is the root benefit for 
the whole (Xunzi 9.105).4 
 
It is no coincidence that Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi all travelled to 
meet with the rulers of the various kingdoms of the age in order to 
convince them to adopt the methods of benevolent government. A state 
system was already in place, all that was needed was to convince the 
ruler of the merits of adopting the Confucian Way.  
However, there is no guarantee that there will always be a 
stable political system because all regimes are subject to the cycle of 
rise and fall. While the legendary sage kings are thought to have 
unified the whole of China through the methods of benevolent 
government, the regimes that they established had each fallen into 
moral decline and eventual ruin after their passing. The consequence 
of regime collapse was the outbreak of war and the widespread 
suffering of the people. This is exemplified by the conflicts that arose 
between the various states vying for supremacy in Confucius’s own day 
as a consequence of the centuries of moral decline that had befallen the 
Zhou dynasty.5 As a result, pragmatically minded Confucian thinkers 
such as Xunzi could not ignore the tangible successes of the Legalist 
state of Qin which had established an impressive level of social order 
within its borders.6 This success was consummated with the military 
victory of Qin over all its rivals, establishing the first imperial dynasty 
of China. The excesses of this short-lived dynasty, for instance the 
infamous ‘burning of books’ that was initiated by Xunzi’s former pupil 
and chancellor to the first emperor Li Si, ensured that the moderation 
                                                   
4 See also the Doctrine of the Mean: ‘The Way of man is to strive for government’ – Daxue and 
Zhongyong, 447. 
5 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 2. 
6 John Knoblock, ‘General Introduction’, in Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete 
Works – Volume 1 Books 1-6, trans. by John Knoblock (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990), 8-9; See Xunzi 15.155 & 16.230. 
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espoused by Confucianism would become the political standard for its 
successor the Han. Nevertheless, the Qin dynasty had shown that the 
standardisation of laws and the homogenisation of ideas could unify 
the various peoples of China, thereby establishing the social order that 
was necessary for nurturing social harmony and benevolent conduct 
across the empire.7 The early successes of the Qin and the political 
stability established by the Han thereafter gave political credence to 
the Confucian assertion that there ‘is one Way and one only’ (Mencius 
3A:1). Not in the sense that there is only one correct method for 
governing a community in all circumstances, but in the sense that 
there needs to be one consensus about the method for governing a 
community in the current circumstances. This is part of the reason 
why Williams describes the Way as ‘a form; not a content’.8 
 Because the world is in a continuous state of flux, the balance of 
Yin and Yang within a society will at some point be thrown out of 
kilter. This is not a question of if, only a question of when. The 
resulting demise of a regime leads to the disintegration of the 
conditions necessary for maintaining the harmony of the community. 
Drawing upon the respective lessons of the Qin and Han dynasties, a 
method of regime change emerged within the Confucian world that 
would ensure that any new government would be strong enough to 
‘withstand the forces of history’ for as long as possible, in turn 
prolonging the social order necessary to facilitate a peaceful and 
harmonious society. Williams refers to this process as Confucian 
Revolution (易姓革命), based on the triad of toku (徳/de), a complex idea 
of moral energy and political effectiveness that I render as virtue, 
tenkō (転向), the political conversion of a population, and tenmei (天命
/tianxia) or the Mandate of Heaven. However, rigorous governments in 
                                                   
7 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 71; 68. 
8 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 53. 
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the Confucian world have often been despotic in nature and secured 
through military conquest. Nevertheless, the social order that is 
achieved by the stable government that emerges from an emphatic 
military victory, even if that of an authoritarian regime, is in the end 
deemed more desirable than the social chaos that results from the 
outright collapse of the political system.9  
As a consequence, the practical role of Confucianism over the 
centuries has been to curb ‘the excesses of the pioneering Qin 
experiment’ and therefore to ‘ameliorate the worst effects of 
authoritarian rule’: 
 
Qin’s power to inspire awe rattles all within the four seas … 
Nevertheless, its worries and troubles are innumerable … Let it 
curtail its use of awe-inspiring power and return to good form … 
let it employ gentleman who are upright, have integrity, possess 
trustworthiness and perfect themselves, and let it bring order to 
all under Heaven (Xunzi 16.265).10 
 
While seemingly contradictory in orientation – Legalism as a political 
doctrine of strict regimentation and harsh punishments, and 
Confucianism as a moral doctrine of benevolent conduct and filial piety 
– Williams believes they represent ‘two sides of the same … coin’. In 
other words, they are the Yin and Yang of East Asian political reality.11 
As Kōsaka points out, political insight cannot be based purely on 
‘philosophical meditation’.i After all, a political crisis may require an 
immediate response to ensure the survival of the state. This is one 
reason for the emergence of Machiavellian realism in the Western 
tradition. Nevertheless, the political cannot separate itself entirely 
                                                   
9 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 69; 11-12; 21. 
10 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 76; 71. 
11 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 79. 
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from the ethical because rulers must be prepared to bear the 
responsibility for what takes place during their reign.12 Herein lies the 
so-called ‘right of rebellion’ in Mencius’s thought.13 Certainly, 
Confucianism sets high moral standards in regard to political conduct. 
In practice, however, the intellectual hegemony that the tradition has 
enjoyed across East Asia has been based on a pragmatic compromise 
between the philosophical ideal and the harsh lessons of history.  
Although the three concepts of toku, tenkō, and tenmei are 
interrelated, it is a secularised version of the Mandate of Heaven that 
is pivotal for comprehending Confucian Revolution. This is because it is 
the Mandate of Heaven that bestows moral legitimacy upon a political 
regime through conceptions of ‘destiny, moral authority, practical 
effectiveness’, and critically for Williams, ‘raw power’. Despite the 
‘traditional Confucian suspicion of warriors’, the person embodying the 
virtue (徳/toku) necessary for securing the Mandate of Heaven is often 
described as having great military leadership:14  
 
Collecting and harmonizing, he will form a unified force … When 
extended, they are like the long blade of Moye – those who touch 
it will be cleaved. When pointed, they are like the sharp tip of 
Moye – those who confront it will be ruptured. When they 
encamp in a circle or establish perimeter in a square, they are 
like a massive boulder – those who charge against it will have 
their horns broken. Accordingly, the opposing force, defeated and 
disgraced, will withdraw (Xunzi 15.55). 
 
                                                   
12 Kōsaka, ‘Rekishi tetsugaku to seiji tetsugaku’, 70-71. 
13 Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston & 
Tokyo: Houghton Mifflin Co. & Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1962), 81.   
14 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 25; 98; See Analects 12.19, 13.11; Mencius 1B:11, 
4A:14, 6B:9; Xunzi 8.355, 9.135, 9.465 and Chapter 15. 
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Xunzi is here talking about a ruler who practises the Confucian Way – 
he is successful in military affairs because he implements benevolent 
government and has therefore secured the loyalty of his people and the 
admiration of his foes. Nonetheless, military success hereby comes to 
embody a strong indication of the virtue (徳/toku) of a ruler or would-be 
successor to the Mandate of Heaven. This is because a successful 
military campaign represents an impressive logistical feat that 
demonstrates the leader’s firm grasp of political reality or the Pattern 
of Heaven, which as Kosaka points out has been an important aspect of 
the success of many great generals in the past, as well as the leader’s 
ability to command, motivate and organise the people.15/ii Williams 
concludes that might ‘makes right in Confucian Asia because for might 
to succeed it must be right; and, having triumphed, might is assumed 
to be right until proven otherwise’.16 
 It is important to note that Williams’s focus on the significance 
of military ‘might’ contradicts the core teachings of Confucian thinkers 
such as Mencius and Xunzi, both of whom emphasise the virtue (徳/de) 
of the exemplary person over brute physical force: 
 
There are people who say, “I am expert at military formation; I 
am expert at waging war.” This is a grave crime. If the ruler of a 
state is drawn to benevolence he will have no match in the 
Empire (Mencius 7B:4). 
 
                                                   
15 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 89; Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 166. 
16 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 25; Compare ‘Chapter 1: On Assessments’ in Sun-
Tzu: The Art of Warfare – The First English Translation Incorporating the Recently 
Discovered Yin-Ch’üeh-Shan Texts, trans. by Roger Ames (New York & Toronto: A Ballantine 
Book/Random House Publishing Group, 1993), 102-105: ‘[T]o gauge the outcome of war we 
must appraise the situation on the basis of the following … criteria … The first … is the Way 
… The Way is what brings the thinking of the people in line with their superiors. Hence you 
can send them to their deaths or let them live, and they will have no misgivings … Therefore, 
to gauge the outcome of war we must compare the two sides by assessing their relative 
strengths. This is to ask … Which ruler has the Way?’; See also Mencius 7A:12. 
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These four emperors and two kings all employed a military 
approach based on ren and yi in conducting their campaigns … 
those nearby drew close to their goodness and far away regions 
admired their virtue. The blades of their weapons were not 
stained with blood, but people far and near came and submitted 
to them. Such was the abundance of their virtue (Xunzi 
15.365).17 
 
Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that during the 
interregnum periods that typically follow the collapse of a dynasty, the 
histories of the Sinitic cultures have often been characterised by tragic 
violence. If this is to be comprehended from an East Asian perspective, 
Williams believes that it is still necessary to try and account for these 
struggles from a Confucian standpoint since it represents the principle 
political tradition of the region. This is the case even if it is a form of 
Confucianism that has been informed by the hard realism of Legalism 
because the focus is on political reality, not political idealism. As a 
consequence, the ideal of benevolence that is espoused by Confucian 
peoples during times of peace is eclipsed by the political pragmatism 
that is displayed by Confucian peoples during times of war – ‘the 
fundamental task of military forces and offensive warfare lies with 
unifying the people’ (Xunzi 15.10). Indeed, bringing an end to the 
suffering that is inflicted on a community by war as quickly as possible, 
even at a human cost, is itself an act of benevolence if it restores social 
harmony to the community as a whole.18 
                                                   
17 See Analects 12.19; 13.11; Compare ‘Chapter 3: Planning the Attack’ in Sun-Tzu: The Art of 
Warfare, 110-113: ‘It is best to keep one’s state intact; to crush the enemy’s state is only second 
best. It is best to keep one’s own army … intact; to crush the enemy’s army … is only second 
best. So to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the 
highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting at all’. 
18 See Mencius 7A:12; Compare Roger Ames, ‘Introduction – Wisdom and Warfare’, in Sun-Tzu: 
The Art of War, 39-43: ‘What it means to be exemplary, then, is not determined by what 
function one serves or by what skills one possesses, but by one’s character. The assumption is 
that persons of superior character will be exemplary in whatever occupations they turn their 
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 It is significant, therefore, that Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi all 
recognised punitive expeditions against those who had deviated from 
the Way of benevolence or humaneness: 
 
Chen Chengzi assassinated Duke Jian. Confucius having 
cleansed himself ceremonially went to court and reported to 
Duke Ai, saying, “Chen Chengzi has assassinated his lord. I 
implore you to send an army to punish him” (Analects 14.21). 
 
King Hsüan said … ‘If I do not annex Yen, I am afraid Heaven 
will send down disasters. What would you think if I decided on 
annexation?’ ‘If in annexing Yen,’ answered Mencius, ‘you please 
its people, then annex it’ (Mencius 1B:10). 
 
King Wu attacked the possessor of the Shang. He executed Zhòu, 
cut off his head, and hung it from a red banner. Carrying out 
punitive campaigns against those who are violent and executing 
those who are brutal is the blossoming of order (Xunzi 18.190). 
 
While Confucian thinkers condemn the violent conduct of state rulers 
who are motivated purely by personal gain, it is accepted that in 
certain situations military intervention may be unavoidable if it is the 
only way of improving the welfare of the people. 
 Mencius (7B:2; 3B:9) placed important restrictions on this 
apparent concession. Firstly, he points out that the Spring and 
Autumn Annals acknowledged ‘no just wars’, a work that he attributed 
to Confucius. He continues that there are ‘only cases of one war not 
being quite as bad as another’. Specifically, this is understood as a 
                                                                                                                                           
hand to – an assumption that is alive and well today … It is the ability of the leader to achieve 
“harmony,” however it is defined, that is signatory of what it means to be a person of superior 
character, whether this harmony is expressed through communal leadership or military 
prowess’.  
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punitive expedition or ‘war waged by one in authority against his 
subordinates’. He concludes that it is therefore ‘not for peers to punish 
one another by war’, a reference to the various kings who were vying 
for supremacy at the time. This limits what constitutes an acceptable 
use of force within the Confucian tradition as only those in ‘authority’ 
are permitted to conduct military interventions. There is one important 
exception, however. When asked whether regicide is permissible in 
reference to the King Wu’s military campaign against the tyrant king 
Zhòu of the Shang dynasty, with whom he and the Duke of Zhou fought 
for three years, Mencius responded that: 
 
He who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator; he who cripples 
rightness is a crippler; and a man who is both a mutilator and a 
crippler is an “outcast”. I have indeed heard of the punishment of 
the “outcast [Zhòu]”, but I have not heard of any regicide 
(Mencius 1B:8).19 
 
At the time of his insurrection, King Wu was in a position of 
subordination to Zhòu as the current ruler of the Chinese people. This 
is why Mencius was asked whether King Wu had not in fact committed 
regicide by rebelling. Nonetheless, Mencius (4A:7) maintained that 
King Wu was fully justified in his conduct. This is because ‘the 
Mandate of Heaven’, which confers moral legitimacy upon a regime, is 
‘not immutable’.20  
 D.C. Lau explains that the Duke of Zhou, someone who was 
greatly revered by Confucius, expounded a philosophy on the Mandate 
of Heaven that not only instilled ‘resignation in the conquered’, but 
inculcated ‘a self-searching vigilance’ in the Zhou rulers thereafter. The 
                                                   
19 See also Mencius 3B:9. 
20 See also the Great Learning: ‘“Take warning from the Yin; the great Mandate is not easy [to 
hold on to]” … “The Mandate of Heaven is not ever-lasting”’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 169. 
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Shang kings maintained that they governed ‘by virtue of the Mandate 
of Heaven’. However, the Duke of Zhou believed that the Shang rulers 
had forgotten that the Mandate could also be withdrawn. King Wu had 
‘shown this to be the case’ by ‘wresting the Empire’ from Zhòu’s grasp. 
In other words, the ruling dynasty could only retain the Mandate if it 
acted in accordance with the Way. Once a ruler ‘strayed from the path 
of virtue’ the Mandate would be lost. Lau describes this doctrine as a 
‘double-edged’ sword because although it explained the reasons why 
the Shang dynasty had collapsed, ‘it also laid down the conditions 
which must constantly be fulfilled’ if the Zhou kings were to remain in 
power.21 In turn, this doctrine had important implications for 
Mencius’s understanding of what constituted legitimate authority. 
Although the tyrant Zhòu was formally the Emperor, he had lost the 
authority to rule as a consequence of his immoral conduct. King Wu in 
contrast, while in a position of subordination to the Shang, held true 
authority because his actions were currently in line with the Way of 
Heaven. He had demonstrated this by the very fact he was able to 
emerge victorious. As a consequence, Mencius argued that he had 
never heard of regicide in the case of punishing the outcast Zhòu. 
 This philosophy provides the ideological foundations for the 
periodic regime changes that are facilitated by Confucian Revolutions. 
Of most significance from the perspective of Williams’s thesis, however, 
is the fact that King Wu’s actions were only justified because he was 
ultimately successful in his rebellion. It is only because Zhòu lost the 
war that the people accepted King Wu’s insubordination as an act 
undertaken in accordance with the Will of Heaven.22 Of course, Zhòu’s 
many misdemeanours no doubt ensured that King Wu was able to rally 
the oppressed peoples of the Empire to his cause.23 This relates to 
                                                   
21 Lau, ‘Introduction’, xi-xii; See also Analects, 7.5. 
22 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 19. 
23 See Xunzi 8.330. 
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Mencius’s (5A:1) description of the people as the ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of 
Heaven. Nevertheless, if King Wu had failed in his insurrection, the 
implication would be that Zhòu retained the Mandate and therefore 
remained the legitimate ruler of China. This is why it was so important 
for both the ruler and would-be usurper to continually gauge the 
patterns and processes of Heaven as expressed through the ‘general 
will of the people’.24 Confucius said that if ‘the way is going to prevail 
in the world, it is because circumstances would have it so; if it is not 
going to prevail, it is because they won’t’ (Analects, 14.36). In a similar 
fashion, Mencius argued that: 
 
[E]ither a gentleman does not go to war or else he is sure of 
victory, for he will have the whole Empire at his behest, while his 
opponent will have his own flesh and blood turning against him 
(Mencius 2B:1). 
 
Williams concludes that ‘Mencius’s classic assertion that the people 
may overthrow a bad ruler really means that an absolute ruler may be 
cast out only if and when he becomes ineffective’. On the other hand, it 
is only by successfully ‘striking down the old regime [that] its 
opponents win legitimacy for their cause’.25 This portrayal is supported 
by Edwin Reischauer and John Fairbank, who argue that the so-called 
‘right of rebellion’ expounded by Mencius would only ‘be an effective 
right … if the rebels proved successful’.26 It is for this reason that 
Williams believes that might makes right in Confucian Asia. During 
times of social turmoil, it is often only through a decisive 
demonstration of military power that one is able to prove without 
doubt that the previous regime has finally lost the Mandate to rule and 
                                                   
24 Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept’, 30. 
25 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 19. 
26 Reischauer and Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition, 81. 
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that the new political orientation one proposes is a more accurate 
reflection of the present needs of the community. If this was not the 
case, then Heaven as expressed through the will of people would not 
have permitted victory.27 
 Williams describes the concept of toku as ‘one of most 
etymologically complex ideas in the synthesis of Confucian thought and 
traditional statecraft’.28 It primarily refers to the ‘power’ that is 
accumulated through a tireless regime of self-cultivation and the 
mastering of somatic practice.29 An important example of such practice 
is ritual propriety or the rites, ‘the meaning invested roles, 
relationships, and institutions which facilitate communication, and 
which foster a sense of community’.30 Perfecting the rites requires both 
precision and sincerity in one’s actions and behaviour towards other 
people. However, a person who masters the rites becomes ‘more open 
and responsive to the world’ as repeated practice nurtures a sense of 
‘self-restraint’, thereby enhancing ‘social harmony’ through one’s 
ability to skilfully interact with others. An important consequence of 
this rigorous process of self-cultivation is the accumulation of a power 
or virtue (徳/de) that ‘has an almost magical effect’ on other people.31 In 
part this is due to the powerful aesthetic imagery that results from the 
seemingly effortless enactment of the rites in an appropriate and 
                                                   
27 Although Williams’s focus is on political realism over political idealism, his presentation of 
the Confucian tradition is contentious. For example, ‘When a tyrant wages an unjust war and 
is victorious, and thereby able to tyrannise the people’, Parkes doubts whether ‘any Confucian 
thinker would say that he has the Mandate’. Williams would likely respond by highlighting the 
role that Confucian scholars have historically played in legitimatising the various imperial 
dynasties of China based on the idea of the Mandate of Heaven, which, as Kōsaka also points 
out, were typically established through warfare. Nevertheless, the very notion that ‘might’ 
could ever be ‘right’ would suggest that during times of social turmoil it is in fact the Legalist 
tradition, rather than Confucianism per se, which takes precedence in determining the 
outcome of Confucian Revolutions – Graham Parkes, Personal Correspondence, 4th May 2016; 
Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 180-181; See also Han Feizi 49 & 50 in Han Feizi: Basic 
Writings, trans. by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 97-130: ‘The 
nation at peace may patronize Confucian scholars and cavaliers, but the nation in danger must 
call upon fighting men’ (108). 
28 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 55.  
29 Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility’, 71-75. 
30 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 51. 
31 Parkes, Awe and Humility, 72-74; See Analects 12.1. 
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heartfelt manner, ‘manifesting the original brightness of innate 
virtue’.32 In turn, this power allows the Confucian gentleman to ‘sway 
others, win them other to one’s side, and have them do one’s bidding’ 
through sympathetic resonance.33 As Mencius (2A:2) states, the flood-
like qi (気) of the Confucian gentleman ‘will fill the space between 
Heaven and Earth’.  
In the political context, the standard of appropriate behaviour in 
the Confucian world is measured in terms of successful statecraft. 
Specifically, this is the ability of the current or new leadership to 
maintain social order within the present political climate. This is only 
possible through a thorough understanding of current trends. A 
successful regime must therefore be in alignment with the Way of 
Heaven in the present moment, because if it wasn’t there would be 
visible signs of its decline. Traditionally, these have included natural 
disasters such as famines and floods. Considering the fact that China 
was an agrarian society that was dependent upon the successful 
management of a community’s relationship with the natural world, 
such concerns were not unfounded.34 In this way, political success 
became the standard of appropriateness for the Confucian political 
realist, bestowing upon a stable regime and its associated institutions 
and methods a reserve of virtue (徳/toku) or political legitimacy that is 
not easily depleted.35 Securing the Mandate of Heaven in this manner 
also ensures that the opponents to the current political regime are 
                                                   
32 Daxue & Zhongyong, 135. 
33 Eric L. Hutton, ‘Footnote 7 – Chapter 10: Enriching the State’, in Xunzi: The Complete Text, 
98; Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility’, 74; See also Zhu Xi’s commentary to the Great Learning: ‘Once 
my own enlightened virtue is already manifest, then I have the means of bringing awe and 
submission to the minds and wills of the people’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 149. 
34 See to Xunzi 9.340. 
35 Williams’s conception of toku or de (徳) is inspired by Paul Mus, who, based on his 
experiences of Vietnam, translated the concept ‘not as a static virtue but as a system of rule’. 
Importantly for Williams, Mus traced ‘the development of the patterns of behaviour involved in 
… struggles to force regime change back to the [Zhou] dynasty’ of China – Williams, Confucian 
Revolution, 60; Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 97; See also John T. McAlister, Jr. & 
Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution (New York, Evanston & London: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1970). 
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regarded as illegitimate because subversive to the harmony of the 
community. This remains the case until these opponents can prove 
beyond doubt that their proposals are the one correct Way in the 
current political climate. This also includes the methods of past 
regimes that were once considered ‘moral’, but have since lost the 
legitimacy that is conferred by the Mandate of Heaven.36 In the end, 
words count for little if not backed up with corresponding actions – ‘be 
cautious in what you say and then make good on your word’ (Analects 
1.6). 
 Williams defines tenkō as the ‘collective moral conversion of an 
entire people in the pursuit of harmony as a form of consensus about 
reality’.37 The consummation of a Confucian Revolution is therefore 
dependent on securing the support of the people, who are the eyes and 
ears of Heaven:  
 
There is a way to win the Empire; win the people and you will 
win the Empire. There is a way to win the people; win their 
hearts and you will win the people (Mencius 4A:9).38 
 
In pragmatic terms, the way to win the hearts of the people is to prove 
one’s grasp of political reality. This is achieved through tangible 
political successes, be it through a decisive military victory over the 
other contenders for the Mandate of Heaven or demonstrating one’s 
ability to bring peace and stability to the community. During times of 
turmoil, this may be regarded as the same thing. The political 
effectiveness of a regime therefore translates into the moral legitimacy 
of a regime, leading to the mass conversion of the population to its 
methods of rule: ‘The excellence (徳) of the exemplary person is the 
                                                   
36 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 96; 39; Williams, Confucian Revolution, 19. 
37 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 12. 
38 See also the Great Learning: ‘[T]o gain the multitude is to gain the state; to lose the 
multitude is to lose the state’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 169. 
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wind, while the petty person is the grass. As the wind blows, the grass 
is sure to bend’ (Analects 12.19).39 
The interregnum between the collapse of a regime and the 
consummation of the Confucian Revolution that results is often brutal. 
This is because these ‘civil wars are concluded in a practical and 
morally satisfying way only when one side wins conclusively’.40 Such 
struggles may therefore witness multiple acts of conversion among 
sections of the population as the fortunes of war shifts from one side to 
another.41 In the end, however, there can only be one holder of the 
Mandate because a broad consensus is needed to establish social order: 
 
According to Confucius, “There cannot be two kings for the 
people, just as there cannot be two suns in the heavens” 
(Mencius 5A:4). 
 
When the most exalted position is held by one person alone, 
there will be order, but if held by two people there will be chaos 
… there has not yet been a case where two people who both 
occupy the most exalted position and contend for greater 
authority can last for long (Xunzi 14.105). 
 
                                                   
39 See also Mencius, 3A:2. 
40 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 81. 
41 Williams gives the example of one South Vietnamese soldier who defected five times between 
the North and South over the course of the Vietnam War. Williams goes on to distinguish 
between tenkō, temporary shifts in a person’s allegiance that ‘may occur any number of times 
during the interregnum’ of a Confucian Revolution ‘in response to the ebb and flow of the 
military success of one side or the other’, and the mass Tenkō of the whole population once a 
regime finally ‘wins the Mandate of Heaven’. He concludes that the ‘shifts in the soldier’s 
loyalties were not arbitrary or opportunistic or accidental … They are measured judgments … 
attempts to read reality with conviction. To make a sound judgment about the nature of reality 
(that is where true power lies) is to contribute personally to the fostering of a harmonious but 
robust political consensus. Thus, Confucian opportunism is not supposed to be an exercise in 
consistency. One changes one’s mind as one’s well-grounded perception of reality shifts’ – 
Williams, Confucian Revolution, 46-47; See also Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The 
Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 
1972), 24.   
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It is therefore essential to clarify which way is the correct Way in the 
present circumstances because people ‘who have chosen different ways 
(道) cannot make plans together’ (Analects 15.40). Once the Mandate is 
secured and the Way of a society decided, the people are ‘sure to bend’ 
to the ‘wind’ of the new regime because there is an obligation to 
conform to the new consensus if it can secure the peace and stability of 
a community. 
Williams goes on to highlight Kōyama’s comments during the 
first symposium in relation to the Meiji Restoration, which he believes 
are indicative of the phenomenon of Confucian Revolution in Japan: 
 
After 1868, the Edo Shogunate was decisively rejected, and 
rejecting the Shogunate meant turning one’s back on Edo culture 
as a whole. Overnight everything about the Edo period was 
condemned as a form of medieval darkness. This was the 
fundamental undercurrent of post-Meiji thought and feeling, and 
it explains why 1868 marked such a radical break with the 
past.42 
 
The ‘Mandate of Heaven’ incorporates an ‘ethical expectation’ that is 
‘never given permanently to any incumbent ruling group’. What is 
more, the Mandate is said to manifest ‘through the wishes and conduct 
of the ordinary people’.43 It could therefore be rescinded once the 
popular consensus for a regime had begun to wane: 
 
There is a saying, “The lord is the boat. The common people are 
the water. The water can support the boat. The water can also 
overturn the boat” (Xunzi 9.95). 
 
                                                   
42 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 39; Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 125. 
43 Hsu, ‘Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations’, 150. 
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Towards the end of the Edo period, the Tokugawa Shogunate was 
shown to be inept at handling the new threat posed by Western powers. 
As a consequence the virtue (徳/toku) of the regime, which constituted 
both its political legitimacy and effectiveness, was justifiably called 
into question. The eventual collapse of the Shogunate showed that the 
Mandate had been lost, revoking the political legitimacy of the 
Tokugawa to rule Japan. The establishment of the Meiji government in 
its stead signalled to the people the endowment of a new Mandate. 
This was reinforced by the new government’s military successes over 
the forces loyal to the Tokugawa. The result was the mass tenkō or 
conversion of the populace to the new political orientation, while the 
previous era was consigned to history. Williams believes that 
understanding the ‘logic and conventions’ of regime change in 
Confucian societies in this way in turn provides a rigorous East Asian 
interpretive framework from which to assess the factional struggles 
that beset Japan during the 1920s and 30s as part of the Post-Meiji 
Confucian Revolution. This includes its apparent consummation with 
the rise of the Control Faction led by Tōjō in 1941. 
 The death of the Meiji emperor in 1912 brought to a close a 
period of momentous social change and reform in Japan, transforming 
the country from a feudal backwater into a genuine power on the world 
stage in the space of only forty years. However, it also signified the 
‘eclipse’ of the consensus that had been reached under the symbol of 
the Meiji emperor’s leadership.44 The foundation of a new regime is 
often typified by ‘a burst of administrative energy’ due to the ‘fresh 
vigour and confidence’ that results from successfully securing the 
Mandate of Heaven.45 This is rarely the case for the successors of the 
regime’s founders, however, as they inherit the virtue (徳/toku) of their 
                                                   
44 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 82. 
45 John W. Darness, Governing China, 150-1850 (Indianapolis and Cambridge, Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2010), 68; Williams, Confucian Revolution, 9. 
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forerunners without having proved their grasp of political reality. If a 
regime is to survive, therefore, it is necessary to periodically 
orchestrate ‘reform … from the top’ in order to renew its reserves of 
virtue (徳/toku) through demonstrating once more its political 
effectiveness.46 The ‘Taishō experiment’ in liberalism may be viewed as 
just such an attempt.47 Ultimately, however, it failed because it proved 
unable to secure a lasting consensus on national policy. For the 
pragmatically minded Confucian this is a damning appraisal because 
the Mandate requires an ability to rule.  
The failure of the Taishō government to successfully revitalise 
the moral energy or virtue of the state consequently led to a prolonged 
struggle to initiate ‘regime change’ within the ‘forms and formalities’ of 
the modern state system ‘inherited from the Meiji period’.48 As a result, 
the 1930s witnessed numerous attempts to re-establish a broad 
consensus on national policy, particularly in regard to the location of 
sovereignty within the Japanese state, its overseas empire and its 
relations with the Western powers, by the various factions that briefly 
secured the reins of government through ‘Confucian-style purges of the 
intellectual losers’.49 For example, ‘the Ōsumi purges in 1933-4 
targeted naval officers who continued to insist that Japan was not 
threatened by the growth of American naval power’.50 It was with the 
accession of the Control Faction led by Tōjō, however, that a national 
consensus was finally reached based on the decision to go to war with 
America. The success of the military attack on Pearl Harbor only 
strengthened his claim to the Mandate as a demonstration of military 
might was a demonstration of political ability and therefore legitimacy. 
In the end, however, this Confucian Revolution was itself overturned 
                                                   
46 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 94; Williams, Confucian Revolution, 32. 
47 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 98. 
48 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 17. 
49 Goto-Jones, ‘The way of revering the Japanese emperor’; Williams, Japanese Wartime 
Resistance, xlv. 
50 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xlv. 
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as Japan was comprehensively defeated. This ensured that the 
Mandate of Heaven passed from Japanese to American hands in 1945, 
thereby facilitating its successful programme of liberal ‘state-building’ 
during the occupation.51  
 Williams’s thesis of Confucian Revolution provides a compelling 
schema of interpretation from which to analyse the factional struggles 
of the early Shōwa period from an East Asian perspective. However, 
questions arise as to whether this is an accurate portrayal of Japanese 
political reality during the war, especially as his interpretation does 
not appear to reflect how the participants of the so-called Post-Meiji 
Confucian Revolution actually understood what was happening at the 
time. As Williams himself concedes, ‘why … are our supposedly 
Confucian thinkers and politicians not more explicit about the political 
framework in which they think and act?’ One possible answer may be 
found in the ‘closed character of the Confucian episteme’. This is the 
idea that ‘as whole communities move from one moral unanimity to 
another in the unfolding of a Confucian Revolution, the thinker follows 
suit’.52 As Hans-Georg Moeller points out, it is simply not possible to 
remain unaffected by the dominant ethical paradigm of an age.53 From 
the perspective of historical reality, Kōsaka argues that a 
revolutionary is unable to write a history about the revolution he is 
participating in while it is taking place because it is still history in the 
making. It is only once such an historical event reaches some form of 
conclusion within a society that it ‘falls away’ from the present and 
                                                   
51 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 64; Williams’s thesis of Confucian Revolution 
provides a compelling East Asian account of ‘how the Japanese moved during the course of 
1945 from fierce, indeed suicidal, resistance to the American assault on the Japanese 
homeland, to prompt and complete surrender, and then to ready and enthusiastic cooperation 
with the US occupation’. It is within the context of this moral paradigm shift, facilitated by the 
logic and conventions of Confucian regime change, that Williams also interprets the post-war 
criticisms of the wartime Kyoto School in Japan from the pacifist standpoint institutionalised 
in Article 9 of the 1947 constitution (Japanese Wartime Resistance, 24; 63-64).  
52 Williams, ‘In Response to Thomas Rhydwen’, 81. 
53 Moeller, The Moral Fool, 91; See Appendix for a discussion of moral paradigms. 
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becomes a fact of the past, and therefore an object of historical 
retrospection.54  
Although the Kyoto School philosophers do not explicitly discuss 
their own participation in the factional struggles of the late 1930s and 
40s, on a number of occasions they highlight past examples of regime 
change in East Asia which may be categorised in terms of Confucian 
Revolution. This is exemplified by Kōyama’s reflections on the Meiji 
Restoration as mentioned above. It is perhaps Nishida, however, who 
most clearly summarises the logic of regime change in the Confucian 
world. A highly suggestive summary of his arguments is provided by 
Setsuzō Kōsaka: 
 
The world is a contradictory self-identity that constantly moves 
as that which is created, to that which creates. Once the form of 
a society no longer matches its environment and thereby reaches 
a dead-end, a ‘revolutionary change of dynasty’ (易姓革命
/Confucian Revolution) would take place in China based on the 
idea of the Mandate of Heaven. In Japan this resulted in the 
restoration of the Imperial Household. This did not entail a 
simple return to the system or culture of the past, however, but 
rather taking the first steps toward a new world. This is what is 
called the Meiji Restoration.55/iii  
 
While Nishida distinguishes between the respective forms of regime 
change in China and Japan, in part due to the unbroken line of 
succession in the case of Japan’s Imperial Family, the causes and 
consequences of these regime changes were essentially the same. For 
whatever reason, the form of a society no longer matched the 
                                                   
54 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 156. 
55 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Kōsaka Masaaki, 119; Kitarō Nishida, ‘Nihon bunka no mondai [The 
Problems of Japanese Culture]’, Nishida Kitarō zenshū dai jūni kan [The Complete Works of 
Kitarō Nishida Volume 12] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 336-337. 
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environment within which it was located (its place or topos). The result 
was a social revolution that transformed the very structures of the 
community.  
 
4b: The Intellectual Consequences of Confucian Revolution 
 Williams believes that once the Mandate to rule has been 
conferred upon a new regime, there are only three options left for the 
supporters of the previous government or the other contenders for the 
Mandate of Heaven: ‘suicide [or exile], illegitimate underground 
resistance or sincere tenkō’.56 This is because ‘one is morally obliged to 
embrace the new regime’ since to disregard the ruling of Heaven is to 
subvert the social harmony that is thereby established. The Kyoto 
School became active participants in the Post-Meiji Confucian 
Revolution toward the end of this internal struggle when Sōkichi 
Takagi, a member of the Yonai Peace Faction of the Japanese Navy 
and chief of the Navy Ministry’s Research Section, approached Nishida 
about the possibility of receiving intellectual cooperation in resisting 
the Army in 1939. Williams speculates that the Navy may have made 
such overtures to the Kyoto School ‘in reaction to the escalation of the 
Army’s struggle against China’. In particular, the Yonai faction 
opposed the Control Faction of Tōjō in regard to forming an alliance 
with Nazi Germany and the prospect of rushing into a ‘war to resist 
American hegemony in the Pacific’.57 However, once Tōjō had secured 
the reins of power a national consensus was reached in relation to the 
conflict, thereby conferring legitimacy upon his regime.  
The Kyoto School refused to convert to the new national 
orientation because it believed that the Tōjō government had 
                                                   
56 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 25; Williams, Confucian Revolution, 9; 50-51; See 
Mencius 1B:8; 5A:3; 5A:6; 7A:31; Xunzi 15.395; 25.205; See also the Great Learning and Zhu 
Xi’s commentary: ‘Only a man who is ren 仁 will send away and banish such a person … and 
will not allow him to dwell with him in the Middle Kingdom’; ‘The man of ren 仁 must deeply 
reject and thoroughly dislike them’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 171-173.    
57 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 25; xlv-xlvii.  
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fundamentally misread political reality. Although there was a general 
consensus across the board in relation to the threat that America posed 
to Japanese regional hegemony, or for the more ideally minded the 
threat it posed to the self-autonomy of the peoples of East Asia, there 
were divisive disagreements about how best to respond to the 
encroachment of the United States into the Pacific. For the Yonai 
faction, the only option was to play the waiting game and build up 
Japan’s national strength because it was no good starting ‘a war that 
Japan could not win’. For instance, the Navy had calculated that the 
country would need at least a ‘70 per cent fleet ratio vis-à-vis the 
United States in capital ships’ just to have a ‘fighting chance’ of 
defending the Japanese mainland, a condition that it was never able to 
meet. Consequently, both the Kyoto School and the Yonai faction had 
serious doubts about the basis on which the Tōjō government had 
decided to go to war when it did.58 Indeed, the first Chūō Kōron 
symposium was originally held as ‘a direct appeal to the Japanese 
public over the heads of the Tojo regime, but … this initiative was 
overtaken by events’ as less than two weeks later Japanese forces 
attacked Pearl Harbor.59 Intellectual exile was also not considered a 
realistic option because the very fate of the Japanese nation was at 
stake. As a result, the Kyoto School and its allies in the Navy were 
subsequently forced underground in their resistance to Tōjō as their 
viewpoint diverged from the national consensus, as exemplified by the 
fact that Takagi was ‘purged from the Navy Ministry’s Research 
Section [in 1942]’ as a consequence ‘of his opposition to Tōjō’s decision 
for war’.60 In this way, Williams insists that the Kyoto School’s political 
activities, including the Chūō Kōron discussions, need to be understood 
                                                   
58 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 71-72. 
59 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 72. 
60 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xlix;  
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as part of a Confucian struggle that was ‘governed by the logic and 
conventions of dynastic succession to the Mandate of Heaven’.61 
If the thesis of Confucian Revolution is accepted, various 
questions arise about the manner in which Japanese society during the 
war has been analysed in liberal presentations of the Kyoto School. 
This is exemplified by the work of Goto-Jones. Although he argues that 
it would be ahistorical and culturally insensitive to attribute a left-
right political spectrum to Japan’s Confucian tradition, he proceeds to 
re-label a liberal discourse that reveals ‘a field of political philosophy 
with parameters defined by tolerant and intolerant extremes’ with 
Confucian designations. This is based on the supposed authoritarian 
and pluralistic interpretations that are possible of Prince Shōtoku’s 
‘Seventeen-Article Constitution’, the primary historical conversation 
partner of Japan’s indigenous political tradition.62 Such divergent 
interpretations derive from the ambiguities inherent in the 
Constitution in relation to the concept of harmony, hierarchical 
designations, and the related issue of the predetermined nature of an 
individual. For example, Goto-Jones argues that the Constitution is 
unclear on whether harmony should be enforced on the people or 
whether is it a ‘principle of tolerance’, a question he rephrases in terms 
of whether harmony should be comprehended ‘as an end or a means’. 
The political spectrum itself ranges from the ‘monarchical 
authoritarianism’ that was exemplified by the Tokugawa Shogunate 
and the ultra-nationalism of the 1930s and 40s, to the more ‘permissive 
pluralism’ that was supported by Nishida and earlier Neo-Confucians 
of the Japanese tradition. It is important to note that Goto-Jones goes 
                                                   
61 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 96; My analysis of Confucian Revolution from 
pages 103 to 110 is an extensive reworking of an earlier examination I conducted in my review 
of Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance – Rhydwen, ‘Review Essay: A Confucian 
Understanding of the Kyoto School’s Wartime Philosophy’, 73-75. 
62 Considering the Confucian influences on Prince Shōtoku’s Constitution, I believe it may be 
reasonably argued that it is in fact the Confucian canon itself that constitutes the primary 
historical conversation partner for the Japanese tradition of political thought. 
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to great lengths to disassociate Nishida’s philosophy from anyone he 
regards as tainted by ultra-nationalism, including the four Chūō Kōron 
participants and Tanabe.63 
Goto-Jones’s attempt to differentiate the various political groups 
and thinkers of Shōwa Japan along a spectrum based on a Japanese 
history of political thought is informative and serves as an important 
reminder of how Confucian ideas have often been manipulated to the 
political advantage of incumbent regimes. Nevertheless, he seems to 
ignore his earlier warning about cultural insensitivity by artificially 
analysing Confucianism in liberal terms despite the divergent 
presuppositions of these two schools of thought. It is not a question of 
whether harmony is an end or a means in Confucianism because of the 
circular dynamic of the tradition’s underlying worldview, as 
exemplified by the interdependence of Yin and Yang. For Confucianism, 
harmony is both the goal of benevolent government and the 
prerequisite of its successful implementation. The thesis of Confucian 
Revolution, in contrast, is an attempt to understand the manner in 
which aspects of the Confucian canon have translated into the patterns 
of political behaviour that are observable across the Sinitic cultures of 
East Asia. This is deemed feasible due to the intellectual hegemony 
that the Confucian tradition has enjoyed over the centuries. Williams 
himself questions the suitability of applying the ‘French Revolutionary 
categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’’ to the Japanese political context.64 
Although not directly related to his research on Confucianism, in his 
first book on the Kyoto School Williams suggests that political 
behaviour is best understood in terms of a relationship between the 
centre and periphery of a debate, which he initially uses to distinguish 
between political realists and idealists during the war.65 While 
                                                   
63 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan, 7; 28-31; 153. 
64 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 42; Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 99. 
65 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 41-42.  
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somewhat different from its original context, the model of a centre and 
periphery is also useful for interpreting the behaviour of different 
groups within a Confucian society once the recipient of the Mandate of 
Heaven has been determined.66 
 By securing the Mandate, the Tōjō regime was able to occupy 
the centre of the political system as the legitimate government of 
Japan. All other factions, regardless of where they were located on 
Goto-Jones’s political spectrum, were a part of the political periphery. 
The image of a circle that is used by Williams is useful in terms of 
understanding the varying perspectives of these different groups in 
regard to how they grasped political reality. It also invokes the idea 
that Japanese society tended to gravitate towards the centre while a 
moral consensus on the current political situation was maintained. For 
example, there was a general acceptance between the various factions 
in relation to the threat that America posed to Japanese sovereignty in 
the Pacific. The distance of the various groups from the centre in turn 
reflects how accurately their respective ‘Ways’ were thought to be 
applicable to the current situation of the country as perceived by the 
majority of Japanese people. Although the Kyoto School and their allies 
from the Navy were a part of the political periphery during the war, 
they were perhaps located relatively close to the centre in the sense 
that they broadly agreed with the reasons why Japan went to war and 
because of the fact that the Navy was itself a junior partner of the 
military junta. This is despite the fact that the members of the Kyoto 
School were poles apart from Tōjō ideologically speaking, since they 
were strong advocates of political tolerance over authoritarian 
oppression. This also reflects the fact that the centre itself was 
                                                   
66 Compare Ames, ‘Introduction – Centripetal Harmony and Authority’, in Sun-Tzu: The Art of 
War, 64-66: ‘Authority is constituted as other centres are drawn up into one encompassing 
center and suspended within it through patterns of deference. This calculus of centers through 
their interplay produces a balancing centripetal center that tends to distribute the forces of its 
field symmetrically around its own axis’.  
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unstable because of the lingering doubts that many members of the 
political establishment, particularly in the Navy, still held in relation 
to Tōjō’s ‘reading of reality’. 
In any case, the conclusion of the war witnessed a seismic shift 
in the location of the political centre as Japan was utterly defeated. As 
a result, the various nuances of the debates of the 1930s and 40s 
became meaningless from the perspective of post-war society, which in 
a predictable fashion turned its back on the past consensus as the 
country had since ‘converted’ to the new political orientation that was 
facilitated under American leadership. Consequently, both the virtue 
(徳/toku) of Tōjō’s Control Faction and the wartime Kyoto School had 
evaporated. This is one of the main reasons why both were so heavily 
criticised for their roles during the war, despite the stark differences in 
their ideological standpoints. However, this is only to be expected as 
the new Mandate of Japan maintained that the war itself had been 
immoral in light of the country’s new pacifist constitution.67 On the 
other end of the scale, communist intellectuals during the 1930s and 
40s were located on the fringes of the political periphery. Although the 
persecution of Marxists is often highlighted as an example of domestic 
oppression, in terms of the interpretative framework of Confucian 
Revolution the communists were susceptible to such clampdowns 
because they had deviated too far from the general consensus on 
political reality at the time. Hence the large number of communists 
who converted to the virtue (徳/toku) of the ruling elite once it became 
clear that Marxism was a spent force in the current political climate. 
This situation was dramatically reversed after the war, however, due 
to the radical relocation of the political centre that followed the passing 
of the Mandate into American hands. 
                                                   
67 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 94; 24-25. 
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If this is an accurate description of Japanese political reality, it 
is also necessary to re-examine the manner in which the activities of 
Japanese intellectuals during the 1930s and 40s have been assessed. 
Goto-Jones believes that the proper role of academics is based on the 
‘imperative for intellectuals to be exiles in their own homes’ or ‘to 
exercise criticism before solidarity and consistency before partisanship’. 
He draws a distinction between ‘insiders’, scholars who are implicated 
in the establishment and its policy decisions, and ‘outsiders’, 
intellectuals who distance themselves ‘from the institutions that 
disseminate orthodoxy’. Although Goto-Jones portrays Nishida as an 
‘outsider’ during the years leading up to the war due to his retirement 
from Kyoto University in 1928 and his ‘subsequent declining of 
invitations to join government forums’, he is highly critical of Tanabe 
and the Chūō Kōron participants for ‘striving to establish themselves 
as ‘insiders’’ by ‘vying for positions at prestigious universities’ and at 
government sponsored bodies. This is because “nothing disfigures the 
intellectual’ more than allegiance with some partisan cause’.68 A 
similar concern is identifiable in the Confucian tradition as well. Xunzi 
(14.1; 9.60), for instance, states that the Confucian gentleman ‘does not 
listen to words of praise from those who form parties and cliques’, and 
that to ‘be biased, partisan, and have no guiding principle is a 
perverted way of judging affairs’.  
Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the distinction between 
insider and outsider is an accurate portrayal of the role of intellectuals 
in Confucian societies. Firstly, in Confucianism there is an expectation 
that the intellectual will put his knowledge to use for the benefit of the 
community, either through passing on his teachings to others or by 
putting his ideas into practice when in a position of office. 
Consequently, there has been a long tradition of ‘scholar-officials’ in 
                                                   
68 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan, 9-15. 
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Confucian cultures, while the ideal of the Confucian gentleman or 
exemplary person in turn became strongly associated with someone in 
a position of authority over others.69 Certainly, the gentleman as a 
man of integrity does not form parties and cliques with an eye to power 
or personal profit.70 Rather, he acts in accordance with the Way, which 
in practical terms means acting appropriately based on an accurate 
and impartial understanding of political reality: 
 
The Master said, “Exemplary persons (君子) in making their way 
in the world are neither bent on nor against anything; rather, 
they go with what is appropriate (義) (Analects 4.10). 
 
This also ensures that the Confucian gentleman will attempt to rectify 
the actions of a ruler who has deviated from the Way of Heaven, at 
least to the extent that this is possible in the prevailing 
circumstances.71  
Secondly, the idea that criticism should always come before 
solidarity goes against the principle goal of Confucianism, which is to 
facilitate harmony within a community or social group. This has led to 
a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the behavioural 
patterns that are associated with Confucian Revolutions. The idea of 
tenkō or conversion, for example, is so disturbing for the Western 
researcher because it seems to suggest that the Confucian is ‘bereft of a 
moral rudder and intellectual paddle’. Japanese intellectuals are 
therefore accused of lacking integrity during the 1930s and 40s because 
they were willing to conform to the official orthodoxy, even if only 
superficially, over maintaining scholarly consistency. However, as a 
member of a group in East Asia ‘one is obliged to conform sincerely to 
                                                   
69 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 239; Watsuji, ‘Nihon no shindō’, 304-305. 
70 See Analects 4.12, 14.12. 
71 See Mencius 2B:5; 2B:12; 3B:6; 4B:3; 5B:9; 6B:6; 6B:7; Xunzi 4.230; 13; 27.210.   
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its mores and objectives’. Debates within a group often take place with 
an eye toward consensus building. A decision is made once everybody is 
on board, either because an agreement has been reached or because 
those who disagree are willing to concede the point to ensure a 
consensus. What is more, once the decision is made everyone shares 
responsibility, irrespective of one’s personal opinions on the matter. 
This is because it is solidarity, not criticism, which is the moral ideal – 
‘The nail that stands out is hammered down’.72 That is not to say that 
there is no dissent in Confucian societies. However, the manner in 
which such dissent manifests has to be understood in the context of 
Confucian patterns of political behaviour – when the Way does not 
prevail in a society ‘be perilously high-minded in your conduct, but be 
prudent in what you say’ (Analects 14.3). 
 According to Williams Confucians are ‘truth-seekers’. Based on a 
thorough assessment of the prevailing trends and patterns of a 
community, Confucians seek to establish the one best Way or truth for 
securing peace and harmony. However, because of the changing nature 
of the world the truths that are discovered are always transient in 
nature: 
 
The truth of the Mandate holder, the truth of his regime and the 
truth that the bulk of the society conforms to does not endure; 
these truths are contingent and therefore not eternal. 
 
Confucian Revolutions generate a ‘series of ‘truths’’. While these truths 
are ‘sincere and correct at the time of the regime in question’, the truth 
before and after the regime are very different because changing 
circumstances require new guiding principles.73 The prevailing 
                                                   
72 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 46-47; 82; An important modern example of such group 
decision making is the ringi (稟議) system employed in Japanese corporations. 
73 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 45; 50. 
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paradigm of a society will in turn affect how the ‘truth’ of the previous 
regime is assessed. This is often of a highly critical nature because the 
virtue (徳/toku) of the present regime was secured as a consequence of 
the failings of its predecessor. Nevertheless, these criticisms are 
themselves contingent because they are only true for the duration that 
the virtue of the present regime is maintained. Once its reserves of 
virtue are depleted and the Mandate of Heaven is lost its claims to 
truth will also be rescinded. Confucian intellectuals are consistent but 
only in terms of the form rather than the content of an argument. This 
is because the Confucian gentleman needs to be adaptable to the ever-
changing situation of a society. This is the reason why he should not be 
‘partisan’ in the fulfilment of his public duties. 
 Kōsaka’s political activities during the 1930s and 40s were 
consistent with those expected of a Confucian-inspired intellectual. 
Like his colleagues, he had serious doubts about the truth-claims of the 
Tōjō government. While he acknowledged that maintaining internal 
harmony was essential during a time of national crisis, he believed 
that such a consensus needed to be built upon a rigorous and open 
debate of the known ‘historical’ facts. As a result, the ‘strong points’ of 
the various ideological perspectives that are held by different people 
should not be rejected out of hand simply for being non-Japanese if 
they could be successfully utilised for the benefit of society.74 The Army, 
however, was forcing a consensus upon the people through a 
programme of indoctrination, censorship and oppression. Although 
Tōjō appealed emotionally to the hearts of many in relation to the 
perceived threat represented by the United States, an enforced 
consensus based exclusively on the ideology of the Japanists was 
dangerous because it was woefully inflexible before the rapidly 
changing circumstances of a world at war. This is one of the reasons 
                                                   
74 Masaaki Kōsaka, ‘Shisō-sen no keijijō-teki konkyo [The Metaphysical Basis of Intellectual 
Warfare]’, Chūō Kōron June (1943), 10; Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 148-151. 
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why the Kyoto School were such strong advocates of academic 
freedoms.75 Proper decisions needed to be based on a thorough 
understanding of historical reality, which would not be possible with 
overly ‘religious, mythical or ideological’ interpretations of the facts.76 
 Kōsaka continued to publish his ideas on the responsibilities 
that were held by the Japanese people in relation to the other nations 
of East Asia in the hope that the Army and its supporters would listen 
to reason.77 However, it was highly unlikely that reform could be 
initiated successfully in the public sphere alone because the Tōjō 
regime, for better or worse, was the morally legitimate government of 
Japan. While by disassociating oneself from the ruling elite a scholar 
may secure his or her individual moral integrity, the Confucian 
intellectual is obliged to try and initiate change for the better if the 
opportunity arises – ‘If the way (道) is going to prevail in the world, it 
is because circumstances (命) would have it so (Analects 14.36). 
Because the Navy represented the only realistic option for countering 
the recklessness of the Army, the Kyoto School philosophers willingly 
cooperated with the Yonai Peace Faction.78/iv What is more, this 
opportunity only presented itself through the mediation of Nishida, 
despite his supposed ‘outsider’ status.79 While questions have been 
raised as to what the Navy could have expected from their alliance 
with the Kyoto School, in Confucian terms this was understandable 
because any attempt to undermine the virtue (徳/toku) of the Tōjō 
regime had to be based on a viable interpretation of political reality.80  
Although the Kyoto School thinkers continued to express their 
ideas to the extent that this was possible in the public forum, because 
                                                   
75 Michiko Yusa and Pierre Lavelle, ‘Correspondence,’ Monumenta Nipponica, 49/4 (Winter, 
1994): 524-529.   
76 Williams, ‘Footnote 98’ in Kōsaka et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 150. 
77 Kōsaka, ‘Aru tetsugakusha no hansei’, 18-19. 
78 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 240.  
79 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xliii; xlvi-xlvii. 
80 Yasumasa Ōshima, et al. ‘Zadankai: Daitōa sensō’, 27-28. 
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of the seditious nature of their alliance with the Navy the main 
meetings were held in secret – ‘Be known in the world when the way 
prevails, but remain hidden away when it does not’ (Analects 8.13). As 
is to be expected, the objectives of the alliance between the Kyoto 
School and the Navy changed in accordance with the shifting 
circumstances of the time. In the beginning they debated how to 
prevent the outbreak of war with America (1941). The focus shifted to 
the problems of the Co-Prosperity Sphere after the outbreak of 
hostilities (1942) and then to bringing down the Tōjō cabinet once the 
conflict took an irreparable turn for the worse (1943). When it became 
clear that Japan would be defeated, the debate again shifted to the 
inevitable fallout of the war and the recovery of the Japanese nation 
(1944).81 While it is difficult to judge the extent to which the Kyoto 
School influenced Navy policy, it is reasonable to assume that their 
suggestions were taken into account considering the number of 
meetings that were held at the Navy’s expense.82 At the same time, the 
Navy ensured that the opinions of the Kyoto School would continue to 
be heard by organising the Chūō Kōron symposia and having Kōsaka 
and Kōyama join the national committee for censorship to ensure that 
it was not completely dominated by the Army and its extremist 
supporters.83 By having someone involved in the debates of the 
committee, and therefore the process of consensus building, it was 
hoped that they would be able to exert an influence on the outcome of 
the decisions made. Ultimately, Kōsaka’s involvement in this 
committee was the main reason why he was automatically purged from 
Kyoto University during the American occupation. Although Tetsushi 
Furukawa and Michio Takeyama are often highly critical of Japanese 
intellectuals who supported the war, they expressed their admiration 
                                                   
81 Ōhashi, Kyoto gakuha to Nihon kaigun, 17-18; Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 112. 
82 Ōshima, ‘Daitōa sensō to Kyoto gakuha’. 
83 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 113-114. 
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for the fact that the Kyoto School philosophers complied with the purge 
quietly and without attempting to defend their actions.84 Even though 
Kōsaka joined the committee as part of an effort to counter the Army, 
as a member of the group he too shared responsibility for the decisions 
that were made. Moreover, the wartime Kyoto School had lost its 
virtue (徳/toku) once Japan was defeated because its arguments had 
been based on support for the war. As a Confucian-inspired intellectual 
it was only natural that Kōsaka would accept his intellectual exile and 
convert to the new political orientation thereafter as he was a part of 
the losing side of the decisive Confucian Revolution of 1945.85 
  
                                                   
84 Ōshima, et al., ‘Zadankai: Daitōa sensō to Nihon no chishikijintachi nitsuite – Kyoto gakuha’, 
25.26. 
85 Kōsaka, ‘Aru tetsugakusha no hansei’, 9-10.  
121 
 
  
                                                   
Chapter 4 Japanese Citations 
 
i 哲学的な瞑想ではあり得ない 
 
ii 偉大な将軍は深い政治的洞察を有たなければならない 
 
iii 世界は矛盾的自己同一としてどこまでも作られたものから作るものへと動いていく。環境に適さ
ない社会形態が行き詰まると中国では天命の思想により易姓革命が起り、日本では皇室に復する復
古となる。それは昔の制度、文物に帰るというのではなく、逆に新たなる世界へ歩みだすのである。
明治維新とはそういうものであった  
 
Nishida’s original prose: 主体が環境を環境が主体を限定する。一つの世界が成立するには、それ
ぞれの環境に応じて主体的なものがなければならない。併し世界は矛盾的自己同一として何処まで
も作られたものから作るものへと動いていくのである…我国歴史に於て主体的なるものは、それぞ
れの時代に於てそれぞれの時代の担い手の役目を演じたのであろう。併し作られて作るものとして、
如何なる主体ももはや環境に適せない、即ち社会形態が行詰まる時が来なければならない。歴史が
生きるものであるかぎり、然らざるを得ない。支那ではかかる場合が易世革命となった。我国では
それがいつも皇室に帰ると云うことであった、復古と云うことであった。そしてそれはいつも昔の
制度文物に返ると云うことでなく、逆に新なる世界へと歩み出すと云うことであった。明治維新と
云う如きものが最も之を明にして居ると思う/A subject determines its environment and the 
environment determines the subject. In order for a ‘world’ to form there must be something 
subjective that matches its environment. Nevertheless, the world is a contradictory self-
identity that constantly moves as that which is created to that which creates. In the history of 
our country there has been something subjective within different ages that has been able to 
bear the burdens of the period. However, as [a process] of from the created to the creating, 
there will come a time when the subject no longer matches its environment, in other words a 
time when the form of a society reaches a dead-end. As long as history is a ‘living’ thing this 
will always be so. In the case of China this led to a ‘revolutionary change of dynasty’. In our 
country, this always resulted in a return to the Imperial Family or in a form of ‘Restoration’. 
What is more, this did not always mean a return to a past system or culture, but rather the 
first steps to a new world. I think it is the Meiji Restoration that best demonstrates this. 
 
iv 東条を中心とする陸軍のやり方にはわれわれも強い不満を持ち、せめてもの期待を海軍に対して
抱いていた 
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Part Three – The Philosophy of Masaaki Kōsaka 
 In this section I present a detailed examination of Kōsaka’s 
philosophy of history. Although I continue to highlight the importance 
of the respective philosophies of Nishida and Tanabe for Kōsaka’s 
speculations, the focus of my analysis shifts away from the general 
cultural and intellectual influences of Confucianism, to his personal 
engagement with and reflections upon the Western philosophical 
tradition. This marks a significant break with the first half of the 
dissertation. However, the main aim of these four chapters is to 
accurately portray the philosophy of a Japanese thinker whose ideas 
remain relatively unknown in the post-war era. It is therefore essential 
that Kōsaka be allowed to speak in his own words as far as possible. 
While I believe Confucianism was a significant influence upon his 
conception of the historical world, like many of his associates in the 
Kyoto School he rarely cites directly from East Asian sources in his 
writings. I therefore present my own Confucian interpretation of 
Kōsaka’s philosophy of history separately from this examination in 
Chapter 9. This ensures that readers who disagree with the importance 
I attribute to Confucianism are still able to engage his ideas free from 
the biases of the interpretative schema I adopt. 
Although I refer to a wide selection of Kōsaka’s books and papers, 
I draw upon three of his works in particular. The first is his major pre-
war text The Historical World, which was published in 1937. The other 
two books are works that are representative of his wartime thought, 
The Philosophy of the Nation from 1942 and the Introduction to the 
Philosophy of History from 1943. While Kōsaka no doubt continued to 
develop his understanding of the historical world over the course of his 
career, most notably in relation to his conception of historical 
subjectivity, overall his wartime philosophy is generally consistent 
with his pre-war speculations. I therefore stress the continuity in the 
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philosophical ideas that he expresses in each of these works. I begin by 
introducing some of the main influences upon Kōsaka’s deliberations 
as highlighted by his son Setsuzō Kōsaka, followed by a number of 
ideas that I personally identify as vital for comprehending Kōsaka’s 
arguments. I then proceed to examine various aspects of his 
philosophical system, starting with his epistemology and then 
proceeding on to his conception of historical nature and historical 
subjectivity. This analysis loosely follows the order in which Kōsaka 
himself presented his ideas in The Historical World, the work that laid 
the foundations for all of his later speculations.
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Chapter 5: The Philosophical Beginnings of the Historical World 
5a: Goethe, Kant and Nishida 
Setsuzō Kōsaka describes three main influences upon his 
father’s early gestation of the philosophy of history. These were Johan 
Wolfgang von Goethe, Immanuel Kant and his mentor at Kyoto 
University, Kitarō Nishida. Specifically, Setsuzō Kōsaka focuses on the 
importance of Goethe for his father’s recognition of the significance of 
metaphysics, the influence of Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace for his 
philosophical conception of history, and Nishida’s deliberations on the 
‘eternal now’ as the principle standpoint from which he undertook his 
investigations.1 Other important Western influences include G.W.F. 
Hegel’s political philosophy and Wilhelm Dilthey’s own reflections upon 
the formation of the historical world. It should also be noted that the 
work of other thinkers associated with the Kyoto School were 
important sources of inspiration for Kōsaka’s philosophical 
deliberations as well. This includes Tetsurō Watsuji and his research 
on the social and cultural significance of climate, Kiyoshi Miki and his 
deliberations on the philosophy of history and the key concept of 
subjectivity, and Hajime Tanabe’s monumental work on the logic of the 
species.2  
 
Goethe and Metaphysics 
 Kōsaka was attracted to the works of Goethe from an early age 
and he always kept in his study a large volume on the German poet 
written by his school teacher Kinji Kimura. In particular, Kōsaka was 
greatly affected by the following quote from Faust: 
                                                   
1 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei, 54-110. 
2 Tetsurō Watsuji, ‘Fūdo [Climate]’, Watsuji Tetsurō zenshū dai hachi kan [The Complete 
Works of Tetsurō Watsuji: Volume 8] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1962), 1-256; Kiyoshi Miki, ‘Rekishi 
tetsugaku [The Philosophy of History]’, Miki Kiyoshi zenshū dai roku kan [The Complete 
Works of Kiyoshi Miki: Volume 6] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967) 1-287; Hajime Tanabe, Shu 
no ronri: Tanabe Hajime tetsugaku sen I [Logic of the Species: Selected Works of Hajime 
Tanabe Vol. 1], edited by Masakatsu Fujita (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 2010). 
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 That I may detect the inmost force 
Which binds the world, and guides its course; 
Its germs, productive powers explore, 
And rummage in empty words no more!3/i 
 
He quotes a part of the original German at the start of his book The 
Philosophy of the Nation, stating that anyone who feels the same 
desire to understand the inner workings of the world ‘stands before 
metaphysics’.4/ii Shirō Kōsaka describes Kōsaka as ‘less a 
metaphysician than a historian of philosophy’.5 However, Setsuzō 
Kōsaka believes that these words from Goethe were an important 
impetus throughout the course of his father’s investigations on the 
philosophy of history.6 Kōsaka states that Nishida and Tanabe taught 
him the importance of logic, because without logic there could be no 
metaphysics, and ‘without an exploration of the metaphysical world 
there could be no true philosophy’.7/iii Any attempt to answer the 
question of what it is that ‘binds the world’ necessarily encounters the 
metaphysical. Kant believed that human beings naturally concern 
themselves with the world around them, while human reason is 
disposed to seek answers to the problems it encounters and completion 
                                                   
3 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei, 95; Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust – A Tragedy, 
trans. by Bayard Taylor (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company – Riverside Press 
Cambridge, 1912), 18 (Although Taylor’s translation is old, of all the editions I have consulted 
he most accurately captures the nuance of Kōsaka’s own interpretation of this passage  – ‘I 
wish to know what it is that guides/controls the world from its innermost depths; I wish to see 
all the powers that move here and all the seeds [from which they derive].’ (The original 
Japanese is provided in endnote i) – For a more recent and very different translation of this 
passage see also Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust with the Urfaust, trans. by John R. 
Williams (Ware (UK): Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2007), 14: ‘I’ll know what makes the 
world revolve, Its inner mysteries resolve, No more in empty words I’ll deal – Creation’s 
wellsprings I’ll reveal’). 
4 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 1.  
5 Shirō Kōsaka, ‘Kōsaka Masaaki (1900-1969)’, in James W. Heisig, et al., Japanese 
Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011), 708. 
6 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me. 
7 Kōsaka, ‘Jō [Introduction]’ in Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 3-4. 
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to the solutions it proposes.8 Consequently, human beings have a 
natural propensity for the metaphysical once they encounter a question 
for which the answer transcends the limits of human experience.  
For Kant himself, these were questions such as ‘What can I 
know?’, ‘What ought I to do?’, and ‘What may I hope?’.9 However, as a 
consequence of this natural propensity, the history of Western 
metaphysics has often been a tale of wild speculations and one-sided 
dogmatism. Nevertheless, Nishida taught Kōsaka that because 
‘philosophy is an academic discipline of totality’iv it necessarily 
encounters the metaphysical problems of the ‘absolute’, ‘transcendence’ 
and the ‘inmost force’ that drives the world.10/v In his introduction to 
The Historical World, Kōsaka writes:  
 
If human existence is an existence that philosophises, then the 
historical is no longer simply temporal, but contains a deep 
crevice that transcends time. In the depths of history there is 
something that is profoundly philosophical, something that is 
profoundly eternal.11/vi  
 
Although Kant was known by his contemporaries as the ‘all-destroyer’ 
for revealing the inherent fallacies of metaphysical theories, Kōsaka 
was greatly influenced by Kant’s development of a new philosophy of 
‘practical-subjectivity’ or shutaisei (主体性), in which the focus of 
metaphysics shifted away from purely theoretical concerns to the 
practical realisation of metaphysical ideals.12 
 
                                                   
8 Masaaki Kōsaka, Kanto (Tokyo: Risōsha, 1977), 66. 
9 Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (New 
York: Dover Publications Inc., 2003), 451. 
10 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 97; Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku 
jōsetsu, 134. 
11 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 3.  
12 Kōsaka, Kanto kaishaku no mondai, 171. 
127 
 
Kant and Metaphysics 
 For much of his early academic career Kōsaka was known as a 
Kantian scholar. His graduation thesis at Kyoto University was on 
Kant’s conception of general consciousness and the problems of 
transcendental apperception.13 After securing a teaching position he 
went on to publish numerous articles on Kant including a paper on the 
meaning of nature within his philosophy.14 However, in his writings on 
Kant, Kōsaka would often focus on the practical dimension of Kantian 
metaphysics, an important influence for his own formulations of 
historical subjectivity. The antinomies of pure reason demonstrated the 
futility of attempting to solve the fundamental problems of 
metaphysics theoretically, whether concerning the existence of God, 
immortality or freedom. However, through the practical application of 
the moral law as a regulative principle, the noumenon of freedom 
attained a positive significance. This is because the a priori moral law 
always implies freedom, and those who act in accordance with its 
maxims must necessarily be autonomous in their self-determination.15 
Kōsaka states that for Kant it is only through its ‘practical application 
[that reason] became constructive and the bounds [of its use] 
established. In this way, the metaphysical world comes to be 
practically constituted’.16/vii On numerous occasions Kōsaka reiterates 
the practical significance of the metaphysical concepts he employs. For 
instance, the historical substratum of nature only holds meaning as 
substance in the historical world through the necessity of its positon in 
relation to the continual process of historical rebirth or creation in the 
present. Nature is the necessary material for the development of the 
human spirit, which as Hegel taught was practically orientated as it 
                                                   
13 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 10. 
14 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 313. 
15 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge & New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 26. 
16 Kōsaka, Kanto, 66. 
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aimed toward the self-realisation of its concept, or in other words, 
freedom.17 Kōsaka reinterprets this in terms of the development of 
historical subjectivity.  
In regard to the philosophy of history specifically, Setsuzō 
Kōsaka points out the importance of Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace. 
Kōsaka translated this work in 1926 and it was included in the twelfth 
volume of Kant’s collected works under the title of ‘Kant’s Thought on 
General History’.18/viii This translation was also republished as a 
standalone book in 1949.19 There are numerous points of congruence 
between the ideas of Kōsaka and Kant, especially in relation to the 
importance of treating the state as a moral ‘personality’ in its role of 
representing the will of a nation, and the importance of war 
historically for the migration of peoples and the early foundation of 
political institutions.20/ix Furthermore, for Kōsaka this essay 
represented an example of Kant’s practical application of metaphysics. 
Sanjūrō Tomonaga, a member of the first generation of the Kyoto 
School who both taught Kōsaka and helped him secure a lecturing 
position in Tokyo after graduation, argued that Kant’s call for 
perpetual peace was not something limited to a specific time, but was 
rather an ‘eternal problem’ of reason. Consequently, although its 
realisation may be impossible in practice, as a demand of practical 
reason the call to end war has absolute authority. It was therefore a 
moral duty that required continual effort.21  
Because the historical world was understood by Kōsaka as a 
‘nothingness-like universal’, and therefore subject to the negating 
forces of mediation, there always remained the possibility of war 
                                                   
17 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 224-225. 
18 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 97. 
19 Immanuel Kant, Eien heiwa no tameni, trans. by Masaaki Kōsaka (Tokyo: Iwanami Shōten, 
1949). 
20 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,’ in Kant: Political Writings, trans. 
by H.B. Nesbit (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
21 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 66-70; Sanjūrō Tomonaga, Kanto no heiwa-ron [Kant’s Theory 
for Peace] (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1947 [first edition 1922]), 78-80. 
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between peoples.22/x Nevertheless, in terms of the practical use of 
reason the categorical imperative demonstrated the absolute authority 
of morality.23 Kōsaka therefore agreed with Kant that war was not 
something that should take place, while his demand for war never to 
be repeated was thought to hold firm before reason. The objective of 
eternal peace represented a goal for which it was the moral duty of 
humanity to continually strive towards. Indeed, the formation of the 
state was itself an historical example of a solution to war and conflict 
between different peoples. As his son indicates, through his translation 
of Perpetual Peace Kōsaka came to appreciate the importance of the 
political and the moral significance of the state.24 For Kant, the state 
was an essential condition for the realisation of world peace, and 
Kōsaka himself identified the political as one of the two axes of the 
historical world, the other being culture. 
Importantly, Kant also incorporated a philosophical 
interpretation of history in this essay in the form of the providence of 
nature, which was presented as a guarantee for the possibility of 
realising perpetual peace. Kōsaka himself rejected purely teleological 
interpretations of history because they subsumed the past within a 
continuous line of development, reducing the past to the ‘means’ 
through which the goal of the present was realised.25/xi In the words of 
Herbert Butterfield, this way of thinking attributes a ‘line of causation’ 
to history that converges ‘beautifully upon the [morally superior] 
present’.26 This was a consequence of attempting to understand history 
from the standpoint of an a priori principle, which was not only 
ahistorical, but destroyed the rich diversity of the past and its 
                                                   
22 Kosaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 305. 
23 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 67. 
24 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukume wo mitsumeta me, pg. 97. 
25 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, pg. 15. 
26 Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, 12. 
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independent meaning.27 Karl Otto-Apel notes the similarities between 
Kant’s description of providence working against the will of 
humankind and Hegel’s later discussions of the ‘cunning of reason’.28 
Nevertheless, it is likely that Kōsaka came to appreciate through Kant 
the importance of history in terms of the practical application of 
metaphysical principles. After his translation of Perpetual Peace, 
Kōsaka published a further two papers on Kant’s general philosophy of 
history and the problem of history in his religious thought.29  
Kōsaka also notes the significance of Kant’s distinction between 
a world of external freedom or laws governed by the teleology of 
providence and the world of internal freedom governed by morality. For 
Kōsaka, this suggested that there was something more to history than 
just a ‘continuous’ line of development or progression.30/xii Indeed, Kant 
himself did not believe that providence was something that could be 
discerned directly in experience itself. Rather, it was a consequence of 
the need for morality to be possible in reality and therefore for its 
objectives to be realisable in the sensible realm of experience or 
nature.31 This led to the necessary application of analogies of ‘human 
artifices’ when looking at nature from the standpoint of freedom, 
thereby attributing the ‘underlying wisdom of a higher cause’.32 
Providence was therefore a consequence of the judgement of the human 
will as a guarantee for the practical demand of reason that all 
hostilities should cease, which as a demand of the moral law must be 
possible in actuality. It was therefore an answer to his question: ‘What 
can I hope for?’. For Kōsaka, the fact that the world of internal freedom 
                                                   
27 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 143-144. 
28 Karl Otto Apel, ‘Kant’s “Toward Perpetual Peace” as Historical Prognosis from the Point of 
View of Moral Duty’, in James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds), Perpetual Peace: 
Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge, USA & London, UK: The MIT Press, 1997), 
81. 
29 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukume wo mitsumeta me, 313. 
30 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 15-16. 
31 Kōsaka, Kanto, 284-287. 
32 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 108-109.  
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was kept free from the teleology of the external realm ensured that the 
moral decisions made by the free personalities of the past did not 
become a part of a chain of historical necessity that would destroy any 
meaning of freedom inherent in these past decisions. In order to be 
able to understand this philosophically, an alternative to the 
‘continuous’ dialectic of Hegel was required, which Kōsaka found in 
Nishida’s ‘dialectic of discontinuity’.33/xiii Through the application of 
this logic, Kōsaka was able to account for the meaning of the past 
independently from the present.34 The temporal application of the 
dialectic of discontinuity was in turn made possible through the related 
concept of the ‘eternal now’.xiv 
 
Nishida and the Eternal Now 
After his retirement from Kyoto University, Nishida gave a 
special lecture at Dōshisha University in 1928 on the ‘eternal now’.35 A 
summary of the contents of this lecture is provided by Kōsaka in his 
introduction to The Historical World, ‘Things that are Historical’, 
which was published as a separate paper in 1932.36 He explains that 
there are four conceptions of time: causality or time understood from 
the past, teleology or time understood from the future, practical time or 
the temporal as understood from the present, and the eternal now or 
time understood from the eternal. The first conception, that of 
causality, is based on an understanding of time flowing from the past 
into the future. It is therefore based on a sequential interpretation of 
time that emphasises the prior causes of historical phenomena. For 
example, a ‘shoot’ is understood to ‘flower and then bear fruit’, or a 
‘child’ is understood to ‘become an adult and then an elderly person’.xv 
                                                   
33 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 25-26. 
34 Hanazawa, Koksaka Masaaki, 40. 
35 Setsuzo Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 103. 
36 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 30. 
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The shoot necessarily precedes the flower and the child the adult. In 
this sense both may be regarded as the cause for what follows.  
The second conception, that of teleology, understands time as 
flowing from the future into the past. Although still sequential, 
teleology reverses the focus of time so that an emphasis is placed on 
future goals or that which lies ahead. For instance, ‘next year’ is 
understood to ‘become this year’, just as the present year will become a 
part of the past as ‘last year’. In the same way, the ‘child’ is no longer 
thought to ‘move closer to becoming an elderly person, rather old age 
moves closer to youth. We do not approach death, death approaches 
us’.37/xvi Death represents an absolute truth for humanity because it is 
the necessary end awaiting all human life in the future.38 Alternatively, 
becoming a responsible adult may be regarded as the main goal for 
children. It is therefore a focus on the future that lends weight to the 
necessity of educating youth in society. The third interpretation of time, 
that of the practical dimension of the temporal, finds its origins in the 
philosophy of Augustine who said that we have ‘a present of past 
things, a present of present things, and a present of future things’. 
Consequently, time is understood to flow out from the present into the 
past and the future. The practical implications of this are that the past 
is held in the present as ‘memory’, the present as ‘direct perception’, 
and the future as ‘expectation’.39 It is only human beings that exist in 
the present who are able to work towards a future objective or who can 
be held accountable for the consequences of their past actions. As a 
                                                   
37 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 19-20.  
38 Masaaki Kōsaka, Jitsuzonshugi (Tokyo: Atene Bunko/Kōbundō, 1948). 
39 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin (London & New York: Penguin 
Books, 1961), 269; Compare Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works・Volume III – The Formation of 
the Historical World in the Human Sciences, eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi 
(Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University press, 2002), 93-94: ‘Concrete time … consists in the 
restless advance of the present, in which what is present continually becomes past and the 
future becomes present. The present is the filling of a moment of time with reality. It is a lived 
experience in contrast to the memory of one and in contrast to wishing, hoping, expecting, or 
fearing something experiencable in the future’.   
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result, the present of Augustine ‘envelops all of the past, present and 
future’ within it.40/xvii  
Although the time of the practical present may be regarded as 
sequential in the sense that it flows out into the past and future, 
Augustine’s interpretation of time allows for a spatial conception of the 
temporal insofar as the present becomes the ‘place’ that encloses the 
past, present and future within it.xviii However, following the teachings 
of Nishida, Kōsaka explains that this is no longer a temporal present 
that stands in opposition to the temporal phases of the past and future. 
This is because as ‘a present that incorporates all of the past, present 
and future’ it consequently ‘transcends time’.xix In actuality, it is the 
eternal present or the eternal now. Time is no longer understood as 
flowing from the present into the past and future, but rather as flowing 
from the source of the ‘eternal now into the past, present and future 
alike’. Kōsaka explains that ‘we no longer go out from the present, but 
rather descend into the present … into the past … into the future’.xx In 
his chapter on the historical substratum of nature, Kōsaka quotes 
Nicholas Cusanus, who argued that the present may be conceived as 
the focal point of time because the past was once the present, while the 
future is destined to become it. The past and future therefore represent 
the historical development of the present, and time may in turn be 
conceived as a long series of presents. This is reinterpreted by Kōsaka 
so that history may be understood as the continual development and 
repetition of the eternal now, or as a long series of eternal presents.  
Through adopting the eternal now, Kōsaka introduces the 
metaphysical into his understanding of historical time. Consequently, 
he admits that ‘it is impossible to apprehend the eternal now 
objectively or to find it conceptually in the external world’.xxi However, 
as a Kantian in his approach to metaphysics, Kōsaka conceived the 
                                                   
40 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 20. 
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eternal now as a concern of historical praxis. The realisation of the 
eternal present was only possible ‘at the moment of determination 
when all of the past and future are laid down during practical 
action’.41/xxii In this moment the eternal now fulfils its role as the place 
where historical creation, mediated by the necessity of the past and the 
freedom of the future, can occur.42 This is why primordial nature, the 
‘dark foothold’xxiii or substratum that is said to permit the 
materialisation of the eternal now within the historical world, was not 
an object of intellectual intuition but rather of Nishida’s ‘action-
intuition’.43/xxiv  
The closeness of the practical to the eternal becomes apparent in 
Kōsaka’s explanation of the interrelatedness of the four conceptions of 
time. He states that the first conception of time, that of causality, aims 
for the second, that of teleology. Likewise, teleology aims for the 
practical and the practical the eternal. Human beings are unable to 
live by focusing entirely on the past, despite its formative importance 
for who they are. Subsequently, their focus shifts to future goals, which 
in turn leads to a focus on what is necessary to realise these goals or 
praxis in the present. However, as Hegel taught, through membership 
of social groups the selfish objectives of specific individuals contribute 
toward and evolve into the shared communal goals of a society. The 
universal ideals of reason thereby serve as the regulative principles 
that guide collective human behaviour. The praxis of the present may 
therefore be said to aim for the realisation of the eternal, since these 
intelligible ideals transcend the temporal realm.  
Nevertheless, Kōsaka warns that stopping here would destroy 
the independent meaning of each conception of time. The relationship 
between the four aspects of time was not simply one-directional, but 
                                                   
41 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 20-21; 170-171. 
42 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 63. 
43 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 174; 181; Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 43-44. 
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dialectical. The lower levels of time are both enveloped by those higher 
up, while simultaneously forming the ground upon which the higher 
levels are supported. Kōsaka compares this to the relationship between 
the body and soul – ‘just as the body is the basis for the soul … a body 
that is not imprinted with the soul cannot be called a body’.xxv The body 
is the ‘negative principle’ of the soul.xxvi However, as the soul’s negation 
the body is also the soul’s ‘material’.xxvii The negative principle of the 
body therefore becomes a positive moment of mediation, leading to 
salvation from the negation.44 The lower levels of time are too 
comparable to the body as they constitute the negative moments or 
material for the eternal.45 The analogy of time and the body also hints 
at Kōsaka’s rejection of purely idealistic interpretations of history and 
the need for a historical substratum (being) in order to realise the 
ideals of a community in actuality.46 The result is a close relationship 
between the eternal now and historical nature. This is because nature 
is both understood to yearn for the eternal, for example in terms of the 
natural laws or in an animal’s instinct to prolong the life of its species, 
while simultaneously existing in the temporal realm of history. The 
connection between the eternal now and nature ensures that the 
eternal is not something that transcends time, but is a necessary part 
of it. Kant himself understood causality in terms of the natural laws of 
cause and effect. It is no coincidence that the material realm of nature, 
which in terms of Kantian causality constitutes the lowest level of time 
for Kōsaka, forms the foundations for the development of spirit and the 
infinite creativity of nothingness or the eternal at the highest level of 
time. 
Kōsaka concludes his explanation of the eternal now by stating 
that:  
                                                   
44 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 225: ‘A soul without a body would not be a living thing, 
nor would a body without a soul’.  
45 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 22  
46 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 44. 
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Time must be understood as showing a complex mix of the 
temporal and the eternal. Time is not simply subsumed within 
the eternal; the eternal is likewise supported within time. The 
eternal does not transcend time, it is an aspect of true time.xxviii  
 
He goes on to identify the world as the mediation of the substantial 
and subjective or the material and spiritual, stating that the ‘historical 
world is a world where freedom is each respective single event, while 
conversely it is also a world where all events together represent the 
realisation of substantial freedom’.xxix This resembles his earlier 
discussions of history as the development of the eternal now, where he 
states that the eternal now is at once both one and many. This is 
because it is present in every moment, while simultaneously the same 
single eternal now when taken as the whole sequence of events. The 
relationship between the eternal now and freedom is guaranteed by the 
fact that history is supported through historical nature and therefore 
the eternal now. The eternal now represents the absolute negation of 
freedom, through which freedom paradoxically becomes possible. The 
determination of the ego requires the ego to break through its narrow 
frame and step into the world. This is because its determination cannot 
remain empty or only subjective, but must be mediated by the world:  
 
The ego breaks through its base and is conversely reborn out of 
something that is not the ego, this is determination. Through its 
determination the ego is discarded and freedom is negated. 
Freedom itself becomes an event.47/xxx  
 
                                                   
47 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 20 & 41: ‘The will is free, so that freedom is both the 
substance of right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, 
the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature’; ‘A person must translate his 
freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea’.   
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He continues by saying that it is through such determination that the 
eternal now is both practically realised, while simultaneously ‘from the 
base of the eternal’ determination itself is born:xxxi ‘The ground of the 
ego becomes groundless and freedom is negated within the substance of 
freedom. This is the eternal now’.48/xxxii Becoming groundless allows one 
to transcend one’s limits and rise up to the eternal. In this way it also 
becomes possible for a dialogue with the historical Thou of the past, 
because the eternal now, as the ‘place’ of historical praxis, encompasses 
all of the past, present and future within it. 
 
5b: The Necessity of a Philosophy of History 
Kōsaka’s first publication of his ideas on the historical world in 
1932 was greatly praised by both Nishida and the novelist Tōson 
Shimazaki. Kōsaka continued to focus on the philosophy of history 
thereafter, and published a further six essays that together would 
make up the various chapters of his first book on his own philosophical 
ideas, The Historical World.49 Each of the later essays was both a 
development and amendment of his earlier arguments as he responded 
to the criticisms of his colleagues and his own understanding of history 
evolved. However, this historical research derived not only from a 
purely academic interest but also from practical necessity. Hanazawa 
explains that before Kōsaka published The Historical World there had 
been only one previous book that focused specifically on the philosophy 
of history in Japan, a work that was entitled The Philosophy of History 
(1932) by Kiyoshi Miki.xxxiii Nevertheless, at the time arguments 
concerning history were becoming more central to philosophical 
debates, a trend that would continue throughout the war.50 This 
coincided with the so-called Kehre or turn of the Kyoto School in the 
                                                   
48 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 24; 241; 172. 
49 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukume wo mitsumeta me, 94. 
50 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 31; 29. 
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late 1920s and early 1930s ‘away from an exclusive focus on religious 
and metaphysical concerns to history and politics’, for which the 
philosophy of ‘Tanabe was instrumental’.51  
Consequently, Tanabe’s work on the logic of the species became 
an important work of reference for the members of the second 
generation in their engagement with the historical and political.52 This 
included Kōsaka who stated that his own works were also an attempt 
to ‘solve the problem of the logic of the species in my own way’.53/xxxiv 
Importantly, Tanabe insisted that ‘a concrete logic could not stop at 
formalism; it had to be a logic of reality, a logic of existence’.54/xxxv Of 
his motivations he explains: 
 
I proposed to investigate the actual structure of society as a state 
understood as a system of dialectical relationships … I wanted to 
address [the kind] of nationalism that was coming to the fore in 
those years … this meant I had to criticise … the theory of 
liberalism that dominated Japanese thinking [from the 1920s] as 
well as the totalitarianism that emerged in the mid-1930s.55 
 
Kōsaka himself would come to understand logic, which was essential 
for metaphysics and therefore philosophy as a whole, as ‘the 
phenomenon of the self-mediation of the historical world itself’.56/xxxvi 
Philosophy and reality are deeply intertwined. This means that 
philosophy has to address contemporary issues to be relevant. Its 
logical concepts must therefore correspond to actual phenomena in the 
real world. In the case of Tanabe’s logical concept of the species, it 
represented ‘the specific base of general society, for example the species 
                                                   
51 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 19. 
52 Unpublished letter from Kōyama to Kōsaka in Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 73-74.  
53 Kōsaka, ‘Introduction,’ in Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 2. 
54 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 100. 
55 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 97.  
56 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 381.  
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substratum that forms the basis of the nation, social classes, and the 
state, etc’.57/xxxvii In this way, the world itself may also be said to impact 
the orientation of philosophy in turn. Hanazawa states that broadly 
speaking the philosophy of history had become a global trend. It was 
therefore only natural that Kōsaka focused on the historical as well. 
 One of the major reasons for the growing interest in the 
philosophy of history was the circumstances in which Japan was 
situated at the time. Many intellectuals believed that a philosophical 
understanding of history would shed light on Japan’s present situation 
and the likely direction that events would take. Hanazawa suggests 
that Kōsaka’s philosophy evolved from a ‘static’xxxviii analysis of the 
historical world in the pre-war years to incorporate the moral ‘ought’ of 
Kantianism after the outbreak of hostilities.58/xxxix Kōsaka himself 
argued that during times of ‘historical crisis’ there is no guarantee that 
the position in which a nation finds itself will not have changed from 
one moment to the next.xl He continues: ‘I strongly believe that 
philosophical speculation must not be limited to particular place [or 
context]’. Nonetheless, at the same time it should always be ‘deeply 
rooted in historical reality’.xli This is because ‘philosophy must become 
a discipline of orientation within the historical world, where the ethical 
substance [of a people] moves at its very source’.59/xlii 
Although his pre-war analysis of the historical world may have 
been ‘static’ in formulation, the need for developing what would become 
the foundation of his wartime philosophy may also be seen as a 
philosophical response to the problems that Japan was facing at the 
time.60 The Shōwa period was a time of great unrest and uncertainty 
both internationally and domestically. In 1927 there was the Shōwa 
Financial Crisis and in 1929 the Great Depression; in 1931 the 
                                                   
57 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 91. 
58 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 29; 13. 
59 Kōsaka, ‘Jō’, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 1-2. 
60 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 29-30. 
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outbreak of the Manchuria Incident, while in 1933 Japan withdrew 
from the League of Nations and the National Socialists took power in 
Germany. What is more, Kōsaka himself was directly affected by 
political events when the Minister of Education Ichirō Hatoyama 
suspended the Kyoto University Law Professor Yukitoki Takigawa for 
suspected communist/liberal sympathies, forcing Kōsaka to cancel his 
own lecture series on the philosophy of history after only two 
sessions.61 In his ‘Afterword’ to The Historical World, Kōsaka 
reminisces on the events that took place: 
 
I was given the opportunity to present a special lecture series on 
the philosophy of history at the Philosophy Department of Kyoto 
Imperial University. Unfortunately, shortly after the lecture 
series began I was forced to cancel. This was because of the 
escalation of the so-called Kyoto University (Takigawa) Incident 
at the start of the summer of 1933. The centre of the ‘vortex’ was 
the Law Department, although we [in Philosophy] were also 
affected. However, with each new day we were caught up in 
different rumours, assertions and opinions, and could only drift 
at the fringes of this vortex. There was no way to know where 
the centre of the vortex was, where the flow of the vortex was 
heading, nor from where the vortex had formed. This ignorance 
made our actions utterly powerless.62/xliii 
 
He asks whether it is not possible to ascertain where the true centre of 
historical events is, and whether there is not a way of proceeding from 
the historical periphery to the historical centre. These questions, he 
says, were the biggest motivation for what would become the first 
chapter of The Historical World, ‘The Historical Periphery’, which was 
                                                   
61 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 96. 
62 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 385. 
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published as a separate paper in 1934.63 These questions also 
confirmed for Kōsaka both the importance of the political in the 
historical world and the need for philosophy to ‘show the proper path of 
history’.xliv This also reflects the extent of Kant’s influence upon his 
thought.64 For Kōsaka, if philosophy was to adequately address the 
issues of reality it would first have to grasp the historical nature of this 
reality. 
 
5c: The Fundamental Assumptions of the Philosophy of History 
There are three important assumptions that underlie Kōsaka’s 
philosophy of history and shape its general character. The first is his 
acknowledgement of Dilthey’s assertion that human existence is 
fundamentally historical; the second is his emphasis on the importance 
of practical-subjectivity; and the third is his adoption of Nishida’s 
stance of absolute nothingness. 
 
Historical Existence 
 Dilthey argued that ‘We are historical beings before being 
observers in history, and only because we are the former do we become 
the latter’.65/xlv As a consequence, Kōsaka adopted the 
phenomenological methodology of hermeneutics as employed by 
Dilthey and Heidegger, whose work Being and Time Kōsaka would 
later cite as an important influence.66 Specifically, just as Dilthey 
attempted to understand life from the phenomena of life itself, so 
Kōsaka attempted to understand the historical world from the 
phenomena of the historical world itself:  
 
                                                   
63 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 30. 
64 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 103. 
65 Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 297; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 145. 
66 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 33. 
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On the one hand, I analyse the variety of phenomena in the 
historical world, while on the other, I attempt to track the 
formation of the historical world itself through this analysis. 
This is why I refer to the work as a phenomenology of the 
historical world.xlvi  
 
Kōsaka believed that humanity, as a fundamentally historical 
existence, ‘holds its essence within its own history’ and therefore 
within the phenomena of the historical world.67/xlvii However, he also 
believed that human beings are by definition social creatures. He 
therefore agreed with Tanabe that one of the main problems of 
hermeneutics was the fact that it could not escape from its 
predisposition toward internality and abstract idealism.68 
Hermeneutics differed from the critical methodology of Kant in that it 
did not deduce the formal abstractions of general consciousness, which 
being a priori in nature transcended time. Rather, through the 
methodology of reduction, hermeneutics apprehended the experience of 
phenomena in the internal flow of time within pure consciousness. 
Nevertheless, both of these approaches are abstract in the sense that 
they ‘lack the standpoint of objective spirit and overlook the historical 
and social subject’.69/xlviii  
In his critique of the ‘general consciousness’ of Kant, which in 
terms of the relationship between the subject and object may be 
regarded as concrete since the subject encompasses all of nature within 
it, Kōsaka explains that in regard to relationships between different 
                                                   
67 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 382; 3; Compare Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 
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subjects it is abstract because it exists in isolation. A person is only 
truly human in their interactions with others, an idea that is lacking 
from general consciousness hence its abstractness in social terms.70 
The same may also be said of the pure consciousness of phenomenology, 
which based on the methods of Kant is predisposed to internality. 
Consequently, Kōsaka describes the methodology of the philosophy of 
history as a process of concretion. This required the ego to break 
through its bottom or limited frame, and therefore step out of the 
confines of general consciousness or pure consciousness into the 
external world. This he describes as a ‘return to the world of objective 
spirit’.71/xlix The fact that Kōsaka discusses this in his chapter on the 
historical substratum or substance reflects the importance of nature 
for objective spirit, which was a product of the mediation of the 
subjective and substantial. Importantly, however, the objective spirit of 
Hegel was not the spirit of an abstract individual, but the 
manifestation of the spirit of a community or society that through the 
cumulative interactions of its members had come to organise itself 
along more rational lines.72 In order to understand the true nature of 
the historical existence of humanity, it is essential to take into account 
the historicity of humanity as a community. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that people are born into a society that already has a language, 
customs and traditions, each products of the history of this society, and 
each something that a single individual is all but powerless to change 
on his or her own.73 In this respect the historical nature of human 
beings may be seen as a consequence of the very fact that people are 
social creatures. 
 
                                                   
70 Kōsaka, Kanto Kaishaku no Mondai, 197-198. 
71 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 186; 129. 
72 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 217-256; Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 105-223. 
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nation and the political state – Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 154-155; 190-
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Practical Subjectivity (Shutaisei) l 
Although Dilthey was an important influence on his 
deliberations, Kōsaka attempted to overcome the limitations of 
Dilthey’s philosophy of life through a synthesis with the principle of 
reason from the standpoint of the eternal now.74 Philosophy could not 
end only with an interpretation of phenomena because it was primarily 
a practical concern, hence the necessity of the standpoint of reason. 
However, Kōsaka rejected interpreting history only from the 
standpoint of pure reason because it was fundamentally ahistorical 
and resulted in the entirety of history being subsumed under the a 
priori principles of a philosophical system, as exemplified by Hegel’s 
philosophy of history. Instead of ‘observing history from within reason’, 
Kōsaka believed that reason should be ‘observed from within 
history’.75/li Nevertheless, historical reason was not instrumental 
reason, but rather the practical reason of spirit or what the Kyoto 
School philosophers referred to as practical subjectivity (shutaisei), an 
idea strongly associated with political agency.76 In his wartime 
writings, Kōsaka interprets subjectivity in terms of a dynamic cycle of 
historical problems and solutions. Specifically, this refers to the ability 
of the historical subject to rationally comprehend and resolve the 
problems that arise within the current historical environment.77 In this 
sense history proceeds as a subjectively driven discontinuous-
continuity, as the solutions developed by the historical subjects of a 
previous age become the problems that must be resolved by the 
historical subjects of the present. 
                                                   
74 For Kōsaka’s analysis of Dilthey’s typology see also Masaaki Kōsaka, Shōchōteki ningen 
[Symbolic Humans] (Tokyo: Genbundō, 1941), 3-37. 
75 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 382; 33; 35; Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 297-
298 
76 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 30; 136. 
77 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 126; Compare Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical 
World, 207: ‘Every age refers back to the preceding age, takes up forces that were developed in 
it, and simultaneously, it already contains the stirring and creativity that prepares for the 
succeeding age. Just as it arose from the insufficiency of an earlier age, so it carries within 
itself the limits, tensions, and suffering that prepares for the future age’.  
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Philosophies of practical subjectivity in the Western tradition 
may trace their origins back to Kant, who first approached the 
Cartesian ego not as a theoretical substance, but as a practical subject. 
Kōsaka explains how through Kant the consciousness of the 
Enlightenment developed into the spirit of German Idealism, which he 
describes in the Kantian terms of a progression from the standpoint of 
the ‘intellect’lii to the standpoint of ‘reason’:liii 
 
The ego does not simply discover laws within nature. Rather, the 
ego stipulates these laws for nature [via the a priori categories of 
the understanding]. In this sense, it is the ego that makes 
nature possible … However, this legislator of nature is not the 
true self. The theoretical ego is only one aspect of the true self, 
which is practically-orientated and forms its own foundations … 
This is not a substance, but a subject … Philosophy up until 
[Kant] did not treat [the ego] as a subject of moral practice, only 
as an object of metaphysical speculation. This led to the 
numerous errors of rational psychology, which Kant attributes to 
his so-called paralogism … the whereabouts of the [true] self is 
located in a far deeper place.78/liv  
 
Nonetheless, Kōsaka believed that there is a limit to what Kant’s 
individual subject alone can achieve in the historical world, perhaps 
reflecting his own powerlessness before the events that unfolded in 
1933. Williams defines the concept of practical subjectivity employed 
by the Chūō Kōron participants as the ‘rational self-mastery’ of a 
people or nation, ‘a complex set of values, practices and institutions 
without which the planet cannot be properly managed or … history 
                                                   
78 Kōsaka, Kanto, 185-186; Kant Critique of Pure Reason, 221-228. 
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cannot be made’.79 This again demonstrates the influence of Hegel’s 
conception of objective spirit upon the Kyoto School, for as Hegel 
argued individual ‘morality is not yet ethical life’, which Kōsaka 
describes as the true location of the historical world.80/lv Kōsaka goes on 
to identify the state as the prime mover of history, continuing that the 
‘power of an individual separated from the state is weak’.81/lvi However, 
he focused on peoples, nations and states not only because of the 
limitations of individual subjectivity when taken in isolation, which 
was nevertheless essential for the collective subjectivity of a 
community and the formation of the state, but also because of the very 
nature of the historical world itself. Specifically, there could be no 
history without the social. 
In the Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Kōsaka 
explains:  
 
Generally, historical time does not form within the individual; it 
is only through human groupings that historical time is created 
and stored … historical memory is not the memory of the 
individual but the memory of the group, the [historical] will is 
the will of the group.82/lvii  
 
Likewise, in The Philosophy of the Nation he argues that:  
 
The nation is the reservoir of history and time … Time and 
history is not created in the place of the single consciousness of 
an individual, it is created and stored within the nation and the 
state.83/lviii  
                                                   
79 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 11. 
80 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsuagaku, 67. 
81 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 298-298. 
82 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 184. 
83 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 126. 
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The historical phenomena of culture, tradition, customs and 
conventions are all products of the social. Articles that are produced by 
a single person in isolation do not constitute culture. As Nishida taught, 
culture only emerges as a consequence of the interactions of people and 
the resulting dialectical interplay of expression and 
recognition/understanding. This leads to a cyclical process of cultural 
formation based on the concept of action-intuition, which is described 
in terms of ‘from the created to the creating’.84/lix This is only possible 
within the social context of a species-existence that persists over time. 
In other words, culture is produced and maintained through the nation 
and state, which Kōsaka therefore considered the proper subjects of 
history.85 
 
Absolute Nothingness 
Kōsaka regarded Nishida’s concept of absolute nothingness as 
the ‘major premise’lx of his deliberations, stating that the ‘historical 
world symbolises absolute nothingness through its respective 
[historical] periods and [cultural] regions’.86/lxi Hanazawa defines 
absolute nothingness as a ‘non-substantial substratum’.87/lxii A similar 
definition is proposed by Kōsaka, who stated that the ‘world is not any 
kind of substance or substratum. It is the mediating process of all 
worlds, a place of mediation’.88/lxiii Although Kōsaka acknowledged the 
necessity of the historical substratum of nature or being, all existences 
in the historical world are mediated through subjective practice and 
                                                   
84 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 26-27. 
85 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 248: ‘What happens to a people, and takes place within 
it, has its essential meaning in relation to the state; the mere particularities of individuals are 
at the greatest distance from this object, an object belonging to history’. 
86 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 90; Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 166. 
87 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 35. 
88 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 191. 
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historical nature was no exception.89 It too was therefore subject to the 
forces of mediation and as such part of a process of continual change 
and recreation in the present. As a consequence, Kōsaka may be 
described as an anti-essentialist in his approach to the historical world 
and the political, which is reflected in his adoption of Nishida’s 
dialectic of nothingness or discontinuous-continuity. 
 Interestingly, Kōsaka compares the dialectic of nothingness 
with the antinomies of Kant as opposed to the all-subsuming dialectic 
of Hegel. This is because Hegel’s logic attributed a ‘continuous’ line of 
development to history that destroyed the independent significance of 
individual events. In contrast, an antinomy of pure reason attributes 
equal weight to its thesis and antithesis, ultimately rejecting both in 
terms of positive theoretical proof. Likewise, the dialectic of 
nothingness does not entail the ‘and this, and that’lxiv of Hegel’s all-
subsuming logic, but rather the ‘not this, not that’ of Kant’s 
antinomies.90/lxv History is therefore understood as a discontinuous-
continuity, which in turn guaranteed the freedom of the historical 
Thou both temporally and spatially. On a personal note, Kōsaka 
greatly disliked absolute assertions in philosophy and was highly 
sceptical of Hegel’s speculations on absolute spirit. This is because he 
thought Hegel had transcended the legitimate restrictions that Kant 
attributed to the human spirit as exemplified by his conception of the 
‘thing-in-itself’, a symbol of the limitations of human reason and the 
ignorance of human knowledge.91 Kōsaka argued that reality is always 
relative in its manifestations, one of the main reasons for the 
metaphysical symbolism he later adopts in his philosophy. 
Consequently, it is only absolute nothingness that could fulfil the 
requirements of the absolute without negating the individual 
                                                   
89 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 35. 
90 Masaaki Kōsaka, Tetsugaku ha nan no tameni (Tokyo: Risōsha, 1992), 163. 
91 Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa no shukumei wo mitsumeta me, 84. 
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significance of the particular. This was possible because of the 
qualitative differences between the absolute as nothingness and the 
particular as being.92  
It is important to note, however, that Kōsaka did not regard the 
historical world as equivalent to absolute nothingness itself. Although 
Tanabe’s deliberations on absolute mediation were influential on 
Kōsaka, who held that within the historical world ‘there is nothing that 
it is not mediated’, in regard to the idea of absolute nothingness he was 
closer to the position of Nishida.93/lxvi He states that: 
 
Although from the side of absolute nothingness, the historical 
world is something that should be mediated within it, absolute 
mediation itself, from the side of the historical world, must 
remain something unmediated.lxvii  
 
If not, there was a danger that the necessary limitations of the 
historical and the human, which by their very nature are imperfect, 
would be obliterated in favour of something analogous to a ‘false 
equality’ between the absolute and the relative.94/lxviii Although the 
historical world displayed the characteristics of nothingness in terms of 
its negative mediation of the confrontational relationships of competing 
peoples, nations and states, something that is substantial cannot be 
absolute nothingness itself.95 Rather, as the mediation of the subjective 
and the substantial, the historical world therefore mediated both 
nothingness and being alike. It was consequently a ‘nothingness-like 
universal’lxix or a ‘nothingness-like being’.lxx This is inherently 
contradictory. However, Kōsaka insisted that the contradictions in his 
                                                   
92 Kōsaka, Tetsugaku ha nan no tameni, 163. 
93 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 336; Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 44-46; Kōsaka, ‘Introduction’, 
in Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 2.  
94 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 303 
95 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 44. 
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logic reflected the dialectical character of the historical world itself. 
What is more, it was this contradictory nature of the historical world 
that permitted the possibility of subjective practice and therefore 
historical progression from one period to another.96 In terms of the 
practical implications of the mediating powers of absolute nothingness 
in the historical world, he defines it as ‘absolute relativity’.97/lxxi 
Everything that exists is subject to the forces of mediation. The 
historical world is therefore a world of birth and death. This is why 
history cannot be conceived only as a continuous progression, but 
rather as a ‘discontinuous-continuity’, a ‘nothingness-like universal’, or 
as a ‘world of worlds’.98/lxxii 
  
                                                   
96 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 303. 
97 Kōsaka, Tetsugaku ha nan no tameni, 163. 
98 Kosaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 305; 353. 
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Chapter 5 Japanese Citations 
 
i 「世界を奥の奥で統べているのは何か、それが知りたい、そこで動いている一切の力、一切の種
子は何か、それが見たい。」 
 
ii このような要求を人が感じた時、彼はまがいもなく形而上学の前に立っているのである 
 
iii 論理なくして形而上学は成立せず、形而上学への冒険―しかしそれなくしては真の哲学は成立し
ない 
 
iv 哲学は全体の学問であって 
 
v 超越と絶対 
 
vi たとえば人間存在は哲学する存在であると云うことによって、歴史的なるものは単に時間的では
なくして、超時間的なる深き裂目を有することが知られるであろう。歴史の底には深く哲学的なる
もの永遠なるものが存するのである 
 
vii 理性は本来実践的であり、実践的使用に於いて構成的たり得ることによって、自らの領域を有し、
かくて形而上的世界を実践的に構成し来る 
  
viii 『一般歴史考其他』 
 
ix 人格 
  
x 無的普遍 
 
xi 手段  
 
xii 連続 
 
xiii 非連続の連続 
 
xiv 永遠の今 
 
xv 苗が花となり、花が果となるように。又子供が大人となり、大人が老人となるように  
 
xvi 来年はやがて今年となり、今年はやがて昨年となる。子供が老人に近づくのではなく、老人が
子供に近づくのである。我々が死に近よるのではない。死が我々に近よるのである 
 
xvii 現在が過去、現在、未来をつつむのである 
 
xviii 場所 
 
xix 我々はアウグスチヌスの現在が、もはや過去及び未来に対する現在ではなくして、過去、現在、
未来を含む現在であるが故に、時間を超えた現在であることを気づかしめられる 
 
xx 現在から過去及び未来に行くのではなくして、永遠の今から、過去、現在、未来に行くのである。
現在から外へ出るのではない、我々は却て現在の内におりてくるのである。又過去におりてくるの
である。又未来に下りてくるのである 
 
xxi まことに永遠の現在を客観的に捕えることは不可能であり、観想的にそれを外に見出すことも
不可能である 
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xxii あらゆる過去と未来とを実在の―点に賭けて決断に出づる時、―ただその時、永遠の現在も実
践的に行ぜられるのである 
 
xxiii 暗き足場 
 
xxiv 行為的直観 
 
xxv 肉は霊の地盤でありながら…霊の刻印を印せざる肉は肉とも言い得ないのである 
 
xxvi 否定の原理 
 
xxvii 素材 
 
xxviii  時は永遠と時との錯綜であることを示すものとして解さなければならない。時は単に永遠の
下に摂せられるのではない。永遠は所謂時に於て支えられているのである。永遠は時を超えたもの
ではない。永遠は真の時の一面なのである 
 
xxix 歴史的世界とは、そこに於ては自由はそれぞれに一つの出来事であり、逆にすべての出来事は
実体的自由の実現である如き世界である 
 
xxx 自我の底が破れて、自我が却て自我ならぬものから逆に誕生し来ること、それが決断である。
決断に於ては自我は放棄され、自由は否定される。自由そのものが一つの出来事となる 
 
xxxi 永遠の底から決断が誕生する 
 
xxxii 自我の底は無底であり、自由の基底に於て自由は否定される。それが永遠の今であるであろう 
 
xxxiii 『歴史哲学』 
 
xxxiv 種の論理の問題を自分なりに解決してみたいと努力した 
 
xxxv 具体的な論理は単に形式的な論理ではなく、現実の論理、存在の論理でなければならない 
 
xxxvi 論理そのものが歴史的世界の自己媒介の現象であるであろう 
 
xxxvii 種的基体である…即ち、総じて社会一般、例えば民族、階級、国家等々の存在の基底をなす
種的基体の謂なのである 
 
xxxviii 静的 
 
xxxix 当為 
 
xl 歴史的危機 
 
xli 私はもとより哲学がその場限りの思索であってはならないことは、深く信じている。しかしそれ
と共に哲学は、あくまで深い歴史的現実に根ざすべきはずのものであると考える 
 
xlii 哲学は、人倫的実体そのものの根源から動き行く歴史的世界に対し、その方向づけの学問でな
ければならない 
 
xliii 私は歴史哲学に関する特殊講義を京都帝国大学の哲学科に於いてなす機会を与えられた。しか
も開講後ほどなく、私は講義を中断するの余儀なきに到った。時に昭和八年の初夏、所謂京大事件
の勃発によるのである。渦動は法学部を中心として起こって、我々にも及んだ。しかし我々は日々
に異なる噂、宣伝、輿論の波にもまれ、渦動の周辺に漂うのみにて、いずこに渦の中心があり、い
ずこに向かって渦が流れ去り、またいずこよりして渦は成立し来たったかを、明確に知る便もなか
った。その無知が我々の実践を無力ならしめる 
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xliv 歴史のあるべき道を示す哲学 
 
xlv 「我々は歴史の観察者たる以前に、まず歴史的存在である、しかして我々は歴史的存在なるが
故にのみ、歴史の観察者たり得る」 
 
xlvi この書は一方に於ては歴史的世界の種々なる現象の分析を営むと共に、他方に於てはかかる諸
現象の分析を通じて、歴史的世界そのものの成立を跡づけんと試みたものである。歴史的世界の現
象学と名付けた所以である 
 
xlvii 歴史的動物として自己の本質を自己の歴史の内に於て有つ 
 
xlviii 客観精神の見地を欠き、歴史的社会的主体を観過する 
 
xlix 客観的精神の世界に再び置き戻す 
 
l 主体性 
 
li 我々は歴史を理性に於て見る代わりに、理性を歴史に於て見なければならない 
 
lii 悟性 
 
liii 理性 
 
liv 自我が自然から法則を汲むのではなく、却って自我が自然に法則を規定するのである。自然をそ
の法則性に関して可能ならしめるのは自我である…しかしそれにもましてカントの意識は、かかる
自然の立法者としての自我すら未だ真の自我ではなく、真の自我はかかる理論的なる自我をその一
面とし、自らは却ってその根底をなす如き実践的なる自我であることを主張した点にあるのである
…それは実体 substanzではなくして、主体 subjektである。しかも従来の哲学はそれを道徳的実
践の主体としてではなく、形而上的思弁の客体として捉えんとした。ここに合理的心理学の幾多の
誤謬が生じたのである。カントはかかる誤謬が彼の所謂論過 Paralogismenに基づく…自我の所在
がより深き場面に存すること 
 
lv 道徳性は未だ人倫態とは言い得ない 
 
lvi 国家は世界歴史の最大の動力である…それを離れては個人の力は弱い 
 
lvii 総じては歴史的時間は単なる個人に於ては成立せず、人間的集団を通じてのみ歴史的時間は創
造され、貯蔵される…歴史的記憶は個人の記憶ではなくして集団の記憶であり、その意志も集団の
意志なのである 
 
lviii 民族が歴史の貯蔵庫 reservoirであり、時間の貯蔵庫である…時間と歴史とは、単に個人意識
の場に成立するのではなく、民族と国家を通じて創造されつつ保存されて行くのである 
 
lix 作られたものから作るものへ 
 
lx 大前提 
 
lxi 歴史的世界は時代的にも地域的にも絶対無を象徴するのである 
 
lxii 無基体の基体 
 
lxiii 世界はいかなる実体でもなく、また基体でもない。しからずして諸世界の媒介過程であり、媒
介の場である 
 
lxiv あれもこれも 
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lxv あれでもない、これでもない 
 
lxvi 歴史的世界に於てはいかなるものも無媒介ではない 
 
lxvii 絶対無の側よりすれば、歴史的世界もその中に媒介されているべきであるけれど、絶対媒介そ
のものが、歴史的世界の側よりしては未媒介であり、無媒介として残されるのでなければならない 
 
lxviii 悪平等 
 
lxix 無的普遍 
 
lxx 有的無 
 
lxxi 絶対的相対性 
 
lxxii 世界の世界 
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Chapter 6: The Epistemology of the Historical World 
6a: The Historical Universalism of Proper Nouns 
The Historical World 
 Kōsaka’s philosophy of history is not wholly concerned with the 
past, but rather the historical world as it manifests in the ‘eternal’ 
present, which in terms of the process of historical formation 
represents the focal point of time through its mediation of the necessity 
of the past and the freedom of the future within historical praxis.1 
Where the purpose of the academic discipline of history is to record the 
past, the philosophy of history is a discipline of ‘orientation’ that 
reveals the direction of world history, and therefore guides action in 
the present. This explains Kōsaka’s attempt to ascertain the 
relationship between the historical periphery and the centre of the 
historical world. However, knowledge of the past is still essential 
because that which is historical is necessarily mediated by the past. 
This includes historical knowledge itself. Kōsaka explains: 
 
Knowledge and existence in the present, as the historical 
present, are always received from the past, or in other words 
they have been necessarily mediated by the traditions and lore 
[of a culture].2/i  
 
In this sense, historical knowledge or cognisance is itself an historical 
event within the historical world and therefore an aspect of the ongoing 
processes of historical formation.3 Furthermore, Kōsaka believed that 
the potentiality of the past continues to affect historical creation in the 
present via the mediation of cultural types and models.  
                                                   
1 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 67 
2 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 92-93. 
3 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 100. 
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As a consequence, Kōsaka adopts many of the methodological 
approaches of the academic discipline of history, in particular those of 
Leopold von Ranke who attempted to record the past ‘as it really was’.4 
Nevertheless, as Kōsaka is concerned with the historical world itself, 
rather than just history per se, he also employs a hermeneutical 
approach in order to analyse the phenomena and appearances of 
historical reality. For instance, the first chapter of The Historical 
World examines the phenomena of the historical periphery, which 
alone is unable to constitute the historical centre itself. These include 
rumours, fashions, social conversations and conventions. However, 
because the historical periphery represents the temporal material for 
the eternal in its mediation with the historical centre (the eternal now), 
even within the rumours and fashions of a society the ‘character of an 
age’ii appears, while the ‘worldview of a society’ is likewise discernible 
from social conversations and conventions.5/iii 
 
Historical Essence 
Kōsaka held that the essence of history was not atemporal or 
universal in an a priori sense. Rather, it universalises itself through its 
own historical development. It therefore can only be said to exist 
through the world-historical events of the historical world, that is to 
say events that hold world-historical significance. For example, Rome’s 
victory against Carthage in the Punic Wars was a world-historical 
event because it determined the historical direction of the Classical 
World in the Mediterranean thereafter. The essence of history acquires 
universal relevance as the material of the historical periphery flows 
into the intrinsic principles that determine historical periods. 
Concerning these underlying principles, an entire historical period 
spanning hundreds of years may also be treated as a single historical 
                                                   
4 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 14. 
5 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 98. 
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event. Importantly, however, nothing that manifests within the 
historical world is ever complete:  
 
That which is absolute is never able to be wholly expressed by a 
specific culture. All cultures that reach completion fall away 
from its attachment to life, [which it finds] in the ambience of 
the historical periphery. As it does, it loses its primary power of 
extension and gives up its seat to a new culture.6/iv  
 
As with everything else in the historical world, Kōsaka conceived the 
essence of history to be in a continual process of historical creation. 
Consequently, the universal relevance of the historical essence, 
embodied in the unique principles that define historical periods, only 
held such universal relevance in terms of their symbolic significance. 
Kōsaka explains that a symbol refers to a thing that comes to represent 
something else of a qualitatively different nature. For example, the 
funeral rituals of a society are symbolic of the phenomenon of death. 
However, death itself cannot be experienced by the living. 
Metaphysical symbolism therefore arises when the material of being 
serves as the medium through which nothingness and its related ideals 
are expressed in reality.7 Nishida suggests that the importance of 
symbolism for Kōsaka was a consequence of his hermeneutical 
approach to the historical world.8 In any case, Kōsaka understood the 
discipline of history to be concerned primarily with historical events, or 
that which is symbolic or representative of such events, be it 
individuals, nations, states or cultures.9 
                                                   
6 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki, 316-320; 103 
7 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 172-174; Kōsaka, Shōchōteki ningen, 29-37.  
8 Kazuhide Uemura, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku ha nan dattanoka: Kōsaka Masaaki no chōsen 
[What was the Philosophy of the Nation: Masaaki Kōsaka’s Challenge]’, Sadai Hōgaku Vol. 43 
Issue. 1 (2009): 12. 
9 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 248: ‘Nevertheless, the mass of other individual details 
is a superfluous mass, by the faithful accumulation of which the objects worthy of history are 
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The Ideal and the Real 
 In relation to the historical materials and documentation that 
have been passed down from the past to the present, on which Ranke 
said that the academic discipline of history must await before it can 
commence, Kōsaka states that regardless of whether recording the 
names of gods, rulers or their retainers, or whether relating to the 
history of a single tribe or a whole state, all are concerned with proper 
nouns.v As a consequence, what is passed down is a notion of practical-
subjectivity because proper nouns necessarily imply human 
relationships. The significance of subjectivity for historical knowledge 
reveals a number of important characteristics in relation to what 
history itself actually is. For example, history is not a direct intuition 
of reality or a simple recollection of past events. Rather, it is an 
academic discipline that ‘cognises’ the past.vi Consequently, as human 
knowledge it therefore requires the use of concepts, categories and logic. 
The very fact that history begins from historical materials and 
documentation ensures that the discipline of history is the ‘cognition of 
the cognised’.10/vii  
Kant believed that the objects of science were not derived 
directly from experience, but are rather mediated through the 
‘academic labour’ of experimentation and are therefore secondary in 
nature.11 The objects of history have also been previously mediated 
through concepts and are therefore secondary as opposed to objects 
that are directly intuited. However, for Kōsaka the categories of history 
are not derived a priori as was the case for Kant, but rather from 
history itself. Basing history on purely intellectual concepts would 
negate the particularity of different periods and reduce history to a 
world governed by immutable laws in the same way that Kant 
                                                                                                                                           
overwhelmed and obscured. The essential characterization of the spirit and its age is always 
contained in the great events’.  
10 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 110; 121-122; 114. 
11 Kōsaka, Kanto no kaishaku no mondai, 41. 
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conceived nature, the consequence of which would be a teleological 
understanding of history. Instead, Kōsaka claims: 
 
Historical cognisance forms through its close fusion with 
historical reality itself. That which does not incorporate the 
meaning of knowledge is not historical reality. At the very least, 
that which does not incorporate conceptual meaning is not 
historical reality.12/viii  
 
Hanazawa confirms that this forms the underpinnings for how Kōsaka 
conceives the historical world in terms of the mediation of the 
subjective and the substantial.13 Kōsaka continues that: 
 
Thought or cognisance is an especially important existence 
within the historical world. That is to say, concepts are real and 
a reality that is separated from concepts is not historical 
reality.14/ix  
 
This also reflects the importance of German Idealism upon his thought, 
as exemplified by the fact that Kōsaka acknowledged the relevance of 
Hegel’s notion of essence in regards to the historicity of historical 
concepts themselves.15/x 
 
Historical Categories and Concepts 
There are similarities between Kant’s a priori discipline of 
science and Kōsaka’s interpretation of history in the sense that both 
                                                   
12 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 145-146; 154; Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 10: ‘What is 
rational is actual and what is actual is rational’. 
13 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 34. 
14 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 387.  
15 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 152; See G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. by George Di 
Giovanni (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 337: ‘The German 
language has kept “essence” (Wesen) in the past participle (gewesen) of the verb “to be” (sein), 
for essence is past – but timelessly past – being’. 
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are imbued with subjectivity or human praxis. However, the discipline 
of history not only differs in the ‘method of its conceptual configuration’, 
its categories and concepts cannot be derived a priori, but ‘essentially 
in terms of the manner that its objects are given’. Although mediated 
through experimentation, the objects of science are given directly from 
what Kant termed the ‘manifold of sense’, which did ‘not yet include 
human meaning’.xi In contrast, history deals with ‘that which already 
contains traces of humanity’.xii Kōsaka believes that humans not only 
create the historical world, but are themselves created by the historical 
world in turn. This in itself demonstrates the fact that the underlying 
principle of an historical age, an object cognised by historical 
knowledge through historical concepts, cannot be given externally to 
the age that it represents. Rather, it must form within this period itself 
through the process of its own historical development. This is true for 
all historical concepts, such as feudalism, capitalism and the national 
state. Consequently, although categories are usually understood in 
terms of their predicative function, for ‘historical categories the subject 
must not be predicated externally’.16/xiii  
This leads to Kōsaka’s adoption of two categories from the 
discipline of history: that of ‘individual totality’xiv and that of 
‘development’xv or ‘movement’.xvi Together, these categories constitute 
the form of a historical concept that adequately captures the inherent 
individuality of historical existences, such as that of historical figures, 
nations, states and individual events. The relationship between the 
individuality and mobility of a historical concept is understood in terms 
of the fact that it is only through the historical self-movement of the 
existence designated by this concept, which can be reinterpreted as the 
concept’s own historical development in terms of historical knowledge, 
that it attains its individuality. This may be understood as the ‘self-
                                                   
16 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 120-121; 143; 145-146. 
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determination’ of the historical world in its continual movement from 
the infinite potentiality of the historical periphery toward the historical 
centre, by which historical trends crystallise into something eternal 
and universal, namely the intrinsic principles or ideals of an historical 
period.xvii This is exemplified in the development of cultural customs 
into laws. The customs of Rome only held relevance for the Romans 
themselves. The universalism of Roman law, however, continued to 
hold relevance into much later periods of history.  
However, Kōsaka notices a potential contradiction inherent in 
the notion of individuality, because a concept by definition must 
include both the meaning of intension and extension. Something that is 
individual and unique, however, is unable to be extended to other 
individual existences. Kōsaka finds the solution in the temporality of 
the historical concept. Through the movement of its self-development, 
the historical concept organises itself into an individual totality. 
Through this process it takes on the significance of ‘communal trends, 
becomes mutually representative and emerges as something 
symbolic’.xviii In this way, a historical concept may extend beyond its 
own time into later periods. That which is truly individual in the 
historical world is also universal as a consequence of its symbolic 
relevance. This is an example of the influence of Ranke who said that 
in history ‘everything is universal, and yet has individual, spiritual 
life’.17/xix 
 
                                                   
17 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 148-151; 82; Kōsaka’s understanding of the relationship between 
the universal and the individual may also be compared with Hegel’s conception of individuality 
or concrete universalism as the ‘unity and synthesis of universal and particular, subject and 
object, form and content’, as well as Dilthey’s discussions on the interdependence of a whole 
and its parts within the context of psychic structures and their objectification within the social 
world as cultural systems – T.M. Knox. ‘Translator’s Foreword’, in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 
vii-x; Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 42-43; 160; 168; 189-195; See also 
Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 130-131. 
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Historical Universalism and Proper Nouns 
 The universalism of the academic discipline of history differs 
substantially from the universalism of mathematics and the natural 
sciences because it is not a ‘universal law, but a representative 
universal, a typological universal, a symbolic universal’.18/xx This is a 
consequence of the focus of history on proper nouns. As to the reasons 
for why historical materials and documentation focus specifically on 
the recording of proper nouns, including the legends and folklores of 
antiquity, Kōsaka suggests that it stems from a desire to ground, 
dignify and rationalise the present from the historical source of a 
culture, as in the case of legends relating to the foundation of a nation 
or to a specific culture’s protective gods. This also strongly relates to 
the magical quality that names were thought to hold in the past, 
particularly in the case of early history. Consequently, Kōsaka believes 
that it is only natural that proper nouns have become the focus of 
historical knowledge, ‘especially those that have representative 
significance’ for a culture.19/xxi 
 Although within mathematical knowledge it may be said that 
the names of past mathematicians are also included in the discipline, 
this is only true of the history of mathematics. Rather, the ‘pure 
potentiality’ of the mathematical world is expressed via codes and 
symbols.xxii The same is also true of the natural sciences, which 
through the mediation of experimentation and observation is primarily 
concerned with universal nouns. For example, heat, light and force. 
However, history does not deal with the natural world, but the human 
world. It therefore ‘presupposes an ethical realm’ and is subsequently 
concerned with the practical-subjectivity that is expressed through 
proper nouns.xxiii In regards to the meaning that proper nouns hold 
within the historical world Kōsaka writes: 
                                                   
18 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 101. 
19 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 122-123. 
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Because proper nouns have the character of (A) a representative 
universal, their function resides in their role as (B) models or 
types, through the mediation of which it is possible to 
understand that which is called (C) subjective causality or 
attributional causality.xxiv 
 
He goes on to introduce a fourth meaning for proper nouns as well: ‘(D) 
showing the present orientation of world history’.20/xxv The symbolic or 
representative universalism of proper nouns therefore depends upon 
its function as a ‘type’ through which it can serve as an example for 
future generations.xxvi 
 Hanazawa explains that the representative universal character 
of the proper nouns recorded in history means that the person (nation, 
state, etc.) that is designated by this noun stood at the centre of the 
process of historical formation. This is why they hold representative 
meaning.21 For instance, historical knowledge is not interested in the 
valets of Napoleon, but Napoleon himself. This is because he stood at 
the ‘heart of historical universalism’.xxvii Behind those who hold 
representative meaning there lies ‘something universal, something 
holistic’, such as that of a whole nation or an entire historical period. It 
is because of this that they become the ‘representatives at the 
extremities of world history’.22/xxviii However, the representative 
relationships discussed within the discipline of history are also 
fundamentally subjective. The historical world is not therefore simply a 
world of haphazard events, but rather ‘in each of the steps taken it 
holds the meaning of an intricate tangle of problems and their 
                                                   
20 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 103-104; 110. 
21 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 149. 
22 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 248: ‘It is true that the universal spirit of an age in 
general leaves its imprint in the character of the distinguished individuals of a period, and 
even their particularities are the remoter and duller media in which the spirit still plays in 
fainter colours’. 
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solutions’.xxix This is the location of historical subjectivity, through 
which Kōsaka argues:  
 
[T]he problems of human life are resolved, while at the same 
time the subject itself is newly reorganised … this is not simply 
a world of universal laws, but rather a world of representative 
universals that form when that which was no more than a trend 
or a possibility takes shape in reality.xxx  
 
This leads into the second meaning of proper nouns in their role as 
models or types: ‘as long as this incorporates the subject of an 
historical event, it holds the meaning of individuality, while as long as 
it stands in the position of a representative relationship, it holds the 
meaning of a model’.23/xxxi 
Hanazawa states that through its role as a ‘model’xxxii or 
‘type’xxxiii a proper noun takes on a ‘universal structure of 
potentiality’.xxxiv This reveals the proper noun’s inclination toward the 
particular.24 The distinction between a model and a type lies in the fact 
that when a type is realised in the actual world it emerges as a real 
model or example, whereas when a model is reduced back to its logical 
potential it takes on the form of a type. Kōsaka gives the example of 
Athens, which was representative of the Greek city states of antiquity 
and therefore holds the meaning of a real example or model of the city 
state in history. Through this model the ‘type’ of Greek city states is 
also constructed through the logical reduction of the Athenian model. 
The model is therefore ‘an idealistic individual, while the type is an 
individualised universal, or alternatively, a universalised 
individual’.xxxv For example, when we refer to capitalism or a city state 
we are referring to a universal rather than a proper noun. This is also 
                                                   
23 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 104-106. 
24 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 149. 
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true for historical concepts such as the Renaissance or the Reformation. 
However, in terms of their use in relation to the historical world such 
concepts are tied to real existences and real events and therefore take 
on the role of proper nouns. As models or types are a mediation of the 
universal and the individual they actually belong to the particular. 
This is because it is only the species that can serve as the medium 
between universality and individuality. Once more, however, Kōsaka 
stresses the importance of subjective action in the historical world. He 
uses the analogy of a ‘mould’, ‘impress’ or ‘design’, which when used by 
a representative actor in the historical world takes on the meaning of a 
model. Over time, this ‘mould’ becomes a type that is passed down in 
the tradition of a culture.25/xxxvi This demonstrates the potentiality that 
remains in the subjectivity of the past, which through tradition is 
maintained and preserved in the present. Kōsaka therefore describes 
types as practical ‘schemas directed at the future’.26/xxxvii This leads into 
the attributional causality of proper nouns, as well as their importance 
for revealing the orientation of world history itself. 
Attributional causality is described by Hanazawa as ‘causality 
that has been mediated by historical typological knowledge’. However, 
the objective applicability of this knowledge is dependent on ‘its 
appropriateness for resolving historical problems and the extent of its 
relevance for historical formation in the historical world’.27/xxxviii 
Kōsaka explains that the purpose of knowledge or cognition is to 
pursue truth. However, unlike nature which does not commit mistakes 
itself, within the historical world a distinction is made between truth 
and fallacy because of ‘its relation to the subject’.xxxix Historical 
knowledge is itself an aspect of present historical reality, which is why 
its objective applicability relates to its capacity to solve historical 
                                                   
25 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 107; 109. 
26 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 354.  
27 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 150. 
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problems. Nevertheless, this does not mean that historical cognisance 
is subsumed within the historical positioning of the present. Rather, 
‘historical knowledge has the double meaning of freeing the present 
from the past, while also mediating the present through the subjective 
potentiality of the past’.xl For example, in the manner that Spinoza 
taught that the cognition of necessity was freedom, by objectifying the 
past we are able ‘recover our own subjectivity’.xli However, cognition of 
the past also confirms the inheritance that has been received by the 
present from the past. This inheritance or subjective potentiality of the 
past is mediated in the process of historical creation within the present. 
This strongly relates to Kōsaka’s interpretation of historical time as 
‘time from the created to the creating’. It is therefore a time within 
which ‘models and types are formed’.28/xlii This also hints at the 
inherently metaphysical nature of types and symbolism because of the 
meaning of the eternal now that is imbued in historical time.  
Historical time is the mediation of the quantitative objective 
time of the laws of nature and the qualitative subjective time of 
psychological personal experience. As time of historical praxis or the 
mediation of the subjective and the substantial it also includes the 
moment of transcendence into the eternal, which leads to distinctions 
between generations, periods and trends within the historical world. 
Because historical time includes the moment of transcendence from 
purely psychological time, in other words the moment when the subject 
breaks through the limited frame of the ego, it encounters the necessity 
of fate that is a consequence of the subject’s meeting with its other or 
the historical Thou in the historical world.29 This is because the 
determination of praxis entails the negation of the subject’s freedom in 
its mediation with substance within the place of the eternal now. In 
this way, through the process of historical formation freedom becomes 
                                                   
28 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 111-113. 
29 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 118; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 333. 
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necessity as the present becomes the past. This may be expressed as 
the externalisation of the internal as the expressions of the subject 
become an independent object.  
However, within historical time the external must also be 
internalised. As Dilthey argued, ‘experience is both expressed, while at 
the same time expression returns to experience once more through 
understanding’.30/xliii Historical time is therefore the ‘mutual switch’ 
between freedom and necessity and vice versa.xliv In order to 
demonstrate this Kōsaka once more uses the analogy of the ‘mould’: 
 
A mould is something into which mud or clay is poured and from 
which numerous clay statues are thereby produced. The traces of 
the pre-image of the mould are left in its imprint on the clay. 
The mould is something that was created; it is the footprint of 
the action of creation. What is more, it is called a mould (kata) 
because as the master form it can be used once more to produce 
numerous clay statues … A mould is both the remnants of the 
process of historical creation, while also the source from which a 
new process of historical creation appears.xlv 
 
Within historical time the self is both killed and reborn in the process 
of historical creation. It is therefore a notion of time that through the 
mediation of necessity and freedom ‘flows toward the eternal now’.xlvi It 
is here that the ‘symbolic practicality of the type’ emerges and the 
attributional or subjective causality of the past is discernible.31/xlvii  
This also leads to the fourth meaning of proper nouns as 
indicating the orientation of world history. As the historical subject is 
caught in the historical cycle of problems and solutions, the 
‘potentiality of the past is once more typologically constructed in the 
                                                   
30 See Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 214-234. 
31 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 119-122. 
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present, through the negative mediation of which it becomes world 
formative determining the direction of world history’. Hanazawa points 
out that it is here that the metaphysical meaning inherent in Kōsaka’s 
notion of symbolism becomes apparent. This is because of the 
simultaneity of the past, present and future as ‘one period is mediated 
by another, which in heading in the direction of world history allows us 
to become constructive’.32/xlviii This is possible because the temporal is 
enclosed within the place of the eternal now. 
 
The Simultaneity of the Historical World 
 Kōsaka explains that a single historical event does not reveal 
the necessity of historical trends. Rather, it appears when a number of 
historical events, each with its own subjective centre, share common 
characteristics. This is a horizontal application of the logic of 
discontinuous-continuity. It is here that the phenomenon of 
simultaneity first appears:xlix ‘I and Thou form one world, and when 
they meet within this one world the phenomenon of simultaneity 
manifests’.l Kōsaka gives the example of the Reformation which 
occurred as a consequence of the combination of two different trends 
represented by two independent subjects. One was a religious trend 
represented by Martin Luther and the other an economic trend 
represented by Friedrich III of Saxony. Although they did not know 
each other personally, ‘the beginnings of a new age were rooted in the 
simultaneity’ of these two specific trends and their respective 
subjective centres.li Here is the ‘form of the self-determination of the 
historical world through the I and Thou’.lii However, the necessity of a 
type is said to be more profound in comparison to that of the historical 
trend of a single historical period. This is because where for historical 
trends simultaneity is an occurrence within the same historical age 
                                                   
32 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 152. 
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and therefore an example of a horizontal discontinuous-continuity, for 
types the simultaneity is shared between entirely different historical 
periods.  
This may be conceived as a vertical community of discontinuous-
continuity, or as the temporal simultaneity of the past, present and 
future. This is possible in the moment of historical formation within 
the place of the eternal now. Here, the past and future are both 
encountered as an individual historical Thou that stands before the I of 
the present. As a meeting between I and Thou, each hold independent 
subjective meaning. Because of the possibility of such simultaneity the 
types of the past continue to hold relevance in the present as subjective 
potentiality, through the mediation of which the way to the future 
opens up. For example, the Renaissance, which sought its basis and 
traditions in the Classical Age, was nevertheless not simply a 
replication of the past but the birth of a new era. Here the past was 
itself overcome within the processes of historical creation.33 In this way, 
the logic of discontinuous-continuity is not only spatial, but temporal. 
The place of the eternal now therefore permits a dialogue between the 
historical I and the historical Thou. The possibility of such a dialogue 
with the past also ensures that historical cognisance is able to learn of 
the past ‘as it actually was’ (Ranke). 
 
6b: The Historical I and the Historical Thou 
The possibility of knowing the past was guaranteed for Kōsaka 
through the concepts of the eternal now and the dialectic of 
nothingness or ‘discontinuous-continuity’. He explains that through the 
eternal now we are able to descend within the past, present and future 
alike. As the four conceptions of time, the causal, the teleological, the 
practical and the eternal, are all interrelated as the lower levels 
                                                   
33 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 329-330; 332; 354-355; 359. 
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constitute the material for those higher up, all aspects of time ‘continue’ 
into the eternal.liii Although time is often said to ‘flow infinitely into the 
past and future’,liv the fact that all aspects of time continue into the 
eternal ensures the possibility for a direct ‘return’ to the past from the 
present.34/lv However, as Hanazawa explains this is not understood as 
‘travelling back to the past’, but rather as a ‘meeting’ between the 
historical I and the historical Thou.lvi This is possible because Nishida’s 
dialectic of discontinuous-continuity ‘guaranteed the freedom of the 
historical Thou’.35/lvii As time incorporates the meaning of the eternal 
within it, the past too has an eternal significance. Consequently, the 
past holds a meaning that is independent of the present. Kōsaka 
acknowledged the importance of the insight that our historical 
cognisance occurs in the present. Nevertheless, he did not believe that 
the past could be wholly consumed within the present as this 
obliterated the independent meaning of the past.36  
In reference to the phenomenological principle employed by 
Dilthey, whose methodological approach had its roots in idealism and 
was therefore inclined to internality, Kōsaka argues that in all 
probability Kant’s concept of the ‘thing-in-itself’ should not only be 
conceived spatially but temporally as well:lviii 
 
If it is possible to overcome the phenomenological principle in 
the direction of space, that is to say in the direction of the body, 
should it not also be possible to overcome the phenomenological 
principle in the same way in the direction of time?37/lix  
 
                                                   
34 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 23. 
35 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 40. 
36 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 12; 15; See also Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 
93-94; 214-216; 250. 
37 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 25. 
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If the independent meaning of the past is to be recognised it is 
necessary to ensure that the past is not simply subsumed within the 
present. Kōsaka gives the example of moral responsibility to show how 
this is possible. As Kant taught, when I make a ‘moral decision’ I act 
freely.lx However, with the passage of time this action becomes an 
event of the past. Nevertheless, I continue to feel responsibility for my 
action because I still treat my past self as the free personality whose 
choice caused the past action. Simply perceiving this act as a moment 
in a chain of historical necessity undermines any meaning of freedom.  
Similarly, if I simply perceive my past self phenomenologically 
and therefore as a product of my present consciousness, then any sense 
of true moral responsibility is undermined because the independent 
meaning of the past is thereby negated. Consequently, it is only 
through the dialectic of discontinuous-continuity that a history of 
freedom is possible and a dialogue with the past as an historical Thou 
can take place. History is not just the mutterings of the present, but a 
dialogue or a negotiation with the past.38 Hanazawa explains that: 
 
A truly free living subject paradoxically opposes [its other] while 
it is creatively unified [by it]. What is more, while it is unified 
[by its other], it too unifies [this other] in turn maintaining the 
independence [of both]. Therefore, in the same way that the past 
is an independent Thou, the future too is regarded as 
independent and free.39/lxi 
 
Nonetheless, Hanazawa still questions whether a true dialogue 
between the historical I and Thou is ever possible, suggesting that any 
dialogue may in fact descend into a monologue of the present.  
                                                   
38 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 25-26. 
39 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 40.  
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Kōsaka believed that it is possible, however, because within 
historical knowledge one’s ‘ground’ becomes the ‘object’ itself.lxii He 
explains that tradition and folklore forms the ground or substance for 
those who live by them. More than that, they form the foundations and 
reasons for daily life. This constitutes their ‘subjectivity’.lxiii In this 
sense, the objective spirit of Hegel is the ground for the present. 
However, although historical knowledge is closely related to historical 
reality, this alone is insufficient. This is because those who merely live 
according to conventions and customs ‘live only as a continuity of the 
past, they have no true present and future’ and therefore no true 
history.lxiv Historical cognisance is more than just the collection and 
interpretation of historical documents. Rather, it is necessary to 
transcend the incompleteness of historical documentation and intuit 
the trends and patterns that symbolise an age and link the various 
pieces together. Likewise, ‘the historical cognisance that forms within 
everyday reality is only a part of what is necessary’.lxv Some form of 
transcendence is also required. This is why it is not possible for a 
revolutionary to write down the history of the revolution while it is still 
taking place. Subsequently, it is necessary for the historian ‘to 
voluntarily abandon their own ground’,lxvi that is to say it is necessary 
for them to ‘take flight from the objective spirit’ of the present.40/lxvii 
Hegel thought that philosophy ‘always comes on the scene too late’, 
concluding that ‘the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the 
falling of dusk’.41 Instead of the philosopher, however, Kōsaka thought 
that these words were more appropriate for the historian, stating that 
‘rather than a historian abandoning their ground, it is perhaps more 
appropriate to say that their period buries itself as the past, by which 
they become groundless. This is what the existence of the historian is. 
                                                   
40 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 155-157; 94. 
41 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 12-13. 
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This is why it is so difficult to write history about the present in the 
present’.42/lxviii  
Nevertheless, for the historian the past is not merely dead and 
buried. Rather, the past falls away in the ‘direction of the eternal’. 
Ranke said that each period of history is in direct contact with God. 
Kōsaka interprets this to mean that ‘within the historian, each period 
heads towards its centre and crystallises as something eternal. 
Through the historian the past is eternally preserved’.lxix This is what 
is meant by one’s ground becoming the object. By becoming groundless, 
the historian is raised up to the aspect of the eternal allowing for a 
dialogue with the past as a historical Thou:  
 
The object that appears before the historian contains its own 
independent ground. This calls out to the historian, urges them 
along and gets them to record its logos. This is something that is 
subjective, this is the [historical] Thou.lxx 
 
Describing his work as a historian, Ranke says that:  
 
Gradually, a history of the most important moments of modern 
times composed itself for me, almost without my assistance; to 
bring it to evidence and to write it will be my life’s calling.43/lxxi  
 
This is what is meant by describing the past ‘as it actually was’. It is 
also important to note that Kōsaka believed that in order for history to 
be a true discipline of historical existence, it must ‘begin from where 
methodology breaks down’ and intuition begins.lxxii This is because as 
Nishida taught we do not connect with existence through a 
                                                   
42 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 156-157. 
43 English translation of Ranke quoted from Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 
125. 
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methodology, but through intuition. At best, methodology is merely a 
‘guidepost’.lxxiii It is no different for existences that have passed away 
into the past. The standpoint of intuition entails standing before the 
historical Thou.44 In this way, interaction with the historical Thou may 
be regarded as an example of Nishida’s action-intuition, which was 
understood as a direct experience of the dialectical world and the 
moment in which the subject and object becomes one.45  
However, the philosophy of history is not only concerned with 
the past, but historical reality as a mediation of the past, present and 
future. Because it is necessary for the historian to become groundless 
to perceive his historical object, historical cognisance is a moment of 
negation within historical reality. However, for the past to appear as 
the historical Thou there must also be an appearance of an historical I: 
 
Within the historian, a historical period becomes groundless, by 
which this period is negated and preserved as an aspect of the 
eternal, while that which should belong to the past is buried. At 
the same time, however, this allows for a new period that 
includes new trends, ideals and [a new materialisation] of the 
eternal to rise up by itself from out of the depths of this 
groundless abyss.46/lxxiv 
 
It is therefore a new period of history that appears as an historical I of 
the future before the historical Thou of the past.  
In this way, the historian may be said to prepare the way for the 
future. This does not mean that the historian can foretell future events, 
as there is no repetition in history. Each and every event is unique, 
individual and one-off. Time is always new in every moment and as 
                                                   
44 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 157; 140; 139; 141. 
45 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 166-167; 172. 
46 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 158.  
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such we too become something new as the I of today develops into the I 
of tomorrow. Rather, the historian prepares for the future by 
remaining sincere in their desire to know how the past actually was. 
Kōsaka explains: 
 
Through the mediation of the [historical] Thou of the past, the 
present loses its ground, yet from the depths of this 
groundlessness we are prompted to seek the [historical] I of a 
new future. Simultaneously, we are mediated by that which is 
ideal and sacred within the Thou of the past, and in the direction 
of the I of the future the present is spurred on, encouraged, 
advised and foretold. However, historical cognisance alone has 
no power to order or advise us. It is [only] actual examples that 
move us. The logos of the past is a logos told by a living Thou. 
What is more, in the recesses of this historical Thou there is 
something holy. The Thou of the past, for those who are able to 
know of it deeply, thereby becomes a ‘symbol’ for that which is 
sacred.lxxv 
 
The historical Thou of the past is always an ‘individuality’lxxvi and a 
‘one-off’ occurrence.lxxvii However, because it also includes symbolic 
significance its individual, one-off nature attains a meaning of 
‘universalism’lxxviii and ‘repetitiveness’.47/lxxix In this way, the future of 
the historical world opens up within the present in the process of 
historical creation.48 
  
                                                   
47 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 27; 160-161; 163-164. 
48 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 63. 
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Chapter 6 Japanese Citations  
 
i 我々の現在が歴史的なる現在として、その存在及び認識が常に過去より贈られたるもの、即ち伝
統及び伝承に媒介せられているが故であった 
 
ii 時代の性格 
 
iii 社会の世界観 
 
iv すべての文化はそれが完全となり、生と癒着せる歴史的周辺の雰囲気より脱し行くにつれて、そ
の原始的なる伸展力を失い、かくしてそれは新なる文化に座を譲る 
 
v「すべての歴史は文書を俟って初めて始まる」 
 
vi 認識 
 
vii「認識されしものの認識」 
 
viii 歴史的認識は歴史的現実それ自身の存在と緊密な融合に於て成立する。認識の意味を含まない
歴史的現実はない。少なくとも観念的な意味を含まない歴史的現実はない 
 
ix 思惟或いは認識が歴史的世界において特に重要なる実在であること、すなわち観念が現実であり、
観念から離れた現実は歴史的世界ではなきことを知り得た 
 
x かくして既にアリストテレスによって「あるべくありしもの」として、又ヘーゲルによって
Gewesenとして規定せられた本質的なるもの、概念的なるものの過去性との関連は、今歴史的概
念に於て、特に鮮かに現れ来ったのである。歴史的なる出来事は、過去の方向に向って完結し行く
事によって、概念的となるのである 
 
xi 単にその所謂概念構成の方法に於て異なるのみではなく、寧ろ本質的にはその所与に於て異なる
のである。自然哲学者にとっては直接に与えられる処のものは、かりにカントの言葉を借用すれば、
「感覚の多様」である。少なくともそれ自身は尚お未だ人間的なる意味を有さない 
 
xii それは既に人間的なる痕跡を帯びているのである 
 
xiii 歴史的範疇にあっては、それは主語に対して外から述語せられているものと考えられてはなら
ない 
 
xiv 個別的全体 
 
xv 展開 
 
xvi 運動 
 
xvii 自己限定 
 
xviii 共同の傾向を有し、相互に代表的であり、従って又象徴的であり 
 
xix すべては普遍にして且つ個別的な精神的生命である 
 
xx 恐らくそれは自然科学に於ける如き法則的普遍ではなくして、代表的普遍、類型的普遍、象徴的
普遍と呼ばるべきものであろう 
 
xxi 特にその代表的なるものの有する 
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xxii 数学的認識はむしろ記号的に組織され、それによって純粋可能の世界が表現されるのである 
 
xxiii 固有名詞が何らか主体的なるものを指さし、既に人倫的世界を示していることは前提されてよ
いであろう 
 
xxiv それは、A、固有名詞が代表的普遍の性格を有つからであり、B、その機能は典型的、類型的な
ところにあり、C、それを媒介として主体的因果或は帰属的因果ともいうべきものが理解されるか
らである 
 
xxv D、現在の世界的方位をも示す 
 
xxvi 類型 
 
xxvii 歴史的普遍の動脈点 
 
xxviii 自己の背後にある何らか普遍的なもの、全体的なもの、例えば時代を、或は民族を、そしてそ
れを通じて世界歴史を究極に於て代表しているのである 
 
xxix その一歩一歩が問題とその解決の錯綜の意味を有つ 
 
xxx そこには歴史的主体があり、それを通じて人間的生の問題が解決されると共に、それは歴史的
主体そのものが新たな組織を有つことであり…単に法則的普遍の世界ではなく、固有名詞的なもの
を通じて単に傾向性、可能性に止まったものが現実の形に形成される代表的普遍の世界なのである 
 
xxxi それは歴史的出来事の帰属の主体である限り、個性的の意味を有つと共に、代表的関係に立つ
限り、典型的の意味を有つのである 
 
xxxii 典型 
 
xxxiii 類型 
 
xxxiv より普遍的な可能的構造 
 
xxxv 典型は理想的個体であり、類型は個別化された普遍、或は逆に普遍化された個体である 
 
xxxvi 型 
 
xxxvii 未来に向けられた図式 
 
xxxviii 帰属的因果性は、歴史的な類型的認識を媒介にした因果といってよかろう。しかしその認識
の客観的妥当性は、歴史的現実に対して形成的か、問題解決的かの妥当性によるのである 
 
xxxix 有意味的な世界であり、主体への関連を含むからである 
 
xl 歴史的認識は、現在を過去から自由にすると共に、過去の主体的可能性を現在に媒介するという
二重の意味を有つのである 
 
xli 自己の主体性を恢復するのである 
 
xlii 典型と類型の成立する時間である 
 
xliii ディルタイ流に言うならば、体験は表現されると共に、表現は了解を通じて再び体験に帰るの
である 
 
xliv 相互転換 
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xlvxlv そこに泥土が流し込まれて、そこから多数の泥土像が造り出された如き型のことを意味する
のである。それは一つの原像が粘土の上に圧しつけられて残した痕跡であろう。それは造られたも
の、否、造る作用の足あとなのである。しかもそれが型と呼ばれる所以は、それが原型として再び
無数の泥土像を造りだす点にある…型は造形作用の痕跡でありながら、しかもそこから新たなる造
形作用が現わるべき源泉である 
 
xlvi 永遠の今に向かっての流れなのである 
 
xlvii ここに類型の象徴的実践性がある 
 
xlviii 過去における可能性が再び類型的に構成され、否定的に媒介されながら同時に世界形成的、歴
史的方位決定的とならなければならない。こうして時代は時代に媒介されながら、歴史的方位に向
かってわれわれも建設的となるのである 
 
xlix 傾向は非連続の連続の世界の法則である。我と汝の出会う世界である 
 
l 我と汝が一つの世界を形成しつつ一つの世界に於て出会う処に、同時と云う現象が成立するので
ある 
 
li 時代の新なる発端は常に特殊なる同時性、宿命的なる同時性に根ざすのである 
 
lii そこに我と汝を通じての、歴史的世界の自己限定の形式がある 
 
liii 連なる 
 
liv 時は無限に過去に、或いは未来に流れると云うのである 
 
lv 帰る 
 
lvi ただしそれは過去に「行く」ということではなく、「対面」するという意味をもつのである 
 
lvii 汝としての自由な歴史を保証しようとする 
 
lviii 物自体 
 
lix 現象性の原理をかりに空間への方向、即ち肉体への方向に於て乗り越え得るならば、同じく時間
への方向に関して、現象性の原理を乗り越え得べきではなかろうか 
 
lx 道徳的決断 
 
lxi 真に自由な自己を生きる主体は、矛盾的に対立しながらしかも創造的に統一されてくる。しかも、
統一されながらも主体は統一し返していく独自性を維持する。それゆえに、過去の独立な汝と同様
に未来にも独立と自由がなければならない 
 
lxii それは Grundが Objektになると云う事である 
 
lxiii それが彼の主体であり、彼の我である 
 
lxiv 慣習のみに生きる人は、過去の連続の上にのみ生きるのであって、彼には真の現在もなく、未
来もなく…単なる慣習は…歴史ではない 
 
lxv 現実的生活に於て自ら形成されつつある歴史的認識は、未だ歴史的認識への半にすぎず 
 
lxvi 真の歴史家は自らの自己の Grundを放棄すべき運命を有つのである 
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lxvii 所謂客観的精神的なるものを脱出して 
 
lxviii 歴史家が自ら自己の Grund を放棄すると云うよりも、時代そのものが自らを過去として葬り、
自らを grundlosとなし行く姿が、歴史家と云う存在ではあるまいか。そこに現在に於て現在の歴
史を書き難い所以もある 
 
lxix 言わば永遠の相に向かって落ちるのである。各々の時代は神に直接するとは…彼に於てそれぞ
れの時代は自らの中心に向かって永遠の結晶を有つ 
 
lxx 歴史家に対して現れ来る Objektは、自らの内に独立性を有する Grundである。それは歴史家
に呼びかけ、歴史家を促して、自らのロゴスを書きしむる、主体的なるものであり、汝である 
 
lxxi 「私にとっては近世の極めて重大なる時期の歴史は、殆ど私自身手を加える事なくして、徐々
に組み立てられてくるのである、その歴史を判然たる姿にもたらし、そして記述する事が私の生涯
の仕事となるであろう。」 
 
lxxii 真に実在的なるものの学は、方法を絶するものに触れる処から始まる 
 
lxxiii 指標 
 
lxxiv 歴史家に於て一つの時代が grundlosとなることによって、その時代は否定されつつ永遠の相
に向かって保存され、過去に属すべきものは葬られて、それ自らが又新なる傾向と理想と永遠を含
む処の新なる時代が、その grundlosな深淵から浮かび上がってくるのである 
 
lxxv 過去の汝によって現在の Grundは奪われて、深き Grundlosigkeitの底から、新なる未来の我
を求むべく駆りたてられると共に、過去の汝は自らに宿す理想的なるもの、神的なるものを介して、
未来の我に向かって現在を鞭撻し、奨励し、忠告し、予言するのである。けだし、単なる認識は
我々に命令し、忠告する力を有さない。実例が我々を動かすのである。過去のロゴスは生きた汝の
語るロゴスである。まして過去の汝の奥は、深く神的なるものにまで達している。過去の汝は深く
汝を知り得るものにとっては、神的なるものの象徴となる 
 
lxxvi 個別的 
 
lxxvii 一回的 
 
lxxviii 普遍性 
 
lxxix 反復性 
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Chapter 7: The Historical World and the Conditions of National 
Subjectivity 
7a: The Historical World as a Nothingness-like Universal 
 Kōsaka perceived the historical world as a nothingness-like 
universal that manifests through the mediation of both being and 
nothingness. This may be reinterpreted as the mediation of the 
substantial and the subjective or the material and the spiritual. As 
Hegel taught, it is therefore a world where ‘substance is subject’.1/i 
Kōsaka agreed with Nishida that the historical world was the most 
concrete manifestation of human existence.2 This is because it is not 
possible to fully construe humankind, an existence whose essence is 
defined by its historical accomplishments, in the one-sided terms of the 
materialism of nature or the rationalism of spirit in abstraction. 
Historical praxis is only possible through the mediation of both the 
spiritual and the material.3 However, that which is truly historical is 
not an individual person taken out of his or her social context, but a 
species existence that persists over time such as an ethnic people or 
nation. As a consequence, Kōsaka believed that it is the state as the 
‘individual’ expression of the national subjectivity of an ethnic group 
that best exemplifies this ‘earthly-spirit’ii or ‘Real-spirit’iii (Ranke) 
within the historical world, going on to identify the ‘formation of the 
state as the greatest event in human history’.4/iv Hanazawa explains 
that ‘it is by having a substratum that nothingness (the eternal) is 
mutually mediated with being (primordial nature/the substratum), 
                                                   
1 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 241; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 9-10. 
2 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 4. 
3 Compare Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 102: Both concepts [the psychical 
and the physical] can be used only if we remain conscious that they are merely abstracted from 
the factually given human being – they designate not full realities but only legitimately formed 
abstractions’. 
4 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 241-242; 245; Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 208: ‘Mind in 
its freedom is an infinitely negative relation to itself and hence its essential character from its 
own point of view is its singleness, a singleness which has incorporated these subsistent 
differences into itself and so is a unit, exclusive of other units. So characterized, the state has 
individuality’.  
181 
 
thereby allowing the structure of … the eternal now to become tangible 
or substantive’ within the world.5/v The focal point of this mediation is 
the state as both a ‘historical body’vi consisting of a territory and 
citizenry, and as the ‘historical subject’, the rational expression of a 
nation’s collective will.vii As a consequence, Kōsaka conceives the state 
as the concrete realisation of the eternal now or the absolute within 
history.6  
That being said, Kōsaka rejected the Hegelian perspective of 
relating the historical world exclusively to the state. Rather, the state 
must also be understood in relation to the historical world itself. 
Although the state may be the ‘greatest motive power’ within history, it 
is still a product of the processes of historical creation.viii It is therefore 
something that is both ‘born’ and ‘develops within the world’.7/ix Kōsaka, 
who himself identified the state as the embodiment of the ‘ethical 
substance’x or ‘substantive freedom’ of a people,xi believed that Hegel’s 
greatest achievement was to be found in the ‘foundation of [the 
philosophy of] objective spirit’.8/xii However, because Hegel situated the 
‘centre of world spirit only within national spirit and the state, it was 
not sufficiently mediated by [the] absolute spirit’ of philosophy, religion 
and art.xiii In other words, Hegel’s philosophy of world history was a 
‘political history alienated from a rich cultural content’, while culture 
itself remained something fundamentally ahistorical as a part of the 
‘domain of absolute spirit’.xiv 
Kōsaka argues that Hegel’s idea of world spirit, which for 
Kōsaka represents the historical world, was not adequately mediated 
                                                   
5 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 43-44. 
6 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 298; Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 43; Compare Hegel, Philosophy 
of Right, 212: ‘The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality 
and is therefore the absolute power on earth’. 
7 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 250; 246. 
8 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 187; Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 64-68; 103; Kōsaka, 
Rekishi-teki sekai, 274; 248; Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 155: ‘The state exists 
immediately in custom, mediately in individual self-consciousness, knowledge and activity, 
while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its 
essence and the end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom’. 
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with culture. As a result, Kōsaka believes that the relationship 
between world spirit and the state remains unclear in Hegel’s 
deliberations on history. Although Kōsaka praises Hegel for 
progressing from an ‘atomistic view of the human being to a holistic 
view of humanity’, as exemplified by his deliberations on the objective 
spirit and ethical life of a community, Hegel still maintained an 
atomistic view of the state itself.xv Specifically, the Hegelian state first 
appears as a universal that only enters world history upon displaying 
particularity. However, this historical particularism had no intrinsic 
meaning in relation to the a priori essence of the state as a rational 
construction.9 Contrastingly, Kōsaka agreed with Ranke that it is not 
possible to proceed from an abstract universal to the particular in this 
fashion – ‘Real-Sprit cannot be deduced from a higher principle’.xvi 
Instead, the order must be reversed so that one ‘climbs up’ to the 
concrete universal from the particular through historical praxis.xvii 
This is because the state as it actually exists in the world is a unique 
‘individuality that defies deduction from the universal’ a priori.xviii 
Kōsaka continues that the world is not simply an amalgamation of 
atomistic parts or a super state to which all other states belong or 
converge. Rather, it is ‘within the world that the state first becomes 
possible’.xix The state is therefore just one example of historical 
individuality among many such examples in the larger world. 
Consequently, it is necessarily situated in a network of mutually 
mediating relationships, itself an important condition for the 
development of the national subjectivity that is essential for state 
                                                   
9 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 236-256: ‘The final aspect of the state is that it is the 
immediate actuality of an individual and naturally determined people. As a single individual 
the state is exclusive against other such individuals’ (245); Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 279: 
‘The state in its actuality is essentially an individual state, and beyond that a particular state. 
Individuality is to be distinguished from particularity. The former is a moment in the very Idea 
of the state, while the latter belongs to history. States as such are independent of one another, 
and therefore their relation to one another can only be an external one’; Kōsaka’s argument 
also may be compared with Dilthey’s critique of Hegel’s conception of objective spirit – Dilthey, 
The Formation of the Historical World, 170-174; 277. 
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formation.10 While Kōsaka agreed with Hegel that the state is a 
‘concrete universal’ as the tangible manifestation of the subjectivity of 
a specific people or nation, as a concrete existence it is also situated 
within the historical world and therefore a product of the processes of 
historical mediation.xx As a result, it is best described as a 
‘particularistic-universal’ that is subject to the forces of negation both 
from its citizens within and from other nations and states without.xxi 
The models for this conception of the state were Tanabe’s logic of the 
species internally and Nishida’s logic of discontinuous-continuity 
externally.11  
Christian Uhl raises justified questions about Kōsaka’s close 
juxtaposition of Hegel and Ranke during the first Chūō Kōron 
symposium due to the latter’s strong opposition to the apriority of the 
former’s philosophical methodology.12 This is something that Kōsaka 
himself highlights on numerous occasions in relation to the teleological 
portrayal of history that is presented by Hegel. Nevertheless, Kōsaka 
believed that if the philosophy of history was to have contemporary 
relevance it had to overcome both the one-sided relativism of 
historicism (Ranke) and the one-sided absolutism of philosophical 
rationalism (Hegel), since it was these two schools of thought that had 
broadly shaped philosophical research on history at the time. This was 
to be achieved via a theory of metaphysical symbolism grounded in 
Ranke’s deliberations on the individual and universal significance of 
historical existences. However, as demonstrated by the particularistic 
nature of cultural types and models, Kōsaka believed this was only 
possible through the mediation of the species as the necessary medium 
of universality and individuality. That is to say the historical 
                                                   
10 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 250-251; 287; 219-223. 
11 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 252-256; Tanabe, ‘On the Logic of Co-Prosperity Spheres’, 190-
194.  
12 Christian Uhl, ‘What was the ‘Japanese philosophy of history’? An inquiry into the dynamics 
of the ‘world-historical standpoint’ of the Kyoto School’, in Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as 
Philosophy, 114; Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 110-111.  
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substratum of nature. Consequently, Kōsaka conceived the subjective 
praxis of the individual state, an embodied historical existence, as a 
symbolic expression of the absolute or the eternal now within the 
historical world.13 This is because the state is the focal point of 
historical praxis and therefore historical creation ‘within the present of 
the eternal now’.14/xxii However, as a particularistic-universal it is just 
one such expression in a world of multiple focal points. In this way, 
Kōsaka hoped to retain the universal significance attributed to the 
state by Hegel as the concrete manifestation of the objective spirit of a 
specific people, while relativizing its absolute significance within the 
world as a whole in a manner compatible with the historical relativism 
of Ranke. Kōsaka premised this upon the nothingness-like nature of 
the historical world itself.  
Broadly speaking, the historical world is the overarching context 
or place of the dialectical mediation between the subjective and the 
substantial and between different historical subjectivities such as 
nations, peoples and states. It therefore encloses the concrete universal 
of the state as a particular within it, including the historical processes 
through which the state is both ‘created’xxiii and ‘destroyed’.xxiv For this 
reason, Kōsaka describes the historical world as a ‘universal of 
universals’.15/xxv However, in order to ensure the autonomy of the 
individual state, as well as the possibility of a free future grounded in 
the practical determination of the historical subject in the present, the 
world ‘must appear as nothingness’ or as a discontinuous-continuity:xxvi 
 
                                                   
13 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetstugaku jōsetsu, 151-164; 168-170. 
14 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 67; 63. 
15 A comparable expression is also used by Dilthey, who, identifying philosophy as the ‘highest 
endeavour to make conscious’, describes the field as ‘the consciousness of every mode of 
consciousness and the knowledge of all knowledge’. Both Kōsaka and Dilthey are perhaps, 
however, playing on Aristotle’s description of the hand as a ‘tool of tools’ – Dilthey, The 
Formation of the Historical World, 27; Kōsaka, Shōchō-teki ningen, 261-272.  
185 
 
It is a fact that we are unable to completely grasp the world in a 
definite form. The world that can be captured as such is not the 
world, only one aspect of it. The world does not know the end of 
its own self-determination.16/xxvii 
 
It is for this reason that the historical world is best understood as a 
process of dynamic mediation, rather than as something that is in itself 
substantial and static.17 The self-negating nature of the historical 
world also ensures that it is not composed of one, but two conduits of 
subjective praxis: 
 
[T]here is no state that is immediately the world. Within the 
historical world it is demanded that the state is mediated 
internally with that which is not the state. This is culture … In 
other words, the structure of the historical world should be 
portrayed not simply as that of a circle centred upon the state 
alone, but rather as an ellipse that has two centres, both the 
state and culture. It is through their mutual mediation that 
history progresses.xxviii 
 
Kōsaka concludes that if the historical world only had a political axis, 
as argued by Hegel, then we would ‘lose sight of its dialectical 
character’, as well as the true meaning of the subjective praxis that 
results.xxix 
 The historical world is not absolute nothingness itself, however, 
since it is only able to manifest itself via the ‘dark foothold’ of the 
historical substratum of nature.xxx Consequently, the historical world 
determines itself through the mediation of being in the form of various 
historical trends, periods and cultural regions as the ‘simultaneous 
                                                   
16 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 299-300. 
17 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 191. 
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existence of that which is free’, or, in other words, as a world of 
multiple subjectivities or expressions of the absolute.xxxi As a 
nothingness-like universal the historical world is therefore ‘a world of 
worlds’ (世界の世界/sekai-no-sekai) (1937), an idea that was later taken 
up by Nishida in his own reflections on the political (世界的世界/sekai-
teki-sekai) (1941). Although Kōsaka initially focused exclusively upon 
the temporal implications of this notion, specifically the independent 
significance and symbolic universalism of past historical periods, he 
explored in greater detail the spatial implications of a ‘world of worlds’ 
in his wartime writings:18 
 
However, if the world should be thought of vertically as a … 
genealogy of historical periods that each represent a symbolic-
metaphysical substance, then should the world not also be 
regarded as horizontally disclosing multiple reflections of the 
absolute as well?xxxii 
 
Ranke believed that each respective period of history was in direct 
contact with God or the absolute, thereby ensuring the independent 
significance of different periods of history. For Kōsaka, the same could 
also be said of the various cultural regions that together constitute the 
world in the present: 
 
This is the concretion of Ranke’s thought … in the same way 
that each period of history needed a metaphysical genealogy, 
each cultural region must have a metaphysical system … the 
concept of the world is not a concrete universal but a 
nothingness-like universal, it is not substance but the world as 
                                                   
18 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 242; 300-301; 316-363; Kitarō Nishida, ‘Hoi [Addendum]’ Nishida 
Kitarō zenshū dai jūni kan [The Complete Works of Kitarō Nishida Volume 12] (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1965), 417-442; Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 6; 56. 
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place … it is not a substratum but a mediator. Just as the ideal 
of humanity cannot be exhausted in one historical period, 
neither can it be exhausted in one cultural region.xxxiii 
 
As a part of the historical world, each cultural region therefore 
represents a spatial historical Thou for other cultural spheres due to 
the unique principles, worldviews and ways of life that define their 
respective centres of historical formation. What is more, each cultural 
sphere has its own distinct regional history, within which an individual 
period or era also appears before the peoples of the present as an 
historical Thou. However, for the historical Thou to materialise there 
must first be an historical I in order for a dialogue to take place. In 
other words, a specific nation or state that is capable of representing 
the cultural sphere in the present age as the principle subject of history 
in the region. Such nations hold world-historical significance as the 
‘symbolic centres’ of the historical world.xxxiv This is because they are 
positioned where the temporal and spatial structures of a cultural 
sphere intersect, in other words at the centre of historical formation. In 
Hegelian terminology, these ‘world-historical peoples’ therefore 
represent the concrete embodiment of the eternal now in historical 
reality.19/xxxv This is only realised, however, through the mediation of 
historical subjectivity (the eternal now) with the historical substratum 
of nature (primordial nature). 
 
7b: The Historical Substratum 
Historical Nature and Primordial Nature 
 Nature represents both the material for historical praxis and the 
place of historical creation.20 It is in this sense that nature may be 
                                                   
19 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 163; 166; 175-191; Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 217-218. 
20 Compare Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 141; 168-169: ‘Nature is not merely 
the arena of history; the physical processes and the necessities inherent in nature, and the 
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described as the substratum of the historical world. Kant observed that 
‘humans are able to perceive nature because it is humans that 
constructed nature’.21/xxxvi This is because nature must correspond to 
the a priori categories of the understanding ‘as the original ground of 
her necessary conformability to law’.22 In the case of historical reason, 
however, Kōsaka believed that the situation is reversed, since it is 
within nature that reason is prepared and through nature that reason 
is born: 
 
Spirit is also something that is born [into the world]. Moreover, 
it is conceived through nature. It is via its itinerancy within 
nature that abstract reason, which is empty [of content], first 
matures into historical reason, in other words spirit. Spirit is 
reason mediated with nature.23/xxxvii 
 
This is one reason why Kōsaka agreed with Hegel that individual 
morality in abstraction is not yet the ethical life of the community.  
Kant’s categorical imperative demonstrated that morality had 
absolute authority. However, this was only as a demand of reason; it 
had no actual ‘power in reality’.xxxviii Consequently, Kōsaka believed 
that ‘absolute authority must be realised within the ethical world’.xxxix 
In other words, individual morality must develop into communal 
ethics.24 This may be reinterpreted as the tangible ‘realisation of the 
eternal now’ within the historical world through the mediation of 
                                                                                                                                           
effects that issue from them, form the substratum for all relationships … in the historical 
world. And the physical world also provides the material for the entire realm in which spirit 
has expressed its purposes, its values – its essence’ (141). 
21 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 224; Compare Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 
105: ‘[T]he relationship of phenomena to that by means of which they are constructed exists 
only as far as the conceptual cognition of nature reaches’.  
22 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 94. 
23 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 224. 
24 This relates to Hegel’s key distinction between ought and is: ‘What is universally valid is 
also universally effective; what ought to be, in fact also is, and what ought to be without 
[actually] being, has no truth’ – Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 151. 
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nature (being) in praxis.25/xl As the concrete manifestation of the ethical 
substance or objective spirit of a people, that is to say the physical 
embodiment of the eternal now in history, the state therefore requires 
a material body: 
 
As long as it is a moral substance, the state must be deeply 
rooted in nature. In all likelihood, it is only that which has a 
material body that can become the place of moral freedom. In 
this way, the state too has its own material body.26/xli 
 
This is because within practical determination, the ego (individual or 
collective) must be able to break through its limited frame and step out 
into the real world. In other words, morality must be realised through 
concrete action in the world. Something that is only possible through 
the medium of a body that is both a part of the world and capable of 
acting upon it. Through the processes of historical praxis, however, the 
historical substratum of nature itself becomes endowed with 
subjectivity and thereby susceptible to the forces of historical 
mediation. Hanazawa explains that unlike Schelling, for whom nature 
was an ‘absolute’xlii and consequently something external to the 
historical world, ‘Kōsaka assumed nature as it relates to humanity’.xliii 
That is nature as it exists within history – ‘because it is the 
substratum of history, it itself must be a thing of the historical 
world’.27/xliv Since cognition of nature is also an event of the historical 
world, Kant’s observations on the subjective conditions of human 
perception constitute one plane of historical reality. However, just as it 
is not possible to cognise the natural world without the input of human 
subjectivity, human subjectivity is itself impossible without the 
                                                   
25 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 66-67. 
26 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 298. 
27 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 44; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 167. 
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mediation of nature both in terms of the body and the wider 
environment. This is why Kōsaka believed that true historical 
cognition was only possible through action-intuition. 
 At first, Kōsaka’s portrayal of the substratum seems problematic 
because ‘that which is suitable to be called the historical substratum 
likely precedes all things that are historical, while not being permitted 
to be historical itself’.xlv On the other hand, ‘in order for nature to give 
birth to history, nature must already be historical’ in some sense.xlvi 
The solution to this apparent contradiction lies in the fact that the 
‘substratum is not a concept that indicates a conclusion, but is rather a 
concept that reveals the location of a hidden problem’.xlvii Kōsaka 
continues that it is therefore ‘not an answer, but a question’.xlviii In 
other words, the substratum of history is not merely an issue of 
abstract theoretical speculation, but a problem of concrete historical 
praxis. As a consequence, the different ways in which nature is 
interpreted within the historical world are in turn dependent upon the 
varying perspectives of the historical subject itself. This is apparent 
from Kōsaka’s varying conceptions of ‘primordial nature’, the 
fundamental form of the historical substratum.  
For instance, primordial nature represents that from which the 
historical world emerges. It may therefore be conceived as the 
‘prehistory of the historical world’xlix or as something representative of 
the ‘eternal past’.l This is how it is able to fulfil the condition of 
preceding the historical. However, the ‘natural world is [also] the 
location of life and death within the historical world’.li In this sense, 
nature is not simply a ‘nature of necessary laws’ determining 
prehistory,lii but is also a ‘nature that incorporates the creativity of 
nothingness’.liii Consequently, primordial nature overlaps with the 
eternal future as well. This is possible because nature is enveloped 
within the eternal now or eternal present as the material through 
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which it is actualised in the historical world via praxis – ‘the eternal 
now only becomes something historical through that which is not itself 
within itself’.28/liv From the perspective of historical subjectivity this 
evolves into the need for the state to be mediated internally with that 
which is not the state, namely culture. It is only in relation to historical 
praxis in the present, however, that the position of nature within the 
historical world is determined in this fashion. Hanazawa explains that 
‘primordial nature is not simply a substratum, since it is only through 
the mediation of subjective practice that it first becomes [historical] 
substance’.29/lv As Kōsaka himself stresses, ‘grasses or trees do not 
qualify as historical nature unless they are tied to a free subject at the 
centre’ of historical praxis.30/lvi Hanazawa recognises that Kōsaka’s 
understanding of the historical substratum contradicts Aristotle’s 
original conception of substance as the foundations that precede that 
which follows. However, it is for this very reason that the historical 
substratum ‘is something that is both [able to] persist at the base of 
history, while not being fixed to the base of history. It is not merely a 
static nature, but rather a dialectical nature’.31/lvii 
It is important to remember, however, that historical nature is 
itself imbued with subjectivity. There is nothing that is purely 
substantial or purely subjective within the historical world. As a 
consequence:  
 
[T]he development of primordial nature into environmental 
nature and historical nature through the mediation of subjective 
praxis is, conversely, the historical movement of subjective 
praxis via the mediation of primordial nature.lviii 
 
                                                   
28 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 168-169; 224-225; 228; 230; 174.  
29 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 44. 
30 Miki and Kōsaka, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku: taidan’, 17. 
31 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 44; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 237. 
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Therefore, nature is not simply the material or location of subjective 
praxis. Rather, it is the necessary medium through which historical 
subjectivity itself first acquires a content and the mode of its 
expression is shaped. This is best exemplified by the fact that 
primordial nature also represents an ‘impulse’ or ‘compulsion’ from the 
world.lix Freedom is only possible through its negation. In other words, 
freedom is only actualised at the moment when the subject becomes 
one with its object in praxis. Here, both the substance and the subject 
are dialectically unified within a process of mutual determination and 
negation that changes both essentially. In the words of Nishida, the 
ego becomes one with its object, thereby allowing the ego to work upon 
the object in an act of creative transformation, while the object in turn 
guides and shapes this process in accordance with its own 
potentiality.32 In turn, the objectified action of the subject becomes a 
past event of the historical world as expression. This is how the 
objective spirit of a people arises over time. In other words, this is a 
process of from the created to the creating. In the same way: 
 
The historical character of historical nature is based on negation 
within the historical world. The historical world can only permit 
its own foundations through the negation of these foundations. It 
is here that the historicity of historical nature forms.lx 
 
Nevertheless, the compulsions of primordial nature alone are 
‘undetermined’.lxi It is ‘only within the place of the eternal now that 
these dark impulses acquire a direction, inclination or curvature’.lxii 
Consequently, it is only as the negation or material of subjective praxis 
or freedom that nature itself becomes historical and thereby subjective 
in turn. Primordial nature is therefore identified with the ‘vortex of 
                                                   
32 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 163-182.  
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impulses’lxiii that constitute the historical periphery – that which 
provides the material for the formative processes of the historical 
centre – within which it is said that the ‘primitive scenery of human 
spirit lurks’.33/lxiv 
 
Environmental Nature and the Issue of Race 
 Kōsaka states that ‘at the base of history must be the depths of 
nature’.34/lxv However, it is not the dark foothold of primordial nature 
that is directly encountered in the historical world, but nature as the 
broad environment of human praxis. Primordial nature is said to 
develop into environmental-nature by becoming an object of human 
action and therefore human cognition: 
 
When freedom is born it simultaneously objectifies its own 
ground, which becomes its environment. Primordial nature 
becomes environmental-nature … Within free praxis [our] 
foundations are objectified. This may be thought of as practical 
self-awareness. In this way, the development of freedom within 
history is carried out through nature.lxvi 
 
The idea that the ground of the ego becomes objectified within praxis is 
a key aspect of Kōsaka’s historical epistemology. It is therefore within 
action-intuition that phenomenal nature ‘rises up from the base of 
primordial nature’.lxvii Kōsaka continues that this is not simply nature 
as it existed before the appearance of humankind, such as ‘the nature 
of light and gravity within Schelling’s philosophy’.lxviii Rather, it is 
‘nature as it relates to humanity, which broadly defined can only be 
environmental-nature’.lxix However, action-intuition is a dialectical 
process of mutual mediation – the ‘internal becomes the external and 
                                                   
33 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 238; 172; 229; 323; 239. 
34 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 172. 
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the external becomes the internal’.lxx As a consequence, environmental-
nature as an object of historical cognition necessarily splits into the 
external and internal environments of climates and peoples. As 
historical nature this is conceived in terms of the territory and ethnic 
population of the state. This is why nature is regarded as ‘one of the 
life sources of the state’.35/lxxi Nevertheless, this also leads to one of the 
most problematic dimensions of the Kyoto School’s political philosophy; 
the seemingly ‘logical manner’ in which they deliberated about ‘the 
importance of race in a genetic rather than cultural sense’.36 This is 
because the external environment is symbolised by ‘soil’, while the 
internal environment is symbolised by ‘blood’.lxxii  
There are aspects of Kōsaka’s philosophy that would appear to 
justify the concerns that have been raised by Goto-Jones and others in 
relation to the Kyoto School’s wartime writings. For example, Kōsaka 
argued that ‘blood constitutes our internal environment’,lxxiii continuing 
that blood’s propensity for ‘closure is encountered in blood relations (血
族/ketsuzoku), tribes and even within the cultural community of the 
nation (民族)’.37/lxxiv Kyoto School scholarship in the West often 
emphasises the fact that the Japanese expression minzoku (民族) must 
be comprehended in terms of the German expression Volk and its 
usage during the 1930s and 40s.38 Consequently, many translators 
have rendered the term as ‘race’. However, Williams believes that the 
use of such biological terminology misrepresents the political 
philosophy of the Kyoto School because it mistakenly associates their 
speculations with ‘the horrors of the Third Reich’.39 Although the 
phrase minzoku may have originated from the German expression Volk, 
the Kyoto School’s usage of the term had far more in common with the 
                                                   
35 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 154-155; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai¸ 189; 182-183; 223. 
36 Goto-Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan, 114. 
37 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 182; 191-192. 
38 Harootunian, ‘Returning to Japan: part two’, 275-282. 
39 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 99-101; 159-160. 
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Hegelian idea of ‘world-historical peoples’ than the Nazi’s proposition 
for a master race.40 As a consequence, Williams argues that the 
phrases ‘nation’ or ‘people’ better convey the meaning of minzoku in 
English, a sentiment that is shared by Kazuhide Uemura and 
Hanazawa.41  
This is supported by the fact that Kōsaka openly rejected the 
‘deterministic racial view’ of Arthur De Gobineau and his arguments 
on the natural superiority of the white races:lxxv 
 
[B]elief in the absolutism of blood within the historical world is 
nothing other than the determinism or materialism of blood. 
Although it looks as if it respects the species and the subjective 
within world history, it falls into racial determinism thereby 
leading to the materialisation of the subject and hence its 
negation. It goes without saying that the mistaken viewpoint 
that it is only the white races which are culturally productive 
should also be rejected. This is because the claim that the black 
or white colour of the skin determines the blackness or 
whiteness of the soul, and hence the superiority and inferiority 
[of different races], is little more than dogma.lxxvi 
 
Referring to the careful analysis that was undertaken on the diversity 
of the human races by Kant, for whom such distinctions were always 
relative, Kōsaka continues that ‘white people and black people are not 
separate human beings, but together [constitute] humankind’.42/lxxvii 
That being said, Kōsaka did not believe that the concept of blood 
could be completely dismissed out of hand:  
                                                   
40 Hayashi, ‘Kindai Nihon no (Minzoku Seishin)’, 1-25. 
41 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 99-101; Uemura, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku ha nan 
dattanoka’, 9. 
42 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 12-16; Immanuel Kant, ‘Of the Different Human Races’, 
trans. by Jon Mark Mikkelsen, The Idea of Race, eds. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 8-22. 
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What we acknowledge is not merely a natural, necessary 
conception of blood, but blood as a part of the historical body, the 
traditions of which have a past, while with the passing of history 
it is recreated and developed in the present along with the 
growth of the nation. It is blood that has a future.lxxviii 
 
The concept of blood is significant for Kōsaka because it is an 
expression of the historical substratum of the ethnic nation when 
viewed from the perspective of the historical nature. This is why he 
suggested that the perceived ‘excellence’lxxix or ‘purity’lxxx of blood could 
be symbolic of the ‘health’ of a state or culture.lxxxi Nevertheless, while 
this is no doubt a problematic proposition in modern political discourse, 
it must be recognised that blood for Kōsaka was not an abstract 
conception of the natural sciences like race, which in reality was itself 
a politically charged concept of modernity, but was rather an aspect of 
historical nature and therefore something inherently subjective.43 This 
is why blood could be conceived as having a past and future. It is this 
idea that also informs his understanding of the Hegelian mediation of 
substance and subject.44 
Like Hegel, Kōsaka insisted that subjectivity or freedom had to 
be materialised in the real world for it to be meaningful. In other words, 
human beings have no choice but to interact with nature because it is 
nature that constitutes the environment within which the historical 
world necessarily unfolds. What is more, human beings are also 
animals and therefore a part of the natural world.45 Consequently, 
nature has to be conceived not only externally via concepts such as the 
land and climate, but internally as well. The specific, continuous 
                                                   
43 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 19; 83-87; 7.  
44 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 241. 
45 Compare Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 101: ‘We ourselves belong to 
nature, and nature is at work in us, unconsciously, in dark drives’. 
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character of this internal environment was best captured in the 
concept of blood as it was inherited temporally across generations. In 
contrast, the continuous character of the external environment or soil 
was conceived as spatial. Problems arise, however, because the subject 
of history cannot be comprehended in the terms of the abstract 
individual, since the products of historical creation such as tradition 
and culture are all products of social groupings. These groups are in 
turn determined along ethnic lines, for which blood-ties hold notable 
symbolic significance. That being said, culture is not simply the 
consequence of nature alone, though its mediation as the material 
means of historical praxis is essential. Kōsaka concludes that the 
proper subject of history is therefore not simply a substantive, 
essentialist or materialist conception of race as argued by Gobineau, 
but the ‘cultural community’ of an ethnic people or nation as a 
mediation of both the subjective and the substantial.lxxxii In turn, the 
ethnic nation serves as the dynamic substratum upon which the 
eternal now is able to materialise in reality via the processes of 
historical creation. This is why Kōsaka believed that the concept of the 
nation was indispensable for formulating a metaphysical 
understanding of the historical world.46 
Williams notes that after Hitler, ‘we are all universalists’.47 As a 
consequence, any suggestion that race or blood is important for 
determining what it is to be human is flatly rejected as a dangerous 
political ideology. During the first half of the twentieth century, 
however, notions of ethnic nationalism conceived in racial terms were 
hugely influential on Western political discourse. Such theories could 
not be ignored by Kōsaka because they were a reflection of the 
historical circumstances of Europe at the time, especially as many of 
                                                   
46 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 63; 4. 
47 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 167. 
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these ideas had also been imported to Japan.48 Nonetheless, the Kyoto 
School thinkers treated ‘arguments for the importance of blood purity 
with well-judged scepticism at a time when black soldiers were 
apparently not allowed to give blood transfusions to white solders in 
the US armed forces’.49 This is exemplified by Kōsaka’s insistence 
during a debate held with Miki, who played the role of devil’s advocate, 
that the notion of ethnic nationalism only held significance as a 
concept of history and not ‘naturalism’.50/lxxxiii After all, the modern 
conception of race was little more than a political belief camouflaged in 
the language of the natural sciences.51 Kevin Doak appears to have 
misunderstood Kōsaka’s intentions here as he believes the Japanese 
thinker therefore sought a total ‘rejection’ of the natural sciences in 
favour of the ‘constructed nature of the ethnic nation’.52 For Kōsaka, 
however, the fact that even the scientifically construed concept of race 
had political implications was of great significance because the political 
always requires a subjective centre, one reason why it is only after a 
people or nation has formed a state that it truly becomes an actor upon 
the world-historical stage.53 As a consequence, abstract notions of race 
or blood cannot alone determine the course of history, since the ethnic 
nation as a focal point of subjectivity must be a mediation of both the 
political and the cultural, and therefore something historical in essence. 
This transcends the simple materialism of a racist worldview. While 
blood may have symbolic significance as an expression of the natural 
substratum of a people, this is only relevant in the context of the 
historical body of the cultural nation or the political state. Kōsaka’s 
conception of blood was therefore historical or cultural, not genetic as 
implied by Goto-Jones. While this may not exonerate all of Kōsaka’s 
                                                   
48 Miki and Kosaka, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku: taidan’, 2-21. 
49 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 31. 
50 Miki and Kōsaka, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku: taidan’, 2-21. 
51 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 7. 
52 Doak, ‘Romanticism, conservatism and the Kyoto School of philosophy’, 152. 
53 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 170. 
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ideas from a modern political perspective, as Williams concludes, the 
Kyoto School thinkers largely rejected racial determinism at a time 
when blood was still regarded as an absolute by many in Germany and 
America.54  
 
Environmental Nature – Internal and External Environments 
Kōsaka believed that ‘the environment of a living nature within 
history is formed through its relationship with that which is free at its 
centre, something that is in all likelihood always historical’.lxxxiv He 
continues:  
 
History works upon nature, while it is both raised and eroded by 
nature in turn. This is how history develops. Furthermore, 
[within this process] the two aspects of environmental-nature, in 
other words the harmony and disharmony of the external and 
internal environments, are mediated [with each other]. Climate 
and blood relations (血族/ketsuzoku) mutually determine, negate 
and mediate one another. The motif of history is developed 
through this ensemble.lxxxv 
 
It is because environmental-nature fractures into the external and 
internal environments that it generates the necessary conditions for 
the emergence of historical subjectivity. Consequently, it may be said 
that environmental-nature forms the basis of the dialectical structure 
of the historical world itself. The formal aspects of environmental 
nature are described in terms of a ‘species-unity’,lxxxvi a ‘dynamic-
unity’lxxxvii and the ‘phenomenon of contact’.lxxxviii The content of 
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environmental-nature, in contrast, is characterised by the ideas of a 
‘dependent-unity’lxxxix and ‘attributional-unity’.55/xc  
 An environment is something that is inherently ‘limited’xci or 
‘closed’.xcii In terms of the external environment of the soil this is 
conceived as a ‘regional-unity’.xciii However, the closed nature of 
particular region is only ever relative, never absolute. For example, a 
specific region is connected with other lands through various roads, 
tracks and paths. This demonstrates that a region is neither an 
‘unlimited universal’xciv nor a ‘complete individual’,xcv but a continuous 
‘particular that oscillates’ between the two.xcvi It therefore comprises a 
‘species-unity’xcvii that has the ‘characteristics of a medium’.xcviii The 
same may also be said of the internal environment, which at its most 
fundamental is expressed in terms of the blood that ‘flows through and 
joins together blood relatives’.xcix Kōsaka explains that ‘just like 
climate, blood has a relatively closed nature that is regional’.56/c 
Nevertheless, an ethnic nation is never wholly determined by external 
factors such as blood-ties, language or cultural traditions. This is 
because a people or nation does not form ‘a complete universal or a 
supreme individual’, but a continuous ‘particular that floats between 
the two’.ci The limits of distinct species or ethnic groups are therefore 
‘undetermined’cii and mutually ‘inter-penetrating’ or continuous.ciii 
Consequently, there is no such thing as a pure race in the biological 
sense.57 However, the internal and external environments are not 
necessarily the same species. Rather, they become the ‘negative 
moments of the historical world’civ by ‘breaking the unity of one 
another’.cv This is exemplified by the historical migration of peoples 
across the Earth – ‘there is no tribe (種族/shuzoku) … that is only 
rooted to one place’.cvi This shows ‘the dynamism of blood in 
                                                   
55 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 189-191; 194; 198. 
56 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 190-191. 
57 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 20-29. 
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comparison to soil’ or the mobility of humankind within the historical 
world.cvii At the same time, it is through this movement that a specific 
region itself ‘becomes tied to other regions’.cviii In this sense, a region or 
climate may also be said to ‘move’ via the migration of peoples, such as 
through the trade of regional goods.cix Environmental-nature therefore 
forms a dynamic-unity.58 
This dynamism is only possible through the phenomenon of 
contact. This is because there is no land or nation that exists in 
complete isolation within the historical world. This interconnectedness 
in turn ensures that different regions ‘move’, ‘oppose’ and ‘collide with 
one another’,cx leading to the development of borders and ‘boundaries’cxi 
through which the soil attempts to ‘maintain its own relative-
closedness’.cxii Nevertheless, due to the specific, continuous character of 
an environment, a particular boundary may develop into a focal ‘point 
of unification’ through the mediation of the larger world in which it is 
situated.cxiii For example, within a border town ‘different lands come 
into contact and are mediated, while different bloods are mixed. A 
boundary is thereby transformed into the centre of a larger region’.cxiv 
Consequently, towns are not ‘regional’cxv but ‘worldly’ in their 
orientation.cxvi This is one of the main reasons why it is urban areas 
that often become the centres of cultural creativity within a society. 
The phenomenon of contact ensures that location also plays a 
significant part in determining the relative importance of specific 
peoples and nations within history. For example, ancient Greece was 
able to prosper despite its relatively small size because it was 
conveniently located at the point of contact between the civilisations of 
the Occident and the Orient.59  
 While the above characteristics detail the formal conditions of 
the dynamism of the historical world, the contents of the subjectivity of 
                                                   
58 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 192-194. 
59 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 194-197. 
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environmental-nature as historical nature are expressed through the 
notions of a dependent-unity and an attributional-unity. Specifically, a 
dependent-unity refers to the mutual interdependence of the blood and 
soil within the historical world. For example, it is the land that gives 
birth to the ‘institutions of a society’.cxvii The convention of marriage 
was only possible once agriculture established itself in a fixed location 
over time. This is one reason why gratitude was expressed to the Greek 
god Demeter, the deity of agriculture, for the foundation of the city-
state.60 On the other hand, by ‘controlling the productivity of nature 
and determining its direction’,cxviii peoples and nations create a 
‘humanised nature’ in turn in order to support their social systems.cxix 
Kōsaka explains that ‘culture arises when the vitality that gave birth 
to humankind is conversely cultivated and assisted by human hands’, 
as the phrase culture itself already implies.61/cxx However, this 
interdependence paradoxically leads to the mutual independence or 
estrangement of the blood and soil within the historical world or the 
attributional qualities of the internal and external environments 
respectively.  
 The autonomy of the internal environment is first realised when 
‘blood confers life upon the most lifeless materials of the soil, in other 
words minerals and ores’.cxxi This also applies to the development of 
tools, vessels and machines: 
 
Tools are the embodiment (肉体化) or vitalisation (生命化) of the 
lifeless. In this way, via [tools] the life of the lifeless is produced 
                                                   
60 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 131: ‘The real beginning and original foundation of the 
state has been rightly ascribed to the introduction of agriculture along with marriage, because 
the principle of agriculture brings with it the formation of the land and consequentially 
exclusively private property … of the agrarian festivals, images, and sanctuaries of the 
ancients … it was because the ancients themselves had become conscious of the divine origin of 
agriculture and other institutions associated with it that they held them in such religious 
veneration’.  
61 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 199-201. 
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as a second nature through the endowment of a [life-force] 
separate from that of simple blood.cxxii 
 
This life-force refers to the vitality of historical subjectivity.62 The 
material civilisation of modernity was achieved through the ‘surrender 
of the arable and pastoral civilisations’ of the past, which were largely 
dependent upon the natural cycles of the external environment.63/cxxiii 
With the development of the modern sciences, however, humanity was 
able to liberate itself from these external constraints through its 
increased command over the laws of nature and its productive 
powers.64 It is important to note, however, that such historical 
developments always incorporate the moment of their own self-
negation. This is because the means necessary to gain ‘independence 
from nature’ must always be sought ‘within nature’ itselfcxxiv – ‘humans 
constantly conquer nature, while simultaneously being conquered in 
return by the very means through which nature had been 
subjugated’.65/cxxv For example, through the creation of modern 
machines, ‘nature and even humanity itself became something 
mechanised’ in turn.cxxvi This threatened true subjectivity as individual 
human beings were thereby reduced to little more than the cogs of 
modern capitalist society, reflecting a notable Marxian influence on 
Kōsaka’s speculations.66 Nevertheless, it is this very paradox that 
                                                   
62 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 41: ‘A person has as his substantive end the right of 
putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such end 
in itself and derives its destiny and soul from his will’.  
63 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 202-203. 
64 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetugaku to seiji-tetsugaku, 27-35. 
65 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 203. 
66 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku to seiji tetsugaku, 29, 33; See also Wataru Hiromatsu, <Kindai 
no chōkoku> ron – shōwa shisō-shi no isshikaku [On ‘Overcoming Modernity’ – One Viewpoint 
on the History of the Shōwa Period] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1989), 36-57; Setsuzō Kōsaka, Shōwa 
no shukume wo mitsumeta me, 63-76; Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 16-24 (Kenn 
Nakata Steffensen argues that the key concept of practical-subjectivity, which he believes was 
first used by the Kyoto School thinker Kiyoshi Miki in his book The Philosophy of History 
(1932), was also influenced by Marxian works such as the Theses on Feuerbach – Steffensen, 
‘The political philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi’, 152-153 & 166). 
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embodies the dynamism of historical subjectivity as a recurring cycle of 
problems and solutions, via which the way to a new future is created. 
 The autonomy of the external environment is best exemplified 
through the development of a legal system within society. In a manner 
comparable to Hegel’s discussions on property, Kōsaka believed that 
subjectivity only materialises through the mediation of the land or the 
soil.67 At the same time, however, human beings do not live in isolation 
but in communities. As a consequence, a person makes a living through 
the ‘communal use’ of the land:cxxvii 
 
Accordingly, at the background of a person’s relationship to a 
specific piece of land are the restraints enforced by the social 
group to which this person belongs, as well as the relationship 
that this group itself has with other social groups [in the larger 
world]. A person’s relationship with the land may be said to be 
… indirect, that is to say negatively mediated via the 
relationships that a person has with other people.cxxviii 
 
It is this negative mediation that forms the foundations of property 
rights within a community. Such legal restraints no doubt reflect the 
subjective power of blood over the land as nature is absorbed into the 
mechanisms of human society. At the same time, however, the land 
itself becomes a legal entity within society that is itself subjective and 
therefore restrictive of human activity. Even within early cultures, 
burial sites were often places that members of a community were 
banned from entering freely. Such conventions are an early example of 
the restrictive powers that the law of a society can yield through the 
mediation of the land. It is perhaps the feudal system of medieval 
Europe, however, which fully demonstrates the extent of the subjective 
                                                   
67 See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 40-57: ‘[F]rom the standpoint of freedom, property is the first 
embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a substantive end’ (42). 
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power of the soil over blood within the historical world. This is because 
the lowly serfs who worked the fields may be described as having 
actually belonged to the land itself, as reflected by the fact that both 
were sold together as part of the same property. In this way, the 
internal and external environments may be said to form a 
contradictory-unity within which they are at once both dependent upon 
one another, while at the same time mutually subjective and 
autonomous.68 It is this dialectical interplay that forms the foundations 
of the dialectical movement of historical subjectivity itself. 
 All things within the historical world are a mediation of both the 
substantial and the subjective. Nature is historical nature, while the 
state as the principle subject of history requires an historical body 
composed of a people as its internal-environment and a territory as its 
external-environment. Consequently, it is not the historical 
substratum of nature and historical subjectivity that directly constitute 
the two axes at the centre of the historical world, but rather the two 
subjective expressions of their mutual mediation; that is to say, the 
state and culture. One of the reasons that historical subjectivity splits 
into these two conflicting centres is because the historical substratum 
of environmental-nature forms a species-unity. Consequently, it is 
inherently self-contradictory and unstable, persistently fluctuating 
between the extremities of the individual and the universal.69 The 
state, as the ‘principle of the individualisation of the world’, and 
culture, which is fundamentally universal or ‘worldly’ in its orientation, 
may therefore be described as the concrete manifestations of this self-
conflicting tendency of the species within the historical world.70/cxxix 
                                                   
68 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 206-210. 
69 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 98-100. 
70 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 126; 27; 80; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 213. 
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This is hinted at by Kōsaka when he states that environmental-nature 
‘deeply overlaps with the state and culture’.71/cxxx  
                                                   
71 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 210. 
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Chapter 7 Japanese Citations 
 
i ヘーゲルの教えた如く、Substanzは Subjektである世界である。基体は主体である世界である 
  
ii irdisch-geistig 
 
iii das Real-Geistige 
 
iv 国家の成立は、人間歴史に於ける最大の出来事であったのである 
 
v 基体をもつことによって無 （永遠）は有（原始自然・基体）に 相互媒介され…永遠の今の構造
も実体的となることができる 
 
vi 歴史的身体 
 
vii 歴史的主体 
 
viii 最大の動力 
 
ix 世界に於て生まれ、世界に於て展開する 
 
x 人倫的実体 
 
xi 国家を substanzielle Freiheitとして、国民の個々の自由の根柢 
 
xii ヘーゲルの最大の功績は客観精神の樹立にあるであろう 
 
xiii 世界精神の中心を単に民族精神、国家に置き、それに対する絶対精神の意義を十分に媒介せし
めざりしことに 
 
xiv 彼の世界歴史は、一方単に政治史的となって豊なる文化的内容を疎外し、他方文化は、絶対精
神の領域にその非歴史性を嘆く結果を将来した 
 
xv アトム的な人間観より、全体的な人間観に進んでいるところに、ヘーゲルの偉大な功績は存する 
 
xvi この実在的・精神的なるもの das Real-Geistigeは、いかなるより高き原理からしても演繹され
得ない 
 
xvii 特殊から…普遍に登り行くことは出来よう 
 
xviii 普遍から演繹し得ざる個体である 
 
xix 世界に於て国家が始めて可能である 
 
xx 具体的普遍 
 
xxi 特殊的普遍 
 
xxii 永遠の今の現在に於て 
 
xxiii 成立 
 
xxiv 消滅 
 
xxv 普遍の普遍 
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xxvi 世界は無として現われねばならぬ 
 
xxvii 事実、我々は世界を一定の形相に於て、完結的に捕えることは不可能であろう。捕え得た世界
は世界の一面であって、世界ではない。世界は自らの限定の終りを知らぬのである 
 
xxviii いかなる国家も直ちに世界ではない。歴史的世界に於ては国家は国家ならぬものと内面的に媒
介されることを要求するのである。しかしてそれは文化であるであろう…言わば歴史的世界の構造
は単に国家を一つの中心とする円としてではなく、むしろ国家と文化の二つの中心を持つ楕円とし
て描かれるべきである 
 
xxix 弁証法的性格も見失わる 
 
xxx 暗き足場 
 
xxxi 自由なるものの同時存在 
 
xxxii しかしもし世界が縦にかかる象徴的形而上的実体である諸時代の…系譜として考えらるべきで
あるならば、世界は横にも分散的に絶対者の映像を複数的に発現せしむるものと考うべきではない
であろうか 
 
xxxiii それがランケ的思惟の徹底である…諸時代の形而上的系譜を有たなければならなかったように、
諸文化の形而上的体系を有たねばならぬのである…具体的普遍としてではなく却って無的普遍、実
体としてではなく場所としての世界…基体としてではなく媒介者としての世界の概念である。人類
の理念は一つの時代には盛り尽せぬように一つの文化圏にも盛り尽せぬ 
 
xxxiv 象徴の中心 
 
xxxv 世界史的民族 
 
xxxvi 自然を人間が認識し得るのは、人間が自然を構成したからである 
 
xxxvii 精神も亦誕生する、しかも自然を通じて誕生する。自然に於ける遍歴が、空虚なる抽象的理
性を、初めて歴史的理性にまで、即ち精神にまで成熟させるのである。精神とは自然を媒介とせる
理性である 
 
xxxviii 現実の力 
 
xxxix 人倫的世界に於ては、絶対の権威が現実でなければならない 
 
xl 永遠の今が現実化 
 
xli 道徳的実体である限り、国家は深く自然に根ざすのでなければならない。恐らく肉体を有つもの
のみ、道徳的自由の場となり得る。そのように国家も自己の肉体を有つであろう 
 
xlii 自然は絶対者であり 
 
xliii 高坂は人間との関連における自然…を想定するのである 
 
xliv 歴史の基体であるが故に、それ自らが歴史的世界のものでなければならない 
 
xlv 歴史的基体と呼ばれるに相応しいところのものは、あらゆる歴史的なるものに先だつものとし
て、それ自らは歴史的であることは許されないであろう 
 
xlvi 自然が歴史を産み得るためには自然が既に歴史的でなければならない 
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xlvii 基体とは結論を示す概念ではなくして、むしろ課題の潜む箇所を示す概念である 
 
xlviii それは答ではなくして問である 
 
xlix 歴史的世界の前歴史である 
 
l 永遠の過去 
 
li 自然的世界は歴史的世界の生死の場であるのである 
 
lii 法則的必然の自然 
 
liii 更に創造的なる無を含む自然であるであろう 
 
liv 永遠の今は、自らの内なる自らならぬものによってのみ、歴史的となるのである 
 
lv 原始自然はただ基体であるのでなく、主体的実践に媒介されて始めて基体たり得るであろう 
 
lvi そういうものと繋って中心に立つ自由な主体がなければ、草や木が歴史的自然にならない 
 
lvii それははあくまでも歴史の底にありながら、歴史の底に固着しない。それは不動の自然ではな
くして、むしろ弁証法的自然である 
 
lviii 原始自然の、主体的実践を媒介としての、環境的自然及び歴史的自然への展開は、逆に主体的
実践の、原始自然を媒介としての、歴史的運動であること 
 
lix 世界よりの衝動 
 
lx 歴史的自然の歴史的性格は、歴史的世界に於ける否定に基く。歴史的世界は自己の根柢を否定す
ることによって、自己の根柢を許容するのである。そこに歴史的自然の歴史性は成立する 
 
lxi 無規定 
 
lxii 暗き衝動も永遠の今の場に於てある限り、何等かの方向を有ち、傾斜を有ち、曲率を担う 
 
lxiii 衝動の渦まく 
 
lxiv 人間精神の原始風景が潜んでいる 
 
lxv 歴史の底には深き自然がなければならない 
 
lxvi 自由は誕生すると共に、自らの地盤を対境となし、環境となす。原始自然は環境的自然となる
…自由なる実践に於て、その根底は対境となる。それは実践的自覚とも考え得るであろう。かくて
歴史に於ける自由の展開は自然的環境を通じて営まれる 
 
lxvii 原始自然の底から昇り来る 
 
lxviii たとえばシェリングに於ける如き重力と光としての自然 
 
lxix 人間との関連に於ける自然、広義に於ける環境的自然でのみあり得よう 
 
lxx 内なるものが外、外なるものが内なること 
 
lxxi 国家的生命の源泉の一つは自然である 
 
lxxii 象徴的に語るならば、一つは土であり、一つは血である 
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lxxiii 我々の血は、我々にとって内的なる環境を構成する 
 
lxxiv 血のもつ封鎖性は血族、種族、さては文化的共同体としての民族に於てすら、出会わないであ
ろうか 
 
lxxv 決定論的な人種観 
 
lxxvi しかし歴史的世界に於ける血のかかる絶対性の信仰は、畢竟、血の決定論、血の唯物論以外の
何ものでもないであろう。それは世界歴史に於ける種的、主体的なるものを重んずる如くに見えて、
実は人種的決定論 Rassendeterminismusに陥るものであり、却って主体の物質化、否定を招くに
到るのである。まして白色人種のみが文化創造的であるとする如き謬見が否定さるべきは言うまで
もない。それは皮膚の色の黒白によって、魂にまで白黒、ひいて高下の別あることを主張せんとす
る独断にすぎないからである 
 
lxxvii 白人も黒人も人間が別なのではない、共に人間なのである 
 
lxxviii 我々に於て認められる血は、単に自然的必然的な血ではなく、伝統的に過去を有ち、歴史を
経過したと共に、現在民族の成長と共に、形成され、発展し、未来を有つ如き、歴史的身体として
の血であるのである 
 
lxxix 優秀性 
 
lxxx 純粋性 
 
lxxxi 健全性 
 
lxxxii 文化的共同体 
 
lxxxiii 自然主義 
 
lxxxiv 自由なるもの―それは常に歴史的であるであろう―との関連に於てのみ、それを中心として、
生ける自然の環境が成立する 
 
lxxxv 歴史は自然に働きかけ、しかして或は自然に育まれ、或は自然に損われる。かくして歴史は展
開する。しかしてその場合、環境的自然そのものに於ける二つの面、即ち外的環境と内的環境との
調和と不調和とが媒介をなすであろう。風土と血族とは、互いに互いを限定し、否定し、媒介する。
歴史は自己の主題を、その合奏を通じて展開させるのである 
 
lxxxvi 種的統一 
 
lxxxvii 動的統一 
 
lxxxviii 接触の現象 
 
lxxxix 依存的統一 
 
xc 帰属的統一 
 
xci 有限なる環境 
 
xcii 閉鎖性を有する環境 
 
xciii 地域的統一 
 
xciv 無限なる普遍 
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xcv 完結せる個別 
 
xcvi 普遍と個別との間を振動する特殊 
 
xcvii 種的統一 
 
xcviii 中間ある性格を保つ種 
 
xcix 種々なる血族を連ねて流れる血 
 
c 血も亦風土と等しく地域的なる相対的閉鎖性を有つ 
 
cici 民族は完全な普遍でもなく、窮極の個別でもなく、言わばその間に浮動する特殊 
 
cii 不定 
 
ciii 互いに浸透する 
 
civ 歴史的世界の否定継起 
 
cv 互いに互いの統一を破り 
 
cvi すべて種族が…ただ一つの土にのみ根ざすのではない 
 
cvii 血は土に対して動的であり 
 
cviii 地域は地域に結ばれ 
 
cix 亦運動する 
 
cx 互いに運動し、対立し、衝突し 
 
cxi 境界線 
 
cxii 自己の相対的閉鎖性を維持せんとする 
 
cxiii 結合点 
 
cxiv 都市に於て地域は接触し、媒介され、血と血は交り、境界線は却って大なる地域の中心となる 
 
cxv 非郷土的 
 
cxvi 世界的 
 
cxvii 社会の制度 
 
cxviii 自然の生命力を支配し、その方向を決定する 
 
cxix 人間化された自然界をつくる 
 
cxx 文化とは Kulturと云う言葉の示すごとく、人間を産む土地の生命力が、逆に人間によって培養
され、助長されるところから生ずるのである 
 
cxxi 血の土からの内容的なる独立は、土に於ける最も非生命的なるもの、即ち鉱物が血によって逆
に生命を与えられるところに成立するのである 
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cxxii 道具的なるものとは、非生命的なるものの肉体化、生命化であり、しかしそれを通じて非生命
的生命が、第二の自然として、単なる血の有し得ざる別個の生命を帯びて産出され来るのである 
 
cxxiii 植物的文明及び動物的文明の屈服 
 
cxxiv 自然から独立せんがためには、自然の内に自然を克服すべき手段を見出さねばならない 
 
cxxv 絶えず人間は自然を克服すると共に、自然を克服する手段によって逆に克服されることを意味
する 
 
cxxvi 自然は機械化され、人間すらもが機械されるのである 
 
cxxvii 共同的使用 
 
cxxviii 従って一人の人の一定の土地に対する関係は、彼の属する集団との関係によって制約され、
一つの集団の彼の土地に対する関係は、他の集団に対するその集団の関係を背景とする。人間の土
地に対する関係は…人間の人間に対する関係によって間接的に、従って否定的に媒介されていると
いうべきであろう 
 
cxxix 国家は世界個別化の原理である 
 
cxxx 環境的自然は深く国家及び文化に連るのである 
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Chapter 8: Historical Subjectivity 
8a: The Conditions of Subjectivity in the Historical World 
 The historical world is a mediation of both being and 
nothingness or the substantial and the subjective. However, this 
mediation is only possible within historical praxis. This is because it is 
only through action-intuition that the subject can become one with its 
object in its practical determination as the ego breaks out of its narrow 
frame and enters into the world. As both the subject and the object are 
recreated anew via this process of mutual determination, the historical 
world may in turn be interpreted as all of the location, material and 
product of historical subjectivity. The idea of subjectivity was originally 
conceived by Kōsaka in terms of the concrete realisation of the unique 
principles or ideals that determine a specific age or period within 
history. The historical subjects that embody these principles in turn 
occupy the centre-points of historical reality, that is to say the primary 
locations of historical and cultural formation within the world. As a 
result, the historical periphery as the location of primordial nature 
gravitates toward these centres providing the materials and impulses 
for continued historical creation in the present.  
With the outbreak of Pacific War, Kōsaka’s speculations shifted 
away from this ‘static’i analysis of the historical world to the more 
practical concern of actively realising the moral ‘ought’ in historical 
reality.1/ii As a consequence, he reinterpreted subjectivity in terms of 
the dynamic cycle of problems and solutions, which he describes as the 
form of historical reason. Specifically, a problem arises when the 
principles that have determined praxis in a society or culture are 
exposed as outdated due to the constantly shifting circumstances of the 
historical world.2 These are resolved by the historical subject via the 
mediation of the topological knowledge at its disposal, through which it 
                                                   
1 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 13-14. 
2 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 3; 97-101; 186; Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 126; 186. 
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draws upon the subjective potentiality of past cultural models and 
types as practical schemas for historical creation in the present. In 
turn, the historical world is propelled towards a new future defined by 
values that better reflect the historical environment. In either case, 
historical subjectivity and its guiding principles can only be actualised 
within the world through the concrete actions of an embodied historical 
subject.  
 For this to be possible, Kōsaka believed that there had to be a 
‘species-subjectivity within the historical world’ that could serve as the 
foundation upon which historical subjectivity proper materialises.3/iii 
This is because as a nothingness-like universal the historical world is 
inherently self-negating and therefore lacking of a fixed or definite 
centre of historical creation. This is why it can only manifest in the 
form of a dynamic world of worlds, both temporally as distinct 
historical periods and spatially as different cultural regions. As a 
consequence, Kōsaka could not accept Miki’s suggestion that the world 
as a whole may represent historical individuality or historical 
subjectivity itself, despite the formative powers it no doubt exerts upon 
human existence as the location or place of historical praxis. If the 
world were an historical individuality it would become something fixed 
and substantial. This would negate human subjectivity and practical 
freedom in favour of a materialist conception of historical progression 
that was continuous or teleological, as exemplified by the economic 
materialism of Marx.4 It is only as a nothingness-like universal that 
the world as a whole is able to fulfil its role as the universal of 
universals. That is to say, as the overarching place of the dialectical 
movement of history as a discontinuous-continuity of multiple 
                                                   
3 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 3-4. 
4 Miki and Kōsaka, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku: taidan’, 13-14; Uemura, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku ha 
nan dattanoka’, 3-4; Michio Takeyama, et al., ‘Zadankai: Daitōa sensō to Nihon no 
chishikijintachi nitsuite (ni) – Kawai Eijirō/Nishida Kitarō [Symposium: The Greater East 
Asian War and Japanese Intellectuals (2) – Eijirō Kawai and Kitarō Nishida]’, Kokoro  Vol. 19 
No. 4 (1966): 39-40. 
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interacting subjectivities. However, while both the internal and 
external environments of historical nature may be said to form a 
species-unity that is inherently subjective, it is only the ethnic nation 
as the concrete embodiment of the internal-environment that meets the 
requirements of a species-subjectivity in history. This is due to the 
inherent internality of peoples and nations as a result of the communal 
solidarity that is first fostered through natural blood-ties. 
An ethnic group is never wholly determined by external factors 
alone, be it the natural materialism of the blood and soil or the shared 
cultural inheritance of a language and art tradition. Consequently, an 
ethnic nation must be able to determine itself as a coherent unity from 
within. This is the source of subjectivity within the historical world. 
The external factors that contribute to the national identity of an 
ethnic group are therefore merely an expression of its materiality and 
potentiality within the historical world. It is only by evolving into a 
‘self-determining’ entity, that is to say a communal group of shared 
goals with both the material means and subjective will to realise them, 
that a people or nation truly becomes unified as an individual actor in 
history, thereby acquiring political authority.5/iv This reflects the 
significant influence of Kant upon Kōsaka’s speculations. This is 
because Kant’s moral personality is also determined internally through 
the dictates of the rational moral law as opposed to the external factors 
of natural causality and the material desires that result. The moral 
personality is therefore something self-determining or autonomous, 
making it an object of respect and admiration for other rational 
beings.6 This is part of the reason why Kōsaka referred to the state, the 
true subject of history, in the terms of the moral personality: ‘For the 
state, territory is not something that can simply be referred to as 
                                                   
5 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 29-30; Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 248: ‘In the life of 
a people the substantial aim is to be a state and to maintain itself as a state. A people without 
state-formation (a nation as such) has, strictly speaking, no history’. 
6 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason.  
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property. Rather, the land constitutes a part of the personality of the 
state … “an infringement of territory … is [therefore] a crime against 
the personality”’.7/v  
Nevertheless, although peoples and nations represent the 
species-subjectivities of the historical world, they do not yet constitute 
historical subjectivity itself. One reason for this is because they are 
still a species-existence, which is inherently particularistic and 
therefore fundamentally unstable. Consequently, in the same way that 
the species fluctuates between the individual and the universal, the 
ethnic nation oscillates between the poles of the natural substratum 
and historical subjectivity. Kōsaka therefore distinguished between the 
naturally determined tribe, the politically determined state, and the 
ethnic nation located between them. On the one hand, the ethnic 
nation overlaps with the ‘natural substratum’vi of tribes, which endows 
a people with an ‘impulse for solidarity’.vii This relates to the natural 
blood ties of the internal environment. At the same time, however, the 
nation is ‘formative’ like the state, as exemplified by the cultural 
creativity of different ethnic groups.viii In this way, nations also display 
the ‘political and ethical character’ of historical subjectivity.ix Because 
of this ‘species-like-indeterminacy’, the ethnic nation is something fluid, 
mobile and continuous that constantly fluctuates between its natural 
roots and its subjective potential.8/x Consequently, a nation or people 
inevitably seeks ‘self-determination as a state’ in order to overcome the 
irrationalism of its indefinite specific character.9/xi It is only by 
organising itself into a discontinuous individual entity that an ethnic 
nation is first able to secure the internal coherency that is necessary to 
become an effective actor upon the world-historical stage.  
                                                   
7 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 211-212.  
8 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 5-6; 11-12. 
9 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 6; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 278-279. 
217 
 
It should be kept in mind that as a part of the historical world 
peoples and nations are also subject to the negating forces of absolute 
mediation. Kōsaka therefore describes nations as being in a process of 
‘continual formation’.xii As a result, they are not simply conceived as 
the focal points of historical formation,xiii but also as the ‘products’ of 
this very process as well.10/xiv In other words, the nation is at once both 
the subject and object of historical praxis. This is the true significance 
of the formative process of ‘from the created to the creating’ within the 
historical world. In his explanation of Nishida’s conception of action-
intuition, Kōsaka writes: ‘As a process where the subject determines its 
environment and the environment determines the subject, form creates 
form itself’.11/xv Correspondingly: ‘Nations form the world while 
simultaneously being formed by the world in turn. The nation is both 
the subject of world history and its product’.xvi The nation therefore has 
both a past that is linked to the necessity of its underlying natural 
substratum, which as historical nature is the already created, and a 
future that is linked to the freedom of its subjective potential, in other 
words the creating. In turn, these two contradictory dimensions are 
mediated within historical praxis, the formative process that unites the 
created and the creating within practical determination, the moment 
where subject and object become one. Consequently, the nation is 
continuously remade anew along with the historical world upon which 
it works. As a species-existence, peoples and nations therefore manifest 
in various forms along the spectrum of this mediation. Kosaka 
therefore identified three general types of ethnic peoples within the 
historical world: the ‘natural nation’,xvii which was primarily 
determined by the natural factors of the land and blood, the ‘cultural 
nation’,xviii determined by language, culture and religion, and the 
‘political nation’, which is or has the potential to become a state.xix 
                                                   
10 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 5. 
11 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 176. 
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Although all these manifestations of an ethnic nation are subjective, it 
is only through the structure of the state that a people is able to attain 
true self-mastery or self-determination, via which historical 
subjectivity itself first becomes explicit within the world. Consequently, 
it is only the political nation that can actually become a world-
historical people at the centre of historical creation.12 This is why 
Kōsaka insists, alluding to Kant’s description of the interrelationship 
of concepts and intuition, that ‘political philosophy without historical 
philosophy is blind, while historical philosophy without political 
philosophy is powerless’.13/xx 
A species-subjectivity is able to organise itself into a unified 
political entity through the negating forces of mediation at work both 
from within an ethnic group as the objectified spirit of its individual 
members, and from without, as the nation is also part of a world 
comprised of numerous peoples in mutual competition. In turn, these 
represent the respective sources of what Hegel referred to as the 
internal and external sovereignty of the state.14 In relation to the 
internal cultivation of subjectivity, Kōsaka draws heavily upon 
Tanabe’s logic of the species and the mediation of the individual and 
the universal it facilitates. This is a process that relies on the 
development of culture via a people’s engagement with its external 
environment. The external cultivation of subjectivity, in contrast, is 
based on Nishida’s dialectic of discontinuous-continuity or the 
interactions that take place between different peoples and nations as 
competing focal points of subjectivity within the world. In turn, this 
facilitates the development of the unified political consciousness of a 
people.  
                                                   
12 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 5; 31-32. 
13 Kōsaka, ‘Rekishi tetsugaku to seiji tetsugaku’, 93; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 44; A 
similar statement is also made by Kōsaka concerning the relationship between politics and 
culture: ‘Politics without culture is powerless, while culture without politics is blind’ (for the 
Japanese see endnote xx) – Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetesugaku, 93. 
14 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 255; Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 179-80; 208. 
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8b: The Internal Development of Historical Subjectivity 
 In The Philosophy of the Nation, Kōsaka argues that the eternal 
now has to be realised in the world for it to be a meaningful concept of 
history.xxi This is said to take place within the historical time of 
‘intricate problems and solutions’xxii or ‘from the created to the 
creating’.xxiii In other words, ‘time in alignment with things’xxiv or the 
‘time of objective spirit’:xxv 
 
Historical time is something that is always in alignment with 
the things in reality that have been created [through this 
process], while at the same time proceeding to create [something 
new].xxvi  
 
This is why Kōsaka refers to ethnic nations and societies as the 
‘reservoirs of historical time’.xxvii Consequently, the eternal now, which 
is realised within the objective spirit of a community, is in turn 
identified with the ‘authority of the state’.xxviii This is because for 
Kōsaka the historical world is an ethical world of human praxis and it 
is the state that is the most concrete expression of the ethical life of a 
people.15 Nevertheless, the realisation of the eternal now in historical 
reality cannot only be comprehended in the formalistic terms of time 
alone as the practical mediation of the necessity of the past and the 
freedom of the future. This is because such a conception of the eternal 
now ignores the necessity of the species-subjectivity within the 
historical world, which is said to represent the ethical content of the 
eternal now in reality.16  
                                                   
15 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 62-64. 
16 Hegel also describes the nation as an implicit embodiment of ethical substance – Hegel, 
Philosophy of Right, 218. 
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As a result, the eternal now does ‘not simply end as a formal 
mediator’, nor the ethnic nation as the reservoir of historical time.xxix 
Kōsaka explains: 
 
As the source of the ethical substance [of a community], [the 
eternal now] mediates the freedom of the individual and the 
necessity of the species. In this way, as the concrete authority of 
the state, it symbolically forms in reality. In turn, it is because 
the state is a mediation of the necessity of the species (called the 
species-substratum) and the freedom of the individual that it is 
depicted as substance qua subject.17/xxx 
 
This reflects the significant influence of Tanabe’s logic of the species 
upon Kōsaka’s political speculations, something that he also explored 
in his earlier work The Historical World. For example, on political 
sovereignty Kōsaka states that at the base of both the ethnic nation 
and the political state is an ‘earthly spirit’.xxxi In other words, 
something that is both ‘material and spiritual’xxxii or ‘natural and 
intellectual’.xxxiii Furthermore, as the state represents the substantial 
freedom of a society, that is to say the basis of the respective freedom of 
its individual members, ‘then through the insertion of the negative 
mediation of the life of the species [the state] should connect with 
individual freedom’.xxxiv This does not mean that the state is merely an 
extension of the individual, however, only that the state and the 
individual are mediated with one another through the species.18  
 Kōsaka continues that while the state and the individual are 
both ‘moral existences’, they must be clearly distinguished.xxxv For 
instance, whereas the life of the individual may on occasion be 
sacrificed in the name of the state as a righteous cause, the most 
                                                   
17 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 65-66. 
18 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 273-274. 
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important duty for the state is to preserve its own existence above all 
else.19 This relates to the fact that the state is the closest thing in the 
historical world to nature as the unity of both the internal and external 
environments. Indeed, there is rarely an organism that shares the 
‘blind obsession’ of the state and its willingness to sacrifice everything 
in order to survive.xxxvi Here lies the importance of Machiavellism in 
political thought. Nevertheless, Kosaka did not believe that the state 
simply ‘ignores universal ethics in favour of the morality of the 
strong’.xxxvii It also had an ethical basis, no matter how slight in 
actuality. In order to understand why, the state must too be 
distinguished from an ethnic nation lacking political autonomy. In 
particular, Kōsaka pays attention to the notable sensitivity of the state 
to the changes that take place in its environment in comparison to an 
ethnic nation without comparable political sovereignty. This is because 
the state is a ‘vast individual entity that is both systematic and 
hierarchal’.xxxviii An ethnic people or nation lacking substantial political 
organisation, in contrast, is not yet truly subjective within the 
historical world. While the ‘life of the species’ is necessary, it must be 
‘negatively raised to the level of the state, which is something 
subjective, self-determining and individual’.20/xxxix 
 Using Kantian terminology, Kōsaka argues that it is through the 
development of the rational systems and hierarchies of the political 
state that ‘a nation may be said to first discover the apperception of its 
ethnic sensibility, intellect and volition’.xl As the natural substratum of 
human existence, the species is normally regarded as little more than 
‘instinctual’ necessity.xli However, nature within the historical world is 
historical nature. As a result, the species is not simply blind natural 
                                                   
19 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 51; 71; 209-211: ‘But the state is not a contract at all … 
nor is its fundamental essence the unconditional protection and guarantee of life … On the 
contrary, it is that higher entity which even lays claim to this very life … and demands its 
sacrifice’ (71); ‘Sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is the substantial tie between 
the state and all its members and so a universal duty’ (210).   
20 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 274-276; 278. 
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necessity, but something that embodies both the materiality and 
potentiality of historical subjectivity. Consequently, Kōsaka believed 
that a species existence, just like the individual, is inherently 
intellectual and volitional. For example, a language tradition only 
emerges within an ethnic group: 
 
Language is often considered one of the most important 
elements of the state. However, it must be acknowledged that 
language already exists within the ethnic nation. If there is no 
such thing as a species-intellect, how is it possible to explain the 
phenomenon of language? Language is not based on the contract 
of the individual. Rather, we are all born or thrown into a [pre-
existing] language tradition … This clearly relates to a natural 
instinct for imitation. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the fact 
that the Bible has been translated into all national languages, it 
is something that also includes worldly rationalism and 
therefore cannot be understood by natural instinct alone.xlii 
 
This also hints at the importance that ethnic culture plays for the 
development of the political autonomy of a people, due to its 
identification as a necessary element of the state. This is why the ‘state 
as law’ may be described as the ‘self-realisation of the ethnic 
nation’.21/xliii 
 However, culture alone is insufficient to distinguish the state 
from an ethnic people. This is because both may be considered along a 
quantitative scale of cultural development. In this sense, the state is 
merely an extension of society. However, ‘no matter how bad a 
particular state is, it is better that it exists than there being no state at 
all’.xliv Although the concept of a species-intellect in terms of its 
                                                   
21 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 280-281. 
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cultural creativity is useful, cultural content alone leads to ‘worldly’ or 
universal abstraction and therefore the negation of the particularism of 
the species. This undermines the unity of a people. In order for this not 
to happen, the species actively attempts to unify itself in to an 
individuality that is properly self-determining. This requires the 
dialectical moment of its individual members. Kōsaka explains that no 
individual is able to gain direct independence from the species: 
‘individual entities as [part of the] life of the species are born from and 
die within an ethnic nation, nothing else’.xlv In this sense, the ethnic 
nation is the ‘necessary substratum of the individual’.22/xlvi This is 
significant because the species attempts to enforce its authority over 
its individual members via the ‘irrational pressures’ it brings to 
bear.xlvii From the perspective of the species, individuals represent 
nothing more than the singular parts of its own structure that should 
submit and act according to its ‘Will of Life’;xlviii irrationalism that also 
manifests within the state as it too is founded upon the substratum of 
the species.23 
However, individuals are able to stand in opposition to the 
species by becoming a ‘subject of culture’xlix as a ‘rational existence’l – 
individuals gain independence by ‘finding themselves within the world 
against the backdrop of a worldly (universal) culture’.li This threatens 
the specificity of the nation, however, which in turn aims to maintain 
its concrete particularism by ‘sublating culture, the world and the 
individual’ through the mediation of its own specific nature.lii It is 
through this process that the state itself is formed: 
 
Because the individual negates the species by having the world 
[or universal] as his or her content and background [as culture], 
the species conversely negates the individual in turn, through 
                                                   
22 Kōsaka, Rekishiteki-sekai, 283; 289. 
23 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 91-92. 
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which it becomes necessary for the species to sublate its own 
specificity and form an individual state. In this way, the state 
demands specificity and individuality, the ethnic nation and the 
individual, even the world itself. While this strongly relates to 
the universalism of culture, all these factors must be mutually 
mediated. In this way, while the systems inherent within an 
ethnic group are merely typological [particular], the systems of 
the state become something self-determining and individual. The 
state therefore jumps from [universal cultural] types to 
individuality via the mediation of a culture that encourages 
abstract dispersion into the world.24/liii  
 
Kōsaka undertakes a phenomenological analysis of this process in The 
Philosophy of the Nation using the example of religion. 
 In early societies, religion was primarily concerned with the 
prosperity of the tribe over individual salvation. As a consequence, 
individual members of a group could not choose their own faith. Rather, 
the individual was born into a religious tradition like that of an animal 
totem. Nevertheless, even within tribal religions there is ‘a moment of 
individuality that is capable of breaking through the completeness of 
the tribal group’.liv This Kōsaka identifies with the distinction that was 
often made between public (white) magic and private (black) magic. 
Whereas public magic focused on the religious festivals of the tribe as a 
group and therefore on the prosperity of the species as a whole, private 
magic related to individual matters such as ‘love, hate and illnesses’.lv 
For example, private magic is used for cursing another member of the 
same tribe, something that would require a power separate from the 
guardian gods of this tribe as this was an act that threatened the 
species-unity of the group. This highlights the fact that many of the 
                                                   
24 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 289-290; 284. 
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pains and worries of the individual could not be resolved through the 
collectivism of tribal religion alone, thereby planting the seeds for the 
development of religious beliefs that transcend simple tribal solidarity 
and attempt to connect the individual directly with the universal. It is 
no coincidence, therefore, that Christianity emerged as a religion for 
the ‘sick and sinful’.lvi Certainly, religions that threatened the 
solidarity of the tribe in this way were often the target of persecution, 
as in the case of Orphism in ancient Greece. Nonetheless, the Orphic 
mysteries were still able to spread across the country because they met 
the spiritual needs of the individual as an individual rather than a 
mere part of the life of the species.25  
Most importantly, however, many of these persecuted faiths 
would eventually come to be recognised as the national religions of a 
people. Once powerful tribes started to expand and absorb other 
peoples and groups, they began to form ethnic nations that are based 
more on a shared cultural identity (subjective) as opposed to natural 
blood-ties (material). In order for these newly formed nations to become 
truly self-determining, however, the mediation of the universalism of 
culture, such as a religion that transcends insular tribal concerns, was 
essential. Christianity in the Roman Empire and Buddhism in Japan 
were able to become national religions as a result of their ‘worldly’, 
trans-tribal orientation.lvii This is because they reinforced the authority 
of the state as a political entity that unites a diverse group of peoples.26 
Kōsaka believes that the same may also be said for the development of 
law, art and science. Culture is something that is both a part of the 
ethnic nation while also worldly in its orientation, allowing a people to 
simultaneously overcome its insular specificity and unify as a group 
                                                   
25 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 74-78. 
26 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 168 & 284: ‘In the nature of the case, the state 
discharges a duty by affording every assistance and protection to the church … since religion is 
an integrating factor in the state, implementing a sense of unity in the depths of men’s minds, 
the state should even require all its citizens to belong to a church’. 
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capable of effective action in the world. This process in turn requires an 
historical substratum that both persists over time and is pregnant with 
subjective potentiality, reasserting the continued importance of the 
species: 
 
It is only by mediating itself in the form of a cultural nation that 
the natural nation is able to become a political nation. An ethnic 
people must be mediated through culture. This is the key to the 
problem of the ethnic nation. The world is not simply determined 
by the conflicts that arise between different groups. It is 
mediated against the backdrop of culture.27/lviii 
 
The mediation of a rich cultural tradition is essential for awakening a 
people to the world while simultaneously establishing the internal 
authority of the state. Nevertheless, it is only through the encounters 
that a nation has with other peoples in this world that it is truly able 
to realise its full subjective potential. This in turn leads into Kōsaka’s 
discussions on the importance of war within the historical world. 
 
8c: The External Development of Historical Subjectivity 
As the embodiment of the mediation that takes place within 
historical praxis, there is something ‘natural and intelligible’ located at 
the base of states and peoples.lix Consequently, the state is said to 
comprise of both ‘a body and a soul’.28/lx Kant too distinguished between 
the intelligible and phenomenal realms of human existence, which 
were determined by the moral laws of reason and the natural desires of 
the body respectively.29 In a similar fashion, Kōsaka deems that the 
state is just as capable of committing crimes as accomplishing the good: 
                                                   
27 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 78-81. 
28 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 273-274. 
29 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. 
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That which is referred to as primordial nature in opposition to 
the eternal now is the source of the material that opposes spirit. 
To the extent that the state is recognised as having an ethical 
character, this dark principle at its base should too be 
acknowledged.lxi 
 
Internally, this is exemplified by the irrational powers that are brought 
to bear upon a population by an oppressive state, which through the 
mediation of its species-substratum attempts to enforce the will of the 
nation over the freedom of its individual citizens. Externally, however, 
this is demonstrated by the phenomenon of war, which for Kōsaka 
constituted an ‘essential’ part of the state as an historical 
existence.30/lxii Once again, a comparison can be drawn with the 
Kantian conception of ‘radical evil’: 
 
In the same way that sin accompanies human freedom, for the 
sovereignty of the state the possibility of war is something that 
will never be lost, regardless of what the future may hold.31/lxiii  
 
This is because war is a necessary condition for the historical formation 
of the state. Consequently, war is not simply ‘instinctual, violent and 
militant’,lxiv but inherently ‘practical, ethical and intelligible’.lxv As a 
consequence, it serves as the ‘place for the self-awakening [of a people] 
to national subjectivity’.32/lxvi 
 War is often compared to a disease that unexpectedly disrupts 
the healthy state of peace between different nations, or to a natural 
                                                   
30 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 274; 256. 
31 Masakatsu Fujita, ‘Commentary: Page 116’, in Shu no ronri: Tanabe Hajime tetsugaku sen I, 
462; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 256. 
32 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 257. 
228 
 
disaster that suddenly occurs like an earthquake.33 Furthermore, it is 
frequently denounced as something inherently ‘barbaric’,lxvii ‘feral’lxviii 
and ‘inhumane’.lxix For Kōsaka, however, the phenomenon of war is not 
simply an event of nature. If it were, Kant’s call for perpetual peace in 
the name of reason would be utterly meaningless, since it is impossible 
to order something like an earthquake to desist.34 Rather, the act of 
war is unmistakeably human and therefore something unique to the 
historical world: 
 
The very fact that [war] should be consigned to the past surely 
means that it is not something haphazard. In the same way that 
crime is conversely essential for law, or the way that an illness is 
both independent from the [various] parts of an organism while 
also residing in its very essence as the possibility of extrication, 
is it not the case that war has necessary meaning for the 
existence and formation of the state itself?35/lxx  
 
In this sense, conflicts between animals, private feuds and the acts of 
hunting carried out by primitive peoples are not acts of war. It is only 
when a struggle is endowed with the potential for state formation, or 
when the absolute authority of one nation comes up against that of 
another, that the resulting conflict may be referred to as an act of war 
within the historical world.36 In turn, this occurs because of the 
phenomenon of contact and the resulting friction that arises between 
                                                   
33 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 257; Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 168-169. 
34 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 151; 168-169. 
35 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 257-258; Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 70: ‘The injury 
[the penalty] which falls on the criminal …is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his 
freedom, his right … The reason for this is that his action is the action of a rational being and 
this implies it is something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law 
which he has explicitly recognized in his action and under which in consequence he should be 
brought as under his right’. 
36 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 151-152. 
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the different peoples and nations that together populate the historical 
world.  
In order to understand the significance of war for state 
formation, one must first be aware of the influence of Hegel’s dialectic 
of self-consciousness upon the Kyoto School, which Suares argues was 
only partly conceded by the members themselves.37 Of particular 
importance was the famous ‘Master & Slave’ dialogue from Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit. In his examination of the three Chūō Kōron 
symposia, Tsutomu Horio writes that subjectivity requires a complete 
‘self-consciousness of the world’. While this is something that 
transcends the interrelations of particular nations and peoples due to 
its grounding in a worldly rather than national standpoint, a reference 
to the ‘standpoint of world history’ that features prominently during 
the discussions, it allowed for an objective engagement with the ‘inter-
subjectivity’ of the ‘I and Thou’ relationships that exist between 
different nations and peoples and between Japan and the historical 
world.38 As Ranke declared, ‘upon the Earth there is not one nation 
that exists in complete isolation from other peoples and nations’.39/lxxi 
For Kōsaka, it is the ‘inter-subjectivity’ of the ‘I and Thou’ exchange 
expounded in Hegel’s philosophy that captures the metaphysical 
implications of this proclamation.lxxii  
 Of particular importance was the notion of recognition or 
acknowledgement that is received by self-consciousness from its equal: 
‘Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that it 
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged’.40 The 
idea of the interdependence of individuals that results from the 
recognition/understanding they give to and receive from one another is 
a theme that runs throughout the philosophy of the Kyoto School. On 
                                                   
37 Suares, The Kyoto School’s Takeover of Hegel.  
38 Horio, ‘The Chūōkōron Discussions, Their Background and Meaning’, 296. 
39 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 258. 
40 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 111. 
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Nishida’s conception of expressions, Kōsaka explained that the idea of 
a ‘discontinuous-continuity’lxxiii referred to the existence of a ‘Thou that 
is not I’.lxxiv That is to say an individual entirely independent from 
ourselves, but on whom we are nevertheless dependent for the 
recognition and understanding they provide for social expressions.41 
For Kōsaka, however, beyond the interplay of particular individuals in 
a limited social context, Nishida’s conception of a ‘discontinuous-
continuity’ is also applicable to the interaction that takes place 
between different peoples and states. It is here that the fundamental 
significance of war is to be discerned.  
 Expanding upon Ranke’s understanding of peoples and nations, 
Kōsaka explains: 
 
All peoples upon the Earth, as long as they are not left behind by 
world history, are never able to maintain total independence; in 
other words, they are never entirely self-sufficient or self-
complete, meaning they always exist in relationships with 
others.lxxv  
 
He continues that the world could never be composed of just a single 
people and that consequently ‘peoples are not universal but particular, 
thereby maintaining the character of a species-existence’.lxxvi However, 
a particularistic people or nation has yet to attain the subjectivity 
necessary to become an ‘individual entity’ or state.lxxvii This is because 
‘even if different species are discriminatory, they are not as yet truly 
confrontational’.lxxviii The species is in essence ‘unstable, fluctuating 
and fluid’,lxxix ensuring that ‘one penetrates into the other’ preventing 
true opposition.lxxx As a result, the species does not embody the 
discontinuity of truly independent individuals and states. For this, a 
                                                   
41 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 24-26. 
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self-awakening to subjectivity is required: ‘only when faced by another 
people, only once a confrontational relationship between I and Thou 
has developed, will the autonomy of the state first hold any 
meaning’.lxxxi It is for this reason that war is ‘necessary for the 
formation of the state’, at least historically speaking.42/lxxxii 
 Kōsaka believes that it is only once a people develops into a state 
that subjectivity and autonomy first appear within the historical world. 
In this way, war is the ‘movement’ necessary to raise a people to the 
level of statehood, again raising comparisons with Hegel and his 
discussions on the life and death struggle that results from the meeting 
of a consciousness and its other:lxxxiii 
 
At the very least, within war different peoples acknowledge each 
other’s subjectivity, via which one’s own subjectivity is 
established and the state is formed and self-awareness [of 
national subjectivity] attained.lxxxiv  
 
If it is permissible to think in this manner, then Kōsaka believes that 
the ‘world is composed of different peoples as species, and it is through 
war that independence via statehood is acquired’.lxxxv As a result, 
‘rather than saying it is war that is derived from states, it is more 
appropriate to say that states originate from war’.43/lxxxvi In the 
Philosophy of the Nation, Kōsaka goes further: 
 
If human history is said to commence with the emergence of 
states, then because this was possible only through the 
mediation of war, it could equally be said that human history 
had essentially began with war.lxxxvii  
 
                                                   
42 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 258-259; 256.  
43 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 259. 
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Kōsaka plays on Heraclitus’s famous declaration that ‘war is the father 
of creation’lxxxviii by identifying war as the ‘father of history’.44/lxxxix 
Furthermore, this applies not only to one particular state or people, but 
to all states and all peoples in the world. In this respect, through the 
‘self-determination’ that is required for subjectivity,xc in other words 
the realisation of being ‘one among many’ as part of a larger world,xci 
‘the complete isolation of a single people or state is breached and the 
interior of the world at large is brought forth’.xcii In this manner, 
‘fundamentally superstitious peoples or tribes develop the rationality 
that is required of them for statehood’.xciii For Kōsaka, it is a historical 
truth that the world is comprised of a manifold of differing peoples. It 
is therefore only reasonable to assume that the creation of the state at 
least anticipates the potential ‘mediation of war’.45/xciv 
In his essay on Perpetual Peace, Kant asserts that ‘reason, as 
the highest legislative moral power, absolutely condemns war’. That 
being said, there are aspects of this essay that may have influenced 
Kōsaka’s conception of war and national subjectivity considering his 
familiarity with the text. For example, although Kant believed in a 
teleological purpose inherent in nature that would ultimately realise 
an everlasting cessation of conflict, he admits that the natural state of 
humankind was not in fact peace but war: 
 
A state of peace among men living together is not the same as 
the state of nature, which is rather a state of war. For even if it 
does not involve active hostilities, it involves a constant threat of 
their breaking out. 
 
Furthermore, Kant acknowledged the role that war had played 
historically in the formation of the state: 
                                                   
44 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 150. 
45 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 152; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 252; 264; 260. 
233 
 
 
Even if a people were not compelled by internal dissent to 
submit to the coercion of public laws, war would produce the 
same effect from outside. For in accordance with the natural 
arrangement described above, each people would find itself 
confronted by another neighbouring people pressing in upon it, 
thus forcing it to form itself internally into a state in order to 
encounter the other as an armed power. 
 
Kant recognised that the possibility of war remains an essential part of 
human nature. Moreover, he acknowledged that it is war that 
facilitates the initial formation of the state historically, a political 
entity that he nevertheless identifies as indispensable for the 
realisation of world peace.46 Noting Hegel’s belief that war always 
maintains the possibility of peace, Kōsaka argues that the ‘formation of 
the state already contained the self-negation of war’xcv and that 
‘although the purpose of war is the state, the purpose of the state is not 
war’.47/xcvi Because of his faith in the design of nature, Kant believed 
that nature would ultimately facilitate the attainment of peace 
regardless of whether it was desired by humankind or not. This is 
because the providence of nature would come to the aid of the ‘rational 
human will’ by making use of ‘precisely those self-seeking inclinations’ 
of humanity that have historically led to conflict. In turn, the states of 
the world would come to be organised in a manner that ensured the 
respective forces of different peoples are arranged ‘in such a way that 
their self-seeking energies are opposed to one another, each thereby 
neutralising or eliminating the destructive forces of the rest’.48 
Although Kōsaka rejected such teleological interpretations of history, 
                                                   
46 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 104; 98; 112. 
47 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 257; 267; Hegel, Philosophy of the Right, 215. 
48 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 112. 
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he too acknowledged that the state had formed in order to overcome 
the ‘crisis of war’.49/xcvii 
  
                                                   
49 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 266. 
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Chapter 8 Japanese Citations 
 
i 静的 
 
ii 当為的 
 
iii 種的主体性 
 
iv 自己限定的 
 
v 国家にとっては領土は決して単にその財産と云う如きものではない。土地はむしろ国家の人格の
一部を構成する…『…領土の毀損は…人格に対する犯罪であって…』 
 
vi 自然的基体 
 
vii 団結的衝動 
 
viii 国家形成的 
 
ix 政治的倫理的性格を示す 
 
x 種的不確定性 
 
xi 国家としての自己限定性を要求する 
 
xii 民族は現に出来つつあるのである 
 
xiii 世界史の主体 
 
xiv 所産 
 
xv 主体が環境を、そして環境が主体を限定することとして、形が形自身を形成して行くことなので
ある 
 
xvi 民族は世界を形成すると共に、世界から形成される。民族は世界史の主体であると共に、世界
史の所産である 
 
xvii 自然民族 
 
xviii 文化民族 
 
xix 国家民族 
 
xx 歴史哲学なき政治哲学は盲目であり、政治哲学なき歴史哲学は無力である／政治なき文化は無力
であり、文化なき政治は盲目である 
 
xxi 歴史的現実に於ける永遠の今の問題である 
 
xxii 問題とその解決の錯綜 
 
xxiii 作られたものから作るものへの時間 
 
xxiv 物に即した時間 
 
xxv 客観的精神の時間 
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xxvi 歴史的時間は現実には常にこのように作られたものに即しつつ作り行くものである 
 
xxvii 歴史的時間の貯蔵庫 
 
xxviii 国家的権威 
 
xxix 形式的媒介者に終わるのではない 
 
xxx それは人倫的実体の源泉としてこの自由と種の必然を媒介し、かくて具体的に権威として象徴
的・現実的に成立するのである。種の必然―それは種の基体性の謂である、―とこの自由を媒介す
るが故に、国家は基体即主体と言われるのである 
 
xxxi irdisch-geistig 
 
xxxii 物質的・精神的なるもの 
 
xxxiii 自然的・叡知的なるもの 
 
xxxiv その間に種的なる民族的生命の否定的媒介を挿入せしむることによって、個人的自由に通ずる
ものが存すべきであろう 
 
xxxv 道徳的存在 
 
xxxvi 盲目的執着 
 
xxxvii 単に一般の倫理を無視する強者の道徳をとく 
 
xxxviii それは国家が組織を有し、体制を有する巨大なる個体であるのに基く 
 
xxxix 種的生命がなければならない。しかし単なる生命が主体性へ、自己限定性へ、しかして個性へ
と、否定的に高められることによってのみ、国家となるのである 
 
xl 国家に到って民族の有する感性、知性、意志は、言わば始めて統覚を発見したのである 
 
xli 種的本能 
 
xlii 言葉はしばしば国家の最も重要な要素と考えられる。しかし言語はもとより既に民族に於て認
められる。もし種的叡知が許容され難きものであるならば、言語の現象の如きはいかにして説明さ
れ得るであろうか。言語は個人の契約でもなく、むしろ我々はその中に生み出され、投入れられる
のであり…明らかに模倣的なる本能に連りつつ、しかもバイブルがすべての国語に翻訳され得ると
云う実例の示す如く、世界的なる合理性を含む以上、決して本能に尽きざる 
 
xliii 民族の自覚が法としての国家となる 
 
xliv いかなる悪しき国家も、無きよりは有るが勝る 
 
xlv 単なる個人には、直接民族より独立し得る根拠はない。種的生命としての個体は、民族より生
まれ、民族の内に死するのみである 
 
xlvi 個体の必然的基体である 
 
xlvii 非合理的な圧力 
 
xlviii 種の生命意志 
 
xlix 文化の主体 
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l 理性的存在 
 
li 個人が自らを世界に於て見出し、世界性を有する文化を背景とすることによってである 
 
lii 文化、世界、個人を止揚して 
 
liii 個人は世界性を内容とし、背景として有つことによって種を否定するが故に、逆に種は個を否
定することによって自己の種性を個性としての国家にまで止揚すべき必然を課せられ、かくて国家
は種性と個性、民族と個人、しかも世界性を求めて普遍化され行く文化内容に関連しても、相互媒
介として成立し来るが故である。かくて民族的体制は単に類型的であるに反し、国家的体制は自己
限定的であり、個性的であり、しかも類型より個性への飛躍は、世界性へ抽象的に散逸せんとする
文化の否定的媒介に基くのである 
 
liv 未開人の集団の中にも、既にその完結性を破るような個人的契機の萌芽が存する 
 
lvlv 愛欲、憎悪、疾病等 
 
lvi キリスト教が、病めるもの、罪ある者の宗教であった 
 
lvii 世界性 
 
lviii 自然的民族は文化的民族の形態に於て自己を媒介してのみ、国家的民族たり得るのである。民
族は文化によって媒介されなければならない。ここに民族問題の鍵がある。世界には単なる民族の
闘争はない。それは常に文化的背景に媒介されているのである 
 
lix 自然的・叡知的なるもの 
 
lx 肉と霊を有する 
 
lxi 永遠の今に対して原始自然と呼んだものは、かかる精神とそれに対する物質の根源をなすべきは
ずのものであったのである。国家にも倫理的なる性格が認められる限り、国家の底にも闇の原理を
認め得べきである 
 
lxii 本質的 
 
lxiii 罪悪が自由に伴う如く、国家の主権性にとってその可能性は―歴史の将来に於ける現実性は別
として―失われることはないであろう 
 
lxiv 本能的、暴力的、武力的 
 
lxv 実践的、倫理的、叡知的 
 
lxvi 国家の主体性の自覚の場として 
 
lxvii 野蛮的 
 
lxviii 動物的 
 
lxix 非人間的 
 
lxx 犯罪が法に対して却って本質的であるように、しかして病気も有機体の部分の全体よりの独立、
遊離の可能性として、有機体そのものの本質の内に蔵せられているように、戦争も国家そのものの
成立と存立にとって必然的なる意味を有しているのではなかろうか 
 
lxxi 「地上には他の民族と無関係ですまされるような民族は一つもない。」 
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lxxii 我と汝 
 
lxxiii 非連続の連続 
 
lxxiv 我ならぬ汝 
 
lxxv いかなる民族も地上に於ては、世界歴史に取残されざる限り、決して孤立を保ち得るのではな
く、即ち自己完結であるのではなく、必ず他との接触に於てあるのである 
 
lxxvi 民族は普遍ではなくして特殊であり、種的な性格を保有するであろう 
 
lxxvii 個体的 
 
lxxviii 種的なるものは互いに差別的ではあっても、対立的ではあり得ない 
 
lxxix 不定性、動揺性、流動性 
 
lxxx 一は他に浸透して 
 
lxxxi ただ他の民族に対し、汝に対する我の関係を有するに到って、始めて自主的なる国家の意味を
有つ 
 
lxxxii 戦争は…国家の成立にとって必然的であった 
 
lxxxiii 運動 
 
lxxxiv 少なくとも戦争に於て民族は互に互の主体性を認め、自らの主体性を確立し、かくて国家形
態及び国家意識の自覚に到るのである 
 
lxxxv 世界に於て種的なる民族は、戦争によって自らを国家形態にまで独立させるのである 
 
lxxxvi 国家から戦争が始まると云うよりも、戦争から国家が始まるのである 
 
lxxxvii 人間歴史は国家の出現と共に始まると言われるならば、国家の出現は戦争を媒介するが故に、
人間歴史は本来的には戦争と共に始まるとさえ言い得るであろう 
 
lxxxviii 争いは万物の父である 
 
lxxxix 戦争は歴史の父である 
 
xc 自己限定的 
 
xci 決してただ一つのみあるのではない 
 
xcii 一民族、一国家の封鎖完了性を破って、より大なる世界の内面を露出せしめ 
 
xciii 単に呪術的なる民族を合理的なる国家へと進展せしむる 
 
xciv 戦争の媒介・戦争に媒介される 
 
xcv 国家の成立が既に戦争の自己否定の第一の結実である 
 
xcvi 国家のための戦争であって戦争のための国家ではない 
 
xcvii 戦争の危機の克服 
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Part Four – Confucianism and the Philosophy of History 
In this final section I undertake a comparative study of Kōsaka’s 
political thought with the major works of Confucianism and associated 
ideas and traditions. This brings together the two principle themes of 
the dissertation: the Confucian influence upon the political thought of 
the Kyoto School and Kōsaka’s philosophy of history as one of its main 
exponents. Because Kōsaka rarely cites directly from Confucian 
sources, the comparisons I make are speculative in nature. 
Nonetheless, the many similarities suggest that Confucianism does 
indeed represent an important East Asian forerunner for many of the 
ideas Kōsaka articulates in his philosophy of history. After reassessing 
Williams’s thesis of Confucian Revolution, I proceed to highlight the 
congruence between this portrayal of East Asian political behaviour 
and Kōsaka’s conception of historical progression. Then I conduct a 
comparative analysis of Kosaka’s conception of the historical world 
with the Confucian canon. I conclude by indicating the compatibility of 
certain aspects of Kant’s philosophy with Confucianism, at least in 
terms of how they were both adopted by Kōsaka.  
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Chapter 9: Confucian Reading of Kōsaka’s Philosophy of History 
9a: Reassessing the Thesis of Confucian Revolution 
Williams describes Confucian thinkers as ‘truth-seekers’. This is 
because he believes the history of the Confucian world may be 
characterised by the numerous attempts that have been made across 
the ages to accurately comprehend the Way of Heaven in order to 
ensure that social praxis is in alignment with the present 
circumstances of the community. In political terms, the legitimacy of a 
regime is therefore based on its ability to accurately apprehend the 
trends and patterns of social reality in the present so that the 
measures introduced are indeed a true reflection of the requirements of 
the people.1 The Mandate of Heaven, which bestows moral legitimacy 
upon a government and its methods, is never given on a permanent 
basis.2 The legitimacy of a particular regime is only valid for as long as 
it is able to demonstrate its grasp of political reality, after which it will 
be replaced by the Way of its successor. This is confirmed by the mass 
conversion of the citizenry to the virtue (徳/toku) or political 
orientation of the successor regime once it has secured the Mandate, 
thereby consigning the Way of the previous dynasty to the past as a 
new age with new values is established. Williams reinterprets this in 
terms of a dynastic conception of political truth.3  
This depiction of Confucianism is problematic because Confucian 
thinkers have traditionally been more concerned with establishing 
‘how to make one’s way in life’ as opposed to discovering the underlying 
truths of reality, social or otherwise.4 For example, there is no close 
lexical equivalent for the English words true or truth in ancient 
Chinese. As a result, ‘the sense of “true to fact” does not have the 
importance invested in it [for Confucianism] that it does within the 
                                                   
1 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 45. 
2 Hsu, ‘Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations’, 150. 
3 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 45; 50. 
4 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 5; Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility’, 69-71. 
241 
 
Western narrative’.5 That being said, it must be kept in mind that 
Williams developed the thesis of Confucian Revolution as a modern 
reinterpretation of East Asian patterns of political behaviour in 
contradistinction with the ‘Kantian liberal-cosmopolitan orthodoxy’ of 
American global hegemony. Whereas this modern political order is 
characterised by the purported moral universalism of contemporary 
liberalism, a supposed political truth that is ‘held to apply at all times 
and in every culture’, the so-called political truths of Confucian 
cultures, that is to say the social values and ideals expressed through 
and reinforced by the political institutions of an incumbent regime, are 
only thought to be valid for as long as they are deemed practically 
effective.6 It is from this comparative standpoint that Williams 
describes the political history of Confucian East Asia in the terms of a 
‘series of ‘truths’’.7 
Nevertheless, Williams’s depiction of Confucianism is misleading 
since this is not how Confucian thinkers would traditionally portray 
their philosophical project. To paraphrase Parkes, what need is there 
to introduce the concept of ‘truth’ when Confucianism already has the 
concept of the ‘Way’?8 Williams, however, is not primarily concerned 
with providing an accurate presentation of the Confucian canon per se, 
but with establishing a robust interpretative thesis that can make 
sense of the behavioural patterns that result from the Confucian 
values deeply embedded within the social consciousness of the Sinitic 
cultures of East Asia in a modern political context. While his approach 
may be guilty of distorting traditional Confucian philosophy through 
his use of Western political concepts, there are a number of advantages 
to the methodology he adopts. For example, his thesis helps us to 
appreciate what exactly is Confucian about Tōjō’s Japan despite the 
                                                   
5 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 33. 
6 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxvi; 23; 25; 87; Williams, Confucian Revolution, 60. 
7 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 50. 
8 Graham Parkes, Personal Correspondence, 4th Nov. 2015.  
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fact that his regime diverged significantly from the Confucian ideal of 
benevolent government.9 Furthermore, Williams’s thesis also sheds 
light on the implications that these behavioural patterns have for 
mainstream political discourse in the West, which continues to be 
dominated by the purported universal truth of a liberal conception of 
human rights, individual freedoms and democracy. From a 
contemporary Confucian perspective, such political ‘truths’ are not 
equivalent to the universal ideals that are expounded by Kant in his 
essay on perpetual peace, the document that Williams identifies as 
providing the philosophical foundations for the moral universalism of 
modern liberalism.10 Rather, the political beliefs of a people are 
entirely contingent on the social, cultural and historical contexts of the 
community in the present moment. As circumstances change, so does a 
society’s definition of political truth, or, in Confucian terms, its Way.  
Although by no means an orthodox portrayal of the Confucian 
tradition, the insights provided by Williams’s thesis of Confucian 
Revolution alerts us to the full extent of the Confucian influence upon 
Kōsaka’s political speculations. This is because, just like Williams, 
Kōsaka himself used Western concepts and techniques to express 
Confucian-inspired ideas in the language of contemporary political 
                                                   
9 Williams also discusses the thesis of Confucian Revolution in the context of contemporary 
China, Korea and Vietnam. For example, he believes this process of regime change allows us to 
better understand the manner in which Mao was able to secure the Mandate to rule in China. 
Of course, Mao’s strong anti-Confucianism raises important questions about this portrayal. On 
the other hand, drawing on the work of John Fairbank, Ames too suggests that the social and 
political order established under Mao was ‘fully consistent with the [Chinese cultural] tradition, 
from “the Chinese readiness to accept supreme personality” to the phenomenon of a population 
continuing to struggle for proximity to the center’. Ames continues, ‘It is by the virtue of the 
supreme personality’s embodiment of his world, as in the case of Mao Tse-tung, that he is able 
to lay claim to impartiality – his actions are not self-interested but always appropriate (yi), 
accommodating the interests of all. Just as the traditional conception of Heaven, encompassing 
within itself the world order, the “Son of Heaven” with similar compass is devoid of a divisive 
egoism. As long as the center is strong enough to draw the deference and tribute of its 
surrounding spheres of influence, it retains authoritativeness – that is, not only do these 
spheres willingly acknowledge this order, but actively participate in reinforcing it’. Ames goes 
on to compare this to the Confucian ‘pole star’, around which the other stars ‘pay tribute’ – 
Williams, Confucian Revolution, 39-40; Ames, ‘Introduction – Centripetal Harmony and 
Authority’, 64-66; See also Analects 2.1 & 15.5. 
10 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, ‘Footnote 4’, 28. See also Rhydwen, ‘Review Essay: 
A Confucian Understanding of the Kyoto School’s Wartime Philosophy’, 72-73. 
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philosophy. For example, Kōsaka also discussed the contingency of any 
notion of political truth within the historical world as exemplified by 
Hanazawa’s analysis on the practical utility of cultural types and 
models as schemas for historical praxis in the present.11 Certainly, 
Parkes’s warning on the dangers of projecting Western ideas back onto 
the East Asian intellectual tradition must be heeded. Nevertheless, the 
Kyoto School was a group of philosophers that actively attempted to 
unify the intellectual traditions of East and West within their 
speculations, more often than not by expressing East Asian ideas via 
the medium of Western philosophical concepts. It is therefore no 
coincidence that Williams should have developed his thesis as an 
interpretative framework for his ‘reading’ of the three Chūō Kōron 
symposia. This is one of the main reasons for the notable similarities in 
the language that he and Kōsaka adopt.12 Consequently, if Williams’s 
thesis is to be criticised for his use of non-Confucian terminology, it is 
difficult to see how Kōsaka’s own political philosophy would be able to 
withstand similar scrutiny. After all, he too rarely employed Confucian 
notions in a traditional sense. Scholars such as Arisaka, Lange and 
Sakai would argue that it cannot. I believe, however, that despite 
Kōsaka’s explicit use of Western themes and concepts, it was primarily 
a Confucian worldview that shaped his political speculations. 
  
9b: The Philosophy of History and the Confucian Tradition of Regime 
Change 
Kōsaka describes his philosophy of history as a ‘discipline of 
orientation’i or ‘directionality’.ii This may be interpreted as a re-
conceptualisation of the intellectual traditions associated with the 
tradition of Confucian Revolution through the methods and techniques 
of contemporary Western philosophy. The practical utility of these 
                                                   
11 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 156. 
12 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance; Williams, Confucian Revolution, 100. 
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ideas was reflected by the impressive command of historical reality 
that had been demonstrated by the Western colonial powers in the 
modern era.13 Nevertheless, the fundamental purpose of Kōsaka’s 
political project was essentially the same as that of his Confucian 
predecessors; namely, establishing whether or not the current political 
order was compatible with the present political environment. If not, 
there was a moral obligation for change. This is because the moral 
authority of a political regime in the Confucian world is ultimately 
dependent upon its practical effectiveness. It is for this reason that the 
four Chūō Kōron participants insisted that the ethics of a people could 
not be understood separately from the historical circumstances of the 
nation, which they considered to be the most concrete expression of 
humanity as a social existence.14  
The influence of Confucian Revolution is most clearly discernible 
in Kōsaka’s conception of historical progression as a process of 
‘discontinuous-continuity’ based on a dynamic cycle of historical 
problems and solutions: 
 
History is an intricate tangle of problems and their solutions. 
Moreover, this mediates something that is practical, creative and 
rational. This is especially apparent within the phenomenon of a 
historical crisis. Crisis here refers to our confrontation with a 
deep-seated problem that forces us to question whether our 
historical existence should be accepted or rejected in its current 
form. Wars, rebellions and revolutions are all connected with 
this notion of crisis. Here, an inevitable problem arises which 
demands a solution. The establishment of the feudal system, the 
Protestant movement and modern capitalism are all examples of 
the efforts that have been made to find such solutions … 
                                                   
13 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 2; 102; 107-124. 
14 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Second Symposium’, 183-185. 
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Different states do not simply fight haphazardly. Rather, it is 
because of problems and solutions, something that is itself a 
method that will give birth to new problems [in the future]. In 
this way, a problem is resolved, a crisis is overcome … and a new 
age is formed.iii 
 
An historical crisis arises because the previous system of social 
organisation deviates too far from the Way of Heaven or the present 
circumstances within which a community is situated. As Kōsaka 
explains, ‘historical problems are always met within a specific 
historical position … they are the problems of a specific period and 
people’.15/iv This is inevitable because Heaven and Earth, what Kōsaka 
refers to as the historical world, is in a constant state of flux and 
transition. As a result, the solutions of today will eventually become 
the problems of tomorrow. In certain cases, the complete overhaul of 
the political system will therefore be necessary before a satisfactory 
resolution can be reached.  
This is why Kōsaka relates his understanding of historical crisis 
specifically with the social turmoil of rebellions, revolutions, and war: 
 
The state is not simply a natural existence, but a historical 
existence. At times, events that cannot be foreseen will take 
place in the future. In order to still make legal decisions in the 
face of such circumstances, it is demanded that the authority [of 
the state] itself have the potential to serve as the source for new 
laws. Once a situation is reached where this continuous 
development is no longer possible, a revolution finally takes 
place.16/v  
 
                                                   
15 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetugaku jōsetsu, 126-128. 
16 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 286. 
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Wang Yang-Ming said that ‘The sage does not value foreknowledge. 
When blessings and calamities come, even a sage cannot avoid them’ 
(IPL 3:281). This is why it was so important for the Confucian 
gentleman, a person that Watsuji describes as primarily responsible 
for leading the people, to do ‘what is appropriate in the circumstances’ 
(Analects 7.3).17 In the words of Xunzi (8.370): ‘He shifts and moves 
with the times. He bends and straightens with the age’. For Williams, 
Kōsaka has basically reiterated through the medium of modern 
Western philosophy a Confucian-inspired tradition of regime change 
that has dictated political behaviour in East Asia for over a millennium. 
 Kōsaka’s depiction of historical progression as a ‘discontinuous-
continuity’, what Williams refers to as a ‘series of ‘truths’’ and which 
Kōsaka himself discusses in the context of his own practically informed 
conception of historical truth, may in turn be conceived as an attempt 
to unify the respective standpoints of East and West.18 Kōsaka was 
highly critical of the traditional methods of studying history in China, 
which he believed lacked a sufficient development of ideas and themes 
across historical periods as was exemplified by Western approaches – 
‘An era ends, and so does the story. Rulers come and go, and there the 
discussion ends’. As a result, he describes Chinese historians as 
displaying ‘a kind of discontinuity’ in their portrayals. However, this 
also implied a deep respect for the independent significance of the past 
in the Confucian tradition, since events are explained according to the 
unique principles that are thought to define an age. This is comparable 
with the methodology that Kōsaka developed within his own 
philosophy of history.19 For example, he insisted that historical 
concepts could not be given externally to the period that they represent. 
Furthermore, he rejected a simple appropriation of the continuous logic 
                                                   
17 Watsuji, ‘Nihon no shindō’. 
18 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 123-131. 
19 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 126-127. 
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of historical progression typical of Western philosophical conceptions of 
history because of their tendency toward teleology. While some notion 
of continuity was needed in order to comprehend the reasoning behind 
the historical praxis of an age, this was not to be conceived as a ‘simple 
continuous development’.vi Rather, it had to include the discontinuity 
of the ‘jumps’vii displayed by the ‘new solutions qua creation’viii that are 
reached within distinct ‘historical positions at different times’.20/ix In 
other words, the progression of history from one age to another occurs 
because the solutions of an earlier period become problematic once 
circumstances change, thereby forcing a people to make periodic leaps 
toward a new age defined by new ideals.  
Despite his criticisms of Confucianism, Kōsaka thought that the 
tradition’s appreciation for historical circumstances would have to be 
incorporated into his philosophy of history if the independence of the 
past was to be fully respected. For example, he believed that it was 
impossible to pass moral judgment on past events like ethnic migration 
or the Crusades.21 Likewise, Confucius asserted that you ‘don’t discuss 
what is finished and done with; you don’t remonstrate over what 
happens as a matter of course; you don’t level blame against what is 
long gone’ (Analects 3.21). Of course, Kōsaka’s understanding of history 
was no doubt influenced by his study of Western thinkers, most 
notably Ranke and his belief that each period of history was in direct 
contact with God or the absolute. Nonetheless, if the thesis of 
Confucian Revolution is indeed an accurate portrayal of political 
behaviour in East Asia, then it is perhaps the Confucian tradition that 
best explains Kōsaka’s affinity for Ranke’s methods due to the dynastic 
conception of political truth it facilitates. This interpretation is 
reinforced by the fact that an East Asian precedent for Kōsaka’s 
discussions of the possibility of a dialogue with the historical Thou of 
                                                   
20 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 128. 
21 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki Sekai, 161. 
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the past, and therefore understanding history ‘as it actually was’, may 
also be found within the Confucian canon: 
 
And not content with making friends with the best Gentleman in 
the Empire, he goes back in time and communes with the 
ancients. When one reads the poems and writings of the ancients, 
can it be right not to know something about them as men? Hence, 
one tries to understand the age in which they lived. This can be 
described as “looking for friends in history” (Mencius 5B:8). 
 
In this way, it is possible to discern a Confucian-inspired interpretation 
of historical progression at the very heart of Kōsaka’s philosophy. In 
turn, this brings into focus the likelihood of a Confucian influence on 
other aspects of his thought as well. For instance, Confucianism 
arguably shaped his appropriation of the Hegelian concept of ethical 
substance or objective spirit and his subsequent assertion that its very 
‘source’ was susceptible to movement within the historical world. It is 
therefore worthwhile examining the many similarities between his 
ideas and the core beliefs of Confucianism 
 
9c: Confucian Influences on the Fundamental Structure of the 
Historical World 
The Great Ultimate and the Complementary Principles of Yin and 
Yang 
The historical world, as a nothingness-like universal, is only able 
to manifest itself through the mediation of being and nothingness or 
the substantial and the subjective. This is comparable to the 
dialectical-unity that is formed by the Great Ultimate and its 
dependence upon the complementary principles of Yin and Yang as 
described by Tanabe in his analysis of Confucian metaphysics. 
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Specifically, the historical world or the nothingness-like universal may 
be said to represent the Great Ultimate from the perspective of 
historical phenomena, at least in terms of the dialectical structure of 
the world itself. Tanabe states that the Great Ultimate is ‘described in 
general universal terms’x as the ‘ultimate cause of creation’.xi The 
historical world is too depicted by Kōsaka as the ‘universal of 
universals’, which as the self-determination of absolute nothingness in 
turn facilitates the creative processes of historical reality.xii  
That being said, it is not possible to ‘arrive at the changes and 
diversity [of reality] from the principle of an unchanging, immobile 
one’.xiii What is required, therefore, are two opposing universal 
principles, ‘via the unification of which the changes and diversity of 
reality are explainable’.xiv Tanabe continues: 
 
Although it is necessary to consider these two principles as being 
in absolute conflict, it is not possible to substantiate the 
generation of the changes and diversity [of the real world] 
through simple opposition alone. Rather, they must be able to 
unify as well. It is impossible for two principles that are in 
absolute opposition, and therefore without the mediation of a 
common universal, to unify … This only becomes possible when 
both are regarded as the differentiation of a common universal 
… Monism or dualism [in abstraction] cannot account for 
diversity and change. The ultimate principle that explains 
change and diversity [within the world] is therefore the one that 
includes the differentiation of two, and the two that are 
mediated by the one.xv 
 
Although the dialectical-unity of the Great Ultimate lacks the 
confrontational relationships that define the interactions that take 
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place between discontinuous historical individualities like political 
states, the mutual dependence of a ‘trinity comprising of [both] the one 
and the two’ reflects the general structure and interrelationship of the 
historical world, historical substratum and historical subjectivity.22/xvi 
This is because the historical world serves as the common universal via 
which the mediation of the material and the spiritual is possible.23 All 
historical phenomena occur within the world as the ultimate place of 
history, while no one phenomenon is purely substantial or subjective in 
and of itself.  
 Significantly, the Great Ultimate was also conceived in terms of 
emptiness, the void and nothingness.24 This is what allows it to 
manifest in the form of a dialectical unity of movement, change and 
diversity. As a consequence of this, however, what embodies the 
universal in the Confucian tradition can never be fully expressed by 
any one particular thing in reality. This is certainly true of the totality 
of Heaven and Earth itself, as evidenced by the fact that they generate 
a perpetual cycle of change via which the world as a whole is 
continuously remade anew in each passing moment. As Kōsaka 
explains, ‘even in the case of the Confucian Heaven … the base of 
action was considered to be nothingness’.25/xvii This also applies to the 
Confucian Way as well, as we learn from Xunzi: 
 
Thus if one speaks of it in terms of usefulness, then the Way will 
consist completely in seeking what is profitable … If one speaks 
of it in terms of laws, then the Way will consist completely in 
making arrangements. If one speaks of it in terms of power, then 
the Way will consist completely in finding the expedient … If one 
                                                   
22 Compare Daodejing 42: ‘The Dao generates Oneness. Oneness generates Twoness. Twoness 
generates Threeness. Threeness generates the ten thousand things’.  
23 Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nituite’, 291-297. 
24 Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy: Debt and Distance’, 141. 
25 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji Tetsurō, 199. 
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speaks of it in terms of the Heavenly, then they Way will consist 
in following along with things. These various approaches are all 
merely one corner of the Way. As for the Way itself, its 
substance is constant, yet it covers all changes. No corner is 
sufficient to fully exhibit it (Xunzi 21.110).  
 
This idea was also taken up by Wang Yang-Ming who stated that the 
‘Way … cannot be pinned down to any particular’ (IPL 1:66). It is also 
important to note that the concept of the Way ‘has as much to do with 
the subject as object, as much to do with the quality of understanding 
as the conditions of the world understood’.26 Consequently, it is similar 
to Kōsaka’s conception of the historical world as a nothingness-like 
universal, which due to its self-negating nature is unable to manifest 
in a definite form.  
The same may also be said of the phenomena that express the 
eternal now within historical reality. For example, no one cultural 
principle is able to fully embody the absolute in and of itself, regardless 
of the symbolic significance that it may hold for a specific people or 
cultural region. Once it attains some form of completion it has already 
fallen away from the present and become an event of the past. As a 
consequence, the nothingness-like universal is a world of multiple 
expressions, that is to say a world of worlds both temporally and 
spatially. Likewise, the Confucian Way is something that changes in 
accordance with the specific time, circumstances and perspectives of 
the peoples concerned. This is why Kōsaka believed it was the 
discontinuous antinomies of Kant, as opposed to the continuous 
dialectic of Hegel, that were better suited to expressing the practical 
implications of absolute nothingness and the self-negation of being it 
invokes. 
                                                   
26 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 46. 
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 The role of primordial nature as the ‘dark foothold’ of the 
historical world is comparable to that of Yin as the dark material that 
facilitates the movement of the Great Ultimate. The pure form of Yin 
takes the shape of the land or the maternal (母). It therefore represents 
the ‘attributes of the land’.xviii This is in contrast with the ‘vital air’ (陽
気) of the pure form of Yang, which takes the shape of Heaven or the 
paternal (父). Tanabe explains:  
 
In this way, the opposition of … Yin and Yang is nothing other 
than the opposition of qi energies and the material, [that is to 
say] the opposition of the principle of invocation and progression 
and the principle of receptiveness and closedness … Yin is the 
ground of movement and generation [within the world], it is the 
material that is worked upon by the dynamic power [of Yang].xix 
 
However, Yin is not simply the ‘attributeless’ material of ancient Greek 
philosophy.xx Rather, it is a ‘principle that has its own attributes as the 
land, the maternal; the soft and the low’.xxi It is for similar reasons that 
Kōsaka conceives primordial nature as something impulsive within the 
historical world. Nevertheless, both Yin and primordial nature are 
required as the vessel that ‘receives the powers of its opposite that 
works upon it’.xxii In other words, Yin is the necessary material that 
invokes and receives the generative powers of Yang, shaping it in turn. 
In the words of Tanabe: 
 
Movement only becomes movement through its necessary 
opposition with the static. This means that movement always 
forms upon the ground of the static, while the static exists as the 
mediation of movement. To say that the Great Ultimate 
separates into Yin and Yang is to say nothing more than it 
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becomes movement through the mediation of that which is 
static.27/xxiii 
 
The language used by Kōsaka in his description of the historical world 
as a mediation of primordial nature and the eternal now would seem to 
substantiate the validity of this comparison. For example, he 
specifically describes nature in the feminine terms of the ‘mother’,xxiv 
‘wife’xxv and ‘younger sister of history’.xxvi In other words, that which 
gave birth to the historical world, that which serves as the material 
and recipient of historical praxis, and that which is a product of 
historical formation. Furthermore, drawing on the philosophy of 
Schelling, primordial nature is discussed in terms of the darkness via 
which the light of historical subjectivity, that which symbolises the 
absolute ideals of human spirit or the eternal now, shines through: 
‘Darkness and lightness are the living identity of spirit’.28/xxvii 
 While the historical substratum of nature may be said to embody 
the principle of Yin in the historical world as the material and 
receptacle of historical creation, it is historical subjectivity that 
represents the principle of Yang, that which initiates and propels these 
creative processes. Tanabe describes Yang as the ‘motive power that 
generates all the myriad things’.29/xxviii Subjectivity may too be 
described as the vital spark (気/qi) that is necessary for the generation 
of historical phenomena. Without subjectivity there would be no 
historical world, only a natural order determined by the universal laws 
of material nature. Kōsaka argued that primordial nature, that which 
is representative of the prehistorical foundations of the historical world, 
is continually reborn along with the world itself via the processes of 
                                                   
27 Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nitsuite’, 291-297. 
28 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 187; 180-181. 
29 Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nitsuite’, 294. 
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historical creation and formation initiated by the praxis of historical 
subjectivity: 
 
Even if time flows infinitely within the world that preceded 
history, it is nothing other than an instant. Simple nature is 
nothing more than an infinite moment. In this way, the 
historical world is continually generated from primordial nature 
in each passing moment. The base of the historical world is 
directly connected to primordial nature. Moreover, the entire 
process [in which] primordial nature [develops] into the 
historical world is but an instant. This is an event of the eternal 
now.30/xxix  
 
The objective time of nature, as exemplified by the philosophy of Kant, 
takes the form of succession. Although it is able to determine the 
‘causality’ of natural phenomena, there is no historical present in such 
a worldxxx – ‘it is merely the arbitrarily fragmented t that is used in the 
algebraic equations of the natural sciences. In other words, it is time as 
measured by a clock’.xxxi True time, at least from the perspective of 
social existence, is the historical transition of from the created to the 
creating.31 That is to say, it is the living time of the historical subject 
as the focal point of the creative powers of the world (Yang). Through 
the mediation of this subjectivity, nature is in turn transformed into 
historical nature or the material of this creation (Yin). In the same way 
that the Great Ultimate may be described as ‘Yang not yet emitted’, 
the historical world is too something that is fundamentally subjective 
as the ultimate expression of all human accomplishments.32/xxxii  
                                                   
30 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 225-226. 
31 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 113-118. 
32 Tanabe, ‘Jukyō-teki sonzairon nitsuite’, 295. 
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 One of the most important dimensions of the Yin/Yang 
cosmology of Confucianism is the fact that there is nothing in Heaven 
and Earth that is in itself inherently Yin or Yang. Certainly, there are 
aspects of existence that are more likely to exhibit one side or other of 
this dyad. Earth is generally Yin and Heaven is generally Yang. 
Nevertheless, the Yin or Yang characteristics that are expressed by a 
specific thing are entirely dependent upon the types of relationships it 
has with the world at a particular time. This is explained by Ames and 
Rosemont using an example taken from traditional Chinese medicine: 
 
The Chinese materia medica describes the chest as yin … with 
respect to the back, which is yang … But in relation to the 
abdomen, the chest is yang. But these relations, too, can be 
changed, depending on anatomical conditions … That is to say, 
nothing is altogether yin or yang in and of itself, but only in 
relation to one or more other “things,” temporally 
contextualized.33  
 
This is similar to the composition of the historical world in Kōsaka’s 
philosophy, since there is no one historical phenomenon that is purely 
substantial (Yin) or purely subjective (Yang). This includes the 
historical world itself, which as a ‘nothingness-like being’ necessarily 
mediates both of these elements.xxxiii Again, there are certain 
dimensions of the historical world that are more likely to exhibit the 
characteristics of one or the other. Nature, for example, is generally 
conceived in terms of the historical substratum. Nonetheless, nature is 
historical nature and therefore something imbued with subjectivity. 
Equally, the subject of history requires a material body. This is why 
Kōsaka believed that the state, as the unity of the blood and the soil, 
                                                   
33 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 25. 
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was the closest thing within the historical world to nature itself. He 
goes on to describe the state as a ‘historically [determined] natural 
object’xxxiv and as an ‘historical organism’.xxxv This is one of the main 
reasons why the state is able to exert its power over social existence. 
 The relativity of both Yin and Yang or the substantial and 
subjective in Kōsaka’s philosophy is most apparent in his deliberations 
on environmental-nature. Generally speaking, nature as being is 
something that is substantial (Yin) within the historical world, in other 
words the material for and receptacle of historical praxis. However, it 
is also nature that gives birth to these creative powers as the ‘mother’ 
of history.34/xxxvi It is therefore a dynamical nature that necessarily 
divides into the internal and external environments, just like the 
totality of the Great Ultimate or the historical world itself, in order to 
facilitate the very movement that works upon it. As environmental 
nature, the historical substratum may therefore be said to exhibit the 
characteristics of both the substantial (Yin) in terms of the external 
environment of the soil or climate and the subjective (Yang) in terms of 
the internal environment of blood or humanity. These distinctions, 
however, are only relative. Depending on the context, it may in fact be 
the external environment that is the more subjective (Yang), while the 
internal environment is more substantial (Yin). This equally applies to 
the two centres of historical subjectivity, the state and culture, which 
just like environmental nature may be said to form a contradictory-
unity that is comprised of two mutually dependent, though 
autonomous elements. It is for this reason that Kōsaka often gave 
contradictory descriptions of the various phenomena that appear 
within of the historical world. 
 
                                                   
34 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki Sekai, 303; 212; 168; 189. 
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A Confucian Interpretation of the Eternal Now 
 The mediation of the substantial (Yin) and the subjective (Yang) 
occurs within the eternal now as the place of human praxis. As a 
consequence, the subjects of history were thought by Kōsaka to 
represent the ‘focal points of the world’s awareness’, or in the words of 
Wang Yang-Ming, the focal points of the unity of Heaven and Earth.35 
This is deemed possible because human praxis was conceived in the 
form of action-intuition, a process where subject and object are unified 
within a creative act of mutual transformation. Action-intuition is 
therefore comparable with Ames’s description of the Confucian 
perspective of ‘embodying our experience’ or ‘the process of assimilating 
and transforming the world as it is experienced’.36 This is because in 
Confucianism there is no strict dichotomy between the subject and 
object or the internal and external. As a consequence, the heart-mind 
and the body are simply regarded as distinct aspects of the same 
person as seen from different perspectives, just as the individual is 
merely one aspect of the great unity that is Heaven and Earth. This is 
reinforced by the inherent emptiness of the self, which in turn opens 
out into the world through the mediation of the body. Significantly, 
Kōsaka believed that the premises for Nishida’s conception of action-
intuition could be traced back to his deliberations on the unity of the 
subject and object facilitated by pure experience, which Dalissier 
suggests greatly resembles the unity of consciousness and the cosmos 
within the Confucian tradition.37  
 Kōsaka believed that Nishida conceived pure experience as a 
metaphysical ‘route to true existence’,xxxvii which was not to be found 
beyond the phenomena of experience but within direct experience itself. 
                                                   
35 Keiji Nishitani, Nishida Kitarō, trans. Yamamoto Seisaku and James W. Heisig (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991), 36; See IPL 3:274. 
36 Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 21. 
37 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 64; Dalissier, ‘Nishida Kitarō and Chinese 
Philosophy’. 
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This is possible since ‘within pure experience the knower and the 
known, the subject and object are unified’, a standpoint that is broadly 
compatible with the epistemological and ontological traditions of 
Chinese thought.xxxviii However, the unity that is represented by pure 
experience was not simply intellectual, but something that was also 
emotional and volitional. For example, Kōsaka states that it is doubtful 
whether we can properly know something that is alive simply as an 
object of the intellect: ‘when we intellectually analyse a colourful, 
fragrant and beautiful flower, we break it down into a lifeless 
material’.xxxix When we know it as the blooming flower that we intuit in 
a lived experience, however, we do so through the mediation of our 
emotions and the will. In other words, ‘only a living thing can know 
another living thing’.xl The same may also be said in relation to our 
awareness of the great life of the cosmos or Nature itself. Kōsaka 
continues that ‘pure experience is a metaphysical organ that touches 
upon the truth of the cosmos. This truth is simultaneously something 
emotional and volitional. Through numerous transitions and the 
deepening of this idea logically, pure experience eventually developed 
into the concept of action-intuition’.38/xli 
 One of the most important aspects of Nishida’s understanding of 
intuition was the inherent emptiness of the subject. Kōsaka explains 
that ‘unless the subject completely negates itself, it will not be possible 
for the object to appear [within consciousness] as it actually is’.39/xlii 
There are a number of precedents for this understanding of intuition in 
the Confucian tradition. For example, Xunzi argues: 
 
How does the heart know the Way? I say: it is through emptiness 
… Humans are born with awareness. With awareness, they have 
focus. To focus is to be holding something. Yet there is something 
                                                   
38 Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō sensei no shōgai to shisō, 62-64. 
39 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 172. 
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called being “empty”. Not to let what one is already holding 
harm what one is about to receive is called being “empty” (Xunzi 
21.165). 
 
Likewise, Wang Yang-Ming uses the Buddhist analogy of a mirror: 
 
The mind of the sage is like a clear mirror. Since it is all clarity, 
it responds to all stimuli as they come and reflects everything. 
There is no such case as a previous image still remaining in the 
present reflection or a yet-to-be-reflected image already existing 
there … we know that a sage does a thing when the time comes 
(IPL 1:21). 
 
It is for this reason that the sage rulers of the past were able to discern 
the Way of Heaven or the Pattern of Nature via a thorough 
‘investigation of things’ (格物/gewu) within the heart-mind. 
Consequently, Wang Yang-Ming argued that the heart-mind and the 
Principle of Nature were in fact identical: ‘Our nature is the substance 
of the mind and Heaven is the source of our nature’; ‘The original 
substance of the mind is one’s nature, and one’s nature is Principle’ 
(IPL 1:6, 1:82). Kōsaka discusses the same idea in terms of the ego 
‘becoming groundless’ by breaking through its frame and ‘being reborn 
out of something that is not the ego’.40/xliii It is this process that in turn 
allows the historical subject to perceive the current trends and 
patterns of the historical world. As Kōsaka states, ‘problems call out to 
us which we comprehend and aim to solve’.41/xliv  
The true significance of action-intuition, however, lies in the fact 
that it is a two-way process. As a consequence, the object, too, is 
                                                   
40 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 172. 
41 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku jōsetsu, 126; See also Nishida, ‘Appendix: A Translation of 
Nishida’s “General Summary”’, 205-206. 
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negated via its unity with the subject, thereby provoking the self into 
action as it proceeds to work upon this object as the medium of its 
expression. Indeed, intuition itself is already action because human 
sensibility necessitates the mediation of a body that is capable of 
interacting with the world of which it is a part through the movement 
of the eyes and hands. Kōsaka emphasised the fact that intuition is 
therefore something active and not passive, as had been ‘correctly’ 
argued by Nishida since An Inquiry into the Good.42/xlv Likewise, in the 
Confucian tradition to know the Way is to act upon it, as is implied by 
the ancient sage rulers who proceeded to extend their self-cultivation 
outwards to All-Under-Heaven. This leads to Wang Yang-Ming’s 
development of his famous theory on the unity of knowledge and 
action: 
 
Knowledge in its genuine and earnest aspect is action, and 
action in its intelligent and discriminating aspect is knowledge. 
At bottom the task of knowledge and action cannot be separated 
… knowledge is what constitutes action and … unless it is acted 
on it cannot be called knowledge (IPL 2:133).  
 
Arguably, this mind-set is one of the main reasons why Kōsaka was so 
attracted to the practical orientation of Kantian metaphysics.43 For 
Kant, metaphysical ideas were only thought to acquire a positive 
significance as the regulative principles of praxis. Freedom is not 
something that can be known through passive observation or 
theoretical speculation, it is something that has to be actively realised. 
As a consequence, he believed that reason must not only focus on the 
speculative question of what people can know, as had been the case for 
                                                   
42 Kōsaka, Nishida tetsugaku to Tanabe tetsugaku, 173-175. 
43 Stephen Palmquist, ‘How Chinese was Kant?’, The Philosopher, Volume LXXXIV No. 1 
(1996), http://staffweb.hkbu.edu.hk/ppp/srp/arts/HCWK.html/; Wawrytko, ‘Confucius and Kant: 
The Ethics of Respect’, 239. 
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much of the history of Western metaphysics, but must also be directed 
toward the practical question of how people should act.44 Here, Kant’s 
philosophy may be said to overlap with the principle guiding question 
of the East Asian tradition: ‘What is the Way?’. Parkes explains that in 
East Asian philosophies ‘‘knowing’ is as much a practical as a 
theoretical matter’.45 For Kant also, the metaphysical ideas of pure 
reason must too be put into practice if they are to hold objective 
significance for the moral subject.46 
 This interpretation is reinforced by the likelihood of a Confucian 
influence on the concept of shutaisei, the Japanese term used by the 
Kyoto School philosophers to express human praxis within the 
historical world. Kenn Nakata Steffensen believes that the Japanese 
term for subjectivity (主体性/shutaisei) was first used by Miki in his 
book The Philosophy of History.47 Although it is difficult to confirm the 
validity of this claim, at the time Jun Tosaka identified Miki as the 
leading theorist of the second generation of the Kyoto School because of 
this work.48 In turn, The Historical World may be seen as Kōsaka’s 
response to the debate on history and subjectivity that was 
spearheaded by Miki in the early 1930s from the perspective of 
Nishida’s dialectic of discontinuous-continuity.49 Kōsaka disagreed 
with the progressive or continuous interpretation of history that was 
forwarded by Miki based on his engagement with Hegel and Marx. 
Nevertheless, Kōsaka’s conception of practical-subjectivity is generally 
consistent with Miki’s earlier usage of the term. This is significant 
because of the clear distinction that Miki draws between the 
contemplative subjectivity (主観性/shukansei) that was typical of 
                                                   
44 Kōsaka, Kanto, 66-67. 
45 Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility’, 70-71. 
46 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 4. 
47 Steffensen, ‘The political philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi’, 166-167. 
48 Kenn Nakata Steffensen, ‘Translation of Tosaka Jun’s “The Philosophy of the Kyoto School”’, 
Comparative and Continental Philosophy Vol 8 No. 1 (2016): 61-73. 
49 Miki, ‘Rekishi tetsugaku’. 
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Western philosophy and what Steffensen renders as the active 
subjectivity (主体性/shutaisei) of historical praxis.  
Although translated as the same word in English, in Japanese 
these contrasting interpretations are distinguished by the use of 
different Chinese characters. Steffensen explains that the character of 
kan (観) ‘connotes meditation and observation’, reflecting the 
contemplative stance of the Western subject who views the world as a 
disinterested third party. In contrast, the practical or active 
subjectivity of historical praxis uses the character of tai (体) meaning 
‘body’. This was thought to capture a perspective that overcame the 
Western dichotomy of subject and object by focusing on the praxis of 
the embodied historical subject. In The Philosophical Foundations of 
Cooperative Communitarianism (1939), Miki argues that the practical 
standpoint he adopts ‘is connected to and develops the tradition of 
Oriental thought’, which perceived ‘matter and mind as one’ and the 
subject and object as ‘united’. Considering Miki’s concern for 
establishing harmonious relations between the peoples of East Asia, it 
is reasonable to assume that Confucianism was an important influence 
on his political deliberations and therefore his conception of 
subjectivity.50 
 Because the subject and object are unified within action-
intuition, the associated concept of the eternal now may in turn be 
interpreted as representing both the historically determined 
circumstances of the present moment as the place or context of 
historical praxis, and the ideals that develop through the subject’s 
engagement with the world and are embedded within the objectified 
expressions that result.51/xlvi In this sense, the eternal now may be 
                                                   
50 Steffensen, ‘The political philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi’, 166-167; Kiyoshi Miki, ‘The 
Philosophical foundations of Cooperative Communitarianism’, trans. by Steffensen, in ‘The 
political philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi’, 250; 266-267. 
51 Kōsaka, ‘Rekishi tetsugaku to seiji tetsugaku’, 46. 
263 
 
compared to the form of the Confucian Way or the Pattern of Heaven. 
Confucius described his Way as ‘bound together with one continuous 
strand’. This suggests that he believed his teachings were based upon a 
constant principle, despite the apparent discrepancies in the advice he 
gave to different people and the conflicting actions he took at different 
times. Specifically, this was the Way of benevolence (仁), which consists 
in ‘doing one’s utmost and putting oneself in the other’s place’ 
(Analects 4.15). However, the ‘continuous strand’ of the Confucian Way 
also connects all of the past, present and future together. On numerous 
occasions Confucius expressed his admiration for the cultural 
achievements of the past, while suggesting that his own methods were 
in fact nothing new.52  
To follow the Way of benevolence was therefore to realise the 
ideals of the past in the present, as reflected by Mencius’s (3B:9) ‘wish 
to safeguard the way of the former sages’. Although changing 
circumstances necessarily require different responses, this did not alter 
the fact that the underlying principle or ‘strand’ remained the same 
across the ages. On the ancient sage-rulers, Wang Yang-Ming explains 
that ‘while their governments were different, the principle is the same 
with them all’ (IPL 1:11). It is for this reason that Xunzi thought it was 
possible to learn about the ancient sage kings of the Xia and Shang 
dynasties through the later teachings of the Zhou, a notion that is also 
implied by Confucius – ‘If you wish to observe a thousand years’ time, 
then reckon upon today’s events’ (Xunzi 5.120).53 
Kōsaka expresses similar ideas when he suggests that the 
eternal now is embodied within all the principles and ideals that have 
shaped past ages, since history may be interpreted as the continual 
                                                   
52 See Analects 4.14, 7.1, 9.5, 19.22; Compare Daodejing 14: ‘Grasp the Dao of today – in order 
to manage what is present today, in order to know the beginning in antiquity. This is called: 
“thread of the Dao”’ – Daodejing (Laozi): A Complete Translation and Commentary, trans. by 
Hans-Georg Moeller (Chicago & La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 2007). 
53 See Analects 3.1. 
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development and repetition of the eternal now as the overarching place 
of historical praxis. This portrayal is strengthened by further 
comparisons with the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming. This is because 
he specifically reinterprets the Confucian tradition in terms of the 
simultaneity of the past, present and future within benevolent praxis. 
This was thought possible because the Principle of Nature, that which 
guides such praxis, resides in all things at all times:  
 
The Way has neither spatial restriction nor physical form, and it 
cannot be pinned down to any particular … Heaven is the Way. 
If we realize this, where is the Way not to be found? .... If one 
knows how to search for the Way inside the mind … then there 
is no place nor time where the Way is not to be found. It 
pervades the past and present and is without beginning or end 
(IPL 1:66). 
 
To innate knowledge there is neither the past nor the future. It 
only knows the incipient activating force of the present moment, 
and once this succeeds everything else will succeed (IPL 3:281).54 
 
Kōsaka employs similar ideas in his discussion on the possibility of a 
dialogue with the historical Thou of the past and the subjective or 
attributional causality of past cultural models and types. This in turn 
invites comparisons with the Confucian rites as the ‘models’ of 
acceptable conduct (Xunzi 1.160, 2.190), as well as the cultural ideal of 
the Confucian sage that ‘shines across generations and across 
                                                   
54 See also the Doctrine of the Mean: ‘[T]o be born into the present and yet return to the ways 
of past – it is things like these that bring disaster down on oneself’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 
477.  
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geographical boundaries as a light that … serves humankind as a 
source of cultural nourishment and inspiration’ in the present.55  
 The actual definition of a sage for a specific people is wholly 
dependent upon the requirements of the age. Wang Yang-Ming 
compared the heart-mind of the sage to a mirror which accurately 
reflects current circumstances, thereby allowing him to respond 
appropriately to the needs of the present in an effortless manner. In 
this sense, the cultural ‘type’ of the sage is comparable to Kōsaka’s 
analogy of the mould. While leaving an imprint of the past upon the 
clay, it serves as the means for a new process of creation in the present. 
The rites also exemplify the importance of cultural models within 
Confucianism. This is apparent from Parkes’s explanation of ritual 
propriety: 
 
Confucius’s insistence that the ritual be performed properly, in 
the traditional way rather than simply as one likes it, evinces 
and encourages humility in the face of the wisdom of the 
ancestors. He does, however, acknowledge that changing 
circumstances may necessitate changes in procedure: he’s 
prepared to go along with the practice of substituting a simpler 
cap of silk for an elaborate linen cap in order to spare expense.56 
 
This concession by Confucius shows that although he viewed the rites 
as the model of appropriate behaviour and harmonious relations, he 
did not believe ritual propriety should curtail justifiable cultural 
innovations in the present.57 Rather, incremental changes as initiated 
by the Confucian gentleman, or in political terms the holder of the 
Mandate of Heaven, were deemed necessary to ensure that the customs 
                                                   
55 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 62-64. 
56 Parkes, ‘Awe and Humility’, 72. 
57 See Analects 9.3. 
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and conventions of a people continued to be relevant. The significance 
of ritual propriety was therefore to be found in what Kōsaka defined as 
attributional causality. As Eric Hutton notes, the rites ‘are not 
inviolable rules’.58 Rather, they are the cultural signposts that both 
guide proper conduct and channel the creative energies of a people in 
the present. Kōsaka states:  
 
True tradition is not simply the past determining the present, 
but the present simultaneously determining the past … in the 
direction of the future … Traditions that have power are 
traditions that are creative … and continue to develop.59/xlvii 
 
Likewise, the Master said: ‘Reviewing the old as a means of realizing 
the new – such a person can be considered a teacher’ (Analects 2.11). 
 
9d: The Historical Movement of the Ethical Substance of a People  
Humanity as a Social and Historical Existence 
Although Confucian scholars primarily discussed their theories 
on praxis in relation to the Confucian sage or gentleman as the 
paradigms of benevolent conduct, the inherent unity of all things 
ensured that the collective praxis of society as a whole was conceived in 
a similar fashion. For Kōsaka, this was expressed through the notion of 
‘from the created to the creating’. This idea in turn informed his 
perception of humankind as an inherently social or historical existence, 
which he relates with the Hegelian notion of objective spirit. This is 
again a proposition that resonates strongly with Confucian teachings. 
For example, Xunzi (9.330) argued that ‘human life cannot be without 
community’. Watsuji speculates that the first book of the Analects, 
believed to be one of the oldest sections of the work, was compiled by 
                                                   
58 Hutton, ‘Introduction’, xxvii. 
59 Kōsaka, ‘Rekishi tetsugaku to seiji tetsugaku’, 54. 
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early members of the school to instruct new students on the core 
teachings of Confucius and his immediate successors. Significantly, 
this section quickly introduces the importance of sincere and 
trustworthy social relations, and the fact that the true realisation of 
the Way is not restricted to family matters alone but is also concerned 
with the affairs of the state: 
 
For the Confucian school, the realisation of the Way … should be 
based on the sincerity of one’s innermost feelings. Nevertheless, 
even though this is the case, it does not mean that the Way of 
morality should be viewed simply as a subjective problem of 
moral consciousness. The breadth of morality (人倫) is found in 
the governance of the country, in the realisation of the ethical 
(人倫) structures of the state.60/xlviii 
 
This hints at the strong affinity that exists between the teachings of 
Confucianism and Hegel’s deliberations on objective spirit and ethical 
substance, the concrete manifestation of which was interpreted as the 
state. This is especially true in relation to Hegel’s criticism of the 
arbitrariness of subjective morality in abstraction.61 If moral principles 
are to hold objective significance for a people, they need to be 
actualised as concrete ideals within the customs and mores of a society. 
In Confucianism, a similar notion is embodied in the significance that 
is attributed to the rites as the cultural means for realising harmony 
and benevolence within the community.62 This is one reason why 
Kōsaka describes the state as the realisation of the eternal now in 
reality, since it is the most concrete expression of the creative processes 
of the ethnic nation. 
                                                   
60 See Analects 1.4 & 1.5; Watsuji, ‘Kōshi’, 311-315. 
61 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 89-103. 
62 See Analects 1.12 & 12.1 
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 It should be noted that there are also aspects of the Confucian 
tradition that encourage or reinforce the emphasis Kōsaka places on 
the ethnic nation as a shared cultural community. The most important 
is Mencius’s (4A:27) conception of benevolence, the basic tenets of 
which were grounded in ‘serving one’s parents’. Upon hearing that a 
Mohist had argued that there ‘should be no gradations in love’, 
Mencius (3A:5) responded that the Mohist in question could not 
possibly believe ‘that a man loves his brother’s son no more than his 
neighbour’s newborn babe’. Lau explains that for Confucians it is 
simply unnatural to love all people indiscriminately in the same way 
that one loves his or her immediate family: 
 
One should love one’s parents more than other members of the 
family, other members of the family more than members of the 
same village and so on until one reaches humanity at large.63 
 
While the benevolent man was no doubt expected to ‘extend his love 
from those he loves to those he does not’, it is regarded as inevitable 
that this would be gradated based on one’s relative proximity to the 
people concerned (Mencius 7B:1).64 It is therefore only natural to feel 
more love for one’s family members than one’s neighbours, just as it is 
only natural to feel more connection with members of the same cultural 
community than persons from other ethnic groups. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the principle distinctions that were drawn between the 
Chinese peoples and the so-called barbarian tribes were cultural 
differences such as language.65 Any sense of superiority was therefore 
based on the perceived excellence of Chinese cultural achievements – ‘I 
have heard of the Chinese converting barbarians to their ways, but not 
                                                   
63 D.C. Lau, ‘Introduction’, in Mencius, xxxi. 
64 See Analects 12.22. 
65 See Xunzi 1.15; Mencius 3A:4. 
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of their being converted to barbarian ways’ (Mencius 3A:4).66 
Nevertheless, if someone from a different ethnic group demonstrated 
sufficient virtue, in other words tangible political ability, they too were 
eligible to receive the Mandate of Heaven. For instance, Mencius states 
that the legendary sage kings Shun and Wen were both from barbarian 
tribes.67 
The social orientation of Confucianism in turn encouraged a 
deep respect for the past and recognition of the historicity of cultural 
traditions.68 Ames and Rosemont explain that the rites are ‘life forms 
transmitted from generation to generation as repositories of meaning’. 
People are born into a tradition of language and predetermined 
conventions on social behaviour. While incremental revisions take 
place with the passage of time, it is the historical customs of a society 
that facilitate harmonious interactions by determining the communal 
standards of appropriate conduct.69 The rites, therefore, served as the 
‘social grammar that provides each member with a defined place and 
status within the family, community, and polity’.70 Xunzi in particular 
pays special attention to the formative power of cultural traditions in 
the present: 
 
The children of the Han, Yue, Yi and Mo peoples all cry with the 
same sound at birth, but when grown they have different 
customs, because teaching makes them thus (Xunzi 1.15). 
 
Names have no predetermined appropriateness. One forms 
agreement in order to name things. Once the agreement is set 
and has become custom, then they are called appropriate, and 
                                                   
66 See Analects 3.5, 9.14. 
67 See Mencius 4B:1. 
68 See Analects 3.14, 9.5. 
69 See Analects 9.3. 
70 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 51. 
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what differs from the agreed usage is called inappropriate 
(Xunzi 22.120). 
 
Many of the key assumptions of Kōsaka’s political speculations were 
therefore ideas and values that have long been cherished in the 
Confucian world. In turn, Confucianism may be said to have impacted 
his understanding of the close relationship between morality and the 
historically determined structures of the political community. 
Generally, Confucian thinkers do not clearly distinguish 
between notions of individual morality and the social customs, rules 
and laws that determine appropriate behaviour within the wider 
community.71 On the key virtue of benevolence or ren (仁), which they 
translate as ‘authoritative conduct’, Ames and Rosemont explain: 
 
“Authoritative” entails the “authority” that a person comes to 
represent in the community by becoming ren, embodying in 
oneself the values and customs of one’s tradition through the 
observance of ritual propriety (li).72  
 
This may explain why the Kyoto School philosophers were so receptive 
to Hegel’s deliberations on the objective spirit of peoples, nations and 
states.73 Because the customs of a society are historically determined, 
however, they are in turn susceptible to the destructive forces of 
history as the socio-political environment of a community shifts with 
the constant transformations of Heaven and Earth. This is an idea that 
is embedded into the negating forces of the nothingness-like universal 
                                                   
71 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 87. 
72 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 49. 
73 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 107 & 260: ‘In an ethical community, it is easy to say 
what the man must do, what are the duties he has to fulfil in order to be virtuous: he simply 
has to follow the well-known and explicit rules of his own situation. Rectitude is the general 
character which may be demanded of him by law or custom’; ‘Just as nature has its laws, and 
as animals, trees, and the sun fulfil their law, so custom (Sitte) is the law appropriate to free 
mind’. 
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that is the historical world. As Xunzi (5.120) concedes, ‘culture persists 
for a long time and then expires; regulations persist for a long time and 
then cease’. The social implications of these changes are in turn 
explored in Confucian theories on the importance of rectifying names.  
 
The Rectification of Names 
The notion of correct naming was first proposed by Confucius in 
response to a question on what his priority would be if he was given 
the responsibility for administering a state – ‘Without question it 
would be to insure that names are used properly’. When pressed on the 
issue, he explained: 
 
When names are not used properly, language will not be used 
effectively; when language is not used effectively, matters will 
not be taken care of … the observance of ritual propriety … [will] 
not flourish … the application of laws and punishments will not 
be on the mark; when the application of laws and punishments 
is not on the mark, the people will not know what to do with 
themselves. Thus, when the exemplary person puts a name to 
something, it can certainly be spoken, and when spoken it can 
certainly be acted upon. There is nothing careless in the attitude 
of the exemplary person towards what is said (Analects 13.3). 
 
This idea was greatly expanded in the philosophy of Xunzi.74 In 
particular, he believed that the correct use of names based on the 
conventions of the enlightened rulers of the early Zhou dynasty had 
facilitated communication and harmonious relations across the Empire, 
despite differences in regional customs. This is because the later kings 
had established a single standard from which to clearly differentiate 
                                                   
74 See Xunzi 22. 
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and classify the ‘myriad things’ of existence, ensuring that everyone 
was able to know what was meant by a specific designation and how to 
act in turn (Xunzi 22.1). This had strong practical implications for 
Xunzi (22.235) because ‘names and terms are the emissaries of … 
thoughts and intentions’. It is for this reason that it was so important 
for the Confucian gentleman to ‘make good on one’s word’ (Analects 
1.4-1.8, 1.13).75 
This relates to the inherent unity of all things and the fact that 
the heart-mind and ‘the Principle of Nature are undifferentiated’ (IPL 
1:20). Wang Yang-Ming explains: 
 
The substance of mind is nature, and nature is identical with 
principle. Consequently, as there is the mind of filial piety 
toward parents, there is the principle of filial piety. If there is no 
mind of filial piety, there will be no principle (IPL 2:133).76 
 
The sage, someone who is in perfect alignment with the Way of Heaven, 
is therefore able to present ideas that not only ‘define the human 
experience, but which … have cosmic implications’ since his or her 
actions are an outward expression of the Will of Heaven itself. As a 
consequence, to ‘name a world properly’, that is to say in accordance 
with the Principle of Nature or the Way of Heaven, is to command ‘a 
proper world into being’.77 In the political context, it is the holder of the 
Mandate of Heaven who realises this in practice at a national level.  
 The Confucian tradition of the rectification of names represents 
an important forerunner for many of the ideas that are expressed in 
Kōsaka’s philosophy of history. This is because the full implications of 
this tradition culminate in the viewpoint of Wang Yang-Ming: 
                                                   
75 See also Daxue and Zhongyong, 429. 
76 See also Daxue and Zhongyong, 411. 
77 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Introduction’, 62-63. 
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All principles are contained … [within the heart-mind] and all 
events proceed from it. There is no principle outside the mind; 
there is no event outside the mind.78 
 
As Confucius himself states, it ‘is the person who is able to broaden the 
Way, not the Way that broadens the person’ (Analects 15.29). Likewise, 
the historical world is only able to manifest itself through the 
mediation of the subjective and the substantial via the praxis of the 
historical subject as the focal point of the world’s self-determination. As 
a result, that ‘which does not incorporate the meaning of knowledge is 
not historical reality’. This is an important example of the inherent 
unity of the ideal and the real within Kōsaka’s philosophy.79 He was 
therefore primarily concerned with the world as it relates to human 
existence. This is most discernible in his portrayal of the natural world 
as historical nature, which is ultimately conceived in relation to the 
territories and peoples that together constitute the ‘historical body’ of 
the state. This would seem to downplay the fact that nature is a force 
beyond human control within his philosophy, a problem that was also 
taken up by Miki during the debate he held with Kōsaka on ethnic 
nationalism in 1942.80 Consequently, Kōsaka’s depiction of nature 
seems to be at odds with the great esteem in which the natural world is 
held within the Confucian tradition. 
That being said, historical nature is basically nature as it relates 
to human society. In this sense, Kosaka’s ideas are not incompatible 
with the portrayal of nature that is presented by Xunzi.81 While 
recognising the natural dispositions of human beings, the various 
                                                   
78 Instructions on Practical Living 1:32. 
79 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 86: ‘The name is thus the thing, as the thing is 
available and carries weight in the realm of representation [or the ‘ideational realm’ – trans. by 
William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), 85]’. 
80 Miki and Kōsaka, ‘Minzoku no tetsugaku: taidan’. 
81 See Xunzi 17. 
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wonders of the natural world, and the calamities and disasters that 
nature can unleash upon humankind, Xunzi believed that the primary 
concern for the Confucian gentleman was not the natural but social 
realm. The goal of the individual, for example, was to refine and make 
the most of his or her natural dispositions within society through 
rigorous self-cultivation. In reference to supernatural interpretations of 
natural phenomena, he states that to ‘marvel’ at the wonders of nature 
is ‘permissible, but to fear them is wrong’ (Xunzi 17.135). Furthermore, 
he emphasises the fact that if the state is badly governed then 
‘although floods and drought have not yet come, you will still go hungry’ 
(Xunzi 17.15): 
 
With respect to Heaven, focus only on those manifest phenomena 
to which you can align yourself. With respect to the Earth, focus 
only on those manifest places which are suitable for growing. 
With respect to the four seasons, focus only on that manifest 
order by which work is arranged (Xunzi 17.75). 
 
Of things that come to pass, it is human ill omens that are to be 
feared. When poor plowing harms the planting, when the cutting 
loses control over the weeds, when the government is unstable 
and loses control over the people, such that … buying rice is 
expensive and the people face famine, and there are corpses 
lying in the roads – these are called human ill omens (Xunzi 
17.150).  
 
Xunzi certainly held the deep respect for nature that is typical of the 
Confucian tradition, as demonstrated by his concern for excessive 
deforestation, unrestricted fishing and excessive farming within the 
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community.82 Nevertheless, he may also be said to have focused on 
what Kōsaka defined as historical nature in the context of the 
historical world. 
 Perhaps the most important aspect of the Confucian tradition of 
correct naming for Kōsaka’s philosophy of history in terms of its 
practical application, however, is ‘the need for regular exercises in the 
rectification of names’. Williams explains: 
 
Because the names we give to pieces of reality may gradually 
come to describe our imaginings about reality rather than what 
is actually there, meticulous effort must be routinely exerted to 
ensure the soundness of any form of truth that unites words and 
things.83 
 
The conventions on names employed by an incumbent regime may no 
longer accurately reflect the political and social environment as a 
consequence of the changing nature of Heaven and Earth. In such 
cases, the virtue (徳/toku) or political orientation of the current 
leadership is called into question because names are an outward 
expression of intentions. Any discrepancies, therefore, point toward a 
fundamental misunderstanding of current circumstances, if not 
outright dishonesty on the part of the ruling elite. As this signified a 
decline in the moral vigour that is embodied in a regime’s political 
effectiveness, it may be necessary to change the name of the dynasty 
itself through Confucian Revolution.84 The virtue of the successor 
regime is in turn consummated by the rectification of names, thereby 
realigning terms and designations with the new political orientation of 
an age: 
                                                   
82 See Xunzi 9.345. 
83 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxx. 
84 See Mencius 2B:13. 
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If there arose a true king, he would surely follow the old names 
in some cases and create new names in other cases. Thus, one 
must examine the reason for having names, the proper means 
for distinguishing like and unlike, and the essential points in 
having names (Xunzi 22.50). 
 
In turn, political history came to be conceived in terms of the cyclical 
rise and fall of dynasties based on the conference and withdrawal of 
the Mandate of Heaven. Something Kōsaka describes as an example of 
the ‘discontinuity’ of the Confucian approach to history.  
 It is during the interregnum of a Confucian Revolution that the 
source of the ethical substance or objective spirit of a people discussed 
by Hegel may be said to be at its most susceptible to the movements of 
the historical world. This is because the accepted standards of social 
conduct within a community are essentially determined by the virtue 
(徳/toku) of the current holder of the Mandate of Heaven and the 
regime he establishes. This is enforced through the rectification of the 
old designations of the previous dynasty with terms and expressions 
that are thought to better represent the new political orientation of the 
community.85 To amend the designations that are used by a society, 
however, is to fundamentally change the meaning of the objects to 
which they refer and therefore the corresponding understanding of the 
population. In other words, the very nature of social reality is 
transformed, leading to corresponding shifts in social praxis. Here lies 
                                                   
85 See also The Doctrine of the Mean: ‘Nobody but the Son of Heaven determines the rites, or 
establishes standards, or verifies the written script’; ‘[W]hen the ruler moves, the world takes 
this to be the Way of the world. When he acts, the world takes this to be the world’s laws. 
When he speaks, the age takes this to set the world’s standards’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 477; 
479. 
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the true significance of converting to the virtue of the new recipient of 
the Mandate of Heaven. It is to embrace a new world.86  
However, the virtue (徳/toku) of this regime will too eventually 
expire once it is unable to adapt to changes in the political 
environment. As Kōsaka suggests, the inevitable result will be 
revolution. This is something that in turn signifies the withdrawal of 
the Mandate of Heaven from the incumbent regime. Consequently, the 
various designations, measures and institutions that had been 
introduced all lose their legitimacy. As a result, the very foundations of 
the ethical substance of the nation crumble away. In turn, the people 
must attempt to establish a new ‘Way’ for going forward. Order is only 
restored when one of the contenders for the Mandate of Heaven 
successfully demonstrates the practical utility of his methods, thereby 
reflecting his firm grasp of socio-political reality. That is to say, the 
Way of Heaven. Once again, this is followed by a programme of reform 
that rectifies the names and designations of a society in accordance 
with the virtue of the new regime, thereby securing a new source of 
morality for the ethical substance of the people. This will remain in 
place for the duration that the regime continues to demonstrate its 
practical effectiveness or its ability to facilitate social harmony within 
the community: 
 
Humans do not exist within the stability of the natural world, 
but within the convulsions and transitions of the historical world. 
Humans are historical, social existences … The substance of 
human existence is that referred to as objective spirit. This is a 
period, a nation, a state. This is the so-called ethical substance. 
Furthermore, as long as this substance is historical it moves. 
Humans do not only change themselves, their actual substance 
                                                   
86 From a Confucian perspective, the Meiji Restoration represents one of the most dramatic 
examples of the rectification of names in Japanese history.  
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changes as well. Within an historical crisis, it is not impossible 
for the present position one takes for granted to change to a 
completely different position in the next moment. Moreover, 
[this occurs] from the very root of one’s ethical substance. This is 
the truth of historical reality. Consequently, in order for humans 
to be able to overcome historical reality, it is necessary to always 
be able to discern one’s position or situation.87/xlix  
 
9e: A Confucian Interpretation of Kōsaka’s Appropriation of Kantian 
Philosophy88 
 In addition to the practical orientation of Kantian metaphysics, 
there are two further aspects of Kant’s philosophy that are likely to 
have appealed to Kōsaka as a Confucian-inspired thinker. To begin 
with, there are the perceived limitations of theoretical speculation. For 
Kant, human knowledge was inherently restricted since it was 
dependent upon the sensible intuition of experience. It was therefore 
limited by the capabilities of the physical body as the means of human 
sensibility. Nevertheless, because reason seeks absolute completeness 
in its inquiries, it necessarily invokes intelligible ideas that defy all 
empirical verification. This leads to the antinomies of pure reason, 
‘self-consistent’ metaphysical propositions on the fundamental nature 
of the cosmos that are both supported and refuted with equal validity 
by the logical argumentations of reason. This resulted in dogmatic 
assertions when one side or other of an antinomy was perceived to 
                                                   
87 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 103. 
88 For various comparisons of Kant’s philosophy with Confucianism see Ching, ‘Chinese Ethics 
and Kant’; George F. McClean, ‘Kant and Confucius: Aesthetic Awareness and Harmony’, 
Philosophy and Modernization in China: Chinese Philosophical Studies XIII, ed. Liu Fangtong 
et al. (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1997), 155-166; Karyn 
L. Lai, ‘Confucian Moral Thinking’, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1995): 261; 
Karyn L. Lai, ‘Understanding Confucian Ethics: Reflections on Moral Development’, 
Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2007): 21-27; Palmquist, 
‘How Chinese was Kant?’; Pohoaţă, ‘Confucius and Kant or the Ethics of Duty’; Wawrytko, 
‘Confucius and Kant: The Ethics of Respect’. 
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constitute the underlying truth of reality.89 The potential dangers of 
such convictions are evident from Kant’s strong condemnation of the 
‘one-sided maxims’ that are used to justify physical force.90  
In a similar fashion, Confucianism rejects theoretical 
deliberations that encourage ‘one-sidedness’ or ‘fixation’ in the 
principles that guide social praxis (Xunzi 3.200, 21):  
 
As for the problems of how fullness and emptiness mutually 
replace each other, or the distinctions between the hard and the 
white [soft], the similar and the dissimilar, these are things that 
a keen ear cannot listen to, things that a sharp eye cannot look 
into, things that a skilled arguer cannot speak of. Even if one 
should have the wisdom of a sage, one could not comprehensively 
point out answers for them. To be ignorant of these things does 
no harm to becoming a gentleman. To know them is no 
impediment to becoming a petty person (Xunzi 8.140). 
 
A similar mind-set is at work when Kōsaka adopts Kant’s antinomies, 
which he described as a logic of ‘not this, not that’,l to explain the 
practical implications of nothingness and his related criticisms of the 
absolute assertions of the political ideologies of liberalism and 
Marxism: 
 
I think that the deeply rooted [source] of the world-historical 
crisis of the present (1959) is to be found in searching for the 
absolute within reality. It is to be found in viewing actual 
nations, states, classes or individuals as something absolute … If 
the absolutism of Marxism or liberalism was abolished, how 
much closer would we be to resolving [the world’s] many 
                                                   
89 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 239; 231. 
90 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 105. 
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problems? If the absolute sovereignty of the state was relativized, 
how much closer would we be to the Way of world peace … As far 
as one goes, reality is relative … this claim is itself an 
acknowledgement of the fact that it is only absolute nothingness 
that is absolute.91/li 
 
Although the experience of the war may have strengthened his 
convictions, similar sentiments are expressed by Kōsaka within his 
wartime writings. For example, although he describes the state as a 
symbol of the eternal now from the perspective of its citizens, the state 
is also a part of the historical world and therefore necessarily mediated 
through its interactions with other peoples, nations and states, as well 
as the world itself. This is why state sovereignty is only ever symbolic 
of the absolute and not the absolute itself. The state is therefore always 
conceived by Kōsaka as a particularistic-universal within the historical 
world, in other words something that is subject to the inevitable cycle 
of historical rise and fall.  
The second aspect is found in the possibility of drawing an 
analogy between the form of the Confucian Way, which continually 
adapts to present circumstances, and the Kantian moral law. This is 
because the categorical imperative is strictly speaking only the form of 
a universal law, not a specific moral content. Consequently, Kōsaka’s 
appropriation of Kant’s moral philosophy via Hegel’s deliberations on 
‘ethical life’ was perhaps closer to the spirit of the Confucian notion of 
appropriateness (義/yi) than the strict ethical rules of The Metaphysics 
of Morals.92 This is supported by his rejection of Kant’s transcendental 
ethics as being fundamentally ahistorical.93 Hegel argued that the 
empty form of the categorical imperative was ‘indifferent to content’, 
                                                   
91 Kōsaka, Tetsugaku ha nan no tameni, 137; 163. 
92 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 66-67; Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 
Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
93 Kōsaka, et al, ‘The Second Symposium’, 184. 
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therefore any ‘one content [was] just as acceptable to it as its 
opposite’.94 This has led to accusations that the moral law simply 
vindicates the dominant moral paradigm of a period.95 However, in a 
manner consistent with the ‘serial truths’ that are facilitated by 
Confucian Revolutions, Kōsaka believed that ‘there is an extremely 
important relationship between peoples and states as they move 
through history, on the one hand, and ethics and morality on the 
other’.96 Certainly, the moral ideals of a particular people are the 
product of its specific culture and history. In turn, these ideals are 
susceptible to the changes that take place in the historical world. 
Nevertheless, true morality is mediated through a thorough grasp of 
the current historical circumstances within which a nation is situated 
and the successful utilisation of the cultural tools that are at its 
disposal. 
 In both the philosophies of Confucianism and the Kyoto School 
appropriate behaviour requires deep introspection, which, because the 
self is regarded as empty, opens out into the wider world. True moral 
action is therefore the result of the unity and co-dependency of the 
subject and object. Kant may be said to have focused exclusively on the 
subjective determination of moral praxis, since he believed that he had 
secured the universalism of the moral law through the 
transcendentalism of pure reason. In actuality, however, the dicta of 
the categorical imperative are necessarily determined by the dominant 
moral paradigm of an age or what Hegel referred to as the objective 
spirit of a people. This is because the moral law as a rational form is 
without its own content, something that can only be determined by the 
overarching context or ‘place’ within which a person is situated. On the 
other hand, the subjectivity of the individual emphasised by Kant was 
                                                   
94 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 257. 
95 Moeller, The Moral Fool, 90. 
96 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 50; Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Second Symposium’, 184. 
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essential because we are all focal points of the world’s awareness or the 
unity of Heaven and Earth. Morality is only realised through our 
determination to act in and work upon the world in response to the 
urges and impulses it invokes within us. The significance of both 
Kantianism and Confucianism for Kōsaka is therefore found in the 
form of moral action and the fact that the individual is the necessary 
medium through which the ideals of a people are actualised in reality. 
In this sense, the categorical imperative is comparable to Wang Yang-
Ming’s description of the innate knowledge of the heart-mind as a 
compass or measure that guides rather than dictates moral 
behaviour.97 Interestingly, both Kant and Wang Yang-Ming argued 
that the moral law or the innate knowledge of the heart-mind precede 
the moral distinctions that are made in a society between good and 
evil.98/lii Although this portrayal goes against Kant’s belief in the 
‘eternal truths’ of reason and the possibility of a rational science of 
morality, Kōsaka concurred with Wang Yang-Ming that the ‘details 
and circumstances’ of historical reality ‘cannot be predetermined’ (IPL 
2:139).99  
 
  
                                                   
97 See IPL 2:139; See also the Great Learning: ‘This comes about through the noble man 
following the Way of “measuring and squaring”’ – Daxue and Zhongyong, 165. 
98 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 55; Kōsaka, Kantō, 234; See IPL 1: 101; 3:315.  
99 Moeller, Moral Fool, 79. 
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Chapter 9 Japanese Citations 
 
i 方向づけの学問 
 
ii 方位づける 
 
iii 歴史は常に、問題とその解決の錯綜である。そしてそれを実践的・創造的・理性的なるものが媒
介しているのである。そのことは歴史に於ける危機の現象に於て、特に明瞭であるであろう。危機
とは、そこに於て我々の歴史的存在そのものが、肯定さるべきか否定さるべきかの、深い問題に、
我々が面していることを意味するのである。戦争、内乱、革命、それはすべてかかる危機につなが
るであろう。そこにはのっぴきならぬ問題が現れているのである。そこにそれは解決を要求してい
る。封建制度が樹立されたこと、プロテスタントの運動、近代資本主義の成立、それは皆、かかる
解決の努力…を示すのである。国と国とは徒らに戦うのではない。それは問題解決のための、そし
てそれ自らがまた新たなる問題を産むところの、手段である。かくて問題が解決され、危機が乗り
越えられることによって…新たなる時代が成立する 
 
iv 我々が歴史的問題に出会うのは、必ず特定の歴史的位置に於てである…必ず特定の時代と民族の
問題なのである 
 
v 国家は単に自然的存在ではなく、歴史的存在として、時として予期し得ざる事態を招来し来るが
故に、かかる事態に対してもなお法的なる決定をなし得んがためには、権力そのものが新なる法の
根源たり得べき可能性が要求され、―そこにもはや連続的なる進展が不可能となるに到れば、遂に
革命となる 
 
vi 単に連続的な展開ではなくして 
 
vii 飛躍 
 
viii 新たなる解決即創造 
 
ix 時々の歴史的位置に於ける 
 
x 一般法則的に説明する 
 
xi 発生の窮極原因 
 
xii 普遍の普遍 
 
xiii 唯一なる不変不動の原理から多様と変化とを導き出すことが出来るかと問うならば…それを不
可能とする 
 
xiv その結合重畳に由って現実の多様と変化とを説明するに導く 
 
xv 而して絶対に相対立するものとして思惟せられることを要する窮極の二元は、単に対立するのみ
では多様と変化との発生を根拠附けることは出来ぬ。それが可能なる為めには両者は結合せられる
ことが出来なければならぬ。然るにただ絶対に対立するのみで何等共通の媒介を有することなき二
元は…不可能である。その結合はただ更に両者が共にそれの分化と考えられる如き共通の普遍者…
に由ってのみ可能となる…単なる一元はもとより単なる二元でも、多様と変化とをそれから導くこ
とは出来ないのである。変化と多様とを説明する窮極原理は二をその分化として含む一、一に由っ
て媒介せられる二でなければならぬ 
 
xvi 二と一との合せる三 
 
xvii しかし儒教の天にせよ…行為の底に無を考える 
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xviii 地の素質 
 
xix 然らば…陰陽の対立は気と質との対立、発動進行の原理とそれに対して素地を供する収容静閉
の原理との対立に外なるまい…陰は発生の行われる素地、動力のはたらく質料である 
 
xx 自性を欠く 
 
xxi それ自身、地たり母たり、柔にして卑しきものたる自性を有する原理である 
 
xxii すなおに対立者のはたらきかける力を受入れるものである 
 
xxiii 動は必ず静と対立して始めて動となる。その意味に於ては常に動は静の素地に於て成り、静は
動の媒介として存する。大極が分れて陰陽となるというのは、ただ斯かる静を媒介にして動の成る
ことをいうに外ならない 
 
xxiv 歴史の母 
 
xxv 歴史の妻 
 
xxvi 歴史の妹 
 
xxvii 暗黒と光明との生ける同一 lebendige Identitätが精神なのである 
 
xxviii 陽は万物発生の動力である 
 
xxix けだし歴史的世界以前の世界に於ては、たとえそこに無限なる時の流れがあるとしても、それ
は単なる一瞬に外ならないからである。単なる自然は無限なる一瞬間にすぎないであろう。かくて
歴史的世界は刻々に原始自然より誕生しつつある。歴史的世界の底は直接に原始自然である。しか
も原始自然より歴史的世界への全過程は全き一つの瞬間である。それは永遠の今の出来事である 
 
xxx 自然現象における前後を決定する形式 
 
xxxi 随意に切断され得る自然科学の方式に於けるｔに過ぎない。それは要するに時計によって計量
される時間であり 
 
xxxii 大極は未だ発動せざる陽である 
 
xxxiii 無的有 
 
xxxiv 歴史的なる自然物 
 
xxxv 歴史的生物 
 
xxxvi 母 
 
xxxvii 真実在への通路 
 
xxxviii 純粋経験においては、知るものと知られるもの、主客が合一しているためであろう 
 
xxxix 色も香もある美しい花を、単に知的に分析すれば、それは生命なき物質に分解されて了うであ
ろう 
 
xl 言わば生きたものが生きたものを知るのである 
 
xli 純粋経験が宇宙の真理に触れる形而上的機関たり得たのである。真理は同時に情意的である。そ
れは幾変遷を経、論理的に深化され、やがて後の行為的直観に発展したものに外ならない 
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xlii 主観が自らを全く否定するということがなければ、客観が自らをありのままに現わすというこ
とはあり得ない 
 
xliii 自我の底が破れて、自我が却て自我ならぬものから逆に誕生し来ること 
 
xliv 問題に呼びかけられ、問題を理解し、またその解決に志す 
 
xlv「善の研究」以来正しく把握されているように 
 
xlvi 歴史の中から理念が生まれる 
 
xlvii 真の伝統は、単に過去によって現在を限定することではなく、同時に現在によって過去を限定
することでもある…過去を未来へ媒介することであり…力の伝統は、創造的伝統であり、発展する
伝統である 
 
xlviii 孔子学派における道の実現は…あくまでも衷心の誠意をもってすべきものであるが、しかしだ
からと言って人倫の道を単に主観的な道徳意識の問題と見るのではない。人倫の大いなるものは治
国である、国としての人倫的組織の実現である 
 
xlix 人間は安定した自然的世界の中にあるのではなく、常に動揺し転変する歴史的世界の中にある
のである。人間は歴史的・社会的存在である…人間存在の実体は所謂客観的精神である。それは時
代であり、民族であり、国家である。それが所謂人倫的実体である。しかもこの実体が歴史的であ
る以上動くのである。人間は自ら変わるだけではなく、彼の実体までが変わるのである。歴史的危
機に於ては、自分が今置かれていると思う位置が、次の瞬間には全く違った位置に変わっていない
とは限らない。しかも自分の人倫的実体の根柢からである。これが歴史的現実の真実である。従っ
て人は歴史的現実を乗り越えて行き得るためには、常に新たに自己の位置 Situationが見定められ
なければならい 
 
l あれでもない、これでもない 
 
li 私は現在の世界史的危機の深い根底は、現実のうちに直ちに絶対を求めるところにあると思う。
民族や国家や階級や個人をそのまま絶対視するところにある…もしマルクス主義やリベラリズムが
自己の絶対化を撤去したら、どれだけ問題の解決は近より易くなることか。また国家の絶対主権が
相対主権化されれば、どれほど世界平和への道は近くなることか…現実はどこまで行っても相対的
である。しかし現実がどこまで行っても相対的であるということを主張するのは、却って逆に絶対
無のみを絶対として認めることに外ならないのである 
 
lii カントは善悪の概念から行為の法則を導く代わりに、逆に行為の原則から善と悪の概念を導くの
である…カントの倫理は善悪の倫理ではなく、むしろ法則の倫理である。その限り彼の倫理は却っ
て善悪の彼岸…にあるとすら言える 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this dissertation I have attempted to demonstrate the 
importance of Confucianism for interpreting the wartime Kyoto School, 
as represented by the political thought of Kōsaka, in its appropriate 
cultural and intellectual contexts. I have also presented what I believe 
to be an impartial account of Kōsaka’s philosophy of history and the 
probable Confucian influences thereon. Although he has been largely 
neglected in the post-war era, in the 1930s and 40s Kōsaka was one of 
the most prominent and influential members of the movement. His 
philosophy clearly demonstrates the manner in which the second 
generation thinkers of the Kyoto School adapted the respective ideas 
and techniques of Nishida and Tanabe to social and political problems. 
Moreover, it is a good example of the continuing relevance of 
Confucianism for modern political theory in East Asia. I believe that a 
Confucian reading of Kōsaka’s philosophy of history also establishes a 
suitable interpretative framework from which to reassess the political 
legacy of the Chūō Kōron symposia from an East Asian perspective. 
This is because Kōsaka’s conception of the historical world broadly 
reflects the worldview that was shared in common by the other 
participants. Furthermore, his ideas contributed significantly to the 
group’s theoretical understanding of interstate relations and their 
perception of the Pacific War as a ‘world-historical conflict’.1/i I will 
therefore conclude this study with a brief examination of a few 
examples taken from these three meetings. 
 The Confucian-inspired influence of Kōsaka upon the Chūō 
Kōron discussions is most clearly discernible from his conception of the 
Co-Prosperity Sphere. During the third symposium he states: 
 
                                                   
1 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 267; Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 135-136. 
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[T]he organization of a co-prosperity sphere that seeks to unite 
the states of East Asia with Japan at the centre … requires that 
the whole idea of separate national independence be abandoned. 
The state itself must be entirely rethought afresh from the 
standpoint of a co-prosperity sphere. This suggests a return to 
the traditional Eastern conception of the state.2 
 
Williams explains that Kōsaka proposes a ‘return to the traditional 
Chinese concept of East and North-East Asia as a collection of semi-
independent peoples caught in orbit around a cultural centre which 
gives the entire region coherence and order’.3 This is a reference to the 
Confucian ideal of All-Under-Heaven, which was modelled on the 
cooperative relationships that transpire within the family.4 For Kōsaka, 
if the Co-Prosperity Sphere was to succeed, its member nations could 
not be treated as a mere ‘means’ for Japan’s imperialist ambitions.ii 
Rather, they had to be acknowledged as partners in a relationship of 
mutual ‘mediation’ and empowerment.5/iii As a result, an atomistic 
conception of the state that fostered national interests alone would 
have to be abandoned.6 While Kōsaka’s argument resembles the second 
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, there are a number of 
Confucian precedents for this idea as well: ‘Exemplary persons are not 
mere vessels’ (Analects 2.12); ‘[D]o not impose onto others what you 
yourself do not want’ (Analects 15.24).7 Furthermore, this 
understanding of interstate relations is firmly grounded in the 
relational worldview of Confucianism, as embodied in the ideal of 
benevolence, reciprocity or humaneness (仁/ren): ‘To ignore the 
                                                   
2 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Third Symposium’, 302. 
3 Williams, ‘Footnote 88’, in ‘The Third Symposium’, 302. 
4 Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept’; Hsu, ‘Applying Confucian Ethics to 
International Relations’; Parkes ‘The Definite Internationalism of the Kyoto School’.  
5 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 89-90; 129-131. 
6 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku no jōsetsu, 190-191. 
7 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 74; See also Daxue and Zhongyong, 429-431. 
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subjectivity of others is to ignore one’s own subjectivity’.8/iv In turn, 
Kōsaka conceived Japanese leadership as a ‘symbolic’v or 
‘representative centre’ that would guide the other member states 
through the strength of its moral energy.9/vi 
 Although the term for moral energy derives from Ranke’s 
concept of moralische Energie, which the historian described in terms 
of the unifying trends or principles of a state that ‘imprint a seal’ on 
the national ‘character’ of its citizens, Williams argues that it is the 
Confucian notion of virtue (徳/toku) which in fact provides the core 
intellectual background for the group’s appropriation of the idea. It 
should not be overlooked, therefore, that the expression is typically 
translated into Japanese as dōtoku-teki-seiryoku (道徳的精力) or 
dōtoku-teki-seimeiryoku (道徳的生命力) considering the etymological 
significance of the Chinese characters for the Way (道) and virtue (徳
/de) within Confucian cultures.10 For Kōsaka, the ideals or principles of 
a people or state are only able to manifest as a consequence of the 
mutual determination of this nation and its external environment 
through the historical praxis of the eternal now. Consequently, moral 
energy is conceived in terms of the creative powers of a people that is 
both unified as a self-determining political entity and located at the 
centre of historical formation. The relative strength of the moral 
energy of a particular nation or state is in turn dependent upon its 
ability to direct the collective energies of its citizens toward meaningful 
historical creation in the present. In other words, the moral energy of a 
state reflects its ability to adapt appropriately to current circumstances 
and resolve the historical problems of an age via a suitable application 
of the cultural models and types at its disposal. For Kōsaka, history 
and ethics are inseparable and therefore mutually defined within the 
                                                   
8 Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku no jōsetsu, 189-190. 
9 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 195; Kōsaka, Rekishi tetsugaku no jōsetsu, 192. 
10 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 219-221; Williams, Confucian Revolution, 55; 76. 
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processes of historical creation.11 As a consequence, the moral worth of 
the principles that direct the creative energies of a nation is 
determined by their practical utility upon the world-historical stage. If 
these ideals prove to be effective, however, then the moral energy of a 
people would flow forth in manner comparable to the ‘flood-like qi’ 
described by Mencius (2A:2). 
Moral energy was consequently conceived by Kōsaka in a 
manner comparable to the virtue of the Confucian gentleman, a power 
that is able to ‘sway others’ and ‘win them over’.12 Kōsaka clarifies his 
position during the third symposium: 
 
When history moves, there is a point [in space and time] from 
which it moves. And this point is the absolute centre of historical 
reality. It is from this point that the motion of history sends out 
its waves; it is from here that history is built. If one wants to 
speak, for example, of moralische Energie, this is where moral 
energy realizes itself.13 
 
Although the wartime Kyoto School has been accused of encouraging 
nationalist chauvinism, the notion that the cultural excellence of a 
people has the power to attract others to its Way is an important 
aspect of Confucian political theory.14 What is more, this is premised 
on the ideal of ‘non-assertive’ action (無為/wuwei), ensuring that 
Confucian leadership is in principle non-coercive or ‘authoritative 
rather than authoritarian’ (Analects 15.5).15 As Kōsaka explains, 
                                                   
11 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Second Symposium’, 183-185; 234. 
12 Hutton ‘Footnote 7 – Chapter 10: Enriching the State’, 74. 
13 Kōsaka, et al, ‘The Third Symposium’, 286-287.  
14 Jan Van Bragt, ‘Kyoto Philosophy–Intrinsically Nationalistic?’, in Rude Awakenings, 233-
254; Arisaka, ‘Beyond “East and West”: Nishida’s Universalism and Postcolonial Critique’. 
15 Ames and Rosemont, ‘Notes to the Translation’, in The Analects of Confucius’, 231-232; See 
also Analects 1.12; 2.3; Although the concept of wuwei (無為) or non-assertive action is often 
associated with Daoism, it was in fact first used in the Analects. Nevertheless, the Daoist 
connotations of wuwei are also relevant for interpreting the Kyoto School’s political philosophy 
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‘Culture can secure voluntary consent from other peoples without 
resorting to military oppression’.16/vii 
 With leadership, however, comes responsibility – ‘The Master 
said, “If one talks big with no sense of shame, it will be hard indeed to 
make good on one’s word”’ (Analects, 14.20). In order for Japan to gain 
the support of the various peoples of East Asia, something that was 
essential if the country was to emerge victorious over its Western 
adversaries, it would have to follow through with its promises to 
nurture and develop the national subjectivity of the other peoples of 
the region.17 If not, the Co-Prosperity Sphere would end up as little 
more than an empty ‘slogan’ for a Japanese version of Western 
imperialism.18/viii It is for this reason that Kōsaka and his colleagues 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of Japan’s conduct on the 
continent and the need to convince the Chinese people of the validity of 
its virtue (徳/toku).19 This could only be done through a concrete 
demonstration of the country’s exemplary behaviour in a Confucian 
sense. In other words, the Japanese people had to be seen as working 
sincerely for the benefit of East Asia. More importantly, Japan would 
have to prove to the other nations of the region that it was in fact 
                                                                                                                                           
from an East Asian perspective. For example, I believe Nishida’s depiction of the Imperial 
Household as a ‘“place of nothingness” which transcends all particularities and embraces the 
world in its emptiness’ may be compared to the Daoist analogy of a ‘cart wheel’ (Daodejing 11). 
This is because although historically the emperor ‘did not come to the political fore’, the 
Imperial Family ‘was always present in the background as a kind of axis around which history 
unfolded’. Moeller explains: ‘Since the sage ruler is the only person who does not take on any 
specific function in the state … he remains … the hub of the social wheel … This nonaction on 
his behalf is … the precondition for all duties being fulfilled and all actions being harmoniously 
performed … By doing nothing the sage ruler ensures nothing remains undone’. Confucius too 
stated that the sage ruler Shun merely ‘assumed an air of deference and faced south’ (Analects 
15.5) – Ames and Rosemont, ‘Notes to Translation’, 262; Yōko Arisaka, The Nishida Enigma: 
“The Principle of the New World Order” (1943), Monumenta Nipponica51:1 (1996): 97; 100-105; 
Michiko Yusa, ‘Nishida and Totalitarianism: A Philosopher’s Resistance’, in Rude Awakenings, 
126-127; Daodejing, 115-116; See also Masaaki Kōsaka, ‘Nishida Kitarō hakase to ‘sekai 
shinchitsujō no genre no yurai [Dr Kitarō Nishida and the origins of ‘The Principle of a New 
World Order’’, in Kokoro, Vol. 7 issue 9 (1954): 21-33; Kōsaka, Nishida Kitarō to Watsuji 
Tetsurō, 187-207; Takeyama, et al., ‘Zadankai: Daitōa sensō to Nihon no chishikijintachi 
nitsuite’, 30-38. 
16 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 88. 
17 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 40. 
18 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 98. 
19 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 139-142; Kōsaka, ‘Shisō-sen no keijijō-teki konkyo’, 10-12. 
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capable of realising its goals. This is why Kōsaka recommended 
sending a large number of ‘morally superior people’ to China in order 
demonstrate first-hand the strength of Japan’s convictions and 
capabilities.20 From a Confucian perspective, it is only to be expected 
that a people which is in alignment with the Way of Heaven would 
display a greater degree of virtue or moral energy. The words and 
conduct of such a people would in turn be able to persuade, guide and 
rectify the other nations of All-Under-Heaven through the example it 
sets:  
 
Governing with excellence (de 徳) can be compared to being the 
North Star: The North Star dwells in its place, and the 
multitude of stars pay tribute (Analects 2.1). 
 
This nation would thus represent a ‘beacon of virtue’ around which its 
neighbours would willingly gravitate and for which its foes would 
express admiration.21 
 This is a very different conception of morality than that 
espoused by the modern liberal based on individual rights and the 
related ideal of self-determination. It is little wonder, therefore, that 
the Kyoto School’s proposal for the Co-Prosperity Sphere has been 
condemned for its hierarchical and elitist nature.22 For Confucians, 
however, ‘If the people’s authority is all equal, then they cannot be 
unified’ (Xunzi 9.65).23 Kōsaka too believed that the success of the Co-
                                                   
20 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Second Symposium’, 183. 
21 This is my rendering of 明明徳/ming ming de. Johnston and Wang translate this term as to 
‘manifest luminous virtue’: Daxue & Zhongyong, 135; Legge renders it as to ‘illustrate 
illustrious virtue’: The Great learning by Confucius; Plaks translates it as ‘to cause the light of 
their inner moral force to shine forth’: Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung (The Highest Order of 
Cultivation and On the Practice of the Mean), 5. 
22 Rusneac, ‘The Philosophy of Japanese Wartime Resistance: A Reading, with Commentary, of 
the Complete Texts of the Kyoto School Discussions of 'The Standpoint of World History and 
Japan' by David Williams’. 
23 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 237: ‘The consistent principle of equality rejects all 
distinctions, and thus allows no sort of political condition to subsist’. 
292 
 
Prosperity Sphere necessitated a subjective centre that facilitated 
meaningful cultural creation based on a single unifying ‘principle’ix or 
‘worldview’ around which the other members could converge.24/x At the 
time, the Kyoto School believed this centre to be Japan. However, the 
nation’s virtue or moral energy was based on the practical efficacy of 
its methods, that is to say its ability for meaningful cultural creation in 
the present circumstances. As Williams points out, the premise of 
change and the circular logic that underpins the group’s arguments 
ensured that they fully accepted the possibility that the ‘so-called 
leading nation-state may over time be replaced by one or more of the 
so-called follower states’.25  
A perhaps more damning appraisal of the symposia is the fact 
that the participants’ idealistic portrayal of the ‘world-historical 
mission’ of Japan bears little resemblance to what we now know about 
Japanese brutality in China and the Pacific.26 Nonetheless, Kōsaka 
and his associates were not attempting to depict how the Japanese 
actually behaved but how they should conduct themselves, at least to 
the extent that this was possible under the watchful eye of the state 
censor.27 This is why Hanazawa describes Kōsaka’s wartime 
philosophy in terms of Kant’s moral ‘ought’.28 Because the group’s 
conception of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was hierarchical and premised 
upon Japanese regional leadership, however, liberal commentators 
typically dismiss their ideas as nothing more than a philosophical 
justification for Japanese aggression.29 As a result, the full significance 
                                                   
24 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 120-122; 130. 
25 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance; Williams, ‘Appendix: ‘On the Logic of Co-Prosperity 
Spheres: Towards a Philosophy of Regional Blocs’ (1942): Footnote 5’, in Defending Japan’s 
Pacific War, 218; Tanabe, ‘On the Logic of Co-Prosperity Spheres’, 196-197. 
26 Rusneac, ‘The Philosophy of Japanese Wartime Resistance: A Reading, with Commentary, of 
the Complete Texts of the Kyoto School Discussions of 'The Standpoint of World History and 
Japan' by David Williams’. 
27 Minamoto, ‘Kōsaka Masaaki Sensei no Koto’, 81. 
28 Hanazawa, Kōsaka Masaaki, 13. 
29 See Appendix for an assessment of the liberal presentation of the Kyoto School’s political 
philosophy. 
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of the Confucian-based arguments presented by the four participants is 
rarely appreciated. These arguments were not lost on the Tōjō 
government, however, as illustrated by the fact that ‘further printings 
of the book were banned’.30 After all, the group were adamant that the 
peoples of East Asia must be persuaded to cooperate with Japan, not 
forced into submission. This is a sentiment that was repeated time and 
again by Kōsaka personally in his individual books and papers.31 
Moreover, he and his colleagues were clear about what would happen if 
Japan failed in this respect.  
A central idea discussed by the Chūo Kōron participants was the 
Hegelian notion that the ‘history of the world is the world’s court of 
judgment’, which Kōsaka also discusses in The Historical World.32 This 
issue is brought up by Kōyama during the first symposium: 
 
One often hears of world history described as the court of the 
world. But this court of judgment does not stand outside 
history ... The court of the world is the criticism that a nation 
makes collectively of itself. In effect, we judge ourselves … 
External pressures are just one cause. Rather, national decline 
is the result of the inner decay of moral energy ... The challenge 
lies not without but within … This dynamic should not be 
reduced to external factors. We neglect this truth at our peril.33 
 
Once again, an East Asian precedent for this viewpoint may be found 
in the Confucian tradition: 
 
Only when a man invites insult will others insult him. Only 
when a family invites destruction will others destroy it. Only 
                                                   
30 Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 57. 
31 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku, 130-131; Kōsaka, ‘Shisō-sen no keijijō-teki konkyo’, 10-12. 
32 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 216; Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 266-267. 
33 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The First Symposium’, 168. 
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when a state invites invasion will others invade it (Mencius 
4A:8). 
 
Thus, in his activities to strengthen Qi, the king did not act for 
the sake of cultivating ritual and yi … Instead, he took as his 
constant task rushing envoys abroad continuously to form pacts 
and draw in others … But when the states were roused by Yan 
and Zhao to attack Qi together, it was like shaking a withered 
tree. The king of Qi perished and his state destroyed, punished 
by All-Under-Heaven (Xunzi 11.105).34 
 
Kōsaka too insisted that destruction without meaningful construction 
would lead to the eventual self-negation of an aggressor state. For the 
Chūō Kōron participants, it was inevitable that Japan would sooner or 
later have to face the judgment of the court of world history as a 
consequence of the brutal destruction it had caused across East Asia 
without any meaningful cultural creation.35 This is why the group 
sought to rectify the conduct of the Japanese people, particularly in 
relation to its East Asian brethren. Ultimately, however, the Kyoto 
School’s warnings were not heeded by the Tōjō government. As Kōsaka 
feared, the Co-Prosperity Sphere became little more than an excuse for 
Japanese imperialism, something that was no different from the 
Western colonial powers from which Japan was supposedly liberating 
the region.36 In the words of Xunzi, therefore, the nation had invited 
punishment from All-Under-Heaven. After all, as Mencius teaches, it is 
the people who are the ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of Heaven (Mencius 5A:1). 
The above is no way an exhaustive presentation of the influence 
of either Kōsaka or Confucianism upon the Chūō Koron symposia. That 
                                                   
34 See also Xunzi 9.125. 
35 Kōsaka, Rekishi-teki sekai, 266; Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War, 62. 
36 Kōsaka, Minzoku no tetsugaku. 130-131. 
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being said, I think this short analysis illustrates the importance of both 
for the discussions. It also hints at the great potential for future 
research. For example, although Jan Van Bragt emphasises the 
significance of Mahāyāna Buddhism for understanding the so-called 
‘immanent transcendence’ of the Kyoto School’s conception of 
metaphysics, it is perhaps the Confucian tradition that was more 
influential in a political context.37 Confucianism would also seem to 
explain the participants’ preoccupation with grasping historical reality, 
what they considered the most concrete expression of humanity as a 
social existence. Future studies may also explore the influence of 
Confucianism upon other members of the Kyoto School. Kōyama in 
particular comes to mind considering the importance he places on the 
ethical structure of the family and his concern for cultural types. Of 
course, none of this means that the validity of the wartime Kyoto 
School’s arguments should go unquestioned. Kōsaka too expressed his 
regret after the war in a private conversation with Ryōen Minamoto 
that the true intentions of the symposia were not sufficiently conveyed. 
This is because most of the group’s criticisms of the government and 
the Army were deleted to avoid censorship. He also reflected upon his 
inability to sufficiently embody the ‘severity’xi and ‘determination’ of 
Socrates in his wartime writings.xii Perhaps the strongest criticism 
from a Confucian standpoint, however, is the fact that the group 
ultimately failed in its alliance with the Navy. I believe it is this more 
than anything that explains the main reason why the symposiasts 
never attempted to excuse their wartime actions in the public forum.38 
                                                   
37 Van Bragt, ‘Kyoto Philosophy – Intrinsically Nationalistic?’, 250-252; Kōsaka, Minzoku no 
tetsugaku, 158-159. 
38 Minamoto, ‘Kōsaka Masaaki sensei no koto’, 81. 
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Nevertheless, Collin Rusneac asks where all this leaves our 
liberal values.39 Indeed, one of the biggest frustrations for the liberal 
commentator of the Kyoto School is the apparent ambivalence of its 
members toward democratic institutions and the various checks and 
balances that these in turn impose upon the powers of the state or 
what Tanabe referred to as the irrationalism of the species. As this 
study has shown, this is due in part to the ontological differences that 
shape the respective worldviews of liberalism and Confucianism. The 
Kyoto School thinker ultimately rejects all substantial conceptions of 
the self, as is presupposed in liberal political theory. It is for this 
reason that Nishitani and his colleagues were so critical of liberal 
arguments for human rights.40 Whatever the moral insights of this 
ideal, the Kyoto School philosophers believed it was based upon a 
mistaken conception of the self that had been abstracted from the field 
of relations upon which its identity always depends. Of course the 
subjectivity of others must be respected, but appropriate action is 
entirely dependent upon both circumstances and the types of 
relationships one has with others. In this sense, the principle moral 
value for determining human relations is not the unchanging rights of 
a substantially conceived individual, but a dynamic conception of ren 
(仁) or Confucian benevolence which adapts accordingly to specific 
situations. Perhaps of equal importance, however, is the impact of 
Confucian Revolution upon how East Asian thinkers determine the 
relative utility of particular political systems and ideologies in a 
modern context.  
Williams argues that whereas the Western political thinker has 
tended to dwell on the ‘forms of government’, the East Asian theorist 
                                                   
39 Rusneac, ‘The Philosophy of Japanese Wartime Resistance: A Reading, with Commentary, of 
the Complete Texts of the Kyoto School Discussions of 'The Standpoint of World History and 
Japan' by David Williams’. 
40 Van Bragt, ‘Kyoto Philosophy – Intrinsically Nationalistic?’, 254. 
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has focused on the ‘fruits of government’.41 One of the principle 
concerns of Confucianism is the establishment of harmony within the 
community and therefore securing a sufficiently robust political system 
to facilitate this. As a result, in a contemporary political context a 
Confucian-inspired thinker may accept various forms of government as 
potentially legitimate depending on the prevailing circumstances. This 
contrasts sharply with the modern liberal for whom democracy is 
always the best form of government regardless of the situation, since 
the individual must take precedence over the community. For the 
Confucian, however, this is only true to the extent that a democratic 
system is able to realise social harmony, which he regards as the 
ultimate goal of government. If a democratic system is unable to 
achieve this, then its legitimacy must be called into question. I believe 
this explains Kōsaka’s response to the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
(1951). For example, he undertakes an impartial examination of the 
respective pros and cons of democracy and communism as the 
dominant political ideologies of the time, before committing to 
democracy based on the present situation of Japan. Even then he 
insists that this did not mean he was rejecting communism in the 
manner typical of American rhetoric, nor was he wholeheartedly 
accepting ‘individualism’ as an unchanging political truth.xiii Rather, it 
was a ‘temporary conclusion’, the validity of which was entirely 
dependent upon the ‘continuity of current world circumstances’.xiv 
Kōsaka could therefore envisage a time when Japan might have to 
introduce a different political system in order to realign itself 
appropriately with the political environment.42 Yet this is only to be 
expected. As Kōsaka states during the second symposium, ‘All 
Japanese must recognize that we owe an enormous debt to Chinese 
culture, which has had such a profound impact on our own’. After all, 
                                                   
41 Williams, Confucian Revolution, 20. 
42 Kōsaka, ‘Aru tetsugakusha no hansei’, 6-10. 
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‘China is the Athens of the Orient’.43 Taking this proposition seriously 
ensures that there is still much to learn from the Kyoto School’s 
political philosophy. 
 
  
                                                   
43 Kōsaka, et al., ‘The Second Symposium’, 198. 
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Concluding Remarks Japanese Citations 
 
i 世界史的戦争 
 
ii 手段 
 
iii 媒介 
 
iv 他の主体性を無視することは自己の主体性を無視することである 
 
v 象徴的中心 
 
vi 代表的中心 
 
vii 文化は他民族を必ずしも武力的に圧服せずとも、自ら、自発的に、その同意を得るのである 
 
viii 単に一片の標語に終わるであろう 
 
ix 一つの原理  
 
x 共通の政治的世界観 
 
xi ソクラテスのようなつきつめた厳しさがなかったことは率直に反省せねばならないと思う 
 
xii ソクラテス的覚悟 
 
xiii 個人主義が直ちに真理だと私は思わない 
 
xiv 私が述べた一応の結論は単に一応の結論であり、無論いつまでもという訳ではない。ただ現在
のような世界情勢が続く限りに於てだけなのである 
300 
 
Appendix – Methodology 
Initially, this essay was written to be the opening chapter of the 
dissertation. However, as the focus of my research shifted away from 
the specifics of Kōsaka’s wartime philosophy to the Confucian 
influences on his general conception of social reality this was no longer 
appropriate. Nonetheless, this essay remains relevant insofar as it 
provides further clarification of the empirical methodology that I 
employ and the implications this has for my portrayal of the Kyoto 
School. One of the main reasons I emphasise the importance of 
methodology is my background in the social sciences. In this field, one 
is obliged to clarify one’s ontological and epistemological standpoints 
because the presuppositions inherent within a particular perspective 
inevitably determine how the object of a study is portrayed.1 Of course, 
philosophy is a very different specialism from the social sciences due to 
the ‘universal idiom’ of the ideas discussed. It is for this reason that 
James Heisig adopts a methodology that focuses upon the 
contemporary relevance of philosophical concepts over the cultural and 
historical nuances of the original texts.2 This leads him to depict the 
‘non-western elements’ of the Kyoto School’s thought as an ‘oriental 
spice’ that may be kept safely at ‘arm’s reach’.3 When an equitable 
dialogue between different traditions is possible such an approach may 
be beneficial, as has arguably been the case in Western research on the 
Kyoto School’s philosophy of religion. However, I do not believe this 
methodology is conducive to an impartial analysis of the group’s 
political thought. This is because it overlooks the fact that the Kyoto 
School thinkers philosophised within a political paradigm quite 
distinct from contemporary liberalism.  
                                                   
1 See Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World, 160: ‘Each optical image differs from the 
others reffering to the same object in accordance with the perspectives and conditions of 
apprehension’. 
2 Heisig, ‘Desacralizing Philosophical Translation in Japan’; Heisig, ‘East Asian Philosophy 
and the Case against Perfect Translations’. 
3 Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness, 8-9. 
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 The problem is that liberalism is not simply a political ideology, 
but is also a form of moral communication as defined by Niklas 
Luhmann, who writes: ‘I understand by morality a special form of 
communication which carries with it indications of approval and 
disapproval’. This distinction refers to the ‘whole person insofar as s/he 
is esteemed as a participant in communication’.4 Williams depicts 
liberalism as the modern exponent of Kantian cosmopolitanism. If this 
is an accurate portrayal, it is not inconsequential that Kant viewed 
individual freedom as a matter of moral necessity.5 As a result, his 
liberal successors are dismissive of any political theory that suggests 
the individual is in some way subordinate to the social group. To be 
illiberal is therefore to be unethical. This is why Williams argues that 
when Kant ‘declared that even God would have to obey the dicta of a 
universally valid set of morals, a formidable … ban on thinking was 
erected against the objective understanding of the non-liberal world’.6 
For example, Pierre Lavelle suggests that his analysis of Nishida’s 
thought is based on ‘universal’ political categories.7 However, by 
describing the Japanese philosopher as an ultranationalist he 
automatically expresses his moral disapproval in a liberal context, 
thereby disqualifying Nishida and his pupils as legitimate participants 
in accepted political communication. This feeds into the sweeping 
generalisations about wartime Japan that dismiss all so-called illiberal 
ideologies, whether of the Kyoto School, Tōjō’s Control Faction or 
Japan’s Confucian heritage, as fundamentally immoral and therefore 
irrelevant to modern political discourse.8 This is why I have chosen to 
                                                   
4 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Paradigm Lost: On the Ethical Reflection of Morality: Speech on the 
Occasion of the Award of the Hegel Prize 1988’, Thesis Eleven 29 (1991): 84. 
5 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 26. 
6 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, 24. 
7 Pierre Lavelle, ‘The Political Thought of Nishida Kitarō’, Monumenta Nipponica, 49/2 
(Summer, 1994): 140. 
8 Rusneac, ‘The Philosophy of Japanese Wartime Resistance: A Reading, with Commentary, of 
the Complete Texts of the Kyoto School Discussions of 'The Standpoint of World History and 
Japan' by David Williams’; See also Goto-Jones, 25-46; Bernard Stevens, ‘Overcoming 
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adopt the empirical techniques of disciplines that purposely emphasise 
the heterogeneity of distinct historical, cultural and political traditions 
over the moral homogeneity that is sought by the modern liberal. 
 I begin the Appendix with a detailed examination of the 
underlying premises of historical empiricism and the problems that 
arise from adopting values and principles that are brought a priori to 
the historical record. I then look at the methodological errors that are 
inherent within morally charged interpretations of the past based on 
the respective analyses of Herbert Butterfield and Hans-Georg 
Moeller.9 Moral historians assume without question that the ethical 
values of the present are universal in application, despite the historical 
contingency of their own perspectives. The resulting portrayals of 
history are dependent upon presuppositions that cannot be 
substantiated by the empirical record. I go on to examine how the in-
built assumptions of moral history have overly affected liberal 
presentations of the Kyoto School’s political philosophy through a 
critical review of the English literature. I conduct this exercise in 
reference to the so-called ‘historian’s dispute’ between Ernst Nolte and 
Jürgen Habermas – in response to the criticisms Williams has faced for 
citing Nolte. The rejection of moral history inevitably leads to 
questions about how to approach the legacy of Nazi Germany, 
questions that are beyond the scope of the present dissertation. 
Nevertheless, while I accept that aspects of Nolte’s thesis are 
problematic, in relation to the empirical methodology of historiography 
that he defends I maintain that many of the counter-arguments 
forwarded by Habermas were misplaced because moralism is non-
empirical and therefore fundamentally ahistorical. 
  
                                                                                                                                           
Modernity: A Critical Response to the Kyoto School,’ in Japanese and Continental Philosophy, 
239. 
9 Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History; Moeller, The Moral Fool. 
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Empiricism and Moral History 
1: The Empirical Approach of Historical Research 
Because this examination of Japanese political philosophy from 
the 1930s and 40s is presented as an historical study it must abide by 
the appropriate academic standards. Cognition of history is based on 
the historical materials that have been inherited in the present. 
Although what has survived only ever reveals an incomplete picture of 
the past, this sets the boundaries for what constitutes historical 
knowledge. If an interpretation of the past goes beyond what is 
discernible in the historical record it is speculative and must be treated 
accordingly. Because the academic discipline of history is thereby 
‘grounded in observation, and by extension, experience’, its 
methodological approach to research is empiricism.10 The validity of an 
historical interpretation is therefore dependent upon the ‘dynamic 
relationship between thesis and proof … which unites the researcher in 
the humanities and most sciences’. In other words, historical 
knowledge is created through the interplay of ‘a proposition or theory 
about the nature of an aspect of reality, and the evidence gathered to 
demonstrate that this theory is true’.11 The validity of an historical 
interpretation must therefore be verifiable against the known 
empirical evidence of the period in question. 
Herbert Butterfield explains that the ‘value of history lies in the 
richness of its recovery of the concrete life of the past’. Through the 
historian the past is recreated in the present. It is not, therefore, the 
role of the historian to attempt to make ‘judgements of value’ but 
rather to try and understand what took place. Consequently, when the 
historian describes the past he or she must attempt to ‘recapture the 
richness of the moments, the humanity of the men, the setting of 
                                                   
10 David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End of History (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 
86. 
11 Williams, Japanese Wartime Resistance, xxiii. 
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external circumstances and the implications of events’. The rich 
diversity of the historical record also ensures that, as a discipline, 
history defies generalisations based on an underlying ‘absolute’ or 
‘essence’, something that goes beyond what can be verified empirically 
by historical documentation. Historical research is therefore ‘bound to 
be intensive, taking us … not upwards to vague speculation, but 
downwards to concrete detail’. Consequently, the methodology of the 
historian must allow one to ‘[pile] up the concrete, the particular, the 
personal’.12 Of the two objective approaches to research described by 
Kant, it is the logical principle of the ‘species’ and its recognition of 
individuality and difference, in other words its commitment to 
empirical detail, that must take precedence in historical scholarship. 
This is as opposed to the principle of the ‘genera’, which sacrifices the 
diversity sought by the historian in the name of unity and identity.13 
The epistemological approach of empiricism assumes that there 
is an objective world about which facts are ascertainable independently 
of subjective interpretation.14 Empiricism therefore shares its 
ontological foundations with the standpoint of positivism, which 
despite its adoption of the principle of genera, in principle also develops 
its theses based on empirical observation. Drawing on the exposition of 
Jürgen Habermas, Williams explains that both of these approaches to 
research subscribe to the view that knowledge has to be proven 
‘through the sense-certainty of systematic observation that secures 
inter-subjectivity’.15 The objectivity of research is therefore secured 
through its basis in facts. The assumption of empirical objectivity is 
problematic, however, due to the reflexivity that is unavoidable in 
research. Parkes explains that a historical fact ‘always obtains within a 
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certain horizon of interpretation; and as horizons of interpretation vary 
across cultures and change over time the realm of historical fact is 
altered accordingly’.16 Interpretations of the past are broadly 
determined by the prevailing paradigms of the society and age from 
which they originate.17 Furthermore, these paradigms are subject to 
shifts in perspective in a manner reminiscent of Thomas Kuhn’s 
explication of paradigm revolutions in the field of science, thereby 
leading to new worldviews and horizons of historical understanding.18 
Because the meaning that is attributed to the past is therefore 
transient and not fixed, historical knowledge becomes inseparable from 
one’s participation ‘in a set of social conventions’. The significance of 
objectivity, in turn, comes to mean no more than to ‘play by the rules 
within a given tradition of social practices’.19 Some scholars devoted to 
‘theory’ have drawn the conclusion from this that the socially 
constructed ‘object of knowledge is a fiction’.20 
The dangers that such a proposition entails are pointed out by 
Carl Ratner, who notes that if objectivity simply ‘denotes congruence 
with cultural values, symbols and terms’, than both the Catholic’s 
acceptance of Christian dogma and the Nazi’s persecution of the Jews 
obtain an ‘objective and even scientific’ value. Collapsing the 
distinction between fact and fiction ensures that the differences 
between ‘science, religion and ideology’ also disintegrate.21 Although 
claims based on a mistaken conception of objectivity may indeed lead to 
dogmatism, the tyranny of radical subjectivity no less undermines the 
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standards of scholarship. The limitations of human cognition ensure 
that the underlying premises that guarantee the inter-subjectivity of 
human knowledge defy empirical verification, as exemplified by the 
induction principle of Bertrand Russell.22 Nevertheless, it seems 
unhelpful practically speaking to therefore dismiss the distinction 
between fact and fiction as meaningless. Parkes writes that, for 
example, we know ‘for a fact that Heidegger resigned from the 
Rectorship of Freiburg University in April of 1934’. We are also aware 
of the sorts of evidence that would be required in order to oblige us to 
reassess this fact. Consequently, although the distinction between fact 
and fiction is indeed ‘subject to blurring and modification’, it would 
require ‘compelling circumstances to abandon it’.23 For the empiricist, 
it is imperative to be able to distinguish between ‘science’ as conceived 
in terms of the relationship between a theory and the burden of proof, 
‘and various belief systems such as religion, metaphysics … and 
Marxism’.24 Rightly or wrongly, the socially constructed criteria for 
telling science and ideology apart are dependent upon the ‘practical 
distinction’ that is made between fact and fiction.25 
In his short critique on the detrimental effects that the ideology 
of totalitarianism had on academia, Eugene Webb argues that 
knowledge creation must proceed through ‘interpretations that are 
developed as a genuine effort to understand reality’. Furthermore, it is 
necessary for these interpretations to ‘compete with others and be 
tested against the evidence of experience’. Although it may be possible 
to interpret an historical event in a myriad of ways, the arguments 
forwarded must be grounded on an appropriate use of the available 
empirical sources. This allows for proper revisions to be made to an 
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interpretation ‘in the light of new hypotheses, evidence, and critical 
procedures for testing their adequacy’. Totalitarian governments, in 
contrast, stifled ‘the free pursuit of general inquiry’ in this way due to 
their dependence upon the complicity of the ‘conformist affirmations’ 
that state ideology induced, thereby maintaining their ‘system of 
control through intimidation’. Ultimately, however, emphasising 
ideology over academic standards contributed to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, since it had severed itself from ‘the sources of objective 
knowledge on which a technologically developed economy depends’.26 It 
is not insignificant that the Kyoto School were also highly critical of 
the erosion of academic freedoms and the propagation of ideology in 
Japanese historical education that were taking place in the 1930s and 
40s.27 This is one of the reasons why the Chūō Kōron discussions were 
so strongly condemned by the ultranationalist opponents of the Kyoto 
School.28  
The historian is also obliged to attempt an accurate portrayal of 
history ‘as it really was’ based on the available textual evidence.29 This 
is so irrespective of the epistemological difficulties that necessarily 
befalls such a task. Consequently, historians must limit as far as 
possible the a priori premises that they bring to their investigations. 
Nevertheless, subjective approaches to research have taught us the 
impossibility of bracketing all of one’s assumptions. This is why 
Kōsaka argued that the introduction and conclusion of any historical 
study is necessarily dependent upon a philosophy of history.30 Both the 
methodology used and the inferences drawn are ultimately based on 
premises that cannot be tested against the historical record, as in the 
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assumed causality of events for example.31 That being said, certain 
methodological approaches would seem to be more conducive to the 
purposes of historical research than others.   
Because of the different ontological foundations at stake, it is 
generally inappropriate to employ a methodology that has been 
adapted from the natural sciences to the humanities.32 Although 
positivism shares an objective ontology with empiricism, it differs 
significantly in its approach because of its dependence on the principle 
of the genera, ensuring that as ‘a school of thought [it] holds that 
science advances solely by the elaboration and testing of universal 
laws’.33 The origins of this assertion may be traced back to John Stuart 
Mill’s analysis of the positive philosophy of Auguste Comte.34 Williams 
believes that Mill ascribed to Comte’s philosophy the idea that ‘facts 
are not real facts unless they are ordered within a framework of 
scientific laws’. A belief that was reinforced by Mill’s distinction 
between what was ‘empirical’ and ‘scientific’, or what is now 
understood as the methodologies of empiricism and positivism in the 
modern academy.35 The result of which has been a wanton neglect of 
any empirical facts that fall outside the scope of positivist laws. 
Williams offers the example of the sociologist Robert Merton’s 
classic attempt to develop a testable thesis on why Catholic 
communities had a lower suicide rate to Protestant communities. 
Although the resulting study was hailed as ‘a masterpiece of 
interpretative reasoning’ for its development of a law-like statement 
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based on Durkheim’s observations regarding the greater social 
cohesion of Catholic communities, it failed to take into account the 
simple fact that for Catholics the act of suicide is a sin against the Holy 
Ghost. A similar charge may be made against the neo-liberal 
understanding of the Japanese economy. The commitment of 
positivists to economic laws ensure that many of the values that are 
held by the Japanese themselves, often in contradiction to those that 
inform Western theories on how economic-actors are meant to behave, 
are disregarded as either delusionary or irrelevant. Consequently, 
Williams insists that the ‘arrogant claims made for universalism’ by 
positivists have to be balanced with a ‘more responsive’ approach to 
‘empirical detail and … non-Western values and perspectives’.36 
The historian too needs to be responsive to values and 
perspectives that are fundamentally different from those prevalent in 
the present. This is especially true when dealing with the history of 
another culture. Although the use of methodologies that are based on 
the genera may be suitable for certain disciplines, the ‘fundamental 
method’ of history is its ‘commitment to detail, not to generalization’.37 
A failure to respect this important methodological distinction can lead 
to portrayals that are comparable to Hegel’s attempt to understand 
history through the distorting lens of his philosophical system. 
Although Hegel laid many of the foundations for the later development 
of Kōsaka’s own philosophy of history, his use of a priori principles 
resulted in a teleological understanding of the history that reduced the 
past to a ‘means’ through which the present was realised.38 
Significantly, this claim was met with severe criticism from 
professional historians such as Ranke for overstepping the bounds of 
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what is discernible from the historical record. Consequently, although 
positivists are equally sceptical of abstract metaphysical speculations, 
their commitment to generalisation through universal laws over 
empirical description may be said to lead to a similar distortion of 
history because their interpretations are based on premises that are 
derived externally to the historical record.  
Knowingly or otherwise, such an approach assumes that the 
present in which we live forms the ‘basis of reference’ for historical 
investigation. However, it is not the job of the historian to ‘stress and 
magnify the similarities between one age and another’ or to ‘hunt for 
the present in the past’. Rather, it is to elucidate ‘the unlikeness 
between the past and present’.39 If the objective methods of the 
historian’s attempt to realise this goal are recognised, in other words, if 
the significance of empirical facts is acknowledged separately from a 
framework of universal laws, it may be possible to reach a consensus 
on the suitability of an empirical approach for historical research over 
a methodology based on universalism as in the case of positivism. 
Nevertheless, although empirical studies attempt to bracket the values 
of the present in an attempt to perceive the past as it actually was, 
questions arise on the suitability of adopting such an objective stance 
to historical research when confronted by the tragic events of the 
Second World War. In turn, this has resulted in a commitment to a 
moral interpretation of history in Japan studies, especially in relation 
to the Kyoto School and their support for the war and the Co-
Prosperity Sphere. 
  
2: Critiquing Moral History  
 Of the Kyoto School’s political works, it is perhaps the three 
Chūō Kōron symposia that have received the most criticism because of 
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the participants’ support for the war, their discussions of Japan’s 
‘world-historical mission’ in Asia, and it is alleged, their deliberations 
on ‘the importance of race in a genetic rather than cultural sense’.40 
More than anything, it is their engagement with the idea of the 
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere that has perhaps attracted 
the most disdain. The ‘orthodox liberal interpretation’ of the Pacific 
War maintains that the Co-Prosperity Sphere was nothing more than a 
moral ‘sham, a mere pretext for Japanese imperialism’. The term is 
therefore always understood as having represented an ‘ideological 
pretence’ for Japanese aggression, regardless of whether used by 
members of the Tōjō junta or the Kyoto School.41 As a result, it is of 
little consequence to the ethical appraisal of the movement that the 
proposals forwarded by Nishida and Tanabe contained ‘nothing fascist 
or imperialistic’, since the very notion of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was 
fraudulent.42 Williams writes that ‘even now, a defence of the surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbour or a justification of the events that led to the 
horrors of the Burma Railway is a moral provocation’.43 Many liberal 
historians have consequently dismissed the Kyoto School’s political 
speculations as inherently flawed, while the Chūō Kōron symposia are 
widely denounced as the ‘most baneful legacy’ of the group’s many 
political ‘misadventures’.44 This prompts Williams to ask, ‘in the face of 
the transcendent claims of ethics, why spend hours reading these 
wartime writings or urge others to do the same?’45  
Influenced by Butterfield’s ‘brilliant dissection of Whig history’, 
Williams argues that the metaphysical claims of ethics are in fact 
untenable in terms of historical research because they allow the moral 
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prejudices of the liberal scholar ‘to overwhelm the historical record’.46 A 
moral interpretation of the past is a ‘form of general history’ that 
presents an abridgement of the past based on the glorification of the 
present. It thereby ascribes a ‘line of causation’ to history that 
converges ‘beautifully’ upon the dominant moral paradigm of 
contemporary society.47 In a manner similar to the distinction made by 
Kant between the principles of the species and the genera, Butterfield 
distinguishes between the approaches of the ‘historical specialist’ and 
the ‘general historian’.48 Adapting the terms of Masao Maruyama, the 
historical specialist may be described as someone who is committed to 
the ‘heterogeneity’ of historical facts and therefore employs the 
principle of the species in order to provide as detailed an account as 
possible. The general historian, in contrast, adopts the principle of the 
genera or the notion of historical ‘homogeneity’ so as to comprehend the 
past in accordance with a set of moral values presumed absolute in 
nature and universal in application.49 The abridgement of the 
historical record that is presented by the general historian who is 
committed to universal moral values is therefore comparable to the 
sweeping generalisations made by the positivist in the name of 
universal economic laws, though a moral interpretation of history 
differs from the objective approach of positivism because its framework 
of interpretation is not grounded in empirical observation. It is no 
coincidence that the influential moral philosophy of Kant regarded 
empiricism as something to be guarded against because it destroyed ‘at 
its roots the morality of dispositions’.50 Nevertheless, Williams argues 
that the assumption of historical homogeneity, whether determined by 
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universal scientific laws or absolute moral principles, is unsuitable for 
historical research because the fundamental method of history is the 
elaboration of empirical detail, not generalisation. Consequently, the 
abridgements of history presented by positivists and moral historians 
alike must be rejected because they are based upon assumptions that 
stand a priori to the historical record. This leads to the neglect of the 
cultural and historical contingencies that were of actual importance 
during the period in question. 
Butterfield believes that ‘the whig interpretation of history’, 
what Williams refers to as moral history, assumes a number of 
propositions that cannot be substantiated by the historical record. 
Firstly, it is maintained that the moral beliefs of the present, 
specifically the values of modern-day liberalism, are superior to the 
moral ideals that were held by various peoples of the past. Williams 
explains that the moralist’s condemnation of the Kyoto School is often 
based upon a simplistic and self-flattering comparison – ‘our high 
ideals against their low conduct’.51 The political philosophy of the 
Kyoto School is repeatedly subjected to moral examinations 
undertaken from the liberal perspectives of individual freedom, human 
rights, and democracy.52 Consequently, their political thought is 
inevitably judged inferior to modern liberalism whenever it fails to 
meet the moral standards of the ‘ideals we have come to hold crucial to 
civilized existence’.53 Secondly, by asserting the superiority of the 
morality of the modern period over that of the past, a notion of moral 
progress is attributed to the historical record. As a result, the Pacific 
War is judged to have been a struggle of liberal morality against the 
ultranationalist dogma of expansionist Japan. The success of the Allies 
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is in turn regarded as a moral victory for freedom over tyranny. Finally, 
the moral historian assigns roles of moral agency to historical figures, 
resulting in a black and white division of the world into ‘the friends 
and enemies of progress’.54 This leads to the ‘contention that the 
Japanese and their allies alone committed all of the sins of the Pacific 
War’, while America’s aggressive retaliation was justified because it 
helped realise the morally superior age in which we now live.55  
 For Williams, Butterfield furnishes ‘the outline of a critique that 
defeats any claim of liberal moralism to qualify as factual history’ 
because he demonstrates that the conclusions drawn by the moral 
historian are necessarily predetermined by the moral principles that 
they advocated ‘before’ initiating their study, not the evidence of the 
historical record.56 Because Japan’s war in the Pacific is judged to have 
been immoral, the Kyoto School’s support for the war must also have 
been immoral. This conceit, which Williams refers to as ‘Pacific War 
Orthodoxy’, undermines any attempt at an impartial understanding of 
the Kyoto School’s political philosophy since empirical ‘objectivity has 
nothing to do with moral judgements’. Williams offers the example of 
the pacifist historian Tetsuya Takahashi, who strongly condemns the 
address on ‘Life and Death’ that was given by Tanabe to newly drafted 
students at Kyoto University. Significantly, Takahashi argues that the 
contents of the text in question are inconsequential for the conclusions 
of his moral appraisal because ‘Tanabe was sending these young 
students off to war, and that was a crime’.57 But Takahashi ignores the 
fact that Tanabe gave the address at the request of the students 
themselves, who having received the draft from the government would 
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have been sent off to fight regardless.58 Takahashi therefore prioritises 
the moral imperatives of pacifism over the evidence of the historical 
documentation. However, this rejection of textual fidelity violates the 
academic obligation of the historian to offer an interpretation of the 
past that is faithful to the available empirical evidence. This is 
tantamount to a fabrication of the historical record. Williams therefore 
calls for the ‘deep revisionism’ of historical research on modern Japan 
to ensure that the moral prejudices of liberal ideology are prevented 
from displacing the standards of empirical research.59 For a textual 
exegesis of the political philosophy of the Kyoto School, the standard of 
such historical objectivity is to ‘generate an interpretation that would 
be recognizable and persuasive to the authors of the Japanese 
original’.60 Only then will it be possible to take their works ‘seriously as 
philosophy’.61 
 Williams’s call for historical ‘revisionism’ is highly provocative, 
however, because it assumes that the tragic events of the 1930s and 
40s are a valid topic for an impartial historical investigation. While it 
may be accepted that a moral interpretation of Martin Luther and the 
Reformation will not produce an accurate depiction of 16th century 
Europe, the very suggestion that an event such as the Holocaust was 
not an act of evil is deemed morally beyond the pale. Consequently, 
Butterfield’s assertion that the generations that follow a past ‘sin or 
calamity’ will inevitably find a way to ‘make the best of it’ no longer 
seems an appropriate proposition in the aftermath of the horrors of the 
twentieth century.62 In terms of moral orientation, Williams too admits 
that after Adolf Hitler ‘we are all universalists’.63 The difficulties faced 
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by attempting a revisionist interpretation to the Second World War are 
illustrated by the so-called ‘historian’s dispute’ that erupted in 
Germany in the mid-1980s. This centred around the debate that raged 
between Ernst Nolte and Habermas on the suitability of treating the 
Holocaust as an object of impartial historical analysis. The 
implications of this are relevant for Williams’s call for historical 
revisionism because he cites Nolte, who Harry Harootunian describes 
as someone who looks forward to the ‘day when nobody will remember 
Germany’s suicidal war’, as an important inspiration for his own 
research.64 Ben-Ami Shillony also points out the significance of Nolte’s 
influence for making sense of Williams’s controversial defence of 
Japan’s Pacific War.65 This prompts the question: is it morally 
acceptable for an empirical historian, confronted by the genocidal acts 
of Japan and her Nazi allies, to approach history in a purposefully 
scientific or impartial manner when the methods of scientific research 
are equally implicated in the horrors of the period?66 
 
3: The Morally Superior Present 
On historical research, Kōsaka explains that it is not possible for 
the historian to write a history about the present because it is a period 
that is still in the process of historical creation. It is only once an epoch 
or era has concluded and fallen away from the present, only when it 
has become the past, that it acquires historical meaning and can 
therefore be treated as a legitimate object of historical inquiry.67 An 
important dimension of Nolte’s research on European fascism was the 
premise that sufficient time had elapsed since the end of the Second 
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World War for the Holocaust to be considered a legitimate object of 
historical analysis and therefore comprehended in its proper historical 
context.68 Furthermore, Nolte argued that ‘it is an indispensable 
postulate of Wissenschaft’ – science as understood in terms of thesis 
and proof – ‘that even Hitler be made understandable in the realm of 
the possible’.69 In turn, Nolte presented an interpretation of the 
Holocaust that insisted on the necessity of its comprehension in 
relation to ‘other cases of politically motivated mass extermination in 
the 20th century’.70 In particular, he identified the genocidal behaviour 
of the Bolsheviks in Russia as the ‘main precondition’ for the Holocaust 
in Germany, going on to describe Auschwitz as a copy of the gulags.71 
In the context of the ideological debate that was taking place on 
national identity at the time, Habermas believed that Nolte’s 
interpretation of the Holocaust was an attempt to normalise German 
history in the name of objectivity or Wissenschaft by relativizing the 
crimes of the Nazis, thereby reducing the nation’s burden of moral guilt 
for its past. Habermas rejected the proposition that the events of the 
Holocaust had become a ‘past which has passed’, however, because 
‘even Germans born after the war were raised in a culture in which 
Auschwitz was possible’.72 This sentiment is shared by Mark Peacock 
who argues that a wissenschaftliche or a scientific study of the 
Holocaust is paradoxical because the tragedy was only possible 
through wissenschaftliche methods. We therefore find the Nazi’s 
behaviour so incomprehensible because their actions were a product of 
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modernity, which we are still very much a part of today.73 As a result, 
Habermas found attempts to understand the Soviet Union’s advance 
into East Germany from the perspective of the ‘brave’ German soldiers 
on the Eastern front astonishing because, in the words of Saul 
Friedlinder, it was this brave defence of Germany that ‘allowed the 
extermination process’ of the Holocaust to continue.74 Consequently, 
Habermas questioned why ‘the historian writing in 1986 [doesn’t] 
assume the perspective of that very year from which he could not 
escape were he to try?’ This he believed had the ‘hermeneutic 
advantage of relating the selective perceptions’ of the historians 
involved, as well as permitting the benefit of the moral hindsight of 
‘later generations’.75 
Even today, many would debate whether sufficient time has 
passed for the Holocaust to be treated as a valid topic of impartial 
historical investigation. This was certainly true back in the 1980s 
when many of the people directly affected by the Nazi’s atrocities were 
still alive.76 Furthermore, there are aspects of Nolte’s thesis that would 
seem to have been ideologically motivated despite his insistence on 
scientific objectivity, as exemplified in his provocative comparison of 
talk about ‘the guilt of the Germans’ in the 1980s with talk about ‘the 
guilt of Jews’ during the Nazi regime.77 Peacock also believes that 
Nolte’s decision to publish his views in a national newspaper instead of 
an academic journal raises questions on the scientific credentials of his 
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thesis.78 Although it is not unusual for German academics to publish in 
this manner, Nolte himself concedes that in the case of the articles that 
provoked the ‘historian’s dispute’ he was more of a ‘publicist than 
scholar’.79 Consequently, Habermas did not believe that he was taking 
issue with the methods of historiography per se, but rather with ‘the 
public use of history’ in society.80 This is why he readily admitted that 
his own arguments were politically charged, something he felt 
historians like Nolte had purposely concealed in the name of science.  
Problems arise because Habermas nevertheless calls for 
wissenschaftlichen pluralism in historical research.81 At the same time, 
however, he insists that the study of history is primarily an 
interpretative problem and therefore ‘always a question of our 
contemporary understanding of ourselves’.82 While it is true that all 
historical research is determined by the perceptions of the individual 
historian, which in turn are shaped by his or her respective social, 
cultural and historical contexts, Habermas mistook the moralist’s 
abridgements of the historical record, based on the assumed 
universality of present-day moral values, as a legitimate 
methodological approach for studying the past. Nolte accepts that there 
are ‘moral grounds’ for condemning the Nazi’s actions. However, if the 
Holocaust is to be acknowledged as a legitimate object of academic 
history as an empirical discipline, the moralist’s ‘claim to totality’ must 
be rejected.83 This is because a ‘permanent negative or positive image’ 
of any past event, be it the Holocaust or the Reformation, will 
inevitably take on ‘the character of a myth’.84 This in turn allows the 
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ideological values of the researcher to take precedence over the 
empirical methods of historiography, thereby undermining the 
historian’s endeavour to understand the past free from the value-
judgments of the present. Consequently, Habermas was mistaken 
when he argued that the ‘historian’s dispute’ was not an issue of 
‘scientific theory’ or ‘value-free analysis’ because the moral approach 
that he advocated was itself a rejection of historical investigation as a 
scientific endeavour. 
Moral interpretations of history inevitably turn the ‘present into 
an absolute to which all other generations are merely relative’. This 
places the modern day historian in a privileged position for dispensing 
moral judgments on past injustices.85 However, it is ‘natural but 
tautological’ for the defenders of a particular morality to believe their 
system superior to all alternatives, past or present.86 This is because 
this system is itself considered morally good, bestowing upon it an 
absolute and universal significance in the eyes of its proponents. From 
the viewpoint of the empirical historian, in contrast, the only absolute 
that is discernible in the historical record ‘is change’ itself.87 It is not 
that the moral values of the present are superior to those of the past; it 
is simply that the moral principles valued today are different now 
because times and circumstances have changed. This is even evident in 
the case of historical figures with whom the moral historian may 
closely identify. For example, the moral philosophy of Kant remains an 
important influence on modern day liberalism, while the second 
formulation of the categorical imperative continues to be used as a 
justification for human rights.88 Nevertheless, the same rational 
foundations of modern morality were used by Kant to condone 
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viewpoints that many liberals would now find reprehensible.89 For 
example, Kant used his system to justify not only the death penalty, 
but the killing of illegitimate children.90 For Hans-Georg Moeller, the 
only reason why a particular moral paradigm is ‘generally accepted in 
society is simply because it is a generally accepted paradigm’. If one 
assumes that their moral beliefs are correct, as most people tend to, 
then ‘one cannot but believe that it is more advanced’ than whatever 
system of morality preceded it.91 
Butterfield argues that by absolutizing the present the moral 
historian fails ‘to realise those things in which we too are merely 
relative’. As a result, we lose any sense of where our own ‘ideals and 
prejudices’ stand in the ‘stream of the centuries’. Furthermore, 
continual reference to the present hinders the principle goal of 
historical research, which is to try and understand the past on its own 
terms. For Butterfield, this is ‘not only an aim of the historian, but is 
an end in itself’.92 Kōsaka believed that if our knowledge of the past 
were only perceivable from the standpoint of modern-day values, then 
true historical cognition would be impossible because the meaning of 
the past is to be found in its independence from the present, not its 
subservience to it. All events in history are one-off and unique. This 
gives events from the past both an individual and universal 
significance that cannot be appreciated if only viewed through the 
distorting lens of contemporary values.93  
The political philosophy of the Kyoto School is often appraised 
from a modern liberal perspective. However, the members of the 
movement are destined to fail any moral test that is based exclusively 
on the ideological values of contemporary liberalism for the simple 
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reason that they were not modern liberals. Moreover, such appraisals 
can tell us nothing about the nature of their political beliefs or their 
reasons for supporting the idea of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. They show 
only that the political speculations of the Kyoto School have fallen 
short of the moral standards now expected by the modern liberal. 
Consequently, the empirically minded scholar is sceptical as to 
whether the standpoint of modern liberalism could ever be capable of 
accurately interpreting a society from the past, never mind a country 
that was distinctly Confucian in character, a substantially different 
moral paradigm.94 
 
4: Moral Progress and Historical Causation 
An important dimension of the moral approach of Habermas to 
the Holocaust is his insistence that a ‘critical appropriation of 
historical traditions’ is only possible if based on the concept of ‘post-
conventional identity’. He believed that there is an identifiable 
‘development of … universalistic value orientation’ in modern societies 
and he adopts aspects of Lawrence Kohlberg’s model of moral progress 
for interpreting history. Post-conventional identity is an orientation 
toward the universal principles of justice, reciprocity and the equality 
of human rights, as well as a respect for the dignity of individual 
persons. Significantly, these principles are thought to be incompatible 
with the ‘closed and second-hand, unreflective images of history’ that 
scholars like Nolte were thought to portray.95 Kohlberg presented his 
model as an empirical study of moral psychology. He believed that the 
six stages of moral development that he identified were ‘culturally 
invariant’ because morality is a ‘cognitive achievement that is 
independent from culture and culminates in an a priori and universal 
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rationality’. However, Moeller strongly questions the scientific 
credentials of Kohlberg’s thesis. Like Kant, Kohlberg claimed to have 
identified a set of universal moral principles. Yet the moral ideals of 
these two thinkers are vastly different despite their shared 
commitment to moral universalism. This is because what they 
rationalised were not absolute principles, but the moral values of their 
respective ‘time and place’. For Kant, the moral values of 18th century 
Germany, and for Kohlberg, the liberal ‘ethics of social justice 
propagated in the Western world’ during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Furthermore, despite the supposedly empirical approach that was 
employed by Kohlberg in his use of interviews, what he measured was 
in all likelihood not the respective stages of the moral development for 
his numerous test subjects, but rather their ability to engage in moral 
communication as defined by Niklas Luhmann. It is little wonder that 
adolescents were better able ‘to communicate in more complex ways 
than younger children’ in response to his moral probing.96 The adoption 
of this thesis by Habermas as a model of historical moral development 
is no less problematic. 
Because of his or her insistence on the moral superiority of the 
present, the moral historian is prone to attribute notions of moral 
progress to the historical record. Particular events or persons become 
associated with stages in the development of a moral process that 
culminates in the present, while in certain cases they are even 
perceived as direct causes for the progress that was achieved, as in the 
case of Luther and the Reformation.97 As a result, the historical record 
is understood as a narrative of humanity’s struggle to morally better 
itself through the ages. The defeat of the Axis nations in the Second 
World War was significant because it was just such a moral victory.98 
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Within this context, the Kyoto School’s call to overcome Western 
modernity is seen as having been fundamentally flawed because they 
misunderstood what was at stake morally speaking. Bernard Stevens 
believes that the Kyoto School were guilty of conflating two distinct 
definitions of modernity in their critique of the West. The first is 
ontological and based on the idea that humanity had been reduced to 
an object of abstract reason, thereby severing it from its essence or 
concrete mode of existence. The second is a political conception of 
modernity, which is conceived as the incomplete endeavour to 
emancipate humanity from all forms of socio-economic and political-
juridical oppression. Political modernity is therefore ‘linked to the 
ancient regime and to its avatars in the contemporary capitalistic 
system of profit and exploitation’. The political ‘ignorance’ of the Kyoto 
School led them to regard the ontological and the political conceptions 
of modernity as identical. Consequently, they mistakenly aimed ‘at 
overthrowing every aspect of Western modernity, including its sense of 
progress, humanism, democracy, and the rule of law’.99 Regardless of 
whether a political conception of modernity could ever be conceived 
separately from its ontological foundations, especially as the Kyoto 
School started from a very different set of such presuppositions, 
Stevens appears to present history as a narrative of moral progress 
that cannot be understood separately from modern-day liberal values. 
The proposition of moral progress presents a teleological 
understanding of history that is reminiscent of the philosophies of 
Kant and Hegel. This is because the significance of the past is reduced 
to nothing more than a ‘means’ through which the morally superior 
‘end’ of the present comes to be realised. As Kant himself concedes, 
such a notion of providence seems far-fetched in theory. Yet in terms of 
                                                   
99 Stevens, ‘Overcoming Modernity’, 233-236. 
325 
 
moral practice ‘it does possess a dogmatic validity’.100 Moeller criticises 
the very idea of moral progress, however, because such an 
interpretation of history is inevitably undertaken from the standpoint 
of whatever happens to be the dominant moral paradigm of society.101 
What is more, empirically speaking there is simply nothing in the 
historical record that can prove that any one set of moral values is 
superior to any other since ‘historical facts are entirely neutral’.102 This 
is why Kōsaka believed that it is impossible to pass moral judgment on 
past events like ethnic migration or the Crusades.103 Moral progress is 
therefore read into history by the moral historian. In turn, the 
principles that are adopted are determined by the particular moral 
paradigm to which this historian necessarily belongs. Consequently, 
these principles stand a priori to the historical record. In other words, 
the moral historian starts with a ‘world-view’ and then proceeds to 
selectively draw from a body of texts ‘in the pursuit of a blanket of 
evidence to confirm the moral opinion’ that is endorsed by this world-
view.104 Such an approach is non-empirical because the conclusions 
that are drawn are predetermined by the principles the researcher 
advocated before initiating their historical enquiry, not the evidence of 
the historical record. 
In opposition to the notion of progress, Moeller forwards an 
alternative thesis of paradigm shifts in ethics based on Kuhn’s 
understanding of scientific revolutions. Such shifts are also 
attributable to what is normally identified as a continuous moral 
tradition, as in the case of the past acceptability of slavery and 
colonialism for historical liberals. Although the basic premises of the 
liberal tradition may have been inherited from the past in terms of 
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their form, the actual content of the maxims prescribed have in many 
cases changed beyond recognition. The proponents of moral history 
may argue that this is evidence of moral progress, but it equally 
reflects the historical contingency of any particular value or belief in 
society, undermining the moralist’s assertion that it is their ideals that 
hold absolute validity for all. While Moeller concedes that it is 
‘rhetorically and logically’ inevitable that ‘a narrative of progress’ is 
attached to both the paradigmatic and progressive understandings of 
history, this does not mean we can conclude the idea of progress to be 
an ‘objective fact’. This is because, as Kuhn demonstrates in the 
natural sciences, it cannot be shown that ‘the history of succeeding 
paradigms is actually a history of progress since there is no neutral 
vantage point’ from which to measure this progress.105 What is more, 
the very notion of causality that is necessarily assumed within the 
thesis of moral progress is itself problematic for the empirical historian 
because such inferences ignore the sheer complexity of factors that are 
necessarily involved in any historical event. 
Butterfield argues that the only thing that the historian can 
positively assert in terms of historical causality is that it is the entirety 
of the past, ‘with its complexity of movement, its entanglement of 
issues, and its intricate interactions, which produced the whole of the 
complex present’. Even then, this is ‘an assumption and not a 
conclusion of historical study’.106 Discussing the concept of causality in 
the natural sciences, Russell insists that the principle of induction is 
an essential premise for assuming the possibility of knowledge about 
something that has not been directly experienced. This is typically 
done through inferences to past examples. Yet despite its necessity for 
the development of scientific laws, the induction principle can neither 
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be confirmed nor refuted by experience itself.107 In the case of historical 
research, the problem is exacerbated further by the different 
ontological foundations involved in the humanities and natural 
sciences.108 The knowledge we have of the past is wholly dependent on 
the historical documents that have survived, which are always 
incomplete. Even then, the sheer number of factors involved makes it 
impossible to identify with any certainty one specific thing as the most 
important factor for bringing about an event. Attributing causality is 
therefore a selective process on the part of the historian that inevitably 
oversimplifies the historical record. While this is also problematic for 
the empirical historian, when they generalise they seek ‘to mirror as 
closely as possible the facts of the case’. The moral historian, in 
contrast, specifically focuses only on those facts that support their case 
for moral progress. On the other hand, ‘No facts that call liberal 
orthodoxy into question are permitted’.109 This results in abridgements 
of the historical record that are ‘sometimes calculated to propagate the 
very reverse of the truth of history’.110  
Even if some notion of causality is assumed, Moeller doubts 
whether it can be said that the world has actually improved in a moral 
sense when tested against the known empirical facts. Although he 
concedes that many societies have abolished slavery and accepted some 
notion of human rights, severe social problems have often accompanied 
the heralded moral progress of civilisation. He offers the non-violent 
example of overpopulation as a result of economic development, which 
has subjected millions of people to abject poverty. Environmental 
problems also raise questions on whether the notion of negative 
freedom, so important for political organisation in liberal societies, is 
still capable of remaining a viable moral paradigm in its present form 
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if humanity is to survive into the future.111 As Stevens concedes, 
contemporary environmental issues add significant weight to the Kyoto 
School’s opposition to Western modernity, although the importance of 
their criticisms likely extends beyond a purely ontological 
understanding to also include valid questions about the political 
implications of its ontological assumptions.112  
 
5: Moral Agency in History 
One of the main issues Habermas identified with Nolte’s thesis 
was his rejection of the ‘singularity’ of the Holocaust because it was 
only one example of the many acts of genocide that were committed 
during the twentieth century.113 Consequently, Habermas believed 
that Nolte was guilty of attempting to reduce the severity of the Nazi’s 
crimes through comparisons of the Holocaust with other acts of 
brutality committed in different regimes and periods, thereby setting 
‘Auschwitz … off against Dresden’.114 As a consequence, Nolte was 
accused of belittling the significance of the Nazi’s actions in an attempt 
to ‘settle accounts’ and he subsequently became associated with 
Holocaust ‘apologists’ and ‘deniers’. In turn, the supposedly objective 
methods of his scientific approach to history were dismissed as little 
more than tactics of ‘denial, denigration, transference, and 
relativism’.115 For the moral historian, the Holocaust was an act of 
‘Absolute evil’, and by relativizing the significance of the horrors that 
took place Nolte was guilty of exonerating ‘Hitler and the Nazis from 
the responsibility of having committed the worst crimes in the history 
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of humanity’.116 His attempts to make Hitler’s treatment of the Jews 
understandable were also dismissed as entirely inappropriate, 
especially as he argued that the connection made by the Nazis between 
the Jews and Bolsheviks was comprehensible, even if mistaken. This 
led Nolte to conclude that it may have been possible that Hitler had 
pre-emptively carried out an Asiatic deed, like that of the act of 
genocide committed by the Turks against the Armenians, because he 
saw Germany as a potential victim of a similar act at the hands of the 
Judeo-Bolsheviks of the Soviet Union.117 In response to this thesis, 
Sergio Minerbi argues that the link drawn by the Nazis was in no way 
comprehensible as Nolte claimed, but entirely irrational. Furthermore, 
Nolte was guilty of shifting the blame for the Holocaust onto the Jews 
themselves by focusing on a non-existent association with the Soviet 
Union. Consequently, more important aspects of the Nazi’s ideology 
were neglected such as Hitler’s racist beliefs.118  
There is no doubt that some aspects of Nolte’s thesis are highly 
contentious. For instance, although welcoming his identification of 
Nazism as a revolutionary movement, François Furet insists that it is 
impossible to determine a direct ‘causal nexus’ between the gulags and 
Auschwitz in the manner Nolte suggested.119 Furet also questions the 
appropriateness of Nolte’s attempt to derive the Nazi’s anti-Semitism 
entirely from their anti-Marxist beliefs.120 Nevertheless, although it 
‘cannot be said that Nolte has demonstrated the truth of his thesis’, 
Ralph Raico wonders what there is in his ‘basic account’ that justified 
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the ‘frenzy’ of the ‘historian’s dispute’. For example, scholars such as 
Paul Johnson had also earlier suggested that the atrocities committed 
by Stalin had likely ‘encouraged Hitler in his wartime schemes’. 
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence to support the notion that 
European rightists after 1917 did strongly associate Bolshevism with 
Judaism. This was even true of more liberally-minded thinkers such as 
Russell, who wrote in a letter after a visit to the Soviet Union in 1920 
that he thought the country was being run by ‘Americanised 
Jews’.121 For Raico, however, Nolte’s thesis remains significant because 
of his refusal to treat the Holocaust only as a metaphysical issue. That 
is to say, as a ‘unique object of evil, existing there in a small segment of 
history, in a nearly perfect vacuum’.122 This is because viewing the 
Holocaust in complete isolation from its historical context only leads to 
the mythologizing of the Nazi’s crimes. Whatever the moral 
imperatives for such a stance, myths are not grounded in empirical fact. 
Nolte believed that historical research needed to focus on 
epochal trends as opposed to purely national factors. Consequently, 
Nazism and the Holocaust cannot be comprehended in abstraction as 
an object of evil or as a uniquely German incident because they were 
actually a part of a much broader ‘world phenomenon’ of 
totalitarianism.123 Instead of focusing specifically on single agents, 
origins and causes, Butterfield argues that the discipline of history is 
more successful when conducted as the study of a ‘process which moves 
by mediations’. These mediations may be ‘provided by anything in the 
world’, be it ‘men’s sins or misapprehensions or by what we can only 
call fortunate conjunctures’.124 Fascism emerged as a ‘broad European 
phenomenon’, of which National Socialism was only one dimension 
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despite its distinctive characteristics. What is more, fascism was itself 
part of an even broader trend of totalitarian resistance to liberalism, of 
which the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 was also a part. As a 
consequence, Nolte believed that in order to understand the events of 
the twentieth century it is essential to understand the relationship 
between fascism and communism, not only in terms of their mutual 
mistrust of liberalism and similar modes of political oppression, but 
also in terms of the extreme enmity that existed between these two 
movements.125 This is why he considered the association that was 
drawn by the Nazis between the Jews and the Bolsheviks in the 1920s 
and 30s as such an important precondition for the Holocaust.  
Nevertheless, Peacock maintains that the supposedly impartial 
analysis that is presented by Nolte is morally inappropriate, referring 
to Peter Winch’s discussions on the importance of the moral ‘unease’ 
that is felt when confronted by the horrors of the brute facts of the 
Holocaust. Significantly, this feeling cannot be ‘alleviated’ by any 
explanation that is provided by historians. Winch continues that 
although Hitler was no doubt a human being, it is vital that we are 
able to feel that his actions ‘could not lie in human nature’ and that we 
can say ‘I do not understand how people could behave in such a way’.126 
This proposition is problematic for the empirical historian, however, 
because the events of the Holocaust did in fact take place. 
Consequently, the potential to act in this manner must lie within 
human nature because the members of the Nazi party were human too. 
This is why even Hitler must be comprehensible in the ‘realm of the 
possible’. If this was not the case, the Holocaust could not have 
happened.  
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Peacock is right to bring our attention to the role that science 
and the values of modernity played in the atrocities of the Nazis. 
Nonetheless, this surely makes it even more essential to attempt to 
understand why the Holocaust occurred based on the available 
historical evidence, even if the facts that are uncovered do provoke a 
feeling of moral unease. This analysis cannot be carried out from the 
ideological standpoint of liberalism, however, because the liberal 
historian is morally obliged to be biased in their conclusions, 
undermining the standard of impartiality that is sought by history as 
an empirical discipline. Although Nolte may have exaggerated the 
significance of the link between Judaism and Bolshevism at the 
expense of other equally important factors, this does not mean that 
such a link did not contribute to the terrible events of the 1930s and 
1940s. Especially when there is evidence to suggest that the possibility 
of such a connection was indeed taken seriously by many at the time. 
Raico insists that the atrocities committed by the Nazis and the Soviets 
must be understood in the wider context of the period as a whole, 
rather than in isolation as objects of metaphysical condemnation. This 
is important because it is highly ‘unlikely that Nazi racist ideology of 
itself can account for the murder of the Jews’ – a claim that would 
appear to be vindicated by the fact that comparative studies of fascism 
and communism have become more widely accepted since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.127 This is despite the fact that the very suggestion 
of such an approach at the time of the ‘historian’s dispute’ was 
considered something ‘terrible’.128 
Butterfield explains that by viewing history in terms of moral 
progress, the moral historian is encouraged to view the past based on a 
metaphysical division of ‘mankind into good and evil’. They depict the 
past as if there had been an ‘unfolding logic in history’ that has 
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continuously worked towards the moral superiority of the modern-age. 
As a consequence, any party that appears ‘more analogous to the 
present’ is depicted as having acted for the moral enhancement of 
humanity. This is because the moral historian concentrates ‘upon [the] 
likenesses’ of their chosen protagonist at the expense of everything else, 
thereby abstracting them from their proper historical context. 
Conversely, a historical figure that is deemed too dissimilar to the 
accepted moral standards of the present is judged to have been a 
hindrance to the moral progress of history. From the standpoint of the 
empirical historian, attributing such moral agency to the perceived 
actors of history is highly questionable. This is because it is extremely 
difficult to determine from the incomplete evidence of the historical 
record the actual degree to which any of the perceived protagonists and 
antagonists of the past were personally responsible for causing the 
historical events under examination for the moral reasons suggested. 
Regardless of the apparent importance of the roles that were played by 
certain historical figures, the complexity of factors involved makes it 
impossible to discern direct causality with any certainty. Kōsaka 
maintained that an historical event only comes about as a result of the 
simultaneity of multiple focal points.129 For example, it is highly 
unlikely that the Holocaust could have taken place without Europe’s 
long history of anti-Semitism, irrespective of the strength of Hitler’s 
personal convictions. Furthermore, news of the acts of genocide that 
were committed by the Soviet Union in the 1920s, combined with fears 
of a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy, may very well have eased the Nazi’s 
introduction of increasingly extreme measures against European Jewry. 
To focus on the causal agency of one specific actor is to simultaneously 
disregard other contingencies that contributed to the realisation of an 
historical event. While it is inevitable that the historian must 
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generalise about his or her research findings, the biases of the liberal 
moralist ensure that the motivations, intentions and circumstances of 
the historical figures that they portray are distorted by the ‘optical 
illusion’ that inevitably results from always presuming the moral 
values of the present in historical research.130 
In the case of the Second World War, the Allied powers are 
thought to have been justified in their actions because the Axis nations 
represented such a serious threat to moral progress. Adopting the 
moral values of a modern liberal ideology based upon a Kantian 
conception of the ‘nature of the state and the law of war’, Japan’s 
actions during the conflict are judged to have been immoral because 
the country rejected a diplomatic solution in favour of acts of 
aggression against the peoples of East Asia and the United States.131 
According to the liberal moral paradigm of the present-day, not only 
were such wars of aggression an illegitimate means for resolving 
international disputes, but Japan’s imperialist agenda infringed the 
right to self-determination of the nations it had subjugated. The Pacific 
War is therefore understood as having been, in essence, ‘a struggle of 
democratic morality against the aggressive brutality of Japanese 
expansionism’.132 In contrast, America’s retaliation against Japan was 
fully justified because, in the words of Bret Davis, it is sometimes 
necessary for liberal nations to risk ‘breaking the principle of non-
imposition of cultural specificity’ in order to secure ‘a more binding 
principle of justice’.133 Japan’s invasion of China and its surprise attack 
on the United States had violated this principle, an assessment further 
strengthened by knowledge of the brutality of Japan and her Nazi 
allies. Importantly, these atrocities were only stopped due to the 
military intervention of the Allied powers. 
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Because Japan’s actions are regarded as having been 
fundamentally immoral, any supporter of the Japanese state or its war 
in East Asia is implicated in the nation’s moral crimes. As a result, 
Elena Lange insists that the Kyoto School’s political philosophy can 
only be properly understood in the historical context of Japanese ultra-
nationalism, as discussed in the works of Pierre Lavelle and 
Harootunian.134 This leads to interpretations of the Kyoto School that 
depict Nishida, despite his strong opposition to Japanese militarism, as 
having desired ‘world domination by Japan’ as a consequence of his 
‘embarrassing’ support for the ultranationalist propaganda of the Co-
Prosperity Sphere.135 Equally, the four participants of the Chūō Kōron 
symposia are thought to have committed a serious error in moral 
judgment in their support for the war because they ended up 
developing a ‘political discourse that effectively served to legitimate the 
Empire’, which was unethical.136 This appraisal is reinforced by the 
apparent influence of illiberal thinkers upon their political thought, 
such as Hegel and his ‘vulgar’ conception of war as a ‘means of 
spiritual affirmation’, and Heidegger who joined the Nazi party in 
1933.137 While these criticisms may be justified from the perspective of 
modern liberalism, they undermine an objective understanding of the 
Kyoto School’s political philosophy because they are based entirely on a 
one-sided denunciation of Japanese wickedness. Nolte insists that a 
historian must ‘try to find out the other side of any historical 
phenomenon that has been presented with a universal simplicity’.138 
Although moral historians assert that the Allied campaign against 
Japan was ethically justified, Parkes argues that only ‘an unregenerate 
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Western imperialist’ would reject the criticisms made by the Chūō 
Kōron participants of ‘British, Dutch and American colonial expansion 
in East Asia’.139 Notwithstanding Japan’s actions during the war, the 
so-called liberal powers of the time were also guilty of frequently 
transgressing the right to self-determination of the peoples they had 
subjugated. This is why thinkers such as Kōsaka also criticised the 
expansionist policies of the Japanese Army through comparisons with 
the imperialist methods employed by the Western colonial powers.140 
The problem of presenting a one-sided interpretation of the 
Kyoto School based entirely upon a liberal moral interpretation of 
history is exemplified by Lavelle’s influential paper on the political 
thought of Nishida. Although alluding to the inherent biases of a 
liberal perspective for understanding wartime Japan, Lavelle strongly 
associates Nishida with ultranationalist ideology because he expressed 
ideas that would normally ‘be identified with the extreme right in any 
liberal democracy’.141 For example, Lavelle believes that Nishida’s use 
of the expression ‘Japanese mind’ or ‘Japanese spirit’ in a letter sent to 
a committee on educational reform was indicative of his extremist 
beliefs.142 Such an assertion is contentious, however, because the Kyoto 
School’s understanding of national spirit was greatly influenced by 
Hegel’s notion of objective spirit and not the values of ultranationalist 
ideology. Although the political philosophy of Hegel is also criticised by 
liberals for having ‘absolutized the Prussian state’, the very fact that 
the Kyoto School championed the political ideas of a European 
philosopher over traditional Japanese values immediately sets them 
apart from the ‘traditional Japanese exceptionalism’ of their 
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ultranationalists opponents.143 Furthermore, Michiko Yusa insists that 
Lavelle has actually quoted Nishida out of context, pointing out that in 
all likelihood he was simply summarising the purpose of the committee 
in question as previously determined by the then Minister of Education 
Genji Matsuda. Significantly, Nishida went on in the same letter to 
argue for the need of objectivity when researching Japanese history 
and culture, an explicit rejection of the prominence of ultranationalist 
ideology in education, as well as insisting on the importance of 
maintaining academic freedoms to ensure this would be possible. 
Ultimately, these proposals were rejected in favour of an education 
policy that was ‘based on traditional Japanese content and method’.144 
In Lavelle’s portrayal, the significance of Nishida’s opposition to state 
ideology is greatly diminished because he employs an all-encompassing 
definition of ultra-nationalism based purely upon a liberal conception 
of political normality.  
For Lavelle, almost everyone who published on the Japanese 
polity during the 1930s and 40s was implicated to some extent in the 
nation’s extremism, regardless of the diversity of ideas that were 
actually expressed. This includes people like the Kyoto School thinker 
Kiyoshi Miki, who Lavelle describes as a fascist opinion maker despite 
the fact that he died in prison after being incarcerated for harbouring 
an escaped communist.145 Considering the influence of Marxism on 
Miki’s philosophy, Parkes rightly points out that the ‘insinuation of a 
penchant for fascism will come as a surprise’ to many.146 In the 
beginning of his article, Lavelle states that ‘anyone involved in politics 
was obliged to position himself in relation to official doctrine’.147 While 
this may be true, he does not go into any detail about the issue of state 
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censorship, nor does he mention the increasing severity of punishments 
for violations. Admittedly, these may not be central issues for the 
purpose of his study, but when dealing with a society that increasingly 
restricted freedom of expression in the public forum one must treat 
with caution Lavelle’s assertion that it is only ‘Nishida's expressions of 
public involvement and not his private conversations and 
correspondence that are significant’.148 This issue is further 
complicated by the fact that the Kyoto School were actively involved in 
a ‘tug-of-war’ over the meaning of many of the phrases that are now 
associated with ultra-nationalism, as exemplified by the careful 
deliberations on terminology by the participants in the secret meetings 
held with the Navy.149 This also included the term ‘Japanese spirit’, on 
the use of which Nishida himself was often highly critical because of its 
implications for the uniqueness of the Japanese nation in 
ultranationalist propaganda.150  
A moral critique of wartime Japan is deemed necessary from a 
liberal ideological perspective not simply because of the country’s 
questionable behaviour during the conflict, but because any political 
system that diverges from the liberal conception of normality is by 
default unethical and therefore deserving of moral censure. However, 
this hinders any attempt at attaining an objective understanding of the 
actual domestic political situation of wartime Japan. Regardless of our 
personal beliefs concerning the immorality of the Japanese during the 
war, the historical evidence suggests that at ‘every point that Imperial 
Japan was a successful society, it was a rational society’. This included 
a legal system for which ‘judicial reason exercised substantial 
sovereignty’ and an economy that was ‘modernising and rationalising 
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in a way that Max Weber would have respected’.151 Furthermore, 
Japan remained a deeply Confucian culture, despite the impact of the 
Western notion of reason on its social systems, and the early Shōwa 
period experienced numerous factional divisions that were ‘governed by 
the logic and conventions’ of this tradition. The Chūō Kōron 
symposiasts were also embroiled in these Confucian influenced 
political struggles as a consequence of their alliance with the Yonai 
Peace Faction of the Imperial Japanese Navy in opposition to the Tōjō 
junta. Subsequently, although they expressed positive opinions about 
the historical significance of Japan’s war with the West and the Co-
Prosperity Sphere in East Asia, the methods and objectives that they 
advocated were often diametrically opposed to the aggressive 
imperialist policies of the Tōjō government. This is of little consequence 
to the liberal historian, however, because their sweeping 
generalisations of the historical record ensure that anyone who 
supported the war, the Japanese state or the Co-Prosperity Sphere is 
immediately dismissed as a political extremist. If we are to 
comprehend the Kyoto School’s political philosophy in its proper 
historical and cultural context, Confucianism will also have to be 
recognised as a ‘respectable form of ethics’ since it was this tradition, 
not liberalism, that determined the nature of their political 
deliberations and resistance to Tōjō.152 This cannot be done if it is a 
liberal conception of ultra-nationalism, with all its moral implications, 
that constitutes the only interpretative framework via which an 
historical analysis of their works is permitted.  
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